Palestine in Transformation

1856-1882



Studies in
Social, Economic
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Development

Alexander Schölch

Institute for Palestine Studies

Palestine in Transformation, 1856–1882
Studies in Social Economic and Political Development
Alexander Schölch

Available in English for the first time in its entirety, this seminal work by the late German historian is indispensable for understanding the history of Palestine in the decades following the introduction of the Ottoman *Tanzimat* (reforms). Based on archival and consular materials, the studies show the extent to which the processes of modernization and integration into the world economic system had already begun in the crucial period before the first wave of Jewish immigration.

The work examines nineteenth-century European interests in the "Holy Land" and how competing interests led to the economic penetration of the southern and eastern periphery of the Mediterranean, and to the presence of British, French, Prussian, and Russian consuls in Palestine. In light of European penetration, the economic development of Palestine is discussed, focusing both on agrarian and industrial advances.

The author goes on to describe the rivalries among the various local lords during the mid-nineteenth century and the eventual integration of these local leaderships into the administrative structures of the *Tanzimat*. The text is enhanced and clarified by fifty-one tables and eight maps.

Through its close examination of social, economic, and political developments in Palestine during the late Ottoman period, *Palestine in Transformation, 1856–1882* provides an important background to the roots of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict essential for students and scholars of the Middle East.

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Palestine in Transformation 1856–1882

Studies in Social, Economic and Political Development

Alexander Schölch

Translated by
William C. Young Michael C. Gerrity

Institute for Palestine Studies
Washington, D.C.

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For
Rudolf von Albertini
Albert Hourani
Fritz Steppat

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Generous assistance by the Volkswagen Fund, whose colleagues deserve my lasting thanks, made it possible to carry out the research. Finally, I would also like to thank my colleagues in the various libraries and archives in Berlin, Bonn, Essen, Vienna, Oxford, London, Paris, Marseilles, Istanbul, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, and Jerusalem, who helped me while I collected this material.

On various occasions during the past few years I have presented for discussion the partial results of my research. The articles that have been published are listed in the Bibliography. They went into the present work in shortened, expanded, or reworked form.

Autumn 1983 A. Schölch

List of Abbreviations

AA = Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn [Archives of the German Foreign Office, Bonn]
AAS = *Asian and African Studies*
HHSTA = Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien [Austrian State Archives, Vienna]
HL = *Das Heilige Land* [The Holy Land]
IJMES = *International Journal of Middle East Studies*
ISA = Israel State Archives, Jerusalem
JPOS = *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society*
JPS = *Journal of Palestine Studies*
MAE = Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Paris]
MES = *Middle Eastern Studies*
NNM = *Neueste Nachrichten aus dem Morgenlande* [Recent News from the Orient]
ÖMO = *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient* [Austrian Monthly Magazine for the Orient]
PEF = Palestine Exploration Fund
PEFQS = *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement*
PP = Parliamentary Papers
PRO = Public Record Office, London
SWP = *The Survey of Western Palestine*
TS = *La Terre Sainte* [The Holy Land]
WI = *Die Welt des Islams* [The World of Islam]
ZDMG = *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* [Review of the German Oriental Society]
ZDPV = *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* [Review of the German Palestine Association]

(See also Bibliography)

Weights, Measures, Monetary Units

aqcha (akçe): Ottoman silver coin; introduced in 1327 but rapidly devaluated; smallest monetary unit.

bishtlik (beslik): Ottoman silver coin containing a large proportion of alloy; introduced in 1810 (the "new *bishtlik*" in 1829); equivalent to 5 *piasters*.

dunum: 919 square meters; approximately 1/4 of an acre.

kile*: 36 liters.

mejidiyya: Ottoman silver coin; worth less than 19 *piasters*.

oqqa (uqqa)*: 1.28 kilograms.

piaster (European term for **kurus**): Ottoman silver coin, introduced aroun 1688.

quintal (quintar/qantar/cantar): 100 *ratl*; approximately 256 to 288 kilograms.

ratl*: 2.88 kilograms.

saah (sa′): 1.14 to 2.84 liters.

tumniyya*: 2.25 liters.

Turkish pound: Ottoman bimetallic (gold/silver) coin, introduced in 1844; equivalent to 100 *piasters*.

uqia (Jerusalem): 208.3 grams.

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* For these units, see Bauer, *Das palästinische Arabisch* (Leipzig, 1926, 4th edition), p. 256. For all other units, see Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800–1914* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press [Midway reprint], 1975), pp. 520–24.

Introduction

Before we pose the question that forms the basis of this study, we must ask ourselves: To what extent do the years 1856–82 represent a period in the history of Palestine that can meaningfully be taken as the subject of such a work? Furthermore, why should this particular phase be studied?

The Middle East's nineteenth-century encounter with a Europe that was industrializing and expanding, economically as well as militarily, and the reaction to the challenges posed by this encounter, passed through clearly recognizable phases. The reaction took the guise of reforms *(tanzimat)*; these constituted a socio-political process of transformation, inaugurated from Constantinople and continuing in part under external pressure. Distinct phases can be observed in both the Ottoman Empire as a whole and in its Arab provinces or geographical regions. Yet specific conditions in each one of these areas, for instance in Mount Lebanon or in Egypt, led to certain local particularities as these phases unfolded.[1] This holds for Palestine also. One problem—that there was no administrative entity with this name [Palestine] during Ottoman times—and the related question—is it legitimate to study the economic and socio-political development of an area during a particular phase in the nineteenth century even though the area was not politically and administratively defined by international boundaries until the twentieth century?—will be examined in the first chapter of this work.

The following events and dates in the history of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century can be identified as closing points for particular phases in development and as beginning points for others:[2]

---

[1] See my periodization of Egyptian history in the nineteenth century: "Die europäische Expansion und die Transformation Ägyptens" [European Expansion and the Transformation of Egypt].

- The Napoleonic invasion of Egypt (1798) and Syria (1799) and its consequences, which are here not understood as the beginning of the "modern age" in the Middle East, but rather as only a stage in the "Eastern question" and as an event that became a catalyst for a political and economic reordering of Egypt;
- The settling of the "Eastern crises" of the 1830s, which Muhammad 'Ali, ruler of Egypt, triggered by occupying Syria and Cilicia (1831–40). The settlement was achieved by the treaties of London of 1840 and 1841 and, at the internal affairs level, by the reform edict of 1839 *(Khatt-i Sherif)*, which brought about the first *tanzimat* period (1839–56);
- The ending of the Crimean War (1853–56) with the Treaty of Paris (1856) and, at the internal affairs level, the reform edict of 1856 *(Khatt-i Humayun)*, which inaugurated the second *tanzimat* period (1856–76);
- The Ottoman bankruptcy (1875) and the setting up of an international debt administration (1881); the renewed military culmination of the "Eastern question" in the Russian–Turkish war of 1877–78 and the attempt at a "solution" by the Berlin Congress (1878); the occupation of Cyprus (1878) and Egypt (1882) by England and that of Tunisia (1881) by France and, at the internal affairs level, the brief success and quick defeat of the constitutional endeavors (1876–78);
- The Young Turk revolution of 1908 and, in its wake, an increasingly vocal Arab nationalism.

The development of Palestine was directly determined by these surrounding conditions and moved forward in fairly close accord with the same stages.

Whereas the Napoleonic campaign (1799) was an ephemeral event for Palestine that left behind almost no traces, the period of Egyptian rule (1831–40) represented a new phase which, because of its short duration, was significant primarily through the secondary developments that it brought about: the opening of land to European penetration at the end of the 1830s and the competing Ottoman reform policy after the reconquest of Palestine. The first *tanzimat* period (1839–56) also represented a new historical stage for Palestine, beginning in 1840; it was followed by the stage that we want to study here.

The years 1856–82 can be seen as a period in Palestinian history that can be given definite boundaries, with regard both to the international and regional conditions and from the perspective of specific local developments as well. With the end of the Crimean War and the signing of the Treaty of Paris, a qualitatively new stage in the economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire began, especially in the form of capital investments and political tutelage by the European powers.[3] In Egypt, Sa'id Pasha (1854–63) opened the gates of the country to the Europeans, which among other things made it possible to begin the year 1859 with the construction of the Suez Canal. In Lebanon, French troops landed after the "unrest" of 1860; in 1861 the "directly governed" administrative entity of Mount Lebanon, established as a quasi-protectorate under the Europeans, was created. In Palestine especially, European political and religious-cultural penetration, begun at the end of the 1830s, accelerated after 1856. At the same time the Ottoman reform policy acquired a new quality. Ottoman policy in Palestine during the first *tanzimat* period, up until the Crimean War, had resulted in no fundamental transformation of the socio-political structures. Now it was more energetic and effective. The goal was unencumbered administrative control and financial and military enhancement of the country.

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[2] See Hurewitz, I; Anderson, *The Eastern Question*; Karal; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, II.

These developments in Palestine naturally continued after 1882 as well. However, just like the events of the mid-1850s, those of the second half of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s represent clear milestones for the Ottoman Empire in general and Palestine in particular. The great European powers, who had set out to divide the world among themselves, also became more aggressive in the vicinity of Palestine (the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Egypt in 1882). Six years after the bankruptcy, the Ottoman Empire acquired a competing financial administration, the *Administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane,* that was controlled by Europeans. The hopes of "liberal" *tanzimat* politicians were dashed in 1878 when the short-lived parliament was dissolved. Political ferment in Egypt and a certain clamor in Syria were diagnosed by a worried Constantinople as manifestations of an Arab nationalism that would have to be checked by whatever counterstrategies proved necessary.

With the onset of the first wave of Jewish immigration, which would later be called the first *'aliya,* an entirely specific development was put in motion in Palestine which resulted in a new extreme challenge. However, because it was not yet possible to assess its significance, the year 1882 hardly appeared to the population of the country to be a dividing line between epochs. In fact, the British occupation of Egypt and the beginning of Jewish settlement in Palestine were the starting points for two lines of development—British imperialism on the one hand and Zionism on the other—which gravitated toward each other and finally converged during World War I. This convergence led to British rule over Palestine and to the establishment of a Jewish national home under British protection. Naturally, at the time these were not inevitable, irreversible historical developments. Yet, in light of the subsequent history of Palestine, the events of 1882, shaped by English and Jewish-Zionist aspirations, marked a decisive turning point.

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[3] See my article, "Wirtschaftliche Durchdringung und politische Kontrolle durch die europäischen Mächte im Osmanischen Reich" [Economic Penetration and Political Control by the European Powers in the Ottoman Empire].

The years 1856–82 can thus be seen as a specific period in the development of Palestine, a phase in the socio-economic and political-administrative transformation. For all that, the period has not until now been made the subject of a historical study. On the one hand, we have studies of the periods of Egyptian rule and the first *tanzimat* period in Syria (which included Palestine).[4] On the other, there is a series of studies of the history of Palestine from 1882 up to World War I which, however, mostly address the question of the effect of pre-Zionist and Zionist activities.[5] Between these two sets of studies is a gap. The studies by ʻAwad of the development of the *mutasarrifliq* of Jerusalem from 1874 to 1914 (see the Bibliography) fill this gap only partially, whether from a geographical, chronological, or thematic point of view.

That this gap has begun to close is documented, however, by the contributions presented at the international conference of 1979 in Haifa, the theme of which was "The Legacy of the Ottoman Period in Palestine," as well as those contributions offered in 1980 in Amman at the Third International Conference on the History of Bilad al-Sham, which was dedicated entirely to the history of Palestine. The resulting studies also should contribute to the closing of this gap; their primary subject is the economic and socio-political transformation during the second *tanzimat* period.

The underlying question, then, of this study is: What were the effects of the two-sided pressure of European penetration and Ottoman centralization policy? As for the analysis of Ottoman politics itself, no contribution was possible: Despite patient and diverse efforts, I was denied without any explanation permission to work in the Turkish archives in Istanbul and Ankara. As a result of the regrettable attitude of the Turkish authorities, the details of politics in Constantinople cannot be debated in what follows. Nevertheless, one can in this regard build on the solid foundation embodied in the books by Davison and Devereux (see the Bibliography). The present study concerns only the consequences of Ottoman politics for Palestine itself, insofar as these can be reconstructed using European and local Arabic sources and literature and published Ottoman materials. As for the European consular reports, I have completely taken to heart Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbak's historiographical advisory; as he titled one article, *"Ayyuha al-dakatira, ihdaru taqarir al-qanasil!"* (O Professors, get the consular reports!)[6]

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[4] See Abir; Hofman; Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*.

[5] For example, Mandel; see also, however, Buheiry; Badran, "Al-rif al-filastini"; Musa, "Nushu' wa-tatawwur"; Rafiq, *Ghazza*; Ramini; Sulayman, "Milkiyyat al-ard." In contrast, the *Sozialgeschichte Palästinas* [Social History of Palestine] by Irabi offers only a few impressions of the time before the British Mandate that are riddled with grave factual errors and are embedded in a questionable and confusing conceptual and terminological framework.

The work is divided into three parts. In the first part a general overview of the administrative structure and demographic development is given. In the second part European penetration and its economic effects are studied. The subject of the third part is socio-political transformation.

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[6] *Al-Tariq*, April 1980.

PART I:
Land and Population

1 Palestine as an Historical-Geographical and Administrative Entity

"There is only one Palestine, and everyone knows where it is. So one might think that an exact statement of the location and borders of this area would be superfluous. But it is not . . . . A more precise definition of what we mean by Palestine here cannot be avoided. Because the demarcation of this concept is by no means everywhere the same."[7] Schwöbel's exercise, which he formulated in 1914, occurs to me here, also. But it is neither my intention nor is it necessary to once again present an historically developed abstraction of the concept "Palestine" as a name for an historical-geographical or political-administrative entity.[8] My concern can only be to ascertain the extent to which it is at all meaningful to write a history of Palestine during a certain phase in the nineteenth century, when there was no administrative unit with this name and when this area's "borders"—in other words, the area's historical-geographical identity—were contested.

It is obvious that, when we speak of Palestine today, the British Mandate zone within the boundaries of 1923–48 appears before our eyes—this flint axe between Egypt (on the African side) and Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon (on the Asiatic side). Hence it is understandable that we tend to think of this territory when we deal with the history of Ottoman Palestine prior to World War I. It is perfectly legitimate to study the development of an ensemble of historical-geographical and administrative regions that later became a political unit, just *because* they grew together—or were fused together—to make such an entity. To that extent, a history of the area that later became the Palestine Mandate zone needs no justification. But we have had to set aside the name "Palestine" when discussing the nineteenth century, at least until we can substantiate the assertion that it is legitimate and meaningful to refer to this territory (except for the southern portion of the Negev) as "Palestine" during that period. And indeed, when the borders of the Mandate zone were drawn, they were not the arbitrary, artificial, drawing-board product of the colonial powers. Rather, "Palestine" had slowly taken shape in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the consciousness of both its inhabitants and its central government.

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[7] Schwöbel, *Die Landesnatur Palästinas,* I, p. 5.

[8] See in this connection the article "Filastin" in *EI*^{2}, II, pp. 910–14 and the article "al-Urdunn" in *EI,* IV, pp. 1115f.; Lewis, "Palestine"; Aronsfeld (under the perspective of what the "Land of Israel" was and is).

Practically all of the Europeans—and in particular the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Zionists—thought in terms of biblical history when they attempted to determine the borders of the "Holy Land," alias Palestine. By doing so they may have perhaps sounded a familiar note for the Arab Christians of the country, but for the Muslim majority and the Ottoman administration the biblical borders meant very little. Nevertheless, in the context of the general penetration of the country and the political tutelage of the Ottoman Empire, these European images were certainly a force that had its effect.

The most general and widespread image in this respect was that of a country that extended "from Dan" in the north "to Beersheba" in the south,[9] and from the Mediterranean in the west to the Syrian desert in the east, that is, to where the desert circumscribed a strip of settled land on the other side of the Jordan. This image underlay the activities of the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF), for example, from the end of the 1860s until the beginning of the 1890s.[10] It also found its way into local publications by means of the PEF's papers and books. Thus in 1878 a report was made about the works of the PEF in the Egyptian journal *al-Muqtataf* under the title "*Kharitat Filastin*" (The Map of Palestine). The report described how the PEF mapped out the country "*min Dan ila Bir Sab'*" (from Dan to Beersheba) and from the Jordan to the Mediterranean.[11] The Lebanese historian Yanni wrote, as well, in 1881, that Nablus was the most beautiful city "*fi Filastin min Dan ila Bir Sab'*" (in Palestine, from Dan to Beersheba).[12]

The full political effectiveness of this concept became apparent after World War I, when, at the conclusion of the peace conference at Versailles in 1919, the possible borders of a British-Zionist Palestine were discussed. Lloyd George telegraphed London to ask that a copy of George Adam

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[9] For this formula, see Boehmer.

[10] For the activities of the PEF, see Qasimiya, "Nashatat sunduq istikshaf Filastin" [The Activities of the PEF], in addition to the PEF's own reports.

[11] *Al-Muqtataf*, III (1878), p. 154.

[12] Yanni, p. 521; see also Matar, pp. 150–52; *Hasr al-Litham*, p. 4; Tautah and Khuri, p. 2.

Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*[13] and its accompanying atlas be shipped across the Channel to help him see exactly what borders the formula "from Dan to Beersheba" actually entailed. Berthelot, the general secretary of the French foreign ministry who at Lloyd George's request also studied Smith's work, even used the formula and the interpretations of it later to ward off even more far-reaching Zionist claims, especially claims to the south of Lebanon (where the border followed the Litani River).[14]

But the debates over where exactly the northern borders of ancient Palestine lay[15] do not at all interest us here. All that matters is to establish what images of regional division and community that the local population and the Ottoman authorities developed in the second half of the nineteenth century, images which in this sense can be regarded as the "borders of Palestine."

The western border, the Mediterranean, represented no problem at a time when there were still no conflicts over coastal zones. As for the eastern border, a few Europeans held that the "Holy Land" ended at the Jordan, however for most, a more or less broad strip of land east of the Jordan belonged to Palestine. The PEF's *Survey of Western Palestine (SWP)*, especially, popularized the definition that contended that the Jordan divided the country into western and eastern Palestine.

For the Arab population and the Ottoman administration this was no problem, even in principle. The land east of the Jordan was economically, sociopolitically, and administratively oriented in part to the west (Jerusalem, Nablus, Nazareth, Haifa, Acre) and in part to the north (Damascus). For the Ottomans, the administration-related association was purely a practical matter. Their primary interest in the land east of the Jordan was to safeguard the pilgrimage route from Damascus to Mecca (see map 5). From the middle of the nineteenth century they began to penetrate the land east of the Jordan administratively, proceeding from north to south. This involved the formation of administrative districts within the framework of their general provincial organization.[16] The southern portion of the land east of the Jordan, as part of the *sanjaq* of the Balqa', was temporarily subordinate to Nablus "in the first instance" (see map 2). The security of the pilgrimage route had always been counted among the foremost duties of the governor of Damascus. For this reason direct administrative control of this area was also truly imperative. One such definitive regulation was made in 1887. The land east of the Jordan was reoriented toward Damascus, becoming a southern part of the province of Syria. The area between Jordan and the Mediterranean was henceforth divided into two parts: the south, which as the "independent" *sanjaq* of Jerusalem had already been directly subordinate to the Porte since 1874; and the north, which from 1887 on belonged to the province of Beirut. It was in this administrative sense that the Jordan now formed the "eastern border" of Palestine (see map 3). We will inquire about the extent to which the area west of the Jordan was regarded as a unit, at least potentially, when we discuss the "northern border."

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[13] London 1894; I am using a reprint of the 25th edition of 1931, New York, 1966.

[14] See Ingrams, pp. 75–77; Frischwasser-Ra'anan, Chapter V.

[15] See for example Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 175f., 195f., and 238; Avi-Yonah; MacKay.

[16] See Kazziha, pp. 8f.

Because Egypt was a component part of the Ottoman Empire, an exact fixing of the borders to the south and southwest was not viewed as a pressing task. But this problem became acute after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and later, in 1892 and 1906, when Lord Cromer, the *de facto* ruler of Egypt, was faced with concrete inducements to clarify the situation[17] and made efforts to do so. In the time period that interests us, two facts were uncontestable: Gaza was governed from Jerusalem and al-'Arish was governed from Cairo. Halfway between these two cities two ancient granite pillars rose heavenward: *'Umud Rafah.* What could have been more apt than to see in these pillars the border marker between Egypt and Syria/Palestine, at the point on the Mediterranean coast where Africa and Asia come together?[18] In the interior of the country, south of Jabal al-Khalil, Palestine disappeared into the Negev; in other words, the *sanjaq* of Jerusalem ended there, where the arm of the governor lost its effectiveness. So Beersheba is a realistic border point in practical terms. The Negev and the Sinai belonged to the Bedouin, who may have recognized the sultan in Constantinople as the *amir al-mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful) but who paid little heed to Egyptian and Ottoman governors. Their life and their battles followed other laws.[19] Egypt, however, had an interest in controlling the Sinai since the Egyptian pilgrimage route led from Suez to Mecca by way of al-Nakhl and al-'Aqaba (see map 5).[20]

As we have already said, we want to address the question of the "northern border" of Palestine in connection with the question of the extent to which this region was regarded as a coherent unit. Toward this end, let us first go back to the year 1830. On the eve of the Egyptian occupation of Syria, the Porte unified the entire region of Palestine—that is, the *sanjaqs* of Jerusalem, Nablus, and Acre—under the governor of Acre. The obvious purpose was to strengthen the military and political front to block the ambitions of Muhammad 'Ali.[21] This notion of an amalgamation of the Palestinian *sanjaqs* surfaced once again a decade later. In a separate act of the London convention of 17 September 1840, the sultan proposed to Muhammad 'Ali that he be named governor of Acre for life. He would be entrusted with the administration of southern Syria, provided that he accepted the conditions of the treaty within ten days. The demarcation of the region that Muhammad 'Ali would have administered for the sultan for as long as he lived is what interests us here:

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[17] See in this regard Frischwasser-Ra'anan, chapter two; Khalidi, *British Policy*, chapters one and two; Lewis, "Palestine," pp. 8–11; Qasimiya, "Qadiyyat al-hudud" [The Question of the Borders].

[18] See for instance *Die Karawanen-Strasse von Aegypten nach Syrien*, p. 70; Sepp, II, p. 531.

[19] See Shuqayr, pp. 112–29 and 570–87; al-'Arif, *Kitab al-qada'*; al-'Arif, *Tarikh Bir al-Sab'*; Bailey.

[20] See Eckenstein, p. 185.

> The limits . . . shall be determined by the following line of demarkation:
>
> This line, beginning at Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the coast of the Mediterranean, shall extend direct from thence as far as the mouth of the river Seisaban, at the northern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias; it shall pass along the western shore of that Lake, it shall follow the right bank of the river Jordan, and the Western shore of the Dead Sea; from thence it shall extend straight to the Red Sea, which it shall strike at the northern point of the Gulf of Akaba, and from thence it shall follow the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba, and the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez.[22]

As governor of Acre, then, Muhammad 'Ali would have administered Palestine up to Ra's al-Naqura in the north and up to the Jordan and the Dead Sea in the east, in addition to the Negev and the Sinai. But this drawing of boundaries was not realized under the governance of Muhammad 'Ali—or that of any other Ottoman governor, for that matter.

It was significant for further development that Jerusalem acquired a special position as the administrative center of southern Palestine after the Porte's reconquest of Syria. There were repeated experiments, under the supervision of the governor of Jerusalem, for expanding the region during the 1840s and 1850s. At times Jerusalem was even placed directly under the Porte for short periods (1841 and 1854).[23]

Three decades later the 1830 and 1840 plans for an amalgamation of the Palestinian *sanjaqs* were taken up once again. In July of 1872 the European consuls announced with great satisfaction that the *sanjaqs* of Jerusalem, Nablus (Balqa'), and Acre had been united to form the province of Jerusalem or, as they expressed it, the province of Palestine. In the middle of the month Thurayya Pasha, who had been until then the governor-general in Aleppo, assumed his official functions as the governor of the new province in Jerusalem. According to the testimony of the Austrian representative, this new administrative order fulfilled one of the dearest wishes of the country's population. His German colleague reported that the end of Palestine's dependency on the governor-general in Damascus was greeted with jubilation. A big impediment to the development of the country had now been removed, they said; great hopes for Jerusalem and for the entire country were raised by this measure.

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[21] See Abu Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem," p. 23.

[22] Hurewitz, I, p. 117.

[23] See Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, p. 33; Abu Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem," p. 23; Sabri, pp. 1f.

One can hardly tell to what extent these consular opinions actually reflected the views of the Arab population. At any rate, the Europeans in the country enthusiastically applauded. They were all the more disappointed when a telegram arrived from Constantinople, on 23 July 1872, that canceled the measure and dissolved the province of Jerusalem. The consuls protested vehemently. They came up with the most diverse conjectures about the reasons for this move, repeating the rumors about the cancellation that were in circulation. On 22 August 1872 the German legation in Constantinople told the consulate in Jerusalem how the affair had been played out in Constantinople. The former grand vizier, Mahmud Nadim Pasha, had called for the formation of the province of Jerusalem because in his opinion the existing provinces were too large for an orderly administration. He was said to have canceled this measure, however, when he was supposedly alerted to the dangers to the Ottoman government that could arise from bringing all the "holy places" together in a single province. The new grand vizier, Midhat Pasha, was of the same mind and so was said to have ordered the *mutasarrifliq* of Jerusalem placed under the control of Damascus as soon as he had assumed office.[24]

The significance of this affair for our study is that the Porte actually considered making a province out of Palestine and a small region in the southern part of lands lying east of the Jordan. As in 1840, the northern border would thus be the line from Ra's al-Naqura to "Dan," that is, the northern boundary of the *sanjaq* of Acre, not the Litani River (see map 2). Until the end of the Ottoman Empire this line remained the border between the *sanjaq*s of Acre and Beirut and in consequence became the northern border of Mandate Palestine.

So it was exactly the same consideration that led the Europeans to welcome the creation of a "province of Palestine" —namely, that it would include both the Christian and Jewish "holy places," especially Safad, Tiberias, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron—that induced the Porte to retract the measure it had taken. The Europeans would certainly have preferred to deal with only one governor under the direct supervision of Constantinople. The Porte, on the contrary, was trying by administrative means to make the European penetration of the "Holy Land" more complicated.[25] Later we shall see that they had similar thoughts concerning the infrastructural opening of Palestine and so exercised restraint when it came to granting concessions.

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[24] For a discussion of these events, see ISA–DKJ, A. XXI 1.1 (Jerusalem, 19, 24, and 27 July 1872; Buyukdere, 22 August 1872); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2242 (Jerusalem, 27 July 1872); HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 54 (Jerusalem, 17, 24, and 27 July 1872). On the policy of Mahmud Nadim, see also Davison, pp. 167–69; on the dismissal of Nadim and the appointment of Midhat, see ibid., p. 287.

[25] In the years 1906 to 1909 the distant subdistrict (*qada'*) of Nazareth was temporarily made a part of the *mutasarrifliq* of Jerusalem, so that the Europeans dealing

A direct line of communication with Jerusalem was, nevertheless, beneficial for Ottoman control. Toward this end, in 1874 the *sanjaq* of Jerusalem was put directly under Constantinople[26] and remained "directly governed" until the British occupation of Palestine in 1917. A telegraph link with Jerusalem was established in June 1865 and one with Jaffa as early as August 1864 (see map 8).[27]

On the one hand, the Porte made an effort on a number of occasions after 1830 to unify Palestine administratively and to govern without the intermediary direction of the governors in Beirut and Damascus. On the other hand, they hesitated, so as not to encourage European penetration. The direct subordination of Jerusalem to Constantinople was, as it were, a compromise. Abu Manneh champions the thesis that an important reason for this policy of administrative strengthening was that the Porte wanted to create a counterweight, a kind of buffer province, out of Palestine (that is, the "directly governed" *sanjaq* of Jerusalem) to counteract Egyptian ambitions and influence in Syria.[28] Be that as it may, the administrative experiments and facts mentioned here, especially the elevated position of the *sanjaq* of Jerusalem (which lasted for almost half a century), doubtless contributed to the emergence of the concept of Palestine as an administrative entity.[29]

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on behalf of Christian pilgrims would only have to apply to a single governor! See 'Awad, "Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani," p. 130.

[26] Hartmann, "Die Ortschaftenliste des Liwa Jerusalem" [The Inhabited Localities List of the *Liwa'* of Jerusalem], p. 102; 'Awad, *Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds* (dissertation), pp. 24f.

[27] Regarding the Palestinian telegraph system, which was also of major significance for trade, see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1834 (Jaffa, 6 September 1864) and vol. 1875 (Jerusalem, 22 June 1865); *HL* VIII (1864), p. 129; Wolff, *Sieben Artikel*, pp. 104f.; Vidal, pp. 386f.; Luncz, pp. 136f.

[28] Abu Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem," pp. 24f.

[29] In 1882 the German consul described "historical" Palestine and "political" Palestine as follows: "Historical Palestine, extending in the north to the foothills of Lebanon and in the south to the edge of the desert, bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the east by the pilgrimage road, or Hadj road, which lies on the other side of the Jordan and goes from Damascus to Mecca, comprises an area of 465 square miles. The borders of the political province of Palestine, the *liwa'* of Jerusalem, are altogether different. They reach the Pashaliq of Naplus in the north and the shores of the Mediterranean in the west. In the south they form the border with Egypt, extending in a large arc through Wadi el-Arisch to the Gulf of Akaba, while in the east the Arab valley, the Dead Sea, and the Jordan serve as the dividing line. Some 300 kilometers long and 150 kilometers wide, it encloses some 8,000 square kilometers of arable land . . . ; the remaining 37,000 square kilometers consists of the steppe, in which nomadic Bedouin tribes have their camping sites, not recognizing the higher authority of any state." *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, p. 416.

Moreover, Porath points out the role of church administration, local Muslim traditions, and finally Zionism in this connection.[30] Thus, the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem included all of Palestine and the land east of the Jordan. It is self-evident that the Protestant Episcopate of Jerusalem (founded in 1841) and the Latin Patriarchate (revived in 1847; see below) also extended over all of Palestine, over the entire "Holy Land."

In this regard the annual Nabi Musa celebration was of special significance for the local Muslims. On this occasion Muslims from all of Palestine made the pilgrimage to the presumed tomb of Moses, northwest of the Dead Sea near Jericho. The week of the Nabi Musa pilgrimage was the most important religious-folkloristic event of the year. Contemporary European observers unanimously believed that this pilgrimage had been energetically promoted by the Ottoman officials since the middle of the nineteenth century as a counterweight to the horde of Christian pilgrims. To be sure, pilgrims from every part of the Islamic world came to this celebration, but it was primarily a "Palestinian pilgrimage." Pilgrim processions streamed in from every part of the country, to the sounds of beating drums and musical bands, and converged under fluttering banners. There were said to have been 10,000 pilgrims in 1875, of whom some 2,000 came from Hebron, Nablus, and the surrounding areas.[31]

After the period that is the subject of our study, and especially after the beginning of the twentieth century, it was the Jewish-Zionist aspirations for the "Land of Israel" that strengthened among the Arab population the notion of an entity called Palestine, as a defense against Zionist claims. After World War I, the Palestinian national movement was formed, principally as an *opposition* movement against Zionism.[32]

One can easily assume that in the second half of the nineteenth century the image of Palestine as a unit (as the "Holy Land" or the "Land of Israel") was more precise and more strongly formed among Europeans than it was among the local population and the Ottoman administration. But beneath the fluctuating surface of administrative boundaries, an image of the region's coherency was recognizable, at least after 1830. During the 1870s it took on contours that were clearer.[33] To this extent, the Mandate zone of Palestine was no artificial, colonial creation.[34]

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[30] Porath, *The Emergence*, pp. 6–9.

[31] *Die Warte*, 3 June 1875. See also Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 204f.; II, pp. 222f.; Ebers and Guthe, I, pp. 35f.; Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, pp. 243–45; Pierotti, *La Bible et la Palestine*, pp. 281–86; Bliss, pp. 268f.; Khalaf, pp. 38–40.

[32] See Flores, chapter six; Wild.

[33] See also Mandel, XX.

[34] As a defense against British and Zionist claims, during the "south Syrian phase," the idea that Palestine belonged to Syria and that it should be united with Syria was put forth; see Salah, pp. 167–86. In that context Palestine was defined as the

To conclude this chapter, I will briefly describe the administrative organization of the Palestinian *liwa'*s/*sanjaq*s/*mutasarrifliq*s (districts)[35] that were parts of the *eyalet*s/*vilayet*s (provinces) in the period from 1856 to 1882. We will follow the statements made in the imperial *salname*s (yearbooks) from No. 10 for the year A.H. 1272 (A.D. 1855–56) up until No. 38 for the year A.H. 1300 (A.D. 1882–83).[36]

The *salname*s for the year 1855–56 up until 1864–65 consistently list three districts—Acre, Nablus, and Jerusalem—that belonged to the province of Saida. After the formation of the new province of Syria (1864), they were attached to Damascus, as the *salname* for 1865–66 shows. According to the *salname*s for 1866–67 and 1867–68, an administrative interlude with altered hierarchies took place during these years. Acre and Nablus were not subordinated to Damascus directly, but rather through Beirut (in the case of Acre) or Jerusalem (in the case of Nablus). In the yearbooks for 1868–69 through 1872–73 the three districts of Acre, Jerusalem, and Nablus (Balqa') were reattached directly to Damascus, the capital of the province of Syria. An innovation that began in 1868–69 (and that remained until the end of the period under study) was the expansion of the Nablus district to include the lands east of the Jordan River that lay to the south; for this reason the district was called Balqa'. According to the *salname*s for 1873–74 through 1882–83, the districts of Acre and Balqa' remained subordinate to Damascus, but Jerusalem was an "independent" *sanjaq*, that is to say, an "independent" *liwa'/mutasarrifliq (mustaqillan idare olunmaqaddir)* (see map 2).

The pattern of *qada'*s within a *sanjaq*, like that of the *nahiya*s within a *qada'*, was subject to repeated changes, about which the provincial *salname*s provide information. But not every year of the provincial yearbooks is available; furthermore, it would seem to be a rather pointless exercise to trace the fluctuations at the lower administrative levels in all of their details. A snapshot of the year A.H. 1288 (A.D. 1871-72) follows at the beginning of the next chapter. The Syrian *salname* for A.H. 1288 is the only one that provides statistics for all three Palestinian *sanjaq*s. Of course, after the formation of the independent *sanjaq* of Jerusalem it was no longer covered in the *salname* of Damascus.

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region between the al-Qasimiya River (*Nahr al-Qasimiyya*) and al-'Arish and from the Mediterranean to the Hijaz railway (ibid., p. 167).

[35] Even after 1864 these terms were used interchangeably; see also Hartmann, "Die Ortsachftenliste des Liwa Jerusalem" [The Inhabited Localities List of the *Liwa'* of Jerusalem], p. 102.

[36] See also 'Awad, *Al-idara al-'uthmaniyya*; and 'Awad, *Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds* (dissertation), pp. 1–5.

2 Demographic Development

The ticklish problems one confronts when trying to sketch the demographic development of Palestine in the nineteenth century have already been described in detail by several authors.[37] We can therefore spare ourselves the introductory lament. It is not as if we are lacking any Ottoman statistics here;[38] rather, the problem has much more to do with their plausibility, reliability, and mathematical accuracy.[39]

The only Ottoman statistics for all of Palestine, as mentioned, come from the year A.H. 1288 (A.D. 1871–72). We want to take them as a starting point, and, proceeding from them, examine the population development back to the middle of the century and forward to the start of the 1880s. At the same time, this comparison is an overview of the administrative "fine division" of Palestine at the start of the 1870s.

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[37] See for example Ben-Arieh, "The Population"; Gerber, "The Population"; Gottheil, "The Population."

[38] Gottheil, "The Population," p. 311; the author has ignored the published Ottoman sources and the contemporary European statistics that were based upon them.

[39] See Hartmann, "Die Ortscahftenliste des Liwa Jerusalem" [The Locality Lists of the *Liwa'* of Jerusalem].

Table 1: Administrative division of Palestine and the number of households (*khane*) in the cities and *nahiya*s according to the Syrian province-*salname* for the year A.H. 1288 (A.D. 1871–72).[40]

(V = villages, M = Muslim households, N = Non-Muslim households, T = total)

LIWA' OF JERUSALEM				
Qada' of Jerusalem				
City of Jerusalem:	Muslims			1,025
	Greek Orthodox			299
	Latins (Roman Catholics)			179
	Armenians			175
	Catholics (Greek Catholics)			18
	Protestants			16
	Copts			44
	Syrians			7
	Jews			630
	Total			2,393
Nahiya Bani Zaid:	24 V	1,220 M	66 N	1,286 T
Nahiya Bani Murra and Bani Salim:	12 V	1,127 M	96 N	1,223 T
Nahiya Bani Malik:	23 V	1,075 M	— N	1,075 T
Nahiya Bani Hasan:	9 V	496 M	12 N	508 T
Nahiya Wadiya (including Bethlehem):	10 V	384 M	760 N	1,144 T
Nahiya Bani Harith al-Shimaliyya and al-Qibliya:	17 V	748 M	148 N	896 T
Nahiya Jabal al-Quds:	21 V	1,068 M	120 N	1,188 T
Qada' of Hebron				
City of Hebron:	Muslims			2,800
	Jews			200
	Total			3,000
Nahiya Hebron:	14 V	1,078 M	— N	1,078 T
Nahiya Amama:	5 V	351 M	— N	351 T
Nahiya Bayt Jibrin:	12 V	672 M	— N	672 T
Nahiya Arqub:	21 V	719 M	— N	719 T

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[40] My totals of *khanes* (households) in the villages of a *nahiya* often do not agree with the totals cited in the *salname*. Although the mathematical secrets of the Ottoman provincial officials often cannot be divined, for the sake of consistency, I give the totals expressed in the source each time. Hartmann, "Die Ortschaftenliste des Liwa Jerusalem" [The Locality List of the *Liwa'* of Jerusalem] tried to make mathematical corrections. His chief interest was in the place names, of course. See also Socin, "Alphabetisches Verzeichniss," p. 138.

Qada' of Gaza[41]

City of Gaza:	Muslims			2,690
	Greek Orthodox			65
	Total			2,755
Nahiya Khan Yunis:	14 V	1,896 M	— N	1,896 T
Nahiya Majdal:	7 V	1,474 M	— N	1,474 T
Nahiya Gaza:	34 V	3,047 M	— N	3,047 T

Qada' of Jaffa

City of Jaffa:	Muslims			865
	Greek Orthodox			135
	Catholics			70
	Latins			50
	Armenians			5
	Maronites			6
	Total			1,131
Nahiya Jaffa	11 V	498 M	— N	498 T
Nahiya Lydda				
City of Lydda:	Muslims			700
	Greek Orthodox			207
	Total			907
In addition:	18 V	1,464 M	— N	1,464 T
Nahiya Ramla				
City of Ramla:	Muslims			675
	Greek Orthodox			250
	Total			925
In addition:	32 V	1,477 M	— N	1,477 T

LIWA' OF BALQA'

Qada' of Nablus

City of Nablus:	Muslims	1,356
	Greek Orthodox	70
	Latins	13
	Protestants	13
	Jews	14
	Samaritans	12
	Total	1,478

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[41] See also Gatt, "Verzeichnis der bewohnten Ortschaften der Kaimakamije Gaza." [List of Inhabited Localities of the *Qa'im Maqam* of Gaza].

Nahiya Mashariq Nablus:	20 V	1,185 M	— N	1,185 T
Nahiya Mashariq al-Jarrar:	28 V	1,932 M	60 N	1,992 T
Nahiya Jamma'in Awwal:	23 V	1,500 M	40 N	1,540 T
Nahiya Jamma'in Thani:	25 V	1,259 M	— N	1,259 T
Nahiya Wadi al-Sha'ir:	20 V	1,707 M	20 N	1,727 T
Nahiya Sha'rawiya Shaqiyya:	24 V	1,997 M	70 N	2,067 T
Nahiya Sha'rawiya Gharbiyya:	8 V	1,358 M	— N	1,358 T
Nahiya Bani Sa'b:	28 V	2,084 M	12 N	2,096 T

Qada' of Jinin

City of Jinin:	Muslims	656
	Greek Orthodox	16
	Total	672

Nahiya Shafa Qibil:	12 V	469 M	7 N	476 T
Nahiya Shafa Shimali:	13 V	513 M	— N	513 T
Nahiya Shafa Gharbi:	14 V	1,138 M	10 N	1,148 T

Qada' of 'Ajlun

7 *nahiyas* with a total of:	97 V	1,599 M	137 N	1,736 T

Qada' of Salt

City of Salt:	Muslims	500
	Greek Orthodox	175
	Latins	25
	Protestants	50
	Total	750

In addition:	12 V	685 M	— N	685 T

LIWA' OF ACRE

Qada' of Acre

City of Acre:	Muslims	547
	Greek Orthodox	97
	Catholics	99
	Latins	8
	Maronites	6
	Jews	6
	Total	763

Nahiya of Sahil:	19 V	775 M	598 N	1,373 T
Nahiya of Shaghur:	15 V	993 M	423 N	1,416 T
Qada' of Haifa				
City of Haifa:	Muslims			224
	Greek Orthodox			64
	Catholics			131
	Latins + Maronites			17
	Protestants			16
	Jews			8
	Total			460
Nahiya Ruha:	19 V	939 M	— N	939 T
Nahiya Sahil:	15 V	896 M	— N	896 T
Nahiya Jabal:	7 V	176 M	160 N	336 T
Qada' Nazareth				
City of Nazareth:	Muslims			275
	Greek Orthodox			533
	Catholics			166
	Latins			247
	Maronites			61
	Protestants			66
	Total			1,348
Nahiya Nazareth:	21 V	998 M	185 N	1,183 T
Nahiya Shafa'amr:	17 V	608 M	359 N	967 T
Qada' of Tiberias				
City of Tiberias:	Muslims			159
	Greek Orthodox			66
	Jews			400
	Total			625
Nahiya Shafa wa-Ghawr:	7 V	507 M	— N	507 T
Qada' Safad				
City of Safad:	Muslims			1,295
	Greek Orthodox			3
	Jews			1,197
	Total			2,495
Nahiya Jira:	25 V	500 M	115 N	615 T
Nahiya Jabal:	13 V	617 M	501 N	1,118 T

Table 2: Summary of Table 1.

Qada's	Number of cities and villages	Number of households (*khanes*)			
		Muslims	Christians*	Jews	Total
Jerusalem					
Jerusalem	1	1,025	738	630	2,393
Countryside	116	6,118	1,202		7,320
Hebron					
Hebron	1	2,800		200	3,000
Countryside	52	2,820			2,820
Gaza					
Gaza	1	2,690	65		2,755
Countryside	55	6,417			6,417
Jaffa					
Jaffa		865	266		1,131
Lydda	3	700	207		907
Ramla		675	250		925
Countryside	61	3,439			3,439
Nablus					
Nablus	1	1,356	108	14	1,478
Countryside	176	13,022	202		13,224
Jinin					
Jinin	1	656	16		672
Countryside	39	2,120	17		2,137
'Ajlun					
Countryside	97	1,599	137		1,736
Salt					
Salt	1	500	250		750
Countryside	12	685			685
Acre					
Acre	1	547	210	6	763
Countryside	34	1,768	1,021		2,789
Haifa					
Haifa	1	224	228	8	460
Countryside	41	2,011	160		2,171
Nazareth					
Nazareth	1	275	1,073		1,348
Countryside	38	1,606	544		2,150

(continued)

Tiberias					
Tiberias	1	159	66	400	625
Countryside	7	507			507
Safad					
Safad	1	1,295	3	1,197	2,495
Countryside	38	1,117	616		1,733

* In the countryside, this heading refers to all non-Muslims; in the city of Nablus, it refers to both Christians and Samaritans.

Doubts about the reliability of these Ottoman statistics are particularly aroused by the following data: the total number of households in Jerusalem, which appears too low; the number of *khanes* in Hebron, which is obviously only a rough, very high estimate; the data for Lydda, Ramla, Jinin, and Nazareth, which are probably too high; the figures for Acre, which are extremely low, even if one considers that the Ottoman garrison was probably not included in them; and finally the data for Safad, which appear extremely high (see below, table 12). To some extent, however, the partially too-low, partially too-high data for these cities appear to balance out in the total statistics. These statistics contain no data on the Bedouin population. If we also ignore the two *qada*'s in East Jordan, we get the following picture for Palestine:

Table 3: Localities and *khanes* by *liwa*'s (A.H. 1288).

Liwa'	Number of cities and villages	Number of *khanes*
Jerusalem	290	31,107
Balqa' (without *qada*'s of 'Ajlun and Salt)	217	17,511
Acre	163	15,041
Total	670	63,659

The 13 cities included 18,952 *khanes*, the 657 villages 44,707 *khanes*.

One need not discuss here in detail how many persons we could assume per *khane*; this has already been done often. Gerber for example concludes that for Syria and Palestine in the nineteenth century, five is an appropriate multiplier,[42] that is, that an average household comprised five persons. Ben-Arieh believes four to five persons per household was relatively low for the urban population of Palestine in the nineteenth century.[43] On the basis of the parallel data regarding *khane*s and *nufus* (population) in an official statistic from around 1870 (see table 4), we deem a multiplier of six more appropriate.[44] This gives a total population of Palestine of 381,954 persons (not counting Bedouin). Of this total, 268,242 lived in villages and 113,712 in the 13 listed cities.

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[42] Gerber, "The Population," pp 59–62.

Let us first compare this last figure with the statistics of Ben-Arieh (table 12), which are based on a critical evaluation of European sources: of the thirteen cities named in the *salname* for the year A.H. 1288, Lydda and Jinin are not contained in table 12, but Bethlehem is added. The urban population of 90,000 souls for the time around A.D. 1860 figured by Ben-Arieh as a rough estimate is compatible with the result of calculations from the *salname* for A.H. 1288, which gave the number five to ten years later as around 110,000 souls.

Of the 63,659 households of the provincial almanac for A.H. 1288, 2,455 were Jewish. This gives a Jewish population of 14,730, or about 4 percent of the total population.[45] (By 1882 the number of Jews in Palestine had grown to about 24,000.)[46] They lived mainly in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safad, and Tiberias, with some families also in Nablus, Acre, and Haifa. If we proceed from the idea that the other non-Muslim *khane*s were largely Christian households, we arrive at a Christian population of 6,992 *khane*s or 41,952 persons, about 11 percent of the total population. The Christians were concentrated in the cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla, Acre, Haifa, and Nazareth as well as in the villages of the highlands around Jerusalem and Lower and Upper Galilee. The Muslims thus made up about 85 percent of the population.

What opportunities do we have now to compare these statistics with other data and to sketch the development since the middle of the nineteenth century on the one hand and until the start of the 1880s on the other?

In 1879 Socin published a "List of the Inhabited Localities of the Jerusalem *Pashaliq*." He wrote in this regard: "It may be about eight to ten years old. It comes from the seraglio of Jerusalem and was written by a Turk, probably it is a poor copy made by a rather uneducated scribe from an official statistical document."[47] If it is a document from around 1870, the data would have to be comparable with those of the provincial *salname* for A.H. 1288. Socin's source covers only the villages, however, not the six cities of the *liwa'* of Jerusalem. In addition Socin proceeded from the idea that the *nufus* column included all persons, thus the total rural population. However this was a false conclusion; it must have dealt, as in the *Defter-i Nufus* of 1849, which we have still to examine (see table 6), with all male subjects of the sultan; by doubling the numbers we thus obtain the approximate total population.[48]

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[43] Ben-Arieh, "The Population," p. 66, footnote 145.

[44] See also HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 5, *Quadro statistico del distretto di Jaffa*, 27 August 1872. There the population of Jaffa is given as 7,000 (1,131 *khane*s), that of the *qada'* of Jaffa as 37,000 (6,402 *khane*s). See also footnote 48 and Owen, p. 218 (an average of six persons in an Egyptian family).

[45] Frankl (II, p. 500) gives 10,639 Jewish inhabitants of Palestine for the 1850s. Thomson (*The Land and the Book*, p. 167) shows 11,100 Jews for the end of the 1850s (Jerusalem 7,000, Safad 2,000, Tiberias 1,500, Hebron 600). In a report for the Alliance Israélite Universelle of 25 December 1868, Netter gave the Jewish population of Palestine as 13,000, of which $^{9}/_{10}$ lived in the four "holy cities"; 2,500 were adult men: Chouraqui, p. 451.

[46] Mandel, XXIV.

Let us first compare the data of Socin and the provincial *salname* of A.H. 1288:

Table 4: Population of the *liwa'* of Jerusalem ca. 1870.

	Salname A.H. 1288		Socin's source ca. 1870			
Qada'	*khane*	Derived tot. pop.	*khane*	Derived tot. pop.	*Nufus*	Derived tot. pop.
Jerusalem	7,320	43,920	7,599	45,594	27,330	54,660
Hebron	2,820	16,920	2,854	17,124	8,777	17,554
Jaffa	3,439	20,634	4,473	26,838	14,551	29,102
Gaza	6,417	38,502	5,594	33,564	16,656	33,312
Subtotal	19,996	119,976	20,520	123,120	67,314	134,628
cities Jerusalem, Hebron, Gaza, Jaffa, Ramla, Lydda Subtotals	11,111	66,666				50,000
Total	31,107	186,642				184,628

Source: *Salname-i Vilayet-i Suriye* A.H. 1288: Socin, "Alphabetisches Verzeichniss."

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[47] Socin, "Alphabetisches Verzeichniss," pp. 135f.

[48] See Schick, "Zur Einwohnerzahl des Bezirks Jerusalem" [On the Population of the District of Jerusalem], pp. 121 and 127 as well as the data of Rosen regarding table 6. The inconsistency and incompleteness with which the *nufus* record was maintained are demonstrated by two volumes in the Israel State Archives: Vol. 77 dated A.H. 1296 (A.D. 1878–79) covers 17 localities in the Jabal al-Quds, vol. 360 dated A.H. 1292 (A.D. 1875) seven villages near Tiberias. In the 17 localities near Jerusalem a total of 944 *khane*s and 2,897 *nufus* were listed. These numbers too give rather exactly the multiplier of 3 to convert from *khanes* to *nufus*, and of 6 to convert from *khanes* to total population.

The number 50,000 for the population of the six named cities was estimated by Socin and may be too low. Since we do not have the comparable Ottoman data for the city population, we must look only at the rural population. It would be too much to ask for the multipliers two (to convert from men to total population) and six (to arrive at the total population from the households) to show the same mathematical result. Both can only provide approximate sizes. At any rate, in light of Gerber's findings we hold the assumption of an average household size of six persons as not too low.

If we look at the number of *khane*s, their total number in the *salname* for A.H. 1288 (A.D. 1871–72) is somewhat lower than in the list of circa 1870. The great difference in the data for the *qada'*s of Jaffa and Gaza is striking. Can this be explained? An attempt at an explanation naturally only makes sense if we assume that both sources are at least somewhat connected with the reality and that the officials did not entirely dream up the figures. Thus if we turn to the sources, we must assume that the *salname* for A.H. 1288 reflects a somewhat earlier reality than Socin's list, say that of the second half of the 1860s. As both lists are based on a fundamentally identical administrative division, the population shifts, above all between the *qada'*s of Jaffa and Gaza, can have been caused only through emigration to safer and economically more active areas. The outlands of Jaffa and the region around Jerusalem appear to have profited from such internal migration.[49]

Now let us compare the statistics of the *salname* for A.H. 1288, which we assume reflects the realities in the second half of the 1860s, with the population statistics from the time around the middle of the century. We have available the data for the *liwa'*s of Jerusalem and Nablus for the years 1847 and 1849 (tables 5 and 6) and for the *liwa'* of Acre for the year 1852 (table 7).

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[49] See also the detailed table in Hartmann, "Die Ortschaftenliste des Liwa Jerusalem" [The Locality Lists of the *Liwa'* of Jerusalem], pp. 146f.

Table 5: Estimated population of the *Pashaliq* of Jerusalem (central and southern Palestine) in the year 1847.

District	Muslims	Christians	Jews	Total
Jerusalem	25,000	10,000	10,000	45,000
Nablus	100,000	1,500	100	101,600
Gaza	40,000	500	—	40,500
Hebron	25,000	1,000	2,500	28,500
Jaffa	15,500	3,000	1,000	19,500
Ramla	7,500	1,000	—	8,500
Lydda	6,200	800	—	7,000
Total	219,200	17,800	13,600	250,600

Source: MAE–CCC Jér., vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1 July 1847).

Table 5 gives estimates of the French consulate. Table 6 is an excerpt from the record of the official census of 1849, which the Prussian consul Rosen acquired. In a detailed report to Constantinople,[50] Rosen discussed these figures and concluded that they were rather exact; only the data for the Christian population in the cities were probably too low. He emphasized expressly that not only the taxed population was included, but all male subjects of the Sublime Porte, including infants and old men. Therefore the statistics represented approximately half of the population. The table provided by Rosen is thus undoubtedly more reliable than the estimate of the French consulate. The discrepancy of the data regarding the population of the individual districts, however, can probably be ascribed to the fact that the French compiler was not visualizing the same district borders as those which underlay the census of 1849.

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[50] ISA–DKJ, A.III.4 (Jerusalem, 10 September 1861). This table was also made available to Petermann (I, pp. 232f.) by the dragoman of the Prussian consulate, evidently acquiring several errors in the copying process.

Table 6: Number of male subjects of the Sublime Porte in the *Pashaliq* of Jerusalem in accordance with the *Defter-i Nufus* of the census of 1849.

District		Muslims	Christians	Jews	Total
Jerusalem	City	3,074	1,872	895	5,841
	Countryside	21,103	2,932	—	24,035
	Total	24,177	4,804	895	29,876
Gaza	City	7,505	276	—	7,781
	Countryside	22,774	—	—	22,774
	Total	30,279	276	—	30,555
Hebron	City	4,017	—	54	4,071
	Countryside	3,252	—	—	3,252
	Total	7,269	—	54	7,323
Ramla	City	2,143	497	5	2,645
	Countryside	6,328	—	—	6,328
	Total	8,471	497	5	8,973
Lydda	City	2,006	314	—	2,320
	Countryside	3,015	—	—	3,015
	Total	5,021	314	—	5,335
Jaffa	City	2,143	896	35	3,074
	Countryside	4,284	—	—	4,284
	Total	6,427	896	35	7,358
Nablus	City	4,203	220	90	4,513
	Countryside	43,274	1,320	(Samaritans)	44,594
	Total	47,477	1,540	90	49,107
Jinin	City	707	93	—	800
	Countryside	7,173	42	—	7,215
	Total	7,880	135	—	8,015
Total		137,001	8,462	1,079	146,542

Source: ISA–DKJ, A.III.4. (Jerusalem, 10 September1861).

The figures of table 7 were acquired by Robinson from the American consular agent at Acre. One must assume that they come from the same census as the figures reported by Rosen. Thus when we double them accordingly, we arrive at a population of the *liwa'* of Acre of 72,140 in the year 1852.

At least for central and southern Palestine we can now compare official population data from the years 1849 and 1865–70. Robinson's data are included in the comparison (table 8).

Table 7: Localities and male population in the *liwa'* of Acre, 1852.

	Localities	Muslims and Druze	Christians and Jews
City of Acre	1	2,378	793
District of Shaghur	38	2,795	762
District of Sahil		2,077	644
District of Jabal		2,081	544
District of Shafa'amr	18	2,767	763
Districts of 'Athlit and Haifa	42	6,184	588
District of Nazareth	25	3,013	1,915
District of Tiberias	26	3,521	691
District of Safad	11	3,612	942
Total	161	28,428	7,642
		36,070	

Source: Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, III, p. 629.

Table 8: Population of central and southern Palestine, 1847–70.

Liwa'	Estimate 1847	Official Census 1849	Official Data ca. 1865–70
Jerusalem	149,000	178,840	186,642
Nablus	101,600	114,244	105,066
Subtotal	250,600	293,084	291,708
Acre	—	72,140 [1852]	90,246
Total		365,224	381,954

Source: Tables 1, 5, 6, and 7.

Exercising all due caution with the figures available to us, and with our multipliers, a striking feature of the demographic development can still be confirmed: the population stagnation of the middle of the century to the end of the 1860s, at least in central and southern Palestine. Rosen, who wrote his report in 1861, was even of the opinion that the Muslim population had diminished since 1849, especially the rural population in the plain of Gaza and the mountains of Hebron.

In 1865–66 Palestine also suffered great population losses to a cholera epidemic. It is hard to say how many people succumbed in the mass deaths. We have only scattered data: As early as October 1865 *Die Warte* reported 1,500 to 2,000 dead in Jaffa and 90 to 100 in Ramla. In November the French consul reported 1,059 dead in Jaffa in 32 days, and 1,760 dead in Nablus in 18 days; Gaza had already lost 432 and Jerusalem 800 victims to the epidemic. People fled from the cities (even the staff of the consulate), but the pestilence caught up with them in the country. It raged through the winter in the north of Palestine; in June 1866 the French consul reported that the cholera was now abating in Tiberias.[51]

As we shall see, a rapid growth in the Palestinian population then ensued, almost a qualitative leap forward, above all in the 1870s. This uneven demographic development of Palestine corresponds to that of all of Syria. Gerber writes of a decline in the growth rate (to 0.3 percent) and a relative demographic stagnation from the 1830s to the 1850s, and a leap forward starting in the 1860s, with a growth rate (1.5 percent) which was higher than in the industrialized European societies of the day (under 1 percent).[52] Kalla calculated the following average annual growth rates of the population of Syria: 1833–57: 0.7; 1857–75: 1.6; 1875–95: 0.9; 1895–1915: 0.6.[53]

When we look at the start of the 1880s, thus at the end of the period examined here, the problem is that we no longer have detailed official figures for southern Palestine (the *liwa'* of Jerusalem). In addition, statistical data for central and northern Palestine in the provincial *salname*s (summary in table 9) are anything but confidence-inspiring. On the other hand, a much-quoted source is the published result of a census Schumacher made for Ottoman officials, of the able-bodied men (age 16–60) in the *liwa'* of Acre in the year 1886 (table 10).

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[51] See *Die Warte* of 26 October 1865 and 7 December 1865; MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 9 (Jerusalem 3 and 22 November 1865, and 13 June 1866); PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 808 (Jerusalem, 13 November 1865); HHSTA–AR, F8/49 (Bethlehem, 2 November 1865); Tobler, *Nazareth*, pp. 303–307.

[52] Gerber, "The Population," pp. 63 and 76.

[53] Kalla, p. 280.

Table 9: Population of central and northern Palestine from A.H. 1288–1300 according to the Syrian province *salnames*.

Qada'	*Salname*	*Nufus* (population)		*Khanes*	Villages
		Muslims	Non-Muslims		
Acre	1288			3,553	34
	1295	9,536	4,570	3,471	
	1296	9,536	4,570	3,471	47
	1300[a]	8,132[b]	4,253	8,187	60
Haifa	1288			2,631	41
	1295	4,500	1,271	3,642	50
	1296	3,500 (!)	1,271	3,641	37
	1300[a]	5,244[b]	1,132	4,619	67
Nazareth	1288			3,498	38
	1295	2,000	1,900	1,183	73
	1296	2,500 (!)	?	1,183	25
	1300[a]	4,012[b]	1,847	1,547	25
Tiberias	1288			812	7
	1295	1,380	201	653	26
	1296	1,900	210 (!)	653	18
	1300[a]	2,172[b]	150	1,617	30
Safad	1288			4,228	38
	1295	8,000	7,558	1,783	38
	1296	8,000	7,008 (!)	1,783	58
	1300[a]	6,503[b]	1,703 (!)	3,876	65
Nablus/ Balqa'	1288			14,702	176
	1295	51,297	1,101	17,943	169
	1296	52,000	446	17,943	220
	1298	52,357	1,008	21,349	253
	1300	47,178	961	17,823	195
Jinin	1288			2,754	39
	1295[c]				
	1296[c]				
	1300	5,172	47	3,526	58

a) Identical with the figures for A.H. 1298.

b) Including Bedouin

c) Probably included with Nablus

Table 10: Calculation of the population of the *liwa'* of Acre (1886) by Schumacher.

Qada'		Number of inhabitants
Acre	City	9,800
	Countryside	29,760
Haifa	City	7,165
	Countryside	18,925
Nazareth	City	6,575
	Countryside	12,140
Tiberias	City	3,640
	Countryside	13,700
Safad	City	24,615
	Countryside	27,420
Total (without government officials and the military)		153,740

Source: Schumacher, "Population List."

Gottheil's estimate of the total population of Palestine is based on this. Based on Schumacher's data he extrapolated individual data for the 10 cities and 31 villages for central and southern Palestine from the *Survey of Western Palestine* of the PEF and from the Palestine literature to reach a total population of the country "circa 1875" of around 500,000 souls.[54] However, his examination raises problems. For one thing, it blurs development tendencies, because it mixes data from different decades. At least for the district of Acre that would mean that "circa 1875" it had about as many inhabitants as in 1886. This is wrong, however, as we shall see. On the other hand, it remains to be tested whether Schumacher's calculations should simply be accepted and some random data extrapolated on this basis.

First: What about the figures of table 10? Gerber wrongly equates the census of able-bodied men age 16–60 with the census of *khanes*. He quotes the multiplier of five used by Schumacher (to convert from able-bodied men to total population) as one of the proofs for his conclusion that an average household consisted of five persons.[55] But a *khane* can certainly have included more than one man between age 16 and 60.

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[54] Gottheil, "The Population," p. 318.

[55] Gerber, "The Population," pp. 60f.

As Schumacher's statistics are based on a census of able-bodied men and not households, we believe his multiplier is too high. As he reports, he calculated it by going personally from house to house in Tiberias and Haifa and learning the number of inhabitants and of able-bodied men.[56] Here there could certainly have been misleading and unrepresentative individual results.

Schick undertook studies in the *qada'* of Jerusalem similar to those of Schumacher, but used the multiplier three. He was obtaining statistics on the able-bodied male rural population of the district who were employed in the corvée work of road construction. "On the average, $^2/_3$ of the entire male population of a locality were deemed able-bodied," he wrote.[57] If the number of able-bodied men is converted to $^3/_3$ to obtain the male population, and to $^6/_3$ to obtain the total population, one gets a multiplier of three, which appears to us more realistic than that used by Schumacher.[58] For the villages of the *qada'* of Jerusalem, Schick arrives in this way at a population of 76,521. According to Socin's list of circa 1870, with which he compares his statistics, the same villages had 59,582 inhabitants.[59] Unfortunately Schick does not report in what year the census of able-bodied men was made (he wrote his article in 1892); thus we cannot say precisely the time period in which the population increase of about 25 percent thus obtained occurred.

Schumacher's total for the population of the *liwa'* of Acre (153,740) appears too high, not merely because of his multiplier, but also because of the population figure for Safad (24,615) that he uses, which he himself says was based on untested data from officials.[60] It appears absurd when we compare it with table 12.

Thus even if we voice doubt in the reliability of the data in table 10, it is established that in the 1870s and in the first half of the 1880s northern Palestine experienced rapid population growth. Schwöbel tried to statistically encompass this growth (tables 11 and 14 and map 4). For the 1880s his statistics are based on Schumacher's "Population List." Unfortunately, he does not explain how he arrived on this basis at a total of 139,200 (i.e., what data of Schumacher he left unexamined). For the 1870s his basis was the *Survey of Western Palestine*, complemented by Guérin's *Description* and by personal reports of Schumacher.[61] According to Schwöbel's calculations, northern Palestine experienced almost a doubling of its population in one and one-half decades (from 73,535 to 139,200). The development cannot have been that dramatic, however. On the one hand we do believe Schumacher's data are too high, on the other the numbers for the 1870s appear too low: According to the *salname* for A.H. 1288, the population for the *liwa'* of Acre was 90,246 (see table 8). Even if we append a question mark to Schwöbel's statistics at both ends, a growth of "only" 50 percent would still have to be termed dramatic. We shall return to the problem below (see tables 15 and 16).

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[56] Schumacher, "Population List," p. 170.

[57] Schick, "Zur Einwohnerzahl des Bezirks Jerusalem" [On the Population of the District of Jerusalem], pp. 120f.

[58] See also Gerber, "The Population" p. 60, and Erder, p. 298.

[59] Schick, "Zur Einwohnerzahl des Bezirks Jerusalem" [On the Population of the District of Jerusalem], p. 126.

[60] Schumacher, "Population List," p. 170.

First it should be pointed out that not only the cities grew in all of Palestine (see table 12). Thanks to the work of Schwöbel we can also sketch the population growth in the northern Palestine countryside, albeit with the above restrictions. Apart from a few new settlements (e.g, at Marj ibn 'Amir), there was mainly a "filling" and in some places a growing together of existing villages of western Upper Galilee, the coastal plain and eastern Lower Galilee (table 14 and map 4) in which immigration, from Lebanon among other places, played a significant role.[62]

As for the population development of the cities, we refrain from critically evaluating the data available to us from literature on Palestine and from consular sources on an individual basis, since Ben-Arieh has already undertaken such an exercise. Gottheil made a similar table. He accepted the figures for the *liwa'* of Acre from Schumacher; the data for the other cities of Palestine, again very generous for the period 1860–85, are mean values from data in the existing literature. In table 13 both columns are placed side by side, and expanded for southern Palestine with data from the German consul for the year 1882.

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[61] Schwöbel, "Die Verkehrswege und Ansiedlungen Galiläas" [The Thoroughfares and Settlements of Galilee], pp. 48 and 98f.

[62] Ibid., pp. 52, 97, and 104.

Table 11: Population of Galilee to the northern border of the *liwa'* of Acre.

No. on Map 4	Geographic regions	1870s population			1880s population	
		Without cities	With cities	No. of settlements	Without cities	With cities
II	Acre Plain	5,060	17,370	23 + 2	7,960	24,525
III	Marj ibn 'Amir	1,510	—	9	3,275	—
IV	Jabal Dahi	2,300	—	14	3,115	—
V	Eastern plains	3,200	—	13	7,645	10,375
VI	Highlands of Nazareth	3,540	11,700	10 + 2	5,630	15,145
VII	Western hills	5,880	8,380	14 + 1	6,515	9,265
VIII	Tur'an and Battuf Plain	1,020	—	5	1,070	—
IX	Shaghur plateau	8,250	—	17	10,270	—
X	S.W. slope of uplands	4,420	—	11	5,265	10,120
XI	Western central plateau	2,980	—	16	6,555	—
XII	Region of Safad	4,930	9,480	22 + 1	14,100	38,715
XXI	E. slope of plateau	0	—	0	0	—
XXII	Hula Plain	650	—	9	0	—
XXIII	Region of Lake Tiberias	1,000	3,500	6 + 1	1,910	5,550
XXIV	Baysan Plain	600	—	2	1,220	—
	Total	43,515	73,535	155 + 7	74,530	139,200

Source: Schwöbel: "Die Verkehrswege und Ansiedlungen Galiläas" [The Thoroughfares and Settlements of Galilee], Table III (Excerpt).

Table 12: Demographic development of the cities of Palestine, 1800–1922.

	1800	1840	1860	1880	1922
Jerusalem	9,000	13,000	19,000	30,000	62,500
Acre	8,000	10,000	10,000	8,500	6,400
Haifa	1,000	2,000	3,000	6,000	24,600
Jaffa	2,750	4,750	6,250	10,000	47,700
Ramla	2,000	2,500	3,000	3,500	7,400
Gaza	8,000	12,000	15,000	19,000	17,500
Hebron	5,000	6,500	7,500	10,000	16,600
Bethlehem	1,500	2,500	3,750	4,750	6,600
Nablus	7,500	8,000	9,500	12,500	16,000
Nazareth	1,250	2,250	4,000	6,000	7,500
Tiberias	2,000 (3,500)*	2,000	2,500	3,000	7,000
Safad	5,500 (7,500)*	4,500	6,500	7,500	8,800
Total	54,000	70,000	90,000	120,750	228,600

* Before the earthquake of 1837.
Source: Ben-Arieh, "The Population of the Large Towns In Palestine," p. 68.

Table 13: Population estimates of the cities of Palestine in the first half of the 1880s.

	Ben-Arieh (1880)	Gottheil (1886/1860-85)	German consul (1882)
Jerusalem	30,000	20,000 (!)	30,000
Bethlehem	4,750	3,000	6,000
Hebron	10,000	9,000	9,000
Gaza	19,000	18,000	16,000
Jaffa	10,000	10,000	8,500
Ramla	3,500	3,000	4,000
Nablus	12,500	13,000	
Acre	8,500	9,800	
Haifa	6,000	6,400	
Nazareth	6,000	6,575	
Tiberias	3,000	3,640	
Safad	7,500	24,615 (!)	

Sources: Table 12; Gottheil "The Population," p. 315; *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, p. 416.

Table 14: Population of Galilee to the northern border of the *liwa'* of Acre by settlement size.

Size of settlements	1870s		1880s	
	No. of settlements	Share of total pop.,%	No. of settlements	Share of total pop.,%
Ca. 50 and fewer residents	12	0.6	9	0.4
Ca. 100 residents	30	4	12	1
Ca. 150 residents	19	4	11	1
Ca. 200 residents	29	8	16	2
Ca. 300 residents	28	11	28	7
Ca. 500 residents	22	13	24	10
Ca. 750 residents	6	6	19	10
Ca. 1,000 residents	7	10	17	13
Ca. 1,500 residents	1	2	8	10
Ca. 2,500–3,000 residents	3	10	4	9
Ca. 5,000 and more residents	4	30	5	38
Total	162	100	157	100

Source: Schwöbel, "Die Verkehrswege und Ansiedlungen Galiläas" [The Thoroughfares and Settlements of Galilee], table IV (Excerpt).

Now let us try a total estimate of the population development of Palestine from 1856 to 1882. Here we will not look closely at the sometimes bizarre numerical data in the literature, however.[63] Just one example of the peculiarity even of the data of otherwise well-informed authors: According to Consul Finn, the population of central Palestine, Jabal Nablus, in the first half of the 1850s was estimated at 30,000 arms-bearing Muslim men, 2,000 Christians, 40 Samaritans, and a few Jews, not including women and children.[64] If we use the same multiplier as with able-bodied men (three), we arrive at a population of central Palestine of 96,150 souls. This is quite compatible with the figure of around 105,000 souls in the second half of the 1860s (table 8). But elsewhere in the same work one reads that Palestine had about 1,500,000 inhabitants![65] Even that same Warren who left us detailed employment statistics for Jerusalem speculated in 1876 that Palestine "has now scarcely more than one and a half million of people."[66]

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[63] See for example the table in Gottheil, "The Population," p. 312.

[64] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 238.

[65] Ibid., II, p. 188.

[66] Warren, *Underground Jerusalem*, p. 468.

Table 15: Population development of Palestine, 1850-1919.

Liwa'	Results of analysis		Comparison data				
	1850–1865[a]	1882[b]	1881–1893[c]	1911–1912[d]	1914[e]	1915[f]	1919[g]
Jerusalem	180,000	230,000	234,770	352,813	328,168	343,362[*]	425,000
Nablus/Balqa'	100,000	120–130,000	115,314	183,574	154,563	153,749	165,000
Acre	70-80,000	110,000	75,882	159,006	133,877	137,164	150,000
Total	350–360,000	460–470,000	425,966	695,393	616,608	634,275	740,000

[*] Without the *qada'* of Beersheba.

Sources:

a) and b) see text.

c) Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records," pp. 262 and 271. These are data from the 1881 Ottoman census, whose results were presented in 1893. Karpat as well as Shaw ("The Ottoman Census System") emphasize almost effusively their reliability. It is clear, however, that the results for the *liwa'* of Acre are nonsense, not only in light of the later figures, but among other things also because only a very small part of the Jewish population of the *liwa'* was included. Thus in Safad only 193 Jews were counted (Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records," p. 262).

d) McCarthy, pp. 21 and 28. There are Ottoman statistics from the year A.H. 1330, the data of which were corrected upward by McCarthy in order to rectify the undercount.

e) Zamir, pp. 92 and 98 (Ottoman statistics).

f) Ruppin, pp. 8f. (see text).

g) Zamir, pp. 105 (estimates of the British Foreign Office).

I now shall first summarize the result of my analysis in table 15, in order subsequently to discuss the individual data.

Of the comparison data, the data for 1915 should be further clarified. These come from Ruppin, who provided them on the basis of "official data." If one adds to the above the Bedouin population of the *qada'* of Beersheba (55,000), one arrives at the oft-cited 689,000 inhabitants of Palestine on the eve of World War I.[67] The official Ottoman data from 1915 appear to be relatively reliable: The census of 1922 showed a population of 653,851 (not counting the nomadic population),[68] preceded on the one hand by a great population loss from the war and on the other by an increase due to Jewish immigration directly after the war. The statistics for 1915 thus appear to offer us usable comparison numbers.

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[67] Ruppin, pp. 8f.; Karasapan, II, p. 19; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, I/1, p. 23; regarding the demographic development of Palestine after 1882, cf. Schölch, "Araber und Juden in Palästina," pp. 15–18.

[68] Bonne, p. 36.

The figures of the first row in table 15, for the year 1850–65, are based on tables 3 and 8. Based on the comparison data from the years 1847 and 1849 and that of Finn for Jabal Nablus, we have rounded slightly downward the population figures for the *liwa*'s of Jerusalem and Nablus from the *salname* for A.H. 1288. Based on the calculations of Schwöbel and Robinson's data (tables 7 and 11), the rounding downward for the *liwa'* of Acre was greater.

The data of the second column (population ca. 1882) must be substantiated and justified in more detail. The data for the *liwa'* of Jerusalem are based on consular sources. The British consul provided statistics in 1880 according to which the total population of this *liwa'* was 210,000 souls.[69] According to statistics of the German consul for the year 1882, the *liwa'* of Jerusalem had 230,000 inhabitants.[70] This number was based on Ottoman data and was therefore accepted in table 15.

More difficult is the problem for the two other Palestinian *liwa*'s. In table 16 we first summarize the data available to us, which are all based on official sources.

Table 16: Calculations of the population of central and northern Palestine in 1880.

		Liwa' of Acre (including Bedouin)	*Liwa'* of Balqa' (without eastern Jordan regions)
1878	Males over one year	36,528	56,224
	Total population	72,427	111,634
1880	Males 18–50 years	35,368	53,359
	Total population	106,104	160,077
1882/83	*Nufus*	35,145	53,359
	Khane	19,846	21,349
	Total population	119,076	128,094

Sources: See text, p.41.

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[69] PP–1880, vol. LXXIV, pp. 259f.

[70] *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II. p. 416.

The figures for 1878 were obtained by a French official from the Ottoman authorities; he reported that he was given the number of male inhabitants of the *qada*'s of central and northern Palestine over one year of age. From this he himself calculated the total population, and quite plausibly.[71] The figures for 1880 were provided by the British Vice Consul Jago in Damascus under the heading, "Official Returns of the Male Population, Between 18 and 50, of the Vilayet of Syria for the Year 1880."[72] As this probably meant able-bodied men, we have multiplied it by three to arrive at the total population. The figures for 1882–83 come from the province *salname* for the year 1300 (see table 9). The number of *khane*s, however questionable the data might be, were multiplied as above by six, in order to obtain the total population.

It is now obvious that approximately the same base figures are the basis of the three columns, but with different data regarding the groups covered; therefore the calculations of the total population must lead to different results. How can we nevertheless arrive at a realistic estimate of the population of the two *liwa*'s at the start of the 1880s? First we give less weight to the French source. First of all it comes from the 1870s, and second, the inclusion of "males over one year of age" is unusual.

The two other sources we attempt to evaluate in light of additional data. With regard to the *liwa'* of Acre, we have already explained above why we believe Schumacher's result (153,740 inhabitants in 1886) is too high. If his calculation were correct, this would mean that in the space of only one and a half decades there was a doubling of the population, and in the following three decades, up to World War I, a decline in the population. In light of table 16 and the population in the year 1915 (table 15) one should rather assume about 110,000 souls in the early 1880s. This assumption does not appear excessive, however, if one considers that the population increase in the country up to World War I probably slowed, and there was even emigration abroad from the Christian villages of Galilee.[73] For the *liwa'* of Nablus/Balqa' we accordingly arrive at 120,000 to 130,000 inhabitants.[74]

So in the 1850s and in the first half of the 1860s, Palestine had about 350,000 inhabitants (with the population figure at this time more or less stagnating, with the exception of a few cities). After accelerated growth since the end of the 1860s, the population of the country climbed until the start of the 1880s to about 470,000 souls (the Bedouin of southern Palestine not being included in this figure). This means an increase of about a third during the second half of the period which we are studying. The growth of the twelve cities by about one-third (table 12) corresponds to this. Now in the second and third part of this study we will examine the framework of economic and socio-political changes in which this population growth occurred.

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[71] *Note et renseignements sur la Syrie et le Liban au point de vue de leur produits, des voies de communications, ports et échelles etc., decembre 1878,* in MAE–MD, vol. 123.

[72] PP–1881, vol. XC, p. 661.

[73] Trietsch, p. 30.

[74] See also Gharayiba, p. 94 and al-Ramini, p. 16f.

We will have to seek the causes of this pattern of demographic development in the assurance of greater security for the peasants (end of the battles in the *Jabal*s and the Bedouin raids in the plains), in the general economic upturn (extension of agricultural production and trade), in immigration induced by the economic situation, and perhaps also in an improvement in hygiene and medical conditions. However one should certainly not overestimate the last-named factor; the "pestilence" of the war of 1877–78 possibly claimed more victims than the cholera epidemic of 1865–66.

PART II:
European Penetration and Economic Development

3 European Interest in Palestine

The "Opening Up" of the "Holy Land"

Before we study the effects of European penetration on the development of the agriculture, economy, external trade, relations stemming from land ownership, cities, and the infrastructure of Palestine, we must first examine the constellation of European interests—political-strategic, religious-cultural, and economic—in, as well as European aspirations for, the "Holy Land." At the same time we must delve into the foundations of Europe's understanding of Palestine and of its policy for Palestine in the early twentieth century. These foundations were laid in the nineteenth century. We will show the specific role that was given to the "Holy Land" in the context of European expansion into the eastern Mediterranean. This will expose the way in which Europe imposed the Palestine conflict on the Near East in the twentieth century. This conflict did not arise in the region itself but was planted there from outside.

In other words, this chapter will show the multidimensional character of European aspirations for Palestine. Up until the establishment of the British Mandate, it had always been emphasized that the "Holy Land" was an exceptional case in the Near East: a case that did not allow exclusive domination by any European power, but one that required an international regime. The later connection between British imperialism and Zionism, on one hand, and the elimination (or displacement) of other European rivals, on the other, was based on quite specific conditions. Writing history can easily turn into a historiography of success—the story, that is, of successful movements. Here the history of the "failures" is dealt with more intensively than usual; that way, the success no longer has the semblance of inevitability.

From our description of European interests in Palestine (interests that crystallized especially after the Crimean War), it should become clear that the Zionist movement represented only *one* of many European movements during the nineteenth century that were dedicated to the "reclamation" and colonization of Palestine. The Zionist movement did not appear in its institutional form until relatively late in the game, and until British mandatory domination was established, it was by no means certain that the Zionist movement would triumph over rival aspirations.[75] The fact that it did triumph was not the result of the skill of some of Zionism's representatives and the magnanimity of individual British politicians. Rather, it was the consequence of the constellation of World War I powers and of the partial convergence of interests of British imperialism and the Zionist movement. The English "Gentile Zionists" of the nineteenth century, the forerunners of the non-Jewish supporters of Zionism, had carried out the ideological advance work for this convergence.

The point of departure for this view must be the opening of the "Holy Land" to Europe's political and religious-cultural penetration during the Egyptian domination of (geographical) Syria, which, from 1831 to 1840, included Palestine. More concretely, it would be the year 1838, when the first European consul, that of Britain, entered Jerusalem. European interests in Palestine during the following four decades can be discussed on two levels: on the level of politics among the European governments, chiefly England, Russia, France, and Prussia (or Germany); and on the level of the nongovernmental and social aspirations, trends, and movements in the context of which nineteenth-century European policy on Palestine developed. Among the latter must be counted both the notion of a "Peaceful Crusade," which was widespread on the continent, as well as the traditional Christian and Jewish interests in Palestine, especially the Anglican chiliastic concept of the "restoration of the Jews." Demands for European colonization of Palestine, often connected with the aforementioned trends, were tied to efforts of European Jews even before the rise of Zionism. Later in this book, a chapter will be devoted to these various governmental and social aspirations.

The foundation for both Europe's penetration of Palestine and for the element connecting governmental and social interests in Palestine lay in the fact that exclusive control of the "Holy Land" by a single European power seemed unthinkable up until the end of World War I. Yet every one of Europe's powers endeavored to build up and expand its presence in Palestine, particularly through religious-cultural penetration, including the "protection" of religious minorities. Toward this end, each energetically supported the philanthropic, cultural, and missionary activities of its own citizens.

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[75] For an example of retrospective periodization, see Hammad, pp. 8–13, who proposed that the Palestine question began with Montefiore's visit in 1849.

To give the reader a better understanding of this, we will recapitulate the developments from the end of the 1830s to the Crimean War. In 1831, Muhammad 'Ali, ruler of Egypt, sent his army, commanded by his son Ibrahim, against his sovereign, the sultan in Constantinople. He conquered the entire geographical region of Syria, which included Palestine. To secure the good will of the European powers, especially England, in the face of his expansionist politics, Muhammad 'Ali did two things. First, he eliminated all forms of open discrimination against the members of non-Muslim religious communities in the areas he had conquered. As subjects of the new ruler, these people had the same rights as the majority and even became to some degree privileged. Second, he facilitated political and religious-cultural penetration by the Europeans by permitting them to open consulates in the interior, and to expand and institutionalize religious missionary activities.

The most important event in Palestine in this connection was the establishment of a British consulate in Jerusalem in 1838. Because the Ottomans had to continue with Muhammad 'Ali's policy even after the Egyptians were expelled in 1840, Jerusalem witnessed the entrance of still other European consuls[76] and religious dignitaries. As a result, the European public's interest in the "Holy Land" markedly increased. Thus, Palestine fell into that whirlpool of conflicting European interests: the Great Powers' "Eastern question" of the nineteenth century. Once the "Holy Land" had come into view, inordinate desires were awakened, plans were devised, and visions were given free rein. None of these, however, was politically feasible, despite the fact that the sultan would not have been able to drive the Egyptians out of Syria and Palestine without European (primarily British and Austrian) help.

Clearly, European intervention was undertaken only for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, Britain's Middle Eastern policy held the conservation of the empire's core as its most urgent goal. For this reason, until World War I there was hardly any possibility that all of the powers would agree on the partition of the empire. Hence, all had to accept, willingly or not, the great European powers' fundamental political premise in the Middle East: maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The difficult problem—the nineteenth century's "Eastern question"—was: How much of the Ottoman Empire had to be preserved, and in what form, to protect the interests of the European powers? Palestine belonged to the core of the empire. European penetration therefore was not a matter of territorial control, but of influence. One of the most important vehicles through which the European powers tried to exercise their influence was the "protection" of non-Muslim minorities in the Ottoman Empire. This factor became decisive for the continued development of Palestine until World War I. For those seeking to acquire influence through religious-cultural penetration and by means of a "religious protectorate," what country other than the "Holy Land" could have held out a greater promise of success?

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[76] These included a Prussian consulate (1842), a French and a Sardinian consulate (1843), an American consulate (1844), and an Austrian-Hungarian consulate (1849).

The Establishment of the English and Prussian Presence

In England's view, Russia and France had taken the lead in the race to gain influence by means of "protecting" minorities. The former was the traditional "protecting power" of the Orthodox Christians, while the latter held the same position for Catholic Christians, both in Palestine and in the Middle East generally. It was high time that this lead was narrowed. The Protestant powers, especially England and Prussia, first had to find (or, more exactly, create) their own protégés: Jews and Protestants. They recognized that, just to set foot in the "Holy Land" and exercise any right to be involved, they would to some extent have to contest the "natural" strong points of Russia and France. This resulted in the appointment of a British consul for Jerusalem in 1838. At the outset, he was supposed to form a counterweight to the feared expansion of Russian influence.[77] Thus, the first step in a systematic European penetration of Palestine was made in the context of European rivalries concerning the "Eastern question." This rivalry continued to be the most important factor in the period under consideration.

But Protestantism still had no institutional base in the "Holy Land" from which it could compete with the religious institutions of the Orthodox and the Catholics. This base was created with the establishment of an Anglo-Prussian Episcopal See in Jerusalem in 1841 and the building of a Protestant "cathedral," Christ Church, dedicated in 1849.[78] The installation of a Protestant bishop resulted from the activities of British missionary societies (primarily the Church Missionary Society, founded in 1799, and the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews, founded in 1809),[79] as well as from the political interests of the British government and the Prussian church policies carried out under Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

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[77] On this point see especially Vereté, "Why was a British Consulate Established?" pp. 316–45. Vereté refutes not only the claim by Tibawi (*British Interests*, pp. 2, 27, and 34f.) that the appointment of a British consul was due to the demands of English missionaries, but also the direct link, frequently made in the Zionist literature, between this measure and English efforts for "a return of the Jews" under British protection.

[78] On the founding of the episcopate and the Anglican and German Protestant activities in Palestine in the nineteenth century, see Greaves; Tibawi, *British Interests*; Hajjar, *L'Europe;* Schmidt-Clausen; Hertzberg; Hanselmann; Mahafiza, *Al-'alaqat*, pp. 40–70; Sinno.

[79] On this point, see also de le Roi, III, pp. 172–203; and Hammer, sect. 11.

In building a unified Protestant state church, the Prussian king was pursuing the goal of creating a high church modelled after the English one; he could make a symbolic beginning with this project by founding an Anglican evangelical episcopate in Jerusalem. The originator of this idea and the man charged with its realization was the ambassador, Bunsen,[80] who led the London negotiations in 1841. In his instructions to Bunsen, Friedrich Wilhelm IV wrote:

> The present condition of Turkish affairs, namely the political position of England and Prussia concerning these affairs, has clearly not arisen without divine guidance. It has given Protestant Christianity the possibility, for the first time, to claim a place for itself in the cradle of Christianity, the Promised Land. This will enable it to secure unfettered preaching for the Gospel, confessional freedom for those who profess the Protestant truth, and equal protection, side by side with the primeval churches of the Orient and the Roman church, as an equal member of the church of Christ. This moment is important for world history: The Protestant church will be judged by history and by God according to whether it considers and utilizes, or whether it disregards and neglects this moment.[81]

In England, the idea of a Protestant episcopate in Palestine was not new; it had been especially promoted by the influential Earl of Shaftesbury. Hence, an understanding with Prussia quickly materialized, particularly since the Anglican church had greater influence. The bishops would be appointed alternately by the English and Prussian crowns but would always be ordained by the archbishop of Canterbury. Both Prussia and England would contribute equal shares for their support.

The choice of the first bishop—the converted Jew Michael Solomon Alexander[82]—was influenced by the goal of creating a nucleus around which a Protestant community could crystallize. Another determining factor that figured high in British Protestantism was the "restoration of the Jews," the conversion and repatriation of the Jews, which was supposed to receive its decisive impulse from Jerusalem.[83] Before the appointment of a consul, the missionaries of the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews had been the most important British representatives in the "Holy Land." The chief task of Bishop Alexander was therefore supposed to be the conversion of Jews; he still had to create a Protestant congregation out of converted Jews. It was also the representative of the above-named London Society who, without the permission of the authorities, had already begun—in 1839—to build a Protestant church. It was not until 1845 that the sultan's *firman* (decree) conclusively granted approval for this. Christ Church was finally dedicated in 1849.

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[80] See Höcker on this point.

[81] Quoted in Roth, p. 53.

[82] See Corey.

[83] Friedrich Wilhelm IV's position on this question (which corresponded to that of the British) is discussed in Sinno, pp. 32–40.

The rate of conversion of the Jews was, to be sure, minimal; their resistance seemed insurmountable. For this reason Alexander's successor, Samuel Gobat[84]—who in accordance with the turn-taking agreement was appointed by Prussia and sent to Jerusalem in 1846—set this original goal aside. He directed his missionary zeal primarily toward the native Orthodox Christians. In conjunction with this shift in the political line and the proselytizing activities of the episcopate, the Jews of Palestine were placed under the amplified political protection of England.[85] Young, the first British consul, had been directed in 1839 to attend to the general protection of the Jews as an important part of his official duties, and when his successor, Finn, entered government service there in the spring of 1846, he also was enjoined to carry out this task. He was supposed to take all Jews under his wing, whether they were British subjects or not. Young wrote in an 1839 report that two groups would doubtless demand a strong voice in the future concerns of Palestine: the first were the Jews, to whom God had originally given ownership of this land; and the second were the Protestant Christians, their legitimate successors. Great Britain would be the natural protector of both groups, who henceforth would be among those laying claim to Palestine.[86]

In 1850, the Protestants were recognized as an official religious community in the Ottoman Empire, and thus a secure basis for the exercise of this protecting function was in place. A Protestant episcopacy had been founded in cooperation with Prussia, Jerusalem had a Protestant "cathedral," and England had assumed the protection of all the Jews in Palestine (especially those who desired it). All the hopes and strivings of a political nature that went beyond this, however, were doomed to remain the stuff of dreams.

Throughout Europe, projects and demands for "taking possession" or controlling the "Holy Land" surfaced during the "Eastern crises" of the

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[84] See Carmel, *Christen als Pioniere im Heiligen Land*, chapter 3. (This book is a history of the activities of the pilgrimage mission of Basel in Palestine.)

[85] In this connection, see Hyamson, *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*. In 1856 there were 697 people under British protection in Palestine, of whom 192 were British subjects. As far as their religious affiliation was concerned, 448 of them were Jews and only 56 Protestants: ISA–BCJ, J22/6 (General Return of all Persons enjoying British Protection within the Jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Consulate at Jerusalem, 21 July 1856). In the year 1879 the indigenous Protestant congregation in the *sanjaq* of Jerusalem numbered 603 people: PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1264 (Jerusalem, 1 October 1879).

[86] Hyamson, *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*, I, p. 4.

1830s and the beginning of the 1840s, especially in connection with the European powers' support of the sultan during the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria. Friedrich Wilhelm IV answered one petition (31 August 1839) which proposed the establishment of an independent, Christian state of Jerusalem under the protection of the Great Powers—with resignation:

> I certainly share the wish that is expressed in your petition, that is . . . to elevate Jerusalem to the status of a Christian imperial state. Please do not fail to recognize the difficulties that stand in the way of this wish, and do not deceive yourself about the ease with which it may be realized.[87]

In 1841 a call was issued from English missionary circles not to waste this golden opportunity, in which the fate of the territories of the "disorganized empire of the Turks" would be decided. A circular demanded that Europe ask the Porte to hand over Palestine to Christendom, so that it could be transformed into an independent, self-governing, Christian territory under the auspices of the Christian sovereigns of Europe and Asia. A sovereign should be installed who would be agreeable to all the Christian nations and whose kingly authority they would fully recognize. The sultan would doubtless agree to this, the circular added, since this Christian kingdom would be a protective barrier against the expansionist efforts of the ruler of Egypt.[88]

But the "opportunity" slipped by unexploited. A propagandist for the "Peaceful Crusade" later wrote: "If we had been better oriented after the Turks were restored to possession of the Promised Land by means of the Christian powers' inverted crusade of 1840, the negotiations about the regulation of Christian possessions would have achieved their goal. Only Friedrich Wilhelm IV, Prussia's king, with his nobility and Christian sympathies, tried to bring up the common Christian interest of the allied powers, but he could not arrive at any agreement."[89]

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[87] Found in MAE–MD, vol. 127; for the plan to internationalize Jerusalem, see also Hajjar, *L'Europe*, pp. 352–72, and Vereté, "A Plan for the Internationalization of Jerusalem."

[88] *Circular of a Project for the Erection of Palestine into an Independent State, 1841.*

[89] Sepp, I, pp. xxf. As late as 1964 a German Protestant professor of theology and former church provost in Jerusalem wrote: "Never in the course of history had the European powers held the Holy Land in their power as they did then, when Ibrahim Pasha was forced to give Syria and Palestine back to the Sultan . . . . The Crusader's dream could have been realized without any difficulties. The outstretched hand over Jerusalem had only to seize it; no earnest opposition by the Sultan would have ensued, quite apart from the fact that he lacked the power to lend emphasis to such opposition.But nothing happened . . . . One can understand why there was then and later general head-shaking among the Christian peoples of Europe at this kind of politics!" (Hertzberg, p. 6).

At the same time England's "Gentile Zionists" broke into everyday politics with their notion of the "restoration of the Jews"; such notions were worked out at the level of foreign policy. In 1840 Palmerston, under the influence of Lord Shaftesbury, tried to win the sultan over to the idea of a "return" of the Jews, arguing that they should be encouraged to settle in Palestine. On the one hand, the sultan and the empire would profit from the riches that "a great number of wealthy capitalists" would give to Palestine. On the other hand, the Jews there would form a barrier against any future ambitions of Muhammad 'Ali. During the 1840s many British journalists, clerics, politicians, colonial officials, and officers were more direct: they demanded, in one form or another, Jewish colonies or even a Jewish state under British protection, to fulfill the goal of the "restoration of the Jews" and to protect British strategic and commercial interests in the region.[90] Equally pressing demands for direct occupation or control of Palestine by England—be it for Britain's own interest or with the aim of repatriating the Jews—were not made again until the crisis years around 1880 and then during World War I.

France and Palestine

With the establishment of British and Prussian consulates (in 1838 and 1842, respectively) and a Protestant espicopacy in Jerusalem, England and Prussia had taken the lead in the religious-political rivalries of the European powers in Palestine. Now these measures demanded a new institutional anchoring of the Catholic/French and Orthodox/Russian presence. Up until that point, the "traditional" role of protector of the Middle East Christians had by no means established any special political influence for Russia and France. Toward this end, a race to secure and expand the European privileges and religious-cultural presence began, first during the 1840s and in accelerated form during the Crimean War (1853–56).

The revival of the Latin patriarchate, abandoned since the Crusades, followed the founding of the Protestant episcopacy. After the arrival of a French consul in Jerusalem in 1843, a Latin patriarch, Joseph Valerga,[91] appeared (1848). France viewed the reinforcement of the Catholic presence in Palestine as its specific mission, as the urgent task of French policy in the "Holy Land."[92] The extent to which the French archival material on nineteenth-century Palestine concentrates on France's religious protectorate and religious-cultural penetration is astonishing. Both the correspondence between Jerusalem and Paris and the many volumes of the foreign ministry's *Mémoires et Documents*[93] recount the problems connected with the acquisition of "holy places," and go into such details as the restoration of the dome over the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Great diplomatic efforts had to be made in order to ward off threats to the exclusive French protectorate over the Catholics in the Middle East and block the claims of Italy, Spain, and Austria.[94] Naturally, these other states, and later the German Empire as well, wanted to "protect" their own Catholics and the Catholic institutions that they supported; what is more, they sought additional Christian protégés.

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[90] See Hyamson, *British Projects*, pp. 5–21; Kobler, pp. 58–81; Hajjar, *L'Europe*, pp. 325–40; Sharif, pp. 127–32.

[91] See Duvignau. According to a "Tableau Statistique du Patriarcat Latin de Jérusalem en 1866" (in MAE–MD, vol. 127), the Latin population of all the parishes in Palestine numbered 7,102 souls at that time. The number of "neo-catholiques dans les nouvelles missions" was given as 1,679.

As with the other powers, especially England, the protectionist politics of France could not necessarily be brought into harmony with the principles of its relationship with the Ottoman Empire. According to a January 1863 memorandum of the French foreign ministry, sympathy for the Christian population had dominated French policy in the Middle East, especially since the Crimean War. This was, moreover, a tradition. At the same time, a precipitate collapse of the Ottoman Empire had to be prevented. This was inconsistent, to be sure, but this inconsistency was also a tradition.[95]

Not until the end of the 1870s did the fixation on the religious protectorate in Palestine begin to slacken. Other possibilities for penetration could now be seen in sharper focus. In 1879, the French consul took pride in sending to Paris the first report about Jaffa's commercial activity, and asked that it be brought to the confidential attention of the chamber of commerce in Marseilles.[96] A few months later the consulate outlined the advantages that French capital investment in Palestine would bring. For example, if a harbor installation were built in Jaffa, not only would Marseilles profit from it, but the political influence of France would increase. One could secure a "new, solid position" in the Mediterranean, in both a commercial and strategic sense, by peaceful means. The government need do nothing more than allow this "peaceful conquest" by French capital to play itself out—until the day came when the government might conclude that it was in its interest to safeguard the results by military means.[97]

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[92] In this connection, see Eichmann, pp. 78–114; Guérin, *Jérusalem*, pp. 389–415; Verney and Dambmann, especially pp. 69–115; Lamy; Young, II, pp. 126–39; Hajjar, *L'Europe*; Hajjar, *Le Vatican*, especially pp. 115–33 and 264–324; Schlicht, pp. 148–80 and 237–48.

[93] See MAE–MD, vols. 98, 107, 127, 128, 129, and 133.

[94] For the Italian and Austrian presence in Palestine, see Guarmani, pp. 210–341; Minerbi; Breycha-Vauthier.

[95] "Note sur les affairs de l'Orient," January 1863, in MAE–MD, vol. 116.

[96] MAE–CCC Jér., vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 31 July 1879).

In subsequent years complaints by the consuls accumulated: French commerce and French capital were not sufficiently engaged, both in the Levant overall and in Palestine specifically. The field had been completely left to the English and the Germans. The pace of economic penetration had to be stepped up to match that of the religious protectorate; Syria and Palestine must be "peacefully conquered." A corresponding economic presence would guarantee that France would have to be reckoned with "*au jour de l'échéance finale*" (on the day of the final accounting).[98]

Without doubt, the French government was preparing itself for this day. In the years 1880 and 1881 two missions were dispatched to Syria and Palestine to reconnoiter the situation and collect information about strategic roads, railways, possibilities of capital investment, and so on. But an occupation of Syria by French troops in the south should not be extended beyond Galilee, as the comprehensive report of the first mission stated, because this would trap France in a web of serious religious and political complications.[99]

This was how the fundamental premises of the Great Powers' Palestine policy were addressed. One could try to gain as firm a footing as possible there, by means of "peaceful conquest," and chase down a suitable position for oneself, but until World War I an exclusive domination or control by any single power was unthinkable. Protectorate politics remained the best-tried means. Lamy's observation about France's position in the entire Levant at the end of the century holds at least for Palestine: "In contrast to our political preponderance and our commercial preeminence, our religious protectorate has not disappointed us."[100] As far as the Vatican was concerned, it would do well to leave everything to the "Catholic apostolic mission" of France, that "most Catholic of nations."[101]

To be sure, after the beginning of the twentieth century the French conception of the religious protectorate ran into difficulties, because of anti-clerical domestic politics in France, the diplomatic break with the Vatican in 1904, and the forced sharing of the protectorate with Italy. Nevertheless, the French position in Syria remained uncontested, so that during World War I, when England was planning for the aftermath of the war, it saw itself confronted with massive French claims in Palestine, just as before. France, however (in contrast to other European powers, particularly England), had never developed a specific policy for Palestine. French policy was much more a part of its politics regarding Syria and its protectorate over the Catholics. To the extent that the French had developed aspirations for an exclusively French territorial bridgehead in the Middle East, they aimed towards Maronite Lebanon, toward a marriage of "Cedar and Lily."[102]

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[97] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 14 (Jerusalem, 24 October 1879).

[98] Ibid. (Jerusalem, 27 July 1880 and 12 January 1881).

[99] "Rapport sur une Mission en Syrie (avril-juin 1880)," in MAE–MD, vol. 123; see also vol. 124.

[100] Lamy, p. 164; see also pp. 239 and 335.

[101] Ibid., pp. 335–85.

Russia and Palestine

For the Western powers the role of protector was only one of many levers through which they could exercise control in the Ottoman Empire. It was, of course, a lever that had proven quite effective in Palestine. But for Russia it was more. The protection of Orthodox Christians—that is, religious-cultural penetration—was the most important instrument of Russian policy in the Levant, and in Palestine it was basically the only one.[103] Hopwood's characterization of the basis of this "protection politics" also holds, *mutatis mutandis,* for the Palestine politics of other powers:

> For most [Russian politicians] if religion had any relevance at all, it was pressed into service as the handmaiden of politics. For a few, a genuine concern for the Christians of the Ottoman Empire was the mainspring of their policy. Yet others—usually those who held no responsibility for the direction of policy—dreamed of Constantinople out of Muslim hands as a step towards the eventual liberation of all Ottoman Christians.[104]

But it is a matter of record that Russia established its political presence in Palestine because of the activities of other powers. Not that the dream of Russian rule had not enticed it even before this. Just as Friedrich Wilhelm IV had revealed his personal vision in the cabinet note cited earlier, Czar Nicholas I confessed in 1833, in answer to a memo that Russia should seize the "Holy Land": "You have guessed my innermost desire; but I know that its fulfillment is difficult and will meet important obstacles."[105] In fact, the wish could never have been fulfilled. Up until World War I, Russian policy was much more concerned with avoiding anything that could provoke the Western powers. Russia also had little enthusiasm for a collective protectorate over Palestine by the Great Powers, once the period of Egyptian rule had ended.

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[102] See Schlicht, passim.

[103] See especially Hopwood; also, compare Eichmann, pp. 47–77; d'Alonzo; Stavrou, "Russian Interest in the Levant"; Stavrou, *Russian Interests in Palestine.*

[104] Hopwood, p. 1.

[105] Quoted in ibid., p. 7.

It was not until western European consuls, a Protestant bishop, and a Latin patriarch moved into Jerulsalem, and Protestant and Catholic missionary activity began to overwhelm the Orthodox Arab Christians, that Russia felt it could no longer remain inactive. Russia's first move was to dispatch a Russian mission to Palestine (1843–44 and 1848–54) under the abbot superior, Porfiri Uspenski. He was expected to sound out the situation, encourage the Orthodox Arabs, and build up a modest Russian position. Just as the English consul had been sent to Jerusalem to ward off a feared Russian expansion, so the Anglo-Prussian activities (in addition to those of the French) had summoned the Russians to the playing field.

As is well known, one of the factors that triggered the Crimean War was the Russian demand that their protectorate over *all* Orthodox subjects of the sultan be recognized. After the war, the Russian presence in Palestine was supposed to be established more effectively. In 1857, the foreign ministry wrote in a report to the Czar: "We must establish our 'presence' in the East not politically but through the church. Neither the Turks nor the Europeans, who have their patriarchs and bishops in the Holy City, can refuse us this . . . . Jerusalem is the centre of the world and our mission must be there."[106]

Shortly before this, in 1856, the Russian steamship company had been founded that was supposed to compete with the French and Austrian Mediterranean lines and snatch away the business of conveying Russian pilgrims to Palestine. (The Russian pilgrims represented the largest contingent in the yearly flood of pilgrims to the "Holy Land"; it reached its zenith in 1900 with a total of 11,000.) To promote the steamship company, it was suggested that someone should be sent to Jerusalem who could act in the dual capacity of shipping company representative and Russian consul. Porfiri Uspenski commented on this proposal with enthusiasm:

> Orthodoxy will triumph eventually. Constantinople will be ours. We must have . . . our representatives throughout the Arab East. We must have the shipping company, consuls, and large amounts of money. All these are necessary to support and uplift Orthodoxy.[107]

Thus both a Russian bishop and a Russian consul/shipping agent entered Jerusalem at the same time, in 1858. In the same year the Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, who until then had resided in Constantinople, transferred his seat back to the "Holy City."

However, the Greek clergy and the Russian representatives did not work hand in hand—on the contrary. The Russians were convinced that the Greeks were neither willing nor able to protect the Orthodox Arab

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[106] Quoted in ibid., p. 51.
[107] Quoted in ibid., p. 61.

Christians from the dangers threatening them; they also thought that the Greeks could not satisfy Orthodox cultural and religious needs. Hence, they instructed the new Russian bishop particularly to support the Arabs. This way, the Russians bypassed the Greek clergy and created for themselves a clientele of native Orthodox Christians.[108]

As was also the case for the western Europeans, the following years witnessed an almost hectic burst of Russian activity in Palestine. Land was purchased and churches, hostels, and schools and so on were built. The most imposing complex, the architectural design of which surpassed that of any other European structure, was the "Russian compound" that was erected in front of the gates of Jerusalem. In 1882, Russian activities were given a further impetus by the founding of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, which had three main tasks: to support pilgrims, to promote scientific activities (on the model of the British Palestine Exploration Fund or the German *Palästina-Verein*), and to uplift Orthodoxy.

Although the Palestine policy pursued by the Russian government since the end of the 1850s was anything but coherent, and the activities of its representatives in the "Holy Land" had been hindered by many quarrels and divergent notions of its goals, by the beginning of the twentieth century the overall goal had been accomplished. A presence had been built that could not be overlooked. Russia could, and would, do no more. Because of Russia's internal and external weaknesses, its influence in Palestine dwindled rapidly after 1905, and when the February 1917 revolution took place, all claims were abandoned.

European Palestine Politics in Perspective

Until 1917 the basic constellation of rivalries among the European powers and confessional communities in Palestine did not experience any essential changes. Each government acted within the context of its own Middle East policy; none could seriously think of claiming the "Holy Land" for itself exclusively, although this was what vehement propagandists and religious enthusiasts in these countries demanded. Moreover, the new stages in the "Eastern question," which began with the Crimean War, and then at the end of the 1870s, did not bring about any fundamental alteration in the pattern of European presence in Palestine. To be sure, European politics in the Near East acquired a new quality at the beginning of the 1850s through the forced economic penetration of the country. For European politics in the "Holy Land," however, cultural-religious penetration was even more important than economic penetration (which will be dealt with in the chapter about the economic development of Palestine). Cultural-religious penetration accelerated after 1856.

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[108] The higher clergy in the Orthodox church was predominantly Greek, while the lower clergy was predominantly Arab in origin. Because of this there was tension within the Orthodox clergy itself.

After the outbreak of the Crimean War, the western European consuls in Palestine had been instructed to discontinue anything at their posts that might harm the efforts to "regenerate" the Ottoman Empire and protect its integrity. But at the same time, the European powers were loudly and openly calling for a "Peaceful Crusade," this "effective take-over of the Holy Land." The large Mediterranean shipping companies now called at the Palestinian ports regularly and brought crowds of pilgrims and travellers into the country. During the holiday seasons there seemed to be more pilgrims crowding the streets of Jerusalem than there were residents in the city. Religious and biblical-archaeological interest in the "Holy Land" was supported by national associations that had confessional, scientific, and political orientations and which had their own publications. Missionaries, pilgrims, and "Palestine explorers" produced a mass of literature that could not be overlooked. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Europeans could get more detailed information about Palestine than they could get about any other non-European area. The European public was more convinced that they had "rights of ownership" in Palestine than in any other non-European territory.

Ever since the European presence in Palestine began, this religious-cultural zeal was continuously amalgamated with political claims and demands for a "reconquest," or colonization. These aspects of European thinking on the future of the "Holy Land" carried even more weight at the end of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s, after Europe had intervened in the region directly and after the Schwabian Templars had successfully established their colonization enterprise (beginning in 1868). Territorial claims were asserted and hypothetical spheres of interest were marked off. But demands of this kind could not be realized, neither in the phase after the Crimean War nor in the years after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882.

Even when England's policy toward the Ottoman Empire changed in the late nineteenth century, England had to rest content with its role as a special protecting power for the Protestants and the Jews and with the promotion of its trade. France had to be satisfied with the energetic promotion of Catholic interests in Jerusalem, within the framework of its claim to a religious protectorate over all Catholics in the Middle East and also in the context of its policy for Syria. Russia's Palestine policy was more defensive than assertive; it was implemented in order to preserve the Orthodox presence and resources there. The primary interest of Russia was focused on Constantinople and the straits, not on Palestine. Germany limited itself to making commercial ties and building up the German presence by means of Christian charitable works. Even the "German settlements" in the "Holy Land" did not change this policy. The protection of German colonists did not become the basis of an aggressive German Palestine policy, because such enterprises were not allowed to endanger the building of ties with Constantinople (especially after the 1880s).[109]

In a certain sense the German Empire even took over England's position as the principal guardian of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This constellation was only broken by the Zionist movement, which sought one of the Great Powers as a partner, and by the possibilities that World War I opened up in this regard.

In what follows, we will depict the nongovernmental efforts, movements, and demands in the climate of which Europe's Palestine politics developed. These aspirations functioned both as a stimulus and as ideological legitimization, and were only to a limited extent "peaceful." During the "Eastern crises" of the nineteenth century they often turned into aggressive demands for European occupation and rule of Palestine. Yet this agitation remained fruitless as long as the existence of the Ottoman Empire was not fundamentally brought into question by the Great Powers. It was not until World War I that the situation made such solutions possible.

"The Restoration of the Jews"

One specific component of the British interest in Palestine was rooted in Britain's intellectual history. This was the chiliastic concept of the "restoration of the Jews" that was developed by Anglican messianism and evangelism. The doctrine had already been completely worked out by the beginning of the nineteenth century;[110] hardly a single new thought was added to it by the voluminous literature during the following hundred years. According to this doctrine, the fulfillment of the prophecies about the Last Day was indivisibly linked to the repatriation of the Jews to the land of their fathers, to which they had an inalienable right. Their physical and religious "restoration"—that is, the end of their diaspora, their gathering in Palestine, and their acceptance of the Christian gospel—was conceived of as an essential component of the divine plan for human redemption and as a prerequisite for the advent of the Kingdom of Christ. The question remained open as to whether the conversion of the Jews must take place before their repatriation to Palestine or whether it could occur later.

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[109] Until recently the only works on the German policy for Palestine in the nineteenth century were essentially Roth's work and Carmel's "Die deutsche Palästinapolitik 1871–1914." Carmel deals with the problem by taking the example of the imperial government's relationship with the Templars. Roth's book is a popularized description without exact source references. Furthermore, Roth is somewhat overwhelmed by his material, since he gives way to the completely misguided observation that, in the age of Kaiser Wilhelm II, "Palestine had long been the home base of widespread German activity which concentrated on sources of raw materials, capital investments, consumer markets, stocks and dividends, positions of political power, and their protection by military means" (p. 238). Palestine as the home base of German imperialism?! At any rate, we now have studies by two Arab historians: Mahafiza, *Al-'alaqat*, chapters 1 and 2, and especially Sinno, passim. Sinno's work is the most comprehensive and most differentiated portrait to date.

[110] See Kobler and, especially, Vereté, "The Restoration of the Jews."

Interpretations of the "signs of the times"—which proclaimed the "restoration" and with it the advent of the Last Day—led again and again to "correctable" errors. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, evidence of a collapse of papal and Islamic power (i.e., Ottoman Empire) was interpreted as such a sign. Of necessity, one's conclusion about which nation or ruler would be singled out to be the tool of divine providence and take charge of the "restoration" varied depending on the power constellation. When Napoleon landed in Egypt and then marched toward Palestine (1798–99), he appeared to have been chosen to carry out God's will. But in subsequent years in the eyes of the supporters of the doctrine it became clearer and clearer this role had gone to England.

These notions had a broader impact when they were reinforced by the evangelical revivalist movement of the nineteenth century. Every "Eastern crisis"—at the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century; at the end of the 1830s and the beginning of the 1840s; during the Crimean War; and at the end of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s—triggered a wave of chiliastic sermons, pamphlets, books, projects, and political demands. The conclusions that people drew from this body of perceptions varied with each crisis; in other words, they were tailored to suit the realities and exigencies of day-to-day politics.

"Britain rejoice!" said a pamphlet during the Crimean War. "It will fall to you to lead the long dispersed members of the neglected race of Judah back to their beautiful land and, by planting in their homeland a colony (whose bond to its protector cannot be doubted) put another obstacle in the path of the menacing intruder [i.e., Russia]." That the conversion of the Jews to Christianity represented a truth that had already been predicted, under divine inspiration, by the prophets was self-evident and hardly had to be emphasized again. But the conversion need not take place before the return to the "Holy Land."[111]

One author who lived in Palestine during those years was less enthusiastic. Where is the statesman, he asked skeptically, who could bring about the rebirth of the Jewish nation, the establishment of a "regenerated kingdom, supported by Christian swords and scepters against the now rightful possessors of an inheritance once so hallowed; supported, indeed, against itself, at least while the impurities which caused its destruction remain unchanged . . . " He consoled himself, however, with the thought that this would occur through "an open manifestation of creative power at the decreed time."[112]

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[111] *The Final Exodus*, pp. 14 and 25.

The Ottoman bankruptcy of 1875 and the years of crisis that resulted from it brought forth still more "signs of the times." "All Christians . . . should rejoice at the decline of the Ottoman Empire," preached Hoare, "because the ruin of the Muslims is the hope of the Jews, and the return of the Jews will be the blissful herald of the triumphant advent of the glorious king of Jerusalem." Palestine would be freed from the blight of Turkish misgovernment and "be entrusted to its lawful owners, the descendants of Abraham, the nation to whom God gave it, so that it wil again become a country once again in which milk and honey flow."[113] But ". . . it would be a very poor blessing to [the children of] Israel if they were restored to their home, but not brought back to God." The conversion would not happen, however, until after the return.[114]

James Neil, who had lived in Palestine from 1871 to 1874, confirmed that the "signs of the times" did indeed point to the impending "restoration." He cited in particular the growth of the Jewish population of the country resulting from the increasing number of "returning" Jews. But at the same time he also warned against short-term expectations, especially since the papacy and the Greek church had settled in Palestine on a massive scale and would not give ground so quickly.[115]

Naturally, the doctrine of the "restoration of the Jews" did not become a general conviction for the population of Great Britain. But the authoritative assertion that Palestine was truly the God-given home of the Jews, to which they sooner or later would return, gained wide currency. In this restricted sense the idea of the "restoration" became a commonplace bit of knowledge. Like a self-evident fact that one mentioned only to confirm, it permeated the English literature on Palestine in the second half of the nineteenth century.[116] In association with the "Peaceful Crusade" that was being preached on the continent, appeals were even made for a Crusade that would pave the way for the Jews.

"[I]f persuasive eloquence was my particular gift," wrote Walker after a sojourn in Palestine, "I would preach throughout Christendom a new crusade—of the plough and the pruning-hook—for the obliteration from the sacred soil of Palestine of every trace of the grass-destroying hoof-prints of the Moslum spoiler." These "miserable, ignorant, half-wild

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[112] Dupuis, I, pp. 156f.

[113] Hoare, *Rome, Turkey, and Jerusalem*, pp. 48 and 103.

[114] Hoare, *Palestine and Russia*, pp. 22 and 27.

[115] Neil, *Palestine Re-Peopled*, pp. 8–11, 36f., 41, 73–77, and 109.

[116] For a description of the parallel millenarianism in the United States, the Protestant evangelical revivalist movement, and its relationship to Palestine, see Levine.

Arabs, with their dirty villages and wretched hovels" cannot be the "fit successors and rightful heirs of the millions of intelligent, refined, highly-civilised, and well-governed subjects whom David and Solomon ruled over in the days of Israel's glory"! If one were to preach a violent crusade to rescue Palestine from the unbelievers, one would hope that it would be possible to get better results than those produced by the holy wars of the Middle Ages. But those times were gone, and one would no longer have to have recourse to these means, since " . . . it has become a recognised duty of powerful and prosperous nations to interfere for the protection of oppressed peoples, and the better ordering of ill-governed lands"— both by diplomatic means and through "extra-diplomatic pressure." More than that would not be necessary in the case of Palestine—nothing more than what the public opinion of the Christian world would sanction. Only the Jews had a legitimate right to Palestine, however; whoever created order there would have to do this in order to "prepare it for the re-occupancy of its rightful owners." The task of the "organizing power" would be fulfilled as soon as the Jews were ready, as a nation, to take over their country themselves. Until then one could prepare them for the responsibilities of an independent national existence.[117] Reflections of this kind were radically formulated; the link between the Crusade motif and the concept of "restoration" was not an everyday, commonplace thing. But in light of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, one cannot dismiss them as absurdities.

Toward the end of the 1870s the idea of "restoration" was joined even more strongly with imperialist tendencies and was linked with all kinds of projects.[118] Edward Cazalet, the British industrialist, called for the establishment of a British protectorate over Palestine in 1878–79, with the goal of leading the Jews back to Palestine and creating a lasting bond between the country and England.[119] Charles Warren, one of the well-known activists of the Palestine Exploration Fund, in the face of the Ottoman bankruptcy proposed that the "Holy Land" be placed under the supervision of a company—modeled after the East India Company —for twenty years. The company would guarantee to pay the government in Constantinople the money accruing from taxes in Palestine and would pay the government's creditors a portion of the interest that was due. The company's task would be to settle Jews in the country, step by step, so that Palestine would ultimately come under their ownership and control. Certainly the question might arise of what would happen to the Arabs of Palestine. Warren said, "I ask in turn: Who are the Arabs?" This was his entire contribution to the solution of this problem.[120]

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[117] Walker, pp. 39, 255–76, 283–85, and 293f.

[118] See Hyamson, *British Projects*, pp. 22–36; Sharif, p. 133.

[119] See Hyamson, *British Projects*, pp. 33f.; Kobler, p. 96.

[120] Warren, *The Land of Promise*, pp. 5f. Regarding English rule over Palestine, he

Conder, the popular director of the *Survey of Western Palestine*, knew of something, at least, that could be done with the inhabitants of the country. In his view, no one was better suited to take charge of the regeneration of Palestine and instruct its present population in the discipline of agriculture than its rightful owners, the Jews, who were energetic, industrious, and tactful by nature. To be sure, the native peasants were "terribly ignorant, fanatic, and above all inveterate liars" but they also had qualities "that, if developed, would make a useful population out of them"—useful, that is, for the owners of the country.[121]

Once stripped of its chiliastic wrappings, the doctrine of the inalienable right of the Jews to Palestine, their repatriation, and the role that Britain thereby acquired, became a commonplace in the English literature on Palestine. It was an essential component of the British understanding of Palestine. Increasingly, the image of the conversion of the Jews to Christianity was lost. At the onset of World War I the doctrine was still effective in this form. The fascination of the concept in its secularized form, as it were, was mixed with the political considerations of war and the imperial strategy that gave birth to the Balfour Declaration in 1917. When Balfour expressed his conviction in 1919 that Zionism was "of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land [Palestine],"[122] he was doubtless expressing the innermost thoughts of the majority of the English population. The goal of the "restoration of the Jews" had imperceptibly been equated with the goals of Zionism; in the context of imperialist policy, the "restorationists" identified themselves with the Zionists.[123]

"The Peaceful Crusade"

Whereas the concept of the "restoration of the Jews" represented the specifically Anglican, evangelical piece in the mosaic of Europe's religious-cultural aspirations for Palestine,[124] the notion of a resumption

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writes: "That the Englishman will eventually find it necessary to establish himself in the country, I do not, myself, in any way doubt." Warren, *Underground Jerusalem*, p. 448.

[121] Conder, "The Present Condition of Palestine," pp. 8f.

[122] Quoted in Sykes, p. 5.

[123] For example, see Sidebotham, pp. 173ff.

[124] There were also isolated advocates of this chiliastic concept in Germany; see for example Boegehold, *Die Zukunft Israels und des Heiligen Landes* and Zimpel, *Mahnruf an die ganze Christenheit*. In this *Mahnruf* ("admonition"), of which 100,000 copies in various languages were ostensibly distributed, the idea of the return of the Jews was joined with the Crusade concept, as it was in the writings of Walker. It was not made clear, however, what kind of religious-political system should be established after the "liberation" of Jerusalem.

and continuation of the work of the Crusades by other means was widespread among the Catholics of the continent, as well as the German Protestants and millenarians. This was the idea of the "Peaceful Crusade," which meant primarily the gradual "reconquest" of the "Holy Land" for Christianity through religious, cultural, and philanthropical penetration.

> Palestine should not be greeted with the clash of weapons but rather with the silent tokens of Christian love, with the eye of the explorer, and the fruits of peaceful labor. The emissaries of the West should now be preachers of the Gospel, brothers and sisters who serve, and teachers and scholars. Through their teaching and help, through service and tolerance, they wanted to bring the Holy Land and its inhabitants under the banner of Christ, rather than through violence and bloodshed. [125]

This was an idealistic view *post festum*. The model of the Crusades was often visualized in less peaceful ways as well; most frequently it appeared in confessional or nationalistic variants. In practice, it was not so much "the cause of Christianity" that was advocated as the competing interests of nations and Christian churches.

Especially after the beginning of the Crimean War and the organization of pilgrimage trips from western Europe to the "Holy Land,"[126] the "heritage of the Crusades" was activated and its idealized history was preached. The literature about the Crusades expanded, and periodicals such as *La Terre Sainte* devoted a considerable portion of their columns to this subject. According to them, the history of the Crusades should be a stimulus; it should show "what the Christian world was able to do when it was inspired by a higher idea."[127] Many Catholic pilgrims indulged themselves in the feeling that they were following in the footsteps of the Crusaders.

Joyful will be the eyes that see Jerusalem—even more, the entire Orient—subjugated once again to the empire of the cross, wrote one French contemporary of the Crimean War. As in the glorious time of the Crusades, the role of a vanguard among peoples would once again come to France. France once more would be a tool in the hand of God in the execution of His plans.[128] A knight of the Holy Sepulchre proclaimed that after the civil war in Lebanon and the massacre of Christians in 1860 in Damascus—which led to France's military intervention—the lot of Middle East Christians had not essentially improved. A new French expedition was necessary—if only he could live long enough to see the banner of the Crusades waving over the walls of Jerusalem once more![129]

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[125] Guthe, "Das Ende des friedlichen Kreuzzuges," column 119. In my description I deal with missionary work simply as an aspect of European aspirations to the penetration of Palestine. It is possible that some readers might want to see an assessment of individual efforts and detailed accomplishments; they are advised to turn to the study by Sinno, who delves into this using the German example.

[126] Beginning in 1853 from Marseilles and 1855 from Trieste.

[127] "How can interest in the Holy Land be aroused more generally, and in a more lively way? How can the means for supporting the holy places and church institutions in Palestine be augmented?" *HL*, XXII (1878), pp. 88–93.

A cleric with the allusive name of de Damas conducted pilgrimages; his numerous works, written with special enthusiasm, went through many editions in France. "Oh, those were fortunate times," he cried, "and how they condemn the mediocrities of our time! Unfortunately, the work of the Crusades was born too weak to live. It is not enough to conquer; to keep what you have, you must colonize. But at the time Europe had not yet thought of colonization."[130] Yet now the moment had come to take up the inheritance of the Crusades; the yoke of the sultan would no longer burden the "Holy City." Perhaps there would be a new triumph of the cross as early as the end of the nineteenth century.[131] The same author, accompanied by a group of pilgrims, organized a religious ceremony in the remains of a Crusaders' church in Jerusalem that was "truly worthy of the Crusades." The *Magnificat* was sung. "For the first time since the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem the holy hymns echoed in these arches."[132]

As other nations and confessions expanded their presence in Palestine, and as the first Templar colonies began to flourish, many Frenchmen saw the "heritage of the Crusades" slipping through their hands. For this reason the well-known Palestine explorer Guérin called for the establishment of Catholic colonies in the "Holy Land." This would be first and foremost the mission of France, which had also founded a powerful state in Palestine at the time of the Crusades and since then had protected the interests of its Catholic population. The new settlers would have to hoist the French banner alongside the standard of Catholicism, which their ancestors had once so resolutely defended here. If France did not want to completely forget its glorious past and its position as the eldest daughter of the church, it would have to be more active in Palestine. While serving the interests of heaven, France would also be serving its own interests, which, especially in Palestine, were closely tied to those of Catholicism.[133]

Although the Catholic colonists whom Guérin had summoned for settlement in Palestine did not come, the French clergy did organize a pilgrimage in the spring of 1882. In its size and organization this pilgrimage was equal to the annual mass levy of Russian pilgrims and eclipsed all previous western European pilgrimages. Over a thousand people took part in it. They "conquered" Jerusalem; half of it from Jaffa and half of it from Haifa. Every participant bore the red cross of the Crusaders on his chest or shoulder. Along with banners marked with lilies (the Bourbon coat of arms) they carried flags embroidered with the Crusader's call, "God wills it!" A local observer wrote that the pilgrims were pursuing "the same goal as the Crusaders, but in a more universal sense and with bloodless weapons."[134]

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[128] Poujoulat, *La France et la Russie*, pp. 107, 127, 131, and 134; see also Poujoulat, *Histoire de Jérusalem*, II, pp. 464–90.

[129] Solignac, p. 171.

[130] Damas, *Voyages en Orient. Jérusalem*, p. 421.

[131] Damas, *En Orient. Voyage en Galilée*, pp. 142 and 242.

[132] Damas, *Voyages en Orient. Sinaï et Judée*, p. 247.

[133] Guérin, *Description*, VI, pp. 405–407.

"The Peaceful Crusade has begun. Jerusalem must be ours." This statement by the respected Palestine explorer Tobler gained wide currency in the German-speaking world.[135] In 1858, at the tenth general congress of the Catholic Societies of Germany, "the Crusader's prayer" was recited "with fervor": "Lord, help the Holy Land; deliver the Holy Sepulchre from the hands of the Unbelievers."[136] "Jerusalem's third Christian era is beginning."[137] Thus they were convinced that the "re-acquisition" of "the Christian's second homeland,"[138] Palestine, was imminent. Sepp, the valiant champion of German and Austrian Catholic interests in the "Holy Land," was angered not only by the "inverted Crusade" of 1840 but also by the missed chances in connection with the Crimean War:

> It is incontestable that the failure to seize the opportunity that existed in 1854 was a sin against the present and future generations of Christians, a sin, the bitter price of which we must pay sooner or later. Chastisement for this sin will not fail to appear, and it may be that the punishment has already been prepared. But the signs of the times admonish us, and all historical preliminaries seem to have been made so that in this very century the Westerners will once again take possession of the promised land and Egypt . . . . In fact, Jerusalem is already under the protection of the great European powers and is governed by their consuls. Soon it will be called: *beati possidentes* [blessed are the possessors]![139]

Wolff, also, was convinced that the "spiritual rule" of Jerusalem would fall to the Christians.[140] His reportage made a decided impression on the Palestine image of the south German public. By acquiring "holy places," one felt "permeated with the awareness that a peaceful conquest had been accomplished,"[141] that "a thread of history broken in 1187" had been tied together again.[142] Gatt, who was active in Palestine for many years, believed that in this contest the Catholics would take the victory crown:

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[134] See the reports about this in *Die Warte*, 8 June, 29 June, and 20 July 1882.

[135] See Tobler, *Nazareth*, p. 322; *Die Warte*, 4 January 1866; Neumann, "Der friedliche Kreuzzug"; Wolff, "Zur neueren Geschichte Jerusalems," p. 15.

[136] *HL*, II (1858), p. 120.

[137] Lorenzen, p. 298.

[138] Sepp, I, pp. IX and XX.

[139] Ibid., p. 753.

[140] Wolff, "Zur neueren Geschichte Jerusalems," p. 15.

[141] Wolff, *Flugblätter*, p. 12.

> The Catholic world will not forget the Holy Sepulchre and will not give up the holy places even if the time of the Crusades should return. But they are already here, for the undertakings of the Catholics in the Holy Land are presently nothing else but a bloodless Crusade of all Catholic peoples for the moral reconquest of the Holy Land.[143]

The Templars also joined the legions of the "Peaceful Crusade" and at the beginning of the 1880s called upon the imperial government to complete Frederick Barbarossa's work in Palestine.[144]

It has already been mentioned that the Crusade motif was also used in connection with the concept of the "restoration of the Jews." It crept in everywhere. British Consul Finn, in his "memoirs" (published by his wife), was surprised at the Latin patriarch's creation of the new knights of the Holy Sepulchre, which was carried out in the Church of the Sepulchre: "Strange, among the many strange things that are done by Europeans within the Sultan's dominions!"[145] Nonetheless, the title pages of both memoir volumes bear as a motto the appeal of the Council of Clermont: *Dieux el veult!* (God wills it!).

Everything was made part of the "Crusade," whether it was the planned construction of a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem[146] or the procurement of capital for the project that would install a harbor in Jaffa and build a rail line to Jerusalem (*"une croisade financière"*).[147] A curious platitude entered the literature about Palestine in this regard. The "Peaceful Crusaders," both clergy and lay members, thought that the extraordinary beauty of the women of Bethlehem and Nazareth should be extolled. The cause of this was quickly determined: Norman blood, Crusader blood, flowed in their veins.[148]

By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the idea of the "Peaceful Crusade" had faded. On the one hand, religious zeal increasingly colored the currents of nationalistic and imperialistic enthusiasm. On the other hand, a brand new factor had entered the picture—the beginning of Jewish colonization and the formation of the Zionist movement. In 1918 one German settler in Palestine, Hermann Guthe, proclaimed "the end of the Peaceful Crusade." He said that the Great Powers' struggle for dominance, particularly England's struggle, was responsible for wrecking the endeavor to bring the "Holy Land under the banner of Christ" by peaceful means. He also did not think highly of "the well-known program of some groups of Zionists . . . to seek to found a new Jewish state in the Holy Land." "Who will win the right of national sovereignty for the Jews? And how will they satisfy the hard-earned rights of the non-Jews [i.e., the European Christians]? The perversity of this kind of thinking lies in the fact that it takes as valid the rights of one party but not those of the other party. That is arbitrary and unjust, a violation of justice."[149] These words expressed the bitter disappointment that many centuries of Christian work and hope could be nullified.

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[142] *Die Anwesenheit Sr. Königl. Hoheit des Kronprinzen von Preußen in Palästina*, p. 36.

[143] Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, pp. 296–98.

[144] Carmel, *Die Siedlungen*, p. 94; see also *Die Warte*, 23 September 1858, 9 December 1869, and 7 June 1877.

[145] Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 265.

[146] *Die Warte*, 16 March 1865.

[147] *TS*, 1875/6/7/8, pp. 842–44.

[148] See, for example, Osborn, pp. 356–60; Sepp, I, p. 463; Besant and Palmer, p. 473; Conder, *Tent Work*, I, p. 142; and Morand, pp. 75–77.

Colonization Projects

A number of suggestions and plans for a colonization of the "Holy Land" were mentioned in connection with the religious-political strivings and aspirations for Palestine that have been dealt with so far. The call for European colonization became especially loud after the middle of the 1860s. It was consolidated in the form of numerous more or less feasible projects and practical endeavors.[150] The "need" for colonization in order to "improve the country" became a fundamental element in the European understanding of Palestine.

> Anyone who is in some measure familiar with matters as they are, and who devotes any thought to the question of how this country may be helped once again, quickly comes to the conclusion that it is only through the culture brought by the Christian world that this will happen and that a substantial immigration from Christian, civilized lands is required in order to prepare the way for new and better conditions.

This is how Schick formulated the issue in 1881.[151] To the extent that the Arab inhabitants of the country were paid any notice at all, the role assigned to them was by no means enviable.

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[149] Guthe, "Das Ende des friedlichen Kreuzzuges," columns 119–22, 132–35, and 146–49; quotation from column 146.

[150] See the overview in Schick, "Studien über Colonisirung," pp. 37–39, 58–61, 80f., and 90–100; Schick, "Zur Colonisations-Frage"; Schick, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Colonisationsversuche."

[151] Schick, "Studien über Colonisirung," p. 37.

"It is very much to be desired," the *Heilige Land* explained to its readers, "that many foreign colonists settle there. The famous fertility of the oasis of Jericho, the plains of Saron and Esdrelon, and many other places in Palestine, once under the hands of industrious and intelligent colonists . . . would once again gladden the eye and the heart of the pilgrim and would richly reward the colonists for their labor."[152] It would be an easy thing to set up European settlements; the *fellahin* (peasants) would gladly sell their land to Europeans and in return would expect "bread and protection" from them. The colonists could then make use of the "natives" as agricultural workers.[153] Despite the unencouraging experiences of individual families and groups who tried to settle in Palestine, the *Heilige Land* would not give up the idea of "stimulating interest in colonization in Palestine"; they especially hoped for "Catholic colonies." They recognized that the settlements of the Templars, which so far were the only known successes, were "an indirect tool of providence, a social factor, and a means of mutual stimulus which was very much needed, especially in Palestine."[154]

Henry Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross, called for the founding of an International Society for the Renewal of the Orient in 1866. Its primary goal would be the mass colonization of Palestine under the protection of Napoleon III. The undertaking would nevertheless have an international character and would lead to the neutralization of Palestine. As part of the project, particular thought would be devoted to settlement by Jews, a task which the Jewish financial magnates of Europe should assume. Perhaps the French emperor could later think about whether to take over the ultimate sovereignty of "a small Hebrew state" in Palestine which, although under European protection, would be dependent on France. The Jews could carry on the civilizing mission of France and England in Asia. The most important outcome of the European colonization of Palestine would be the liberation of the "Holy Land" from the yoke of the Turks, the peaceful termination of the rule of Islam.[155] These ideas, and the international society that would arise from them, preoccupied the Europeans who were interested in Palestine until the mid-1870s;[156] however, no tangible results were achieved.

A specifically Catholic colonization project, brought to life in 1876 in France by the well-known architect and writer about Palestine, Pierotti, received the blessing of Pope Pius IX, was also no great success. The goal of the project was to establish Catholic colonies in the "Holy Land" and promote Catholic pilgrimages.[157]

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[152] *HL*, X (1866), p. 162.

[153] "Der Ackerbau in Palästina," *HL*, XVI (1872), pp. 117f.

[154] "Gedanken über die politische, sociale und religiöse Frage Palästina's," *HL*, XIX (1875), pp. 149–53.

[155] Dunant. For information on Dunant's collaborative work with the Schwabian Templars, see Carmel, *Die Siedlungen*, pp. 19–21 and 25; Brugger, pp. 42f.

[156] See Roulliet; *Die Warte*, 17 February 1870; "Gedanken über die politische, sociale und religiöse Frage Palästina's," *HL*, XIX (1875), pp. 147f.

Shortly before the founding of the first Templar colony near Haifa, the Viennese geographer Kuhlmann,[158] who previously had spent two years exploring the terrain in the Middle East, urged the Germanic colonization of Palestine on the basis of a chauvinistic, radical sense of mission that viewed the entire Middle East as a field of Germanic action. His project was no more distinguished by a seductive logic than that of Dunant. On the one hand, Kuhlmann depicted for his readers a Palestine that was to a great extent empty of people. On the other hand, he warned that the immigrants could not establish themselves one by one, but must be settled "always in large bands with at least a thousand men able to bear arms," so that they could hold their own against the Muslim population.[159]

In Zionist literature, it is especially the colonization project of Oliphant, a Scottish diplomat, political activist, and (Christian) mystic, that is described as "proto-Zionist."[160] On the eve of the first wave of Jewish immigration, and with the support of the British government, Oliphant was pursuing the plan for a Jewish colony in the Balqa', on the other side of the Jordan; however, his endeavors ran afoul of Constantinople.[161]

It was not true that the colonization enthusiasts simply did not perceive the problem of the existence of a native population. Whereas Kuhlmann proposed a military solution, plain and simple, Oliphant wanted those elements of the Transjordanian population who did not give up a nomadic way of life to be put in reservations, like the Indians of North America. As far as the sedentary agriculturalists were concerned, they would "make a valuable labor force which could be employed by immigrant capitalists."[162] He also clearly revealed his mind-set when he reported that, with regard to the fertile Hula Plain, he wished to imitate the example of the men of Dan: in earlier times, they had driven out the peasants living there. One had to do this in a "modern way," however; a joint stock company could be founded, the owners of the land could be compensated and retained as laborers, and a profitable business in the Hula region could be set up.[163]

Conder, too, believed that one could make use of the native population and turn them into "hewers of wood and drawers of water."[164] In 1872 his colleague Tyrwhitt Drake, of the Palestine Exploration Fund, wrote bluntly:

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[157] *TS*, 1875/6/7/8, pp. 261f., 426f., and Supplement No. 1.

[158] The Templars met with Kuhlmann in Vienna and spoke with him on their way to Palestine; see Brugger, p. 45.

[159] *Palästina als Ziel und Boden germanischer Auswanderung und Kolonisation*; quotation on p. 35.

[160] The characterization of Oliphant as a "proto-Zionist" can be found in Israel Pocket Library, *Immigration and Settlement*, p. 14, note 12.

[161] Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, especially XIII–XXXVII, pp. 284–304, 502–38; Henderson, pp. 203–12; PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1263 (Beirut, 14 May 1879).

[162] Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, p. 286.

[163] Ibid., p. 19.

> I can only say that it would be a most splendid thing if the [Ottoman] government could overcome its aversion to selling land to foreigners. With the right guarantees, a great portion of this land [Palestine] would find a favorable market, and then the peasants now there would either be cleared away or transformed into useful members of society, while the increased income of the Turkish government would be very considerable.[165]

In comparison with this, the conclusion reached in 1882 by the director of the Templar Society, Hoffmann, could actually be described as refreshing: "The Arabs certainly cannot be driven out, for they are the overwhelming majority and the rightful owners of the land. What is more, they are not defenseless; the militarily well-organized force of the Turks would be able to frustrate any act of violence against the indigenous inhabitants." In any case, for European colonists the protection of a European power would be indispensable.[166]

In general, however, the potential colonists were not overly concerned about the indigenous population. Either they fell back on platitudes of an "unpopulated" Palestine or they offered simple, ready-made solutions. Thus, there was an overarching continuity in thinking, extending from the conceptions of individual propagandists who promoted the "restoration of the Jews" in the 1840s, to the colonization enthusiasts of various derivations in the last third of the nineteenth century, and up to the Zionist conceptions of the twentieth century. In 1845, Mitford (a "restorationist") had the idea that room could be made for Jewish immigrants by resettling the Muslim population in Asia Minor.[167] And in 1918 Ballod still believed that, "The least of our difficulties would be the Arab *fellahin*. They . . . would gladly leave Palestine if they were offered better conditions somewhere else, for example, in northern Syria or Babylonia, if it were restored through broad-scale cultural activities.[168]

But of the many colonization projects and enterprises, only two had any success: the settlements of Templars since 1868 and those of Jewish immigrants since 1882. The Templars, a pietistic sect from Württemberg, had set for themselves the goal of "bringing together the people of God" in Jerusalem. They had declared their basic principles in a proclamation of 1861: "The mind of the German nation should be directed toward the building of the Temple in Jerusalem and the occupation of Palestine . . . we must strive to create a central German authority that pursues this goal."[169] They believed that the "people of God" (in other words, they themselves) had an inviolable right to possess the "Holy Land." The way to realize their goal was emigration to Palestine. After lengthy difficulties in getting started, the Schwabian "people of God" founded four settlements between 1868 and 1873, and three more were added in the years 1902–1907. The masses of people who were expected to transform the "Holy Land" failed to appear, however. The number of Templars settled in Palestine never exceeded a maximum of 2,200 souls.[170]

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[164] Conder, "The Present Condition," pp. 8f.; see also Conder, *Tent Work*, II, pp. 327f.

[165] Quoted in *SWP*, *Samaria*, p. 256.

[166] *Die Warte*, 11 May 1882.

[167] See Kobler, p. 77.

[168] Ballod, p. 30.

The imperial German government had never elevated settlement activities in Palestine to the level of policy, however. For this reason it showed relative restraint with regard to the German colonists. It became apparent that the Templars, constantly quarreling with the local authorities and even going so far as to evade paying taxes,[171] were an extraordinary disruptive element for German-Ottoman relations. The Porte naturally had fundamental misgivings. Despite the law of 1867, which conceded to foreigners the right to acquire real estate in the Ottoman Empire, the Porte opposed the granting of property titles to the Templars for a long time, fearing that they would make themselves independent of the national authorities—as the German representative in Constantinople reported to the foreign ministry. For the same reason, Keller, the German consular agent in Haifa, was initially refused recognition; it was feared that he would become a kind of governor of a small German state.[172] Therefore the Templars were not viewed by the imperial government as an important bridgehead in the Middle East, nor were they sheltered and promoted accordingly, as they had hoped, especially after the original religious zeal had flagged. It was more important for the expansion of the German positions in Palestine to promote German Protestant and Catholic institutions and create a "German-Jewish" clientele. This last factor played a significant role, especially after the 1870s.[173] As far as the "protection" of the Jews was concerned, England had grown into a serious rival of the German Empire. Thus the historical role of the Templars was reduced to having proved to their more successful competitors and successors, the Jewish settlers, that European colonization in Palestine could actually succeed. The Jewish settlers tried to learn from the experience of the Templars.

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[169] Quoted in Brugger, p. 39.

[170] Concerning the Templars, see especially Carmel, *Die Siedlungen*; see also Paulus; Brugger; Seibt; Imberger.

[171] The documents about the continuous disputes over taxes and tributes fill volumes in the archives of the German consulate in Jerusalem; see ISA–DKJ, A.XIII.1.S., vol. 1; A.XXII.1.$^{a.4.}$; A.XXII.1.$^{d.}$; A.XXII.1.$^{e.}$ vol. 1; A.XXII.10.$^{a.}$; A.XXXVI.1., in particular. This might also be a reason why Münchhausen, the consul for Jerusalem, had nothing good to say about the Templars. He wrote to Keller in Haifa on 2 May 1879 that the needy colony would receive no support from the foreign ministry. The emigrants had harmed the German state by depriving it of property and productive forces; therefore they could expect no help. Münchhausen suggested that the Templars be resettled in Cyprus, where they could cultivate vineyards under English protection! (ISA–DKJ, A.XXXI.7.) He had already written brusquely to Murad in Jaffa on 27 July 1874, saying that allowing the Templar community to become a state within a state could not be tolerated. (ISA–DKJ, A.XXXVI.1.)

[172] AA–I.A.B.q. (Turkey), p. 126 (Pera, 29 November 1877); on the real estate question, see also the file of AA–Konst., GEN.76.K.18.d.

On the eve of the first wave of Jewish immigration (the first *'aliya*) only 24,000 Jews were living in Palestine. The great majority of them lived in the "holy cities" of Jerusalem, Safad, Tiberias, and Hebron (although Hebron had only a relatively small Jewish community). The many-faceted European aspirations concerning the "Holy Land" and increasing contact with and knowledge of Palestine gave new impetus to the Jewish affiliation with the Land of Israel, and promoted the interest of European Jews in Palestine and in the situation of the Jews living there—the "old Yishuv." Parallel to the "Christian" colonization projects there were also Jewish enterprises of this kind. For example, in 1860 a Dr. Lorje founded the "Colonizations Society for Palestine" in Frankfurt on the Oder which was well received by the Austrian consul general in Jerusalem. Its immediate goal was to found "a large Jewish agricultural colony in Palestine" while its long-term goal was the "restoration of the Jewish state."[174] Philanthropists such as the Englishman Sir Moses Montefiore or organizations such as the Alliance Israélite Universelle supported improvement of the living conditions of their coreligionists in "Eretz Israel," especially by creating incentives for industrial and agricultural production activities. This led to the first major attempts by Jews to settle on newly acquired land in Palestine. The Alliance Israélite Universelle established a school for agriculture close to Jaffa (Mikveh Israel) in 1870, and in 1878 Jews from Jerusalem founded the first agricultural settlement (Petach Tikva); it was abandoned in 1881.[175] However, actual Jewish colonization after 1882 is beyond the scope of this book.

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[173] See Eliav, *Die Juden Palästinas*; Eliav, "German Interests."

[174] A dossier for this can be found in HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 46 (1862/63).

[175] See Chouraqui, pp. 357–63, 451–56, and 494f.; Margalith, *Le Baron*, pp. 42–45.

4 The Economic Development of Palestine

The Problem

European endeavors in the "Holy Land" were primarily noneconomic in nature. There were no special or outstanding economic interests in Palestine: these were embedded in the general economic penetration of the entire Middle East. Nonetheless, the European penetration of Palestine, and within this framework the growing trade volume, had significant consequences for the country's economic development and, as a result of that, for the country's social structure as well.

What Palestine had to offer Europe during the period under study, and what importance the country had for Europeans, were vividly demonstrated at the Vienna World's Fair of 1873. There was of course no "Holy Land" display there; the products of Palestine were to be found among the exhibits of the Ottoman Empire. For the German-speaking public, however, there was a special report on "Palestine in the World's Fair"—probably for the first time since the start of those self-presentations of industrializing Europe in 1851 in London—in order to satisfy the constantly growing interest in the "Holy Land."[176] Reflecting the country's economic output, three categories of exhibits from Palestine could be seen: agricultural products, objects of the souvenir business, and models of "holy places."

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[176] Zschokke, pp. 4–8; regarding exhibit pieces from Jerusalem at the World's Fair of 1867 in Paris, see Cuinet, p. 618.

Among the first category were wheat, barley, sesame seeds, *dura* (*Sorghum vulgare*),[177] legumes, tobacco, wine, and oil. In the second category was the whole variety of olive-wood, mother-of-pearl, and glasswares produced in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron. The third category included a zinc model of the city of Jerusalem,[178] as well as wooden models of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim "holy sites" in and around Jerusalem.

On the one hand this expressed the increased integration of Ottoman Palestine into the world market as a provider of agricultural raw products; on the other hand it became clear that Palestine had a special status as the "Holy Land." Were it not for its "holy sites," European interest in Palestine would have been marginal.

Thus, if we examine Palestine's economic development in the post-Crimean War period of Europe's forced expansion and economic penetration into the southern and eastern Mediterranean periphery, we must keep a second factor in mind: that of the religio-cultural penetration, as it was characterized above. However, as has been shown, goals were propagated within this framework that were by no means purely religious or cultural. The "Peaceful Crusaders" and "restorationists" were members of expansionist societies, in which colonial notions were gaining ground. If their goals could have been realized, a conglomeration of the most diverse European settlement enclaves would have developed. The political and religio-cultural penetration of Palestine thus cannot be detached from the anchoring of that country in an economic and political structure that was dominated by European capitals and industrial centers.

Our task now is to examine how Palestine was touched by this expansionist movement—and what reactions were provoked—in the areas of foreign trade, agrarian production, the change in agrarian ownership conditions, urban development, and trade and business in the cities. First, the development of agricultural production and the import and export trade through the ports of Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre will be discussed. Here there are three subordinate questions: The first has to do with the validity of the literary stereotype of a stagnating, neglected, indeed desolate Palestine before 1882, that is, before the start of Jewish colonization.[179] The second question concerns the economic position of Palestine within the greater Syrian framework, with a look at Syria's nineteenth-century trade imbalance with Europe.[180] Finally one must inquire into the consequences of this penetration for agricultural ownership conditions and forms of production.

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[177] "A type of cereal with leaves like Turkish maize and white seeds like lentils," *HL*, XVI (1872), p. 118.

[178] This model was displayed from 1878 to 1920 in Geneva and more recently has been displayed in Jerusalem again; see Isabelle Vichniac, "L'étrange destin du 'Relief de Jérusalem,'" *Le Monde*, 21–22 October 1984.

[179] Regarding the uses of this stereotype, see for example Aumann, passim. Even David Landes, the well-known historian of European economics, contributed to the perpetuation of this political fairy tale in a superficial novelistic excursion into an unfamiliar area: Landes, pp. 48–50. One "refutation" is Kishtainy, passim.

The chief sources for this chapter are the trade and economic reports of the English, German, Austrian, and French consuls in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre.[181] Those who work in the field of nineteenth-century economic history of the Middle East know the problems that such sources pose. Most quantitative data can be understood as only approximate values, whether they are based on the consuls' personal calculations or are offered by the local customs officials or the European trading houses. In addition, there were significant discrepancies between the statistics of various consulates, as their calculations were not always made on the basis of the same criteria.[182] Thus, we do not intend to present the data in the most precise and reliable manner, but merely to identify development characteristics and trends.

Subsequently, the development and production of Palestinian cities in this phase of forced European penetration must be demonstrated. Here of course we cannot expect dramatic results. Apart from the soap industry and a few specialized local craft branches, there were no flourishing urban manufacturers that could have been endangered or forced into a restructuring by European penetration. We will thus attempt a stocktaking and ask about possible changes.

In this part, too, along with the consular documents, we rely mainly on European sources—primarily on the rich and occasionally excellent contemporary Palestine literature. Arabic-language municipal and local histories offer only sparse information on this topic and for the period studied here. This also applies to Dabbagh's monumental encyclopedia *Biladuna Filastin* and the Ottoman provincial almanacs.

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[180] Kalla, pp. 30–40; Chevallier, chapter 13; Schatkowski-Schilcher, "Ein Modellfall" [A Model Case], pp. 482–505.

[181] It is a mystery to me why Gerber ("Modernization," p. 257) asserts that British consuls did not compile trade statistics for Jaffa until the middle of the 1880s.

[182] Added to this were numerous mathematical errors in the original reports of British consuls in Jaffa as well as printing errors in the statistics that were published in the Parliamentary Papers. Therefore the final totals of my tasbles, which are based on British consular reports, are not always identical with the overall totals appearing in the PRO or PP documents.

Foreign Trade and Agriculture

Export Orientation of Agricultural Production

In the period under study, Palestine produced relatively extensive agricultural surpluses that were exported to neighboring lands such as Egypt and Lebanon, and increasingly to Europe. After 1850, European consular agents (themselves largely merchants, entrepreneurs, landowners, and even tax farmers), as well as the representatives of European commercial companies in the ports and their middlemen or partners in the interior, functioned as transmitters of European demand and of the needs of the European market, in accordance with which local production could be adapted.

The products of the southern part of the country were exported from Jaffa, those of northern Palestine from Haifa and Acre. Acre was also the main export port for that portion of the Hauran wheat that was not consumed in Syria itself. However, here it cannot be determined what portion of the various export goods of Jabal Nablus were exported via Haifa and Jaffa.

The most important export goods of Jaffa[183] during the entire period from 1856 to 1882 (although in varying degrees of importance, which has yet to be explained) were: wheat, barley, and *dura;* sesame; olive oil and soap; and oranges and other fruits, as well as vegetables. The main customers were: France, to which was sent most of the sesame and a considerable portion of the olive oil, as well as corn and, for a time, cotton; Egypt, which imported from Palestine the larger portion of the soap as well as olive oil, fruits, and vegetables; and England, to which almost all the *dura* and a considerable part of the wheat and barley exports went. Corn, fruits, vegetables, and soap were also shipped to northern Syria and Asia Minor as well as to Greece, Italy, and Malta.

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[183] When other sources are not cited, all data regarding Jaffa's commerce are from the following annual reports of the British consuls:
1857: PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1296 (Jaffa, 31 December 1857);
1858: PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1387 (Jaffa, 31 December 1858);
1859: PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1449 (Jaffa, 31 December 1859);
1860: PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1537 (Jaffa, 31 December 1860);
1862: PP–1863, vol. LXX (Jaffa, 27 January 1863);
1863: PP–1864, vol. LXI (Jaffa, May 1864);
1873: PP–1874, vol. LXVII (Jaffa, February 1874);
1874: PP–1875, vol. LXXVII (Jaffa, April 1875);
1875: PP–1876, vol. LXXV (Jaffa, February 1876);
1876: PP–1877, vol. LXXXIII (Jaffa, March 1877);
1877: PP–1878, vol. LXXIV (Jaffa, May 1878);
1879: PP–1880, vol. LXXIV (Jaffa, February 1880);
1880: PP–1881, vol. XC (Jaffa, March 1881);
1881: PP–1882, vol. LXXI (Jaffa, May 1882);
1882: PP–1883, vol. LXXII (Jaffa, March 1883).

The most important export goods of Haifa and Acre[184] were wheat, barley, *dura*, sesame, and olive oil. The wheat went to Italy (for pasta-making), France, England, and Greece, but also to Lebanon and Asia Minor; the barley was sent mainly to Lebanon, England, and France; the *dura* primarily to England and France, sesame almost exclusively to France, and olive oil to Egypt, France, and Asia Minor. At one time, cotton was sent to France. The greater part of the wheat loaded in Acre came from Hauran, however: In 1876, for example, 1 million of 1.5 million *kile*s,[185] in 1879 about 1 million of 1.75 million, in 1881 (because of a failed harvest in the Hauran) only 10,000 of 250,000 *kile*s. In 1882, 934,000 *kile*s of Hauran wheat and 420,000 *kile*s of "country wheat" were exported from Acre.[186] On the basis of these data, one can assume that about two-thirds of the wheat exported from Acre came from Hauran and one-third from northern Palestine (from the districts of Acre, Nazareth, and Tiberias).

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[184] All data regarding the trade of Acre and Haifa, if not expressly noted, comes from the following annual reports of the German consuls for Acre and Haifa:
1872: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.1 (Haifa, 5 March 1873);
1873: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Haifa, 23 April 1874);
1874: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Haifa, 27 January 1875);
1875: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Acre, 24 February 1876);
1876: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Haifa, 25 January 1877);
1877: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Haifa, 19 January 1878);
1878: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.4 (Haifa, 20 January 1879);
1879: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.4 (Haifa, 10 January 1880);
1880: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.4 (Haifa, 7 January 1881);
For 1856 see PP–1857, sess. 2, vol. XXXVIII (Jerusalem, 31 December 1856).

[185] According to Bauer, *Das palästinische Arabisch*, p. 256. In this work the following equivalents of measures and weights are used: 1 *oqqa*= 1.28 kg; 1 *ratl* = 2.88 kg; 1 *tumniya* = 2.25 liters; 1 *kiles*= 36 liters.

[186] *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, p. 258.

Table 17: Average yearly export of the main export goods of Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre, 1872–82 (in millions of *kiles*/*oqqas*/units).

Export goods	Jaffa 1873–77, 1879–82	Haifa 1872–80	Acre 1872–80
Wheat (*kiles*)	0.279	0.429	1.291
Barley (*kiles*)	0.102	0.111	0.203
Dura (*kiles*)	0.062	0.233	0.625
Sesame (*oqqas*)	2.059	0.800	1.000
Olive oil (*oqqas*)	1.027	0.053	0.260
Soap (*oqqas*)	0.904		
Wool (*oqqas*)	0.115		
Oranges (units)[a]	19.650		

a) Only average of the years 1873–77 and 1879; starting in 1880 the data is in boxes.
Sources: Personal calculations in accordance with the sources named in footnotes 183 and 184.

Table 17 provides an idea of the importance of the three ports for the export of particular products; this list does not allow an exact comparison, because the nine-year export period of Jaffa is not exactly comparable with those of Haifa and Acre.

The main export products of Palestine remained basically the same from 1856 to 1882. The short- and long-term shifts in importance in the export structure can be seen in tables 18, 19, 20, and 21. The factors that occasioned these fluctuations and shifts were:

- natural conditions, mainly failed harvests due to low rainfall or a locust plague;[187]
- market conditions, led by changes in demand and thus depressed or increased prices; and
- closely connected to the market conditions, political conditions such as wars and disturbances in the region itself, as well as in Europe and America.

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[187] Regarding the correlation of rainfall and grain prices, see above all Chaplin, pp. 99f.; Dalman, I/1, p. 132 and I/2, pp. 300f.; regarding the Palestinian locust years, see Dalman, I/2, p. 393.

Table 18: Most important export goods of Jaffa (in *kiles*/*oqqas*/units).

Year	Wheat (*kiles*)	Barley (*kiles*)	*Dura* (*kiles*)	Sesame (*oqqas*)	Olive oil (*oqqas*)	Soap (*oqqas*)	Oranges (units)	Wool (*oqqas*)	Cotton (*oqqas*)
1857	45,455	245,011	39,392	503,000	20,000	1,000,000	6,000,000	10,000	—
1858	18,000	143,414	166,712	820,000	100,000	800,000	3,000,000	4,000	—
1859	30,000	30,000	25,000	400,000	100,000	500,000	6,000,000	—	—
1860	—	—	—	1,000,000	2,040,000	50,000	5,000,000	5,500	20,000
1862	78,928	117,661	57,810	1,856,078	1,673,696	100,000	8,000,000	2,000	20,000
1863	176,614	192,139	113,750	2,893,449	300,050	70,000	8,300,000	38,517	190,678
1873	310,000	110,000	25,000	3,000,000	250,000	600,000	27,750,000	100,000	40,000
1874	212,000	120,000	115,000	2,000,000	130,000	1,000,000	25,500,000	120,000	10,000
1875	448,000	288,000	70,500	2,800,000	1,000,000	1,300,000	10,200,000	50,000	5,000
1876	430,000	25,000	80,000	2,350,400	3,500,000	246,000	14,000,000	150,000	—
1877	—	—	16,000	1,870,000	1,000,000	220,000	14,200,000	120,000	—
1879	—	—	—	1,100,000	2,000,000	1,350,000	26,250,000	130,000	—
1880	189,500	100,500	25,300	1,700,000	800,000	1,450,000	145,000[a]	105,000	—
1881	440,000	255,000	80,000	1,420,000	160,000	850,000	170,500[a]	135,000	—
1882	482,905	18,270	143,302	2,292,844	406,115	1,124,000	116,350[a]	129,000	—

a) crates

Sources: See footnote 183.

Table 19: Value in piasters of the three most important export goods of Jaffa and their share of the total export value.

Year	Export goods	Value in piasters	Percentage of total
1857	Soap	6,000,000	72.4
	Barley	3,515,908	
	Sesame	1,760,500	
1858	Soap	4,480,000	70.6
	Sesame	2,255,000	
	Dura	1,908,852	
1859	Soap	2,500,000	63.6
	Oranges	1,200,000	
	Sesame	1,000,000	
1860	Olive oil	10,200,000	94.9
	Sesame	3,000,000	
	Oranges	1,000,000	
1862	Olive oil	10,879,024	81.8
	Sesame	5,568,234	
	Wheat	1,880,200	
1863	Sesame	8,680,347	62.9
	Wheat	3,887,508	
	Cotton	3,813,560	
1873	Wheat	9,300,000	69.8
	Sesame	9,000,000	
	Oranges	3,607,500	
1874	Soap	6,000,000	63.5
	Sesame	6,000,000	
	Wheat	4,876,000	
1875	Wheat	8,960,000	65.2
	Sesame	7,000,000	
	Soap	5,580,000	
1876	Olive oil	24,500,000	79.2
	Soap	11,030,000	
	Wheat	9,030,000	
1877	Sesame	6,077,500	81.3
	Olive oil	5,500,000	
	Oranges	1,230,666	

(continued)

1879	Olive oil	10,000,000	82.3
	Soap	7,425,000	
	Oranges	3,380,000	
1880	Soap	7,612,500	62.2
	Oranges	5,800,000	
	Wheat	5,685,000	
1881	Wheat	11,000,000	68.3
	Oranges	6,820,000	
	Soap	5,100,000	
1882	Wheat	9,899,552	64.1
	Oranges	8,144,500	
	Soap	6,182,000	

Table 20: Most important export goods of Acre, 1872–80 (in *kiles* or *oqqas*).

	Wheat (*kiles*)	Barley (*kiles*)	*Dura* (*kiles*)	Sesame (*oqqas*)	Olive oil (*oqqas*)
1872	1,500,000	500,000	600,000	2,000,000	1,000,000
1873	400,000	50,000	—	500,000	—
1874	2,000,000	500,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	300,000
1875	3,500,000	600,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	600,000
1876	1,500,000	—	20,000	400,000	200,000
1877	500,000	100,000	400,000	300,000	200,000
1878	1,750,000	—	—	—	—
1879	211,219	—	4,780	—	40,307
1880	260,000	80,000	100,000	800,000	—

Sources: See footnote 184.

Table 21: Most important export goods of Haifa, 1872–80 (in *kiles* or *oqqas*).

Year	Wheat (*kiles*)	Barley (*kiles*)	*Dura* (*kiles*)	Sesame (*oqqas*)	Olive oil (*oqqas*)
1872	800,000	300,000	350,000	1,500,000	100,000
1873	400,000	100,000	—	500,000	—
1874	800,000	150,000	600,000	1,000,000	50,000
1875	1,000,000	200,000	700,000	2,000,000	30,000
1876	100,000	25,000	150,000	500,000	150,000
1877	80,000	20,000	150,000	200,000	150,000
1878	200,000	100,000	—	—	—
1879	81,320	—	—	—	—
1880	400,000	100,000	150,000	1,500,000	—

Sources: See footnote 184.

First, using the example of cotton cultivation, the incentives that originated in external markets will be illustrated and then the fluctuations of all exports in Acre and Haifa on the one hand, and in Jaffa on the other, will be explained.

Northern and central Palestine—more precisely the district of Acre and Jabal Nablus—belonged to the traditional and most important cotton-growing regions of Syria. Cotton that was not used right there or marketed in central Syria (mainly Damascus) went almost exclusively to France. Starting in 1852, however, the French demand for sesame (for oil) became more urgent. Agricultural production was therefore oriented toward this product. This shift was all the more easy for the *fellahin* since the sesame cultivation was much less labor intensive and sesame sowing was more weather-independent than that of cotton. In addition, with the outbreak of the Crimean War and the interruption of the grain shipments from southern Russia, there was a sudden, fierce demand for wheat and barley,[188] so much so that cotton exports almost ceased (cf. tables 22 and 23).

A second reorientation ensued when the prices for raw cotton increased due to the increased English demand at the end of the 1850s, but most especially after the outbreak of the American Civil War. Compared to the price quotations of the previous twelve months, in spring 1863 three times as much cotton was planted in northern Palestine as in the year before. Even the outlying, swampy corners around the Lake Hula—where Tristram says Damascus Jews invested capital in cotton cultivation—were seized by the boom.[189] In 1863 and 1864 cotton had regained its old position as the foremost crop and export article. The boom was only short-lived, however, because in the second half of the 1860s Europe's demand was no longer as great; furthermore, from 1865 to 1872 crop failure followed crop failure in northern Palestine. Only in 1869 was there once again a boom in cotton exports.[190] In the 1870s this product finally lost its importance. In 1871 only 184,545 *oqqa*s were exported from northern Palestine;[191] the German consul listed Acre's cotton exports for the year 1872 as 100,000 *oqqa*s, while in good years (until 1869) one million *oqqas* were exported.[192] In 1876 only 32,489 *oqqas* were exported.[193]

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[188] The participation of a notable family of Jabal Nablus, who otherwise invested its capital in mortgages, agrarian land, olive orchards, and oil presses, in the grain export boom during the Crimean War and directly afterward through investments in the grain trade (1853–58), were described by Firestone, "Production and Trade," I, pp. 191–95.

In the Jaffa district developments were similar. The French demand for sesame, the increase in grain prices during the Crimean War, and the start of a regular, well-organized export of oranges since the end of this war had also brought cotton cultivation to a complete standstill. Instead, orange groves were expanded near Jaffa, and in the outlying areas grain and sesame were cultivated. To be sure, the English (above all the Cotton Supply Association in Manchester and Consuls Finn in Jerusalem and Kayat in Jaffa) attempted to stimulate cotton cultivation again after the Crimean War had ended. Egyptian and American seeds were sown in different places in southern Palestine on a trial basis, and showed great success.

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[189] Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 577f.; Karmon, "The Settlement," p. 11.

[190] Regarding the development of cotton production in northern Palestine, see above all PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1384 (Haifa, 20 November 1857); PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 771 (Haifa, 24 July 1863); PP–1872, vol. LVIII (Beirut, March 1872); Zwiedinek, pp. 52–56.

[191] Calculated from PP–1872, vol. LVIII (Beirut, March 1872).

[192] ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.1 (Haifa, 5 March 1873).

[193] PP–1878, vol. LXXIII (Beirut, 16 August 1877).

Table 22: Cotton exports of Acre and Haifa, 1852–62.

Year	*Oqqas*
1852	446,545
1853	294,545
1854	37,091
1855	3,819
1856	—
1857	—
1858	—
1859	5,237
1860	69,455
1861	58,909
1862	55,273

Source: Calculated from PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 771 (Haifa, 24 July 1863).

Table 23: Average share of listed products in the total cultivation area of northern Palestine, 1858–62.

Wheat	40%
Barley	9%
Dura	7%
Sesame	13%
Cotton	6%
Lentils, beans, peas	5%
Tobacco	2%
Watermelons, vineyards, figs	4%
Olives	14%

Source: PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 771 (Haifa, 24 July 1863).

It was the American Civil War that brought cotton cultivation and export to new prosperity; to be sure, they stayed with local seeds, as the local Ottoman officials did not take any initiative in this area. Of the 94 cotton varieties that were shown in the exhibition of 1863 in Constantinople, two did come from Palestine,[194] but the "Holy Land" did not get to see the better seeds that the Porte distributed.

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[194] Dorn, p. 88.

Nonetheless the area under cultivation in the Jaffa district in 1863 was already four times as great as in 1862. Seven villages of the district, Kayat reported, reserved two-thirds of their land, on which they had earlier cultivated sesame, for cotton planting. In 1863, therefore, almost ten times as much was exported as in the previous year; the businessmen imported cotton gins as this amount could not be handled by simple local devices. In 1864 there was scarcely a district village that had not sown a significant portion of its land with cotton; overall, six times as much was cultivated as in 1863. Even the Bedouin got involved in this lucrative business. Here, too, the turnaround came with a price drop of more than 50 percent in the autumn of 1864, the end of the American Civil War, and the locust plagues of 1865 and 1866.[195] Exports ran out at the start of the 1870s (cf. also table 18).

Cotton did continue to be cultivated in the Nablus district, but only for the needs of the local and central Syrian market; the yearly yield in the period from 1866 to 1874 was estimated at 600,000 to 700,000 *oqqa*s. The British consuls complained vainly for two decades about the fact that the Ottoman government neither during the short cotton boom nor afterward undertook serious efforts to promote this agrarian branch. Consul Moore in Jerusalem complained about this in wearisome monotony every year.[196]

If we now look at the quantitative tables of exports from Acre and Haifa in the nine years from 1872 to 1880 (tables 20 and 21), the fluctuations in this period can be explained by the natural and political conditions. The year 1873 was generally a bad harvest year for northern Palestine. In 1876 the harvest was termed "moderately good," but exports decreased sharply due to the outbreak of war. In 1877, along with the war, there were very meager harvest yields, especially in the Hauran. In 1878 the Hauran did have an excellent wheat harvest, but in northern Palestine it was low, and the summer crops of *dura* and sesame were destroyed by locusts.[197] In 1879 the harvest was extremely poor due to lack of rain. In 1880 the yields in northern Palestine were indeed very good, except for olives, but the Hauran experienced a complete crop failure. It is therefore not surprising that the years 1877–79 were considered the worst in human memory, especially given the fact that conscription levels combined with the precarious economic situation.

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[195] Regarding this development see:
PP–1857, sess. 2, vol. XXXVIII (Beirut, 21 May 1857);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1296 (Jaffa, 22 December 1857);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1384 (Jerusalem, 28 January 1858);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1537 (Jaffa, 2 February 1860);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1605 (Jerusalem, 26 September 1861);
PP–1863, vol. LXX (Jaffa, 27 January 1863);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1775 (Jerusalem, 26 August 1863);
ISA–DKJ, A,III,4 (Jerusalem, 25 November 1863);
PP–1864, vol. LXI (Jaffa, May 1864);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol, 1834 (Jaffa, 15 March, 15 April, 7 June, and 7 November 1864);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1874 (Jaffa, 13 June 1865);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1929 (Jerusalem, 11 June 1866).

[196] See PP–1865, vol. LIII (Jerusalem, March 1865);
PP–1866, vol. LXX (Jerusalem, March 1866);
PP–1867, vol. LXVII (Jerusalem, 16 January 1867);
PP–1867/68, vol. LXVIII (Jerusalem, January 1868);
PP–1872, vol. LVIII (Jerusalem, 25 April 1872);
PP–1874, vol. LXVI (Jerusalem, 12 September 1873);
PP–1874, vol. LXVII (Jerusalem, February 1874);
PP–1880, vol. LXXIV (Damascus, 13 March 1880).

To be sure, a consideration of the Jaffa exports (table 18) is more fruitful than a glance at tables 20 and 21. Here we have relatively coherent data from a single source (i.e., compiled with uniform criteria), for the first and third parts of the period of interest here. Thus we can make comparisons and note trends.

Events similar to what occurred in northern Palestine initially brought about export fluctuations of individual products from Jaffa. In 1859 and 1860 there was almost no grain harvested in southern Palestine due to lack of rain. In 1865 and 1866 cotton and sesame were destroyed by locusts and great damage was done to the olive and fruit trees, while the grain was spared because it either was already harvested or was already too ripe.[198] In 1877–79 the same natural and political conditions as in the north of the country brought privation and misery to the populace; in these years even grain and flour had to be imported.

The considerable fluctuations in the export of olive oil and soap had their natural cause in the fact that generally only every second or third year promised a good to excellent olive harvest, while the harvests of the other years were moderately to extremely bad, quite apart from drought or locusts.[199] According to contemporary estimates, about half of the olive oil produced was used for soap,[200] a quarter was used for food and heating, and a quarter exported.[201]

Table 19 shows the three economically most important export goods, whose share in the annual total exports of Jaffa was between 62 percent and 95 percent. It was possible to compensate for a bad or moderate harvest of one product with a good or excellent harvest of another because of the nature of the agriculture (which in the south was more diversified than in the north); only in 1859 and 1877 were there total crop failures.

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[197] See also *Die Warte*, 11 July 1878; PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1202 (Acre, 12 September 1878).

[198] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1537 (Jaffa, 31 December 1860);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1605 (Jerusalem, 23 January, 1 March, and 12 April 1861);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1874 (Jaffa, 13 June 1865);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1929 (Jerusalem, 11 June 1866).

[199] Regarding olive cultivation, see especially Anderlind, "Die Fruchtbäume" [The Fruit Trees], pp. 66–77; Klein, "Mittheilungen 1881" [Reports 1881], pp. 81f.

[200] Regarding the process, see Warren, *Underground Jerusalem*, pp. 500–509; Gatt, "Industrielles aus Gaza," pp. 77–79; Dalman, IV, pp. 273–77; Nimr, II, pp. 288–91.

[201] Conder, *Tent Work* II, p. 325; Anderlind, "Die Fruchtbäume" [The Fruit Trees] pp. 76f.; Zwiedinek, p. 46.

The long-term changes in the export structure of Jaffa, which can be seen in table 24, were based first of all on changes in external demand and the socio-political situation in Palestine itself. The table shows the quantitative export increase of the chief products of southern Palestine from the first to the last third of the period under consideration. The export growth in general, as evident especially from table 25, was based only to a slight extent on an intensification of agriculture, improved production methods, or expansion of the agricultural infrastructure (including irrigation); also for individual products the growth was achieved only partially at the expense of other, neglected products. Rather, the chief factor was the physical expansion of the cultivated land, including the addition of extensive new olive and orange plantations.[202] This was a consequence of controlling the battles and feuds in the *Jabal*s, which are described below (and in which, for example, the felling of an enemy's olive trees was a favorite means of "warfare"), deterrence of Bedouin raids, and the growing sales opportunities for Palestine products in external markets.

The growth in wheat, sesame, olive oil, and soap production may be explained by the increasing demand for these goods, especially in France and Egypt, but also in other Mediterranean countries and in England. Since the Egyptian cattle pest of 1863, cattle of all types were also an important export item from Palestine to Egypt, especially in the years 1864, 1873, and 1877, from which, not least of all, the Bedouin profited. The extraordinary growth of wool exports, which in the last third of the period under study represented a not inconsiderable export product, likewise pointed to strong Bedouin involvement in export economic activities.[203]

Some comments regarding the Jaffa orange exports are necessary. The regular export of this product began after the Crimean War; it was organized chiefly by Greek coastal shippers. In 1856 the average annual yield was listed at 20 million units.[204] In 1873 there were already 420 orange plantations around Jaffa with an annual yield of 33.3 million. One-sixth of that met the needs of Palestine; the rest was shipped on Greek "fruiters"

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[202] Regarding the expansion of olive cultivation, see PP–1863, vol. LXX (Jaffa, 27 January 1863) and PP–1872, vol. LVIII (Beirut, March 1872); Zwiedinek (p. 46) was told that 500,000 olive trees were planted annually in Syria. A newly planted seedling required ten years before it would bear fruit (Anderlind, "Die Fruchtbäume" [The Fruit Trees], p. 70). See below for the orange plantations.

[203] See Conder, *Tent Work*, II, p. 325; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, p. 141; Zwiedinek, pp. 47–51.

[204] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1419 (Jaffa, 17 May 1856—"Answers to Queries").

Table 24: Growth of exports of the main export goods of Jaffa (quantity in *kiles*/*oqqas*/units).

Export goods	Average annual exports of 1857–60 and 1862–63	Average annual exports of 1873–77 and 1879–82	Growth (multiple)
Wheat (*kiles*)	58,333	279,156	4.79
Barley (*kiles*)	121,371	101,863	0.84
Dura (*kiles*)	67,111	61,678	0.92
Sesame (*oqqas*)	1,245,421	2,059,249	1.65
Olive oil (*oqqas*)	705,624	1,027,346	1.46
Soap (*oqqas*)	420,000	904,444	2.12
Wool (*oqqas*)	10,003	115,444	11.54
Oranges (units)[a]	6,050,000	19,650,000	3.25

a) Average of the years 1873–77 and 1879 only, as starting in 1880 the count was in boxes.
Sources: Personal calculations in accordance with the sources named in footnote 183.

to Egypt and Asia Minor.[205] Starting in 1875 the Jaffa oranges were exported in significant quantities to Europe as well (France, Germany, Austria, and Russia). This long-distance trade experienced a new growth when the oranges were packed better and exported in crates. But only the egg-shaped, thick-skinned *shamutis* were suitable for shipping to Europe; the smaller round *baladis* were sold in the local and regional markets. In 1880 the total annual yield was 36 million.[206] The British consul noted in his report of 1881 that orange groves were then considered the best capital investments, as one could expect an annual net yield of 10 percent of the invested capital.[207] At the start of the 1880s, American consular officials estimated the orange stock around Jaffa at about 500 groves, each between two and six acres in size, with about 800,000 trees.[208] Overall it was calculated that the orange-grove area of Jaffa had quadrupled in the three decades from 1850 to 1880.[209]

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[205] PP–1874, vol. LXVII (Jerusalem, February 1874).

[206] PP–1881, vol. XC (Beirut, 19 March 1881).

[207] PP–1882, vol. LXXI (Jaffa, May 1882). This same calculation is already in Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 519; regarding orange cultivation see also Anderlind, "Die Fruchtbäume" [The Fruit Trees], pp. 84–88 and *Die Warte*, 18 June 1874.

[208] Owen, p. 178.

[209] Schick, "Fortschritte der Civilisation" [Advances of Civilization], p. 64; Fischer, p. 27.

Export Proceeds

If we turn now from the export-oriented, quantitative production growth to the increase in value of the exports of Jaffa (table 25), we see a doubling of the value of the goods in the last third of the period under consideration in comparison with the first third. In addition to this, a very significant (although so far unmentioned) factor of the growth in exports is evident from this table: the explosive growth in exports after the reduction in the Ottoman export duty from 12 percent to 8 percent *ad valorem* in the year 1861. This rate was then further reduced by 1 percent annually until in 1869 it was a constant 1 percent.[210]

Table 25: Exports and imports of Jaffa (values of goods in piasters).

Year	Exports	Imports
1857	15,583,350	
1858	12,244,040	
1859	7,384,200	
1860	14,968,500	
1861		
1862	22,408,348	
1863	26,039,100	
1873	31,369,000	
1874	26,562,000	14,575,500
1875	33,056,750	14,166,500
1876	56,283,900	29,776,575
1877	15,749,966	26,239,745
1878		
1879	25,272,500	31,642,000
1880	30,725,600	29,635,500
1881	33,570,250	32,534,000
1882	37,802,744	36,964,663

Average annual exports (values in piasters):
1857–60 and 1862–63: 16,437,923.
1873–77 and 1879–82: 32,265,855.

Sources: See footnote 183.

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[210] Regarding Ottoman customs and trade policy, see Kalla, pp. 91–111.

Table 26: Exports and imports of Jaffa from 1876 to 1882 according to non-English consular reports (value of goods).

Year	Exports	Imports
1 Mar. 1876–1 Mar. 1877[a]	10,541,444 francs	8,697,660 francs
1876[b]	4,350,000 gulden	2,144,000 gulden
1879[c]	4,024,000 franken	2,954,250 franken
1880[d]	2,015,000 gulden	1,303,000 gulden
1881[e]	3,069,000 gulden	1,005,200 gulden
1882[f]	5,408,750 franken	2,647,875 franken

Sources: a) MAE–CCC Jér. vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 31 July 1879).
b) HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 6 (Jaffa, 12 January 1877).
c) ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.4 (Jaffa, 31 March 1880).
d) HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 7 (Jaffa, 22 May 1881).
e) Ibid. (Jaffa, 15 May 1882).
f) ISA–DKJ, A.III., vol. 1 (Jaffa, 7 March 1883).

Table 27: Average quarterly/annual export prices in Jaffa in piasters.

Quarter/ Year	Wheat per *kile*	Barley per *kile*	*Dura* per *kile*	Sesame per *oqqa*	Olive oil per *oqqa*	Cotton per *oqqa*
I/1856	34.5	23.5	23.5	3.125		
III/1856	26.5	10.75	15.25	2.75		
IV/1856	28.5	14.5	17.25	2.875		
III/1857	24	15.5	17			
IV/1857	21.5	13.5	17	3.25	5.5	
I/1858	20	9.5	11	3.125	5.25	
II/1858	16	9	9	2.75	4.25	
III/1858	13.75	9.5	10.5	2.5	5.25	
IV/1858	16.5	10.5	11.5	2.75	5.25	
I/1859	18.5	11.5	12.5		5.125	
II/1859	22	12.5	14		5	
III/1859	24.5	13.5	16	2.625	5	
IV/1859	37.5	17.5	22.5	2.875	5	
I/1860	40	17.5	27.5	3.125	5.5	7
I/1861	38.75	16.5	23.75	3.125	6.75	7
IV/1861	25	12.5	13.25	3.375	6	9.5
1862	25	10	12	3	6.5	15
1863	22	10	12	3	6	20
1873	30	13	15	3	6	7.5
1874	23	12.5	16	3	4.5	8
1875	20	11	13.5	2.5	5	6.5
1876	21	12	11.5	2.75	4.75	
1877			35	3.25	5.5	
1879				3	5	
1880	30	13	17	3	5	
1881	25	12.5	16.5	2.75	5.5	
1882	20	12	16	2.625	5	
Average of the available data from the years:						
1856–63	25.25	13.04	15.86	2.95	5.46	
1873–82	24.14	12.29	17.56	2.875	5.14	

Sources: Data for 1856–61 calculated from
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1221 (Jaffa, 31 March, 30 August, and 31 December 1856);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1296 (Jaffa, 30 August and 31 December 1857);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1387 (Jaffa, 31 March, 30 June, 30 August, and 31 December 1858);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1449 (Jaffa, 31 March, 30 June, 30 August, and 31 December 1859);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1537 (Jaffa, 31 March 1860);
PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1605 (Jaffa, 31 March and 31 December 1861);
Data for 1862–82 are from the sources cited in footnote 183; my own calculations.

Table 28: Average annual export prices in Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa from 1874 to 1880 in piasters.

Year		Wheat per *kile*	Barley per *kile*	*Dura* per *kile*	Sesame per *oqqa*	Olive oil per *oqqa*
1874	Acre	27	14	18	3	5
	Haifa	24	14	18	3	
	Jaffa	23	12.5	16	3	4.5
1875	Acre	25	12	17	2.5	5
	Haifa	24	12	18	2.25	
	Jaffa	20	11	13.5	2.5	5
1876	Acre	22		11	2.125	4.5
	Haifa					
	Jaffa	21	12	11.5	2.75	4.75
1877	Acre	36	20	22	3	6
	Haifa	34	20	22	3	6
	Jaffa			35	3.25	5.5
1878	Acre	38				
	Haifa	30	14			
	Jaffa					
1879	Acre	40		16		5.5
	Haifa	35				
	Jaffa				3	5
1880	Acre	30	12	16	2.75	
	Haifa	30	12	16	2.75	
	Jaffa	30	13	17	3	5

Sources: Data for Jaffa from table 27, for Acre and Haifa calculated in accordance with the sources mentioned in footnote 184.

Table 29: Consumer prices in Jerusalem 1858–80, in piasters.

	Start of 1858	1880
1 *ratl* lime	1/2	2/5
1 camel-load firewood	18–25	30
1 *ratl* coal	3	1 1/2
1 *ratl* soap	13–15	12
1 Arab robe	90–100	80
1 pair Arab shoes	22–24	10
1 cauliflower	1–2	1 1/2
1 *ratl* cabbage	3	3
1 *ratl* carrots	2	2
1 *ratl* turnips	1 1/2	1 1/2
1 *ratl* cucumbers	4	2
1 *ratl* onions	3–4	3 1/2
1 pomegranate	1/2	1/4
8 oranges	1	1
1 *ratl* figs	3–4	1 1/2–3
1 *ratl* almonds	12–16	10
1 *ratl* raisins	10–12	6
1 *ratl* olive oil	10	15
1 *ratl* sesame oil	15	22 1/2
1 *ratl* beans	4–6	7
1 *ratl* lentils	3	8
1 *ratl* rice	7–9	8–9
1 *tumniya* wheat	10–12	5–11 1/4
1 *tumniya* barley	6 1/2	3–6 1/4
1 *tumniya dura*	7	2 3/4–6 3/4
1 *ratl* flour	5 1/2	4–10
1 *ratl* butter	54	36
1 *ratl* cheese	16–24	18
1 *ratl* mutton	15	12–18
1 chicken	6–7	8
4 eggs	1	1/2
1 dove	2	2
1 *ratl* salt	2	3
1 *ratl* vinegar	6	3
1 *ratl* honey	30	36
1 *ratl* sugar	22–23	16
1 *ratl* coffee	24	33
1 *ratl* domestic wine	10–13	9
(Monthly rent for a room	200–300	400–600)
(Wages for one day	5–8	4–8)

Sources: Data for 1858 from: *Titus Toblers Dritte Wanderung* [Titus Tobler's Third Journey], pp. 331–33 (table 29a); for 1880 from: Luncz, pp. 11–16 (table 29b). Conversion of measurements and weights according to Bauer, *Das Palästinische Arabisch*, p. 256 (see note 185).

Table 29a: (As from *Titus Toblers Dritte Wanderung* [Titus Tobler's Third Journey], pp. 331–33).

> "Here I want to provide a survey of wages and prices of necessities, construction materials, cloth, and foods, in piasters and parah, which was prepared in January and February 1858 in Jerusalem and kindly provided to me in manuscript form."

Wages for 1 day	5 to 8
Mason for 1 day	15 to 20
Stonecutter for 1 day	12 to 15
1 camel-load construction stone	7.8
100 tuff stones	40
1 gutter tile	.20 to .30
1 *rottel* lime	.20
1 donkey-load of ash	2.20
$^1/_2$ in. board to 1 G′	1
1 G″ (?) tin	5.5
1 iron bedstead	150
1 canopy bed	160
1 camel-load of sticks (firewood)	18 to 25
1 camel-load of rootstock	18 to 20
1 *rottel* coal	3
Monthly rent for a room, depending on size	200 to 300
1 rush mat	12
1 reed mat	13
1 hand mill	50
1 donkey or horse mill	530
1 oil press	4,500
1 jug containing 1 *rottel*	.10
1 *rottel* flax	8
1 *rottel* hemp	12
1 sack of straw	7 to 10
1 broom of rice straw	4.20
1 rush basket	3
1 basket of palm leaves	4
1 *rottel* wax	84
1 *rottel* wax candles	96
1 *rottel* tallow candles	26
1 *rottel* wool	15 to 16
1 *rottel* rope	24
1 *rottel* twine	30
1 flour sifter for wheat	10
1 *rottel* soap	13 to 15
1 *rottel* tobacco	48
1 Arab robe	90 to 100
1 pair Arab shoes	22 to 24
1 pair European shoes	60 to 80
1 cauliflower	1 to 2
1 *rottel* cabbage	3
1 *rottel* carrots	2

1 *rottel* turnips	1.20
6 to 8 radishes	1
1 *rottel* cucumbers	4
1 *rottel* onions	3 to 4
8 garlics	1
1 pomegranate	.20
8 lemons	1
8 oranges	1
1 *rottel* quince	1
1 *rottel* figs	3 to 4
1 *rottel* almonds	12 to 16
1 *rottel* raisins	10 to 12
1 *timneh* fresh olives	16
1 *timneh* salted olives	9 to 12
1 *rottel* olive oil	10
1 *rottel* sesame oil	15
1 *rottel* white beans	5 to 6
1 *rottel* field beans	4 to 6
1 *rottel* peas	6
1 *timneh* wheat	10 to 12
1 *rottel* ground wheat (*burghul*)	6 to 7
1 *timneh dura*	7
1 *rottel* rice	7 to 9
1 *timneh* barley	6.20
1 *rottel* lentils	3
1 *rottel* semolina	7
1 *rottel* flour	5.20
1 *rottel* black bread	3 to 4
1 *rottel* macaroni	15 to 17
1 *timneh* potatoes	5
1 *rottel* butter (earlier 24 to 30)	54
1 *rottel* lard	36
1 *rottel* Arab cheese	16 to 24
1 *rottel* European cheese	36
1 *rottel* mutton (later 10, also 8)	15
1 *rottel* goat meat	15
1 chicken	6 to 7
4 eggs	1
1 dove	2
1 *rottel* fish	24
1 *rottel* salt	2
1 *rottel* vinegar	6
1 *rottel* grape honey	15
1 *rottel* bee honey	30
1 *rottel* sugar	22 to 23
1 *rottel* coffee	24
1 *rottel* tea	144
1 *rottel* domestic wine (1857)	10 to 13
1 *rottel* Cypriot wine	12 to 24
1 bottle port wine	10

Table 29b: (As from Luncz, pp. 11–16).

"Prices of agricultural products and other market items, as well as wages in the year 1880."

Wheat per *saah*	60–26 piasters
Barley per *saah*	33–15 piasters
Dura per *saah*	36–14 piasters
Rice per *rottel*	8–9 piasters
Onions per *rottel*	3 1/2 piasters
Garlic per *rottel*	4 piasters
Potatoes per *rottel*	8–4 piasters
Beans per *rottel*	7 piasters
Lentils per *rottel*	8 piasters
Carrots per *rottel*	2 piasters
Squash per *rottel*	1 1/2 piasters
Turnips per *rottel*	1 1/2 piasters
Beats per *rottel*	2 1/2 piasters
Cauliflower, each	1 1/2 piasters
Tomatoes per *rottel*	1 1/2 piasters
Grapes per *rottel*	3 piasters
Raisins per *rottel*	6 piasters
Figs, fresh, per *rottel*	1 1/2 piasters
Figs, dry, per *rottel*	3 piasters
Olives per basket containing 4 *rottel*	8 piasters
Olives, salted, per *ukijeh*	1 piaster
Watermelons per *rottel*	1 1/2 piasters
Sugar melons per *rottel*	2 piasters
Apples per *rottel*	3 piasters
Pears per *rottel*	3 piasters
Plums, fresh, per *rottel*	3 piasters
Plums, dried, per *rottel*	12 piasters
Pomegranates, each	1/4 piaster
Peaches per *rottel*	3 1/2 piasters
Apricots per *rottel*	3 piasters
Lemons, each	1/4 piaster
Seville oranges, each	1/8 piaster
Bamia, a vegetable, per *rottel*	2 piasters
Eggplant per *rottel*	3 piasters
Cucumbers per *rottel*	2 piasters
Kara, a type of vegetable, each	1 piaster
Ethrog, large, each	1 3/4 piasters
Ethrog, unripe, for Feast of the Tabernacles	1–30 francs
Dates per *ukijeh*	1 piaster
Sweet almonds per *rottel*	10 piasters
Walnuts per *rottel*	9 piasters
Hazelnuts per *rottel*	11 piasters
Chestnuts per *rottel*	9 piasters
Cabbage per *rottel*	3 piasters

Flour, best per *rottel*	10–6 piasters
Flour, second quality per *rottel*	8–5 piasters
Flour, third quality per *rottel*	7–4 piasters
Wine per *rottel*	9 piasters
Brandy per *rottel*	12 francs
Wine vinegar per *rottel*	3 piasters
Wine spirits per *rottel*	18 piasters
Bee honey per *ukijeh*	3 piasters
Date syrup per *ukijeh*	1 piaster
Lamb per *ukijeh*	1 1/2–1 piasters
Fat per *ukijeh*	1 1/2 piasters
Beef per *ukijeh*	1 1/2–2 piasters
Chickens	8 piasters
Eggs, 100	12 1/2 piasters
Geese, each	35 piasters
Turkeys, each	40 piasters
Ducks, each	12 piasters
Doves	2 piasters
One ox (still useable for plowing)	500 piasters
One ox (no longer able to plow)	300 piasters
Calf	50 piasters
Sheep	55 piasters
Donkey	400 piasters
Camel	1,000 piasters
Milk per *ukijeh*	1/2 piaster
Butter per *ukijeh*	3 piasters
Cheese per *ukijeh*	1 1/2 piasters
Olive oil per *ukijeh*	1 1/4 piasters
Sesame oil per *ukijeh*	1 7/8 piasters
Petroleum per *ukijeh*	1/2 piaster
Sugar per *rottel*	16 piasters
Coffee per *rottel*	33 piasters
Wood per *kantar*	45 piasters
Wood per donkey-load	10 piasters
Wood per camel-load	30 piasters
Coal per camel-load (two large sacks and one small, weight a total of 50–60 *rottel*)	45 piasters
Coal per *rottel*	1 1/2 piasters
Lime per *kantar*	40 piasters
Soap per *rottel*	12 piasters
Salt per *rottel*	3 piasters
Water (in summer) per donkey-load	1 1/2 piasters
Water in summer, per man's load	1 1/4 piasters
Rent (in the city) for a medium room (of 7–8 square yards) with a small kitchen and with a share in the common storehouses	600 piasters
Rent outside the city	400 piasters

A finished undergarment of pressed cotton (for men)	28 piasters
Wage for sewing such	6 piasters
Wage for sewing a broad cloth robe	7 piasters
A broad cloak for the winter, made from camel's hair	80 piasters
Girdle	20 piasters
Red shoes of the Mohameddans	10 piasters
Turban	15 piasters
Wooden shoes (for women)	3 piasters
Daily wage for an adult laborer	8 piasters
Daily wage for a young laborer	4 piasters
Weekly earnings of a craftsman apprentice	50 piasters

Although we have already confirmed the production increase, one might now assume that the increased export proceeds shown in table 25 entailed no corresponding real income increase for exporter and producer, or that it was not comparable with the quantitative increase in exports, due to the general inflation or devaluation of the currency. But this was not the case, as tables 27, 28, and 29 show.

The prices of Palestine's export goods fluctuated in the short-term according to the market situation (shortage or increased demand in Europe, shortage or low supply in Palestine), but the average export prices of the years 1856–63 and 1873–82 generally show no significantly different level (table 27). The price differences between Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa (table 28) are based mainly on differing quality and differing transport costs (of Hauran wheat).

The generally constant level of the cost of living in Jerusalem, which is evident from table 29, also corresponds to this finding. Here with regard to the overall socio-political and economic situation, it is possible to compare two years, 1858 and 1880, without too many objections ("post-war years," no failed harvests). The complete price and wage tables of Tobler and Luncz are attached as tables 29a and 29b. Of course the price level in Jerusalem was not representative of all of Palestine. Rather the "Holy City" was also the most expensive, not least of all because of the European residents and pilgrims. Here are only a few price comparisons with Gaza in the years 1857–61 (in parentheses are the prices in 1858 in Jerusalem in Turkish piasters): 1 *ratl* olive oil 7 P.T. (10 P.T.); one *tumniya* wheat 2 P.T. (10–12 P.T.); 1 *tumniya* barley 1 1/2 P.T. (6 1/2 P.T.); 1 *tumniya dura* 2 P.T. (7 P.T.); 1 *ratl* butter 25 P.T. (54 P.T.); 1 *ratl* raisins 8 P.T. (10–12 P.T.); 1 *ratl* almonds 5 P.T. (12–16 P.T.); 1 *ratl* honey 23 P.T. (30 P.T.); 1 *ratl* beans 5 P.T. (4–6 P.T.); 1 wool robe 60 P.T. (90–100 P.T.). The less well-

to-do Europeans constantly moaned over Jerusalem prices, above all over apartment rents. While a European in 1858 in Jerusalem paid 200–300 P.T. *monthly rent for a room,* the average *purchase price of a house* in Gaza according to the wills examined by Rafiq was 3,100 P.T. and the *annual rent* of half of one specific house was 60 P.T.[211]

Table 30: Exchange rates in Jaffa 1857/1872/1882, in piasters.

Currency	Rate at customs 1857	Spot rate 1857	Spot rate 1872	Spot rate 1882
Ottoman Lira	108.5	128	115.5	140
Ottoman *Mejidiyya*	21.25	26		26
Ottoman *Bishtlik*	5	6		
Twenty-Franc piece	93.25	112	100	122
English Sovereign	117.5	140	126.5	154
Russian Impérial	95	114	102	
Austrian Ducats	55	66	59	
Spanish Colonnade	26	33.5		

Sources: 1857: HHSTA–Jaffa Archive, file 1 (Sardinian consulate in Jaffa, 1857).
1872: HHSTA–Jaffa Archive, file 5 (*Quadro statistico del distretto di Jaffa*, 1872).
1882: *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, p. 421.

A quite detailed and discriminating statement would have to consider the development of the exchange rates, which, to be sure, differed from city to city. They were not only important for foreign trade; rather, European money in Palestine (as in the entire region), primarily gold and silver coins, also served as the means of payment. It was not piasters which were "saved"—meaning hoarded—but Ottoman and foreign gold and silver pieces. Tables 30, 31, and 32 are meant to provide an impression of the local and temporary currency rate fluctuations. No definitive statements can be made regarding their effect on exports or export receipts: there is not enough numerical material available; the rates were very dependent on the political and economic situation and on the numerous monetary manipulations of the Ottoman government; and the rates varied from place to place. However, it is certain that the money dealers, speculators, and above all the treasury tried as hard as possible to make a business out of the currency rate changes.

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[211] Rafiq, *Ghazza*, pp. 72, 73, 83, and 85. Many interesting price data appear on p. 73, but we do not have any comparable Jerusalem prices.

Table 31: Exchange rates of gold and silver coins in Jerusalem 1874–82 in piasters.

Currency	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879	1880	1881**	1882
Ottoman Lira	110	*	118	129	130–133.5	123–133	121–133	121 (100)	122.5
Ottoman *Mejidiyya*	21.75	*	22.75	24.25	24.5	23–24	22.75		22.75 (19)
Ottoman *Beshlik*	5.25	*	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	2.5–2.75	2.875 (2)	
Twenty-Franc piece	96	*	103	112	113–116.5	105–116	106–116	106 (90)	107
English Sovereign	121	*	128–129	139	142–146			133 (110)	135
Russian Impérial	98	*						108 (92)	
Russian Silver Ruble	19	*	19	20.5				18 (16)	
Austrian Ducats	56.5	*						63 (50)	
Spanish Colonnade	25	*	25						

*Basically as in 1874.

**The official rate in 1881 appears in parentheses.

Sources: 1874–80: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Jerusalem, 8 January 1875 and 5 January 1876);
ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Jerusalem, 30 January 1877 and 16 January 1878);
ISA–DKJ, A.XXXX.4 (Jerusalem, 7 February 1876, 20 January 1880, and 5 February 1881).
1881: Luncz, p. 9.
1882: *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, II, 1883, p. 421.

Table 32: Exchange rate in Haifa/Acre, 1878–81 (piasters).

Currency	Start of 1878	Start of 1879	Start of 1880	Start of 1881
Ottoman Lira	128	120	121	121.5
Ottoman *Mejidiyya*		22.75	22.75	22.75
Twenty-Franc piece	111	105	105	106.5
English Sovereign	140	131	131	134

Source: ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Haifa, 19 January 1879) and A.XXXIX.4. (Haifa, 20 January 1879, 10 January 1880, and 7 January 1881).

The economic upsurge and the growing prosperity of Palestine were at any rate undeniable facts for attentive observers. That this prosperity benefitted the actual producers, that is, the *fellahin*, only to a limited extent, is a different matter. First to profit from it were the businessmen and middlemen, the medium and large landholders, and the tax farmers, precisely all those who invested their capital in trade and in agriculture. Above all, though, was the treasury, which in the face of the financial need and the growing military expenditures of the central government was always thinking up new ways and means to skim off the surplus through tax increases, special levies, and monetary and financial manipulations, without providing the corresponding reciprocating services for the benefit of the Palestine economy.[212]

At the time of the grain boom around the middle of the 1850s and the cotton boom in the first half of the 1860s, however, individual wealth among the *fellahin* was observed. Regarding the export of grain, Consul Finn reported in 1856 that

> coin is poured in from abroad for payment. An Ionian merchant of Caiffa (Avicrino, the Vice Consul for Russia and Greece) assures me that last year no less a sum than half a million Sterling passed through his hands between the ships of that Port and the Bedaween of the Hauran, who have on their side imported no merchandize. It is the same with the peasantry of the villages, they export grain, they greedily grasp the coin in return, and then hide it in the ground often dying without revelation of their secret.[213]

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[212] Regarding the exploitation of the peasants, see Gottheil, *Money and Product Flows in Mid-19th Century Palestine*. This contribution is just as deficient from a historical standpoint as Gottheil's article, "The Population of Palestine." European sources from the second half of the nineteenth century are cited to describe the situation at mid-century; a demonstration of developmental lines thus becomes impossible. Probably the subliminal intention was to impart an impression of static and stagnant conditions.

[213] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 1 January 1857).

Two years later he reported:

> Of late an export trade of grain from this country to Europe has been opened up, from which the peasantry notwithstanding the losses sustained by extortion of their own Shaikhs, and of the tax-farmers, have accumulated an unprecedented degree of wealth—but they bury the coin in holes, they purchase arms, and they decorate their women.[214]

And during the brief cotton boom, Consul Kayat observed that the *fellahin* who profited from it bought English goods and bedecked their women with gold and silver coins.[215] The upsurge and the growing prosperity of individual Palestinian cities and districts, not only Jerusalem and Haifa, were emphasized again and again. One voice, for example, in this regard: In his economic report on the Syrian coast for the year 1880, the British vice consul in Beirut wrote: "Of the outlying districts I may remark that the state of Jaffa seems the most satisfactory."[216] The above described population growth is also to be seen within the framework of this economic expansion.

Imports and Trade Balance

Thus, with its agricultural surpluses, Palestine contributed to the provision of neighboring regions, especially Egypt, Lebanon, and the western coast of Asia Minor. Beyond that, with its exports to Europe and its high import deficit, it made a contribution to equalizing the Greater Syrian trade balance. The disproportion of overall exports and imports for Palestine (i.e., the ports of Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa) seemed to all consuls to be the most noteworthy aspect of the economic development of the country during the entire period under consideration. This disproportion was all the more surprising since a growing portion of the imports had to satisfy the needs of the Europeans and European institutions in the country, which themselves contributed nothing to the growth of exports (apart from the Templars, whose share in the economic upsurge of Palestine, however, is usually overstated). But the import deficit was to an extent only apparent, as we must distinguish between direct and indirect imports.

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[214] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 9 October 1858).

[215] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1834 (Jaffa, 15 March 1864).

[216] PP–1881, vol. XC (Beirut, 19 March 1881).

Until the second half of the 1870s there were virtually no direct imports to Acre and Haifa from Europe. The major Arab businessmen and the representatives of the French, Italian, and Greek trading houses were almost solely involved in the organization of exports. Many Greek and also Italian businessmen conducted their trade even without local agents, that is, the captains of the trading ships doubled as the buyers. The import goods from Europe were almost exclusively obtained by local small traders from large houses in Beirut, and in small quantities and via the land route. In the 1870s, there was only one German iron and dry goods business in Haifa that transacted direct import business (above all from Germany); in 1878 a few more German businessmen established themselves there, and constantly complained of the absence of direct shipping connections with Germany.

Imports (mainly indirect) to northern Palestine were like those in the south of the country: rice from Italy and Egypt, sugar from France, coffee from South America and Arabia (primarily via the land route), cotton manufactured goods from England and Switzerland, cloth from Switzerland and Germany, iron and dry goods from Germany, England, Austria, and France, and construction lumber from Asia Minor. But the total value of the imports (both the indirect and the minimal direct ones) did not begin to approach the value of the exports, according to the unanimous opinion of the consuls.

In Jaffa, even the British consuls, who supplied the most detailed trade and economic surveys from there, provided no import statistics before 1874, because the arriving cargoes were largely already duty-paid (mainly in Beirut), and after presentation of the duty certificate (*reftiyye*) they were discharged and some immediately transported farther into the interior without further formalities. Thus this portion of Palestine's imports, too, appeared in the Ottoman duty statistics of Beirut, even though the goods were not obtained through this city.

The import structure of Jaffa in the period from 1856 to 1882 showed no fundamental change. The economically most important import goods for the years 1874 to 1882 are listed in table 33. What had changed in this phase in comparison with the 1850s and 1860s was, first of all, the importance attached to the import of so-called luxury and fashion articles as well as petroleum. The former included, for example, clocks, porcelain, perfumes, jewelry, and "fancy goods." These imports were probably partially at the expense of the Europeans in the country, but also may be the result of a greater prosperity and changed taste of the local upper class. With regard to clothing and footwear, luxury foods, objects of daily consumption and lifestyle, they began to be styled on European models. The European businessmen and craftsmen who settled in Palestine increasingly satisfied not only the needs of the foreigners, but also those of the local upper class.[217]

With regard to the origin of the imports, the rice came mainly from Egypt, Italy, France, and India; sugar from France, Egypt, Austria, and England; coffee via Europe from South America and from Arabia; cotton-manufactured items primarily from England; lumber from Asia Minor and Romania; wine from Cyprus and France; petroleum from America; and coal from England. From different European lands (France, England, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and Greece) came luxury items, cloth and silk, iron and household wares, glass, paper, and spirits.

The otherwise concurring statements of the consuls regarding the export surplus of Jaffa (a phenomenon that was observed until the turn of the century) show significant discrepancies in the statistics for the years 1879–82 (tables 25 and 26). One reason for this could lie in the different treatment of the indirect imports.

Table 33: Imports of Jaffa (the seven most important goods, value in piasters).

1874	Coffee	3,920,000
	Rice	3,397,500
	Sugar	2,400,000
	Cotton manufactured items	2,240,000
	Lumber	1,540,000
	Wine	573,000
	Cloth	295,000
1875	Coffee	4,040,000
	Sugar	2,990,000
	Rice	2,447,500
	Cotton manufactured items	1,920,000
	Lumber	1,869,500
	Wine	515,000
	Cloth	360,000
1876	Coffee	10,802,000
	Sugar	6,924,000
	Cotton manufactured items	3,934,500
	Rice	3,574,175
	Luxury and fashion items	1,156,250
	Petroleum	850,000
	Cloth	709,400

(continued)

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[217] See *HL*, XVII (1873), p. 188; *Die Warte*, 2 April and 11 June 1874; Schick, "Fortschritte der Civilisation" [Advances of Civilization], p. 65; Wolff, "Zur Neueren Geschichte," pp. 12f.; Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 143–50.

1877	Sugar	5,390,000
	Coffee	5,169,000
	Rice	3,869,250
	Cotton manufactured items	3,362,145
	Luxury and fashion items	2,130,000
	Wheat	1,925,000
	Dura	875,000
1879	Sugar	10,350,000
	Rice	3,992,500
	Wheat and flour	3,868,000
	Coffee	3,760,000
	Cotton manufactured items	2,800,000
	Luxury and fashion items	2,295,000
	Cloth	939,000
1880	Sugar	10,500,000
	Rice	4,757,500
	Coffee	4,140,000
	Cotton manufactured items	3,250,000
	Luxury and fashion articles	2,080,000
	Petroleum	1,600,000
	Cloth	1,067,000
1881	Sugar	10,125,000
	Luxury and fashion items	5,985,000
	Rice	4,099,500
	Cotton manufactured items	3,220,000
	Coffee	3,162,500
	Petroleum	1,980,000
	Lumber	1,215,000
1882	Sugar	9,421,500
	Rice	6,683,350
	Luxury and fashion items	5,578,325
	Cotton manufactured items	3,536,000
	Coffee	3,261,000
	Petroleum	2,880,000
	Lumber	1,680,000

Sources: See footnote 183.

Land Ownership and Acquisition

The profitability of the export-oriented agricultural production and the possibility of expanding the agricultural acreage within the framework of the overall socio-political development of Palestine after the Crimean War resulted in a reassessment of individual land ownership on the part of both the Ottoman central government and the local upper class. The legal framework, which was gradually to guarantee private, individual discretionary power over real estate, were created in three "waves of laws," as it were, at the end of the 1850s, the end of the 1860s, and the middle of the 1870s, partially under direct or indirect European pressure. Most well-known are the land law of 1858 and the law of 1867, which conceded to foreigners the right to possess real estate in the Ottoman Empire.

However, it should be emphasized that the law of 1858 did not create fundamentally new land-ownership norms, but comprehensively codified the law already in force. It was intended to create a clear basis, as it were, for the implementation of the actual intentions of the central government: fiscal reform, especially of the *miri* land. The goal was individual registration of all ownership titles and the extension of the right of inheritance, and thus also the break-up of communal ownership forms (above all the *musha'* system). The laws and decrees regarding the registration and issuance of ownership titles ensued, until in 1874 and 1876 even the issuance of new ownership titles for *mulk* and *waqf* land was prescribed by law.[218]

The central government could hope for both direct and indirect fiscal profits: Indirect, in that the assurance of individual ownership titles and their transferability would increase production and thus the tax yield. Direct income could be expected in three ways: through issuance of ownership titles; through "privatization" (the sale of state land); and, with regard to taxes, through holding individual bearers of title deeds liable for the required taxes in the event of bankruptcy.

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[218] Actually *milk* land; but here I use the transliteration *mulk* generally used in the literature. The texts of the different land laws from our period in Testa, VII, pp. 729–55; Aristarchi, I, pp. 19–26, 57–240, and 254–66; Young, I, pp. 344–45 and VI, pp. 45–107; Fisher, pp. 1–80. Interpretive presentation of the law of 1858 in HHSTA–P.A. XII, box 64 (Constantinople, 27 August 1858–29 pages); German translation and commentary of the ownership title law of 1874 in ISA–DKJ, A.XXII.4 (24 pages); there also is a model of ownership titles for *mulk* and *miri* land.

Studies: *ÖMO*, 1 (1875), pp. 154–56; Engelhardt, I, pp. 205–14 and II, pp. 124–28; Arslanian; Mülinen, "Beiträge zur Kentniss des türkischen Grundbuchwesens" [Contributions to Knowledge of the Turkish Land Register System]; Padel; Padel and Steeg; Granott; Klat, "The Origins of Landownership"; Baer, "The Evolution of Private Landownership"; 'Awad, *Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds* (Diss.), pp. 125–39; Davison pp. 99f. and 256–62; Eisenmann, pp. 52–69; Musa, pp. 79–90; Sulayman, "Milkiyyat al-ard" pp. 37–47.

We know that the result in Palestine was not a wide dispersion of the ownership titles in the hands of the *fellahin* who actually worked the *miri* land. The reasons leading to registration mainly in the names of members of the dominant social groups, and thus to formation of great landholdings, have often been described: inability of the peasants to obtain the documents; fear of the consequences with respect to the levy of taxes and conscription; protection by influential personalities from arbitrary oppression by tax farmers, tax officials, the military, and money-lenders.[219] However, with the advent of large landholdings, the *musha'* system was not eliminated but extended because of the expansion of agricultural acreage to the coastal and inland plains.[220] *De jure* the land remained mostly *miri*, while *de facto* it largely approximated the *mulk* land.

One consequence of this development for the economic structure was the beginning commercialization of the countryside and capitalist penetration of agricultural production, even if this was not (or only to a small extent) based on entirely legal private ownership. Communal cultivation by the *fellahin* to some extent continued. Land was now available for sale. In some cases "uncultivated" land was offered by the government; sometimes indebted peasants or villages sought a new owner, who paid their debts and their back taxes and relieved them of the burden of immediate fiscal responsibility to the government.

At the end of the 1860s and the beginning of the 1870s, the government conducted outright sales campaigns of land that was not continuously cultivated, especially land in the northern part of the country.[221] But also in the south, interested parties were provided with lists of purchasable land. In 1874 Montefiore published a list of 12 properties together amounting to more than 25,000 *dunums*, situated mostly along the Jerusalem-Ramla-Jaffa road, which the government wanted to sell.[222] The *fellahin's* emergency situation at the end of the seventies due to the war and the poor harvests brought about a wave of sales of a different type, from which dealers and moneylenders especially profited.[223]

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[219] See for example, "Der Ackerbau in Palästina" [Agriculture in Palestine] *HL*, XVI (1872), pp. 44–47 and 116–19; Granott, chapter 3.

[220] Regarding the *musha'* system in Palestine see Schick, "Landwirtschaftliche Verhältnisse" [Agricultural Conditions], pp. 51f.; Klein, "Mittheilungen 1881," pp. 74–76; Neil, "Land Tenure," pp. 155–62 and 192f.; Post, pp. 105f.; Bergheim, pp. 191–99; Lees, pp. 85f.; Baldensperger, "The Immovable East," *PEFQS* (1906), pp. 192f.; Auhagen, pp. 34 and 49–51; Schulman, pp. 63–66; Dalman, II, pp. 38–41; Granott, pp. 174–79 and 213–48; Firestone, *Faddan and Musha'*; Owen, pp. 256–59 and 269. According to Baer, *Fellah and Townsman*, p. 136, on the eve of World War I the *musha'* land made up around 70 percent of the area of Palestine.

[221] AA–Konst., Gen. 76.K.18.d (Beirut, 12 April 1868); *Translations of a Letter . . . by Sir Moses Montefiore*, pp. 15, 29, 31f., 34, 38f., 45, 53, 63–65, and 79; Jessup, II, p. 423.

[222] *Translations of a Letter . . . by Sir Moses Montefiore*, p. 32; Rosenberg, "The Condition of Palestine," p. 125.

Who then acquired the land? We can distinguish three main groups. Through money lending (financial dependency) or by the path of simple registration, that is, issuance of ownership titles based on the laws and decrees of 1858–60 and 1874–76, the established local upper class obtained medium and larger land holdings. The dominant families in the *Jabal*s and the urban *effendi*s assured themselves land in the highlands, at the foot of the *Jabal*s, and around the cities on the coast, which they had already controlled, and where they now to some extent shifted to more intensive agriculture, for instance around Jaffa and Gaza (see also pp. 171f). It was said that by means of irrigation at the foot of a hill between 'Arraba and Jinin, the 'Abd al-Hadi family had "begun garden cultivation after the example of the Germans in Haifa and Jaffa."[224] At the start of the Mandate period reports told of their extensive land holdings near Jinin and a holding of 200,000 *dunum*s near 'Arraba.[225]

The second group consisted of representatives of the slowly emerging new commercial and financial bourgeoisie in the coastal cities (including Beirut) and in Jerusalem. This group consisted mainly of Europeans or European protégés, Jews, and Palestinian and Lebanese Christians, and they acquired (especially after 1867) land around the cities, as well as entire stretches of land in the plains, through purchase and "usury." Many examples and names can be listed. (The two most well-known cases, Sursuq and Bergheim, will be discussed below.) A dossier from the German consular records contains documents about approximately two dozen real estate transactions around Jerusalem in the years 1872–73, struck by German merchants, businessmen, and bankers (Bergheim, Frutiger, Spittler, and Frank), as well as the Jewish protégés.[226] Loehnis and Schick cite a different group of Jerusalem businessmen who invested capital in real estate.[227] Two merchants from Acre who acquired land near Tiberias are named.[228] According to Conder, the coastal plain near Jaffa was bought up by Jewish, Greek, and Maronite "capitalists."[229] The trade and bank capital began to penetrate Palestinian agriculture.

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[223] Conder, *Heth and Moab*, pp. 366f. This naturally was nothing new; moneylenders had always understood how to get land under their control. The methods of a Jerusalem Jew and British protégé to acquire land *de facto* before the law of 1867 is described by the English consul: PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 761 (Jerusalem, 9 June 1863).

[224] Ebers and Guthe, I, p. 271.

[225] Jaussen, p. 132.

[226] ISA–DKJ, A.XXXVII.5.ª (Real estate acquisition and transfer of ownership titles, 1872–1873); see also *An Open Letter Addressed to Sir Moses Montefiore*, pp. 63f. and Loewe, II, pp. 180 and 274f.

[227] Loehnis, *Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse* [The Most Important Results], p. 254; Schick, "Studien zur Colonisierung," p. 61.

[228] PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1369 (Beirut, 23 July 1880); see also PP–1880, vol. LXXIV (Damascus, 13 March 1880).

The third group that had an interest in land acquisition were foreign colonists, especially the Templars and Jews. The colonies of Templars are briefly discussed below; the Jewish colonization did not become important until after 1882 and therefore does not need to be discussed here.

Another consequence of this development since the end of the 1850s must be pointed out: the increase in land prices, not only in the cities and their environs, but everywhere in the country, albeit to different degrees in different places and times. Except for the land in the cities, even at the start of the 1880s prices still remained "ridiculously low," in European eyes, but the price increase nonetheless reflected the growing importance of this new commodity.[230]

In this regard, finally, it should be mentioned that a significant amount of the agricultural acreage, especially in southern Palestine, was *waqf* land, the tithe of which went chiefly for maintenance of the Muslim "holy places" in Hebron and Jerusalem. However, we have comprehensive figures only for the Mandate period: The land, the tithe of which flowed into the *waqf* account, was estimated at 600,000 to one million *dunums*. The land of approximately 100 villages belonged entirely in this category. In 1921–22 the *waqf* tithes made up 12.75 percent of the entire tithe yield in Palestine, and 55 percent of the entire *waqf* income came from these tithes. In addition there were the family *waqfs*.[231]

We have already discussed the accumulation of ownership titles in the hands of the large landowners. According to the estimates of Auhagen, at the start of this century only 20 percent of the land in Galilee and 50 percent of the land in Judea was still in the hands of the peasants.[232] We do not have precise data. A few figures from the end of the Ottoman period shall indicate the extent of the land accumulation: According to official data from 1909, in the *sanjaqs* Jerusalem, Nablus, and Acre, 16,910 families cultivated 785,00 *dunums*, an average of 46 *dunums*. According to a register from the second decade of this century, 144 large landowners of Palestine owned 3,130,000 *dunums* of land, thus an average of 22,000 *dunums*.[233] For our period we have no such figures. We can supply a somewhat detailed picture of only two of the very well-known large landowners in the 1870s.

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[229] Conder, *Heth and Moab*, p. 368.

[230] Some figures for the 1870s and the first half of the 1880s are provided by Anderlind, "Ackerbau" [Agriculture], pp. 52–54; see also PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1202 (Jerusalem, 23 November 1878); Neil, *Palestine Re-Peopled*, pp. 13–16.

[231] See Barron, especially pp. 18, 47, and 56–62; Dalman, II, pp. 37f.; Granott, pp. 139–45 and 151–55; Khayat, pp. 42f.; Layish, p. 53. Regarding the *waqfs* of Jerusalem and Hebron see also Mujir al-Din, II, pp. 431–46 and Massignon; regarding the *waqfs* in and around Hebron see Rosen, "Ueber das Thal," pp. 489f.; *Titus Toblers dritte Wanderung*, p. 52; Sepp, I, p. 42; Hijazi, pp. 99f; Karmon, "Changes," p. 76; regarding the *waqfs* in and around Jerusalem see *HL*, VIII (1864), p. 43; Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 220; *SWP, Judaea*, p. 13; Anderlind, "Ackerbau," p. 52; Baer, "The Dismemberment"; Baer, *Jerusalem's Families*.

Also the Jewish quarter in Jerusalem was largely *waqf* (according to 'Arif, *Al-nakba*, II, p. 490, footnote 3, 90 percent; according to 'Amiri, *Al-Quds*, p. 12, 85 percent).

Regarding two soap factories at Ramla and Gaza which were *waqf*, see ISA–DKJ, A.XXII.1.ᶜ (Jerusalem, 2 May 1883) and Gatt, "Industrielles aus Gaza," p. 77.

[232] Auhagen, p. 52.

In 1869, the government sold the land of 17 villages in the Marj ibn 'Amir (including the land of Nazareth) to the Beirut businessmen Habib Bustrus, Niqula Sursuq, Tuwaini, and Farah, with Sursuq assuring himself the lion's share through assumption of Bustrus's share. The Nazarenes, who back in 1868 had protested the unsuccessful settlement of Templars near Sammuniyya,[234] now went on the offensive, and in 1870 a portion of the land was given back and the Beirut businessmen compensated accordingly. We assume that the spokesmen of the protest represented that "most respected class" of large landowners and grain dealers of Nazareth that we will encounter below (table 43). In 1872 the government sold the land of another five villages, largely again to Sursuq and to Salim al-Khuri.[235] This was the start of Sursuq's undertaking in Palestine, which constitutes our first example.[236]

The Sursuq brothers, Greek Orthodox from Beirut, were possessors of one of the largest entrepreneurial complexes in Greater Syria: they were bankers, owners of a modern steam-driven silk spinning mill and one of the largest trading houses on the Syrian coast (trading particularly in grain, wool, and cotton export).[237]

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[233] Granott, pp. 38f.; regarding the large landholdings and the large landowners in Palestine at the start of the twentieth century, see also Sulayman, "Milkiyyat al-ard," pp. 52–55; "Nushu' wa-tatawwur," no. 26, pp. 40f. and no. 28, pp. 17–20; 'Amiri, *Al-tatawwur*, pp. 59–68.

[234] AA–Konst., GEN.76.K.18.d (Beirut, 12 April 1868). However, the founding of this colony failed first of all because its members succumbed to illnesses. Hoffmann compared them to the fallen in a campaign: "They too died for the Temple in Jerusalem"; Hoffmann, *Nachricht*, pp. 3 and 18–22. See also AA–Konst., GEN.76.K. 18.d (Beirut, 4 August 1868 and Nazareth, 5 August 1868).

[235] Chief of an influential merchant family in Haifa; see citation on p. 000 [*sic*] as well as Granott, p. 81 and Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas* [History of Haifa], p. 131.

[236] All details are from Mansur, pp. 98f. and 287f.; see also Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VII/2, pp. 49 and 577; named in 1916 as large landowners in the Marj ibn 'Amir: Sursuq and Tuwaini from Beirut, Khuri and Ra'is from Haifa; Schulman, p. 53. Regarding further Lebanese large landowners in northern Palestine, see Sulayman, "Milkiyyat al-ard," p. 55; Musa, p. 88.

[237] Zwiedinek, pp. 25, 51, 56, and 67f.; Fawaz, pp. 91–94.

The Sursuq land near Nazareth and in the Marj ibn ʻAmir comprised 230,000 *dunums* and was acquired for £20,000;[238] this investment was rapidly amortized through the high profits, however. The new owners recruited peasants from other districts, had abandoned villages rebuilt, equipped the *fellahin* with improved tools, employed local managers and agents in their villages, and assumed the tax farming themselves. The peasants were tenants on the land of the Sursuqs, and saw them in the capacity of owners, tax farmers, moneylenders, and protectors. In 1872, Conder complained that officials did not go after people who had attacked members of the Palestine Exploration Fund in the Sursuq region, because they feared this powerful family.[239] Oliphant wrote at the start of 1883:

> The whole plain of Esdraelon...as well as part of the hills behind, is now all owned by one rich firm of Syrian bankers, who draw an annual income of about $200,000 a year from it. They own practically about five thousand human beings as well, who form the population of thirty villages, which are in their hands. I found no more potent talisman in inducing the natives to comply with my request than to mention the name of "Sursuk," and imply that I had the honour of his acquaintance. No despot exercises a more autocratic power over the liberties or the lives of his subjects than does this millionaire landed proprietor, who continues annually to add to his territory till the whole of Galilee seems in danger of falling into his hands.[240]

The Sursuqs undertook further steps for the improvement of their land. As early as 1871 they contracted with the German architect Schumacher to study the terrain, as they wanted to have a road built to Haifa.[241] Nothing appears to have come of it, however, as the Templars later claimed that they had to build the road from Haifa to Nazareth at their own expense. In 1882 the Sursuqs received the concession for the construction of an Acre-Haifa-Damascus railroad line through their "territory." But it was impossible for them to raise the necessary capital (as foreseen in England) so the concession lapsed.[242]

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[238] Regarding this enterprise of the Sursuq, see *Personal Recollections*, p. 14; Conder, *Tent Work*, I, pp. 165f. and II, p. 328; Conder, "The Present Condition of Palestine," pp. 10 and 13; Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, pp. 328–32; *SWP, Galilee*, pp. 273 and 356; *SWP, Samaria*, p. 46; Loehnis, *Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse*, p. 253; Wright, p. 133; Anderlind, "Ackerbau," p. 53; Bonne, pp. 144f.; Granott, pp. 39, 80f., and 83.

[239] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2282 (Haifa, 28 December 1872).

[240] Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 52f.

[241] *Die Warte*, 29 June 1871.

[242] See Schumacher, "Das Eisenbahnproject" [The Railroad Project]; Neumann, "Palästinas zukünftige Eisenbahnen" [Palestine's Future Railroads]; Hartmann, "Das Bahnnetz Mittelsyriens" [The Rail Network of Central Syria], p. 57; Verney and Dambmann, p. 272; Young, IV, p. 242; Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*, p. 112.

In the years we are considering here, the enterprise was nonetheless exceptionally profitable for the Sursuqs, and it changed the face of the Marj ibn 'Amir.[243] Sultan 'Abdulhamid evidently wanted to share in this success. In 1882, the eastern part of the Marj ibn 'Amir and the northern Ghawr (Baysan) became his private property.[244] Probably he was personally interested in the construction of the above-mentioned rail line to reduce the transport costs for the grain.[245]

The second example of a landowner is that of the Jewish banker, merchant, factory-owner and German protégé, Bergheim, in Jerusalem. The Bergheim company ran the only real banking house in the city; it represented the Banque Impériale Ottomane and several London banks. In addition, at the end of the 1840s it acquired a landed property near Jaffa and especially Jerusalem. A soap company at Ramla also belonged to it. In 1877, its capital was estimated by the German consul at 400,000 marks, of which half was invested in the land holding of Abu Shusha southeast of Ramla.[246]

The extent of this holding is given in German sources as 5,000 *Morgen* (about 1,275 hectares), in English sources as 5,000 acres (about 2,100 hectares). Melville Bergheim acquired it in 1872 for a sum amounting to the back taxes of about 400 residents of the village of Abu Shusha, namely 46,000 piasters. Fifty-one peasants were involved in the transaction, and 153 ownership titles were transferred to Bergheim's hands. The *fellahin* remained as tenants on the land and insisted on cultivating it as previously by the *musha'* system, and thus not dividing it up into individual parcels. Apart from that, the holding was directly cultivated by the Bergheims. They erected new buildings, installed a water pump, acquired machinery, and improved cultivation methods. The enterprise is described as exceptionally successful and profitable economically.[247]

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[243] See for example, Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 478f.; Conder, *Tent Work*, I, pp. 112f.; Hellwald and Beck, II, p. 256; Ebers and Guthe, I, p. 276; Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 73f.

[244] See *NNM*, 27 (1883), p. 131; *NNM*, 37 (1893), pp. 149–55; Owen, p. 267.

[245] Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 74f., 78.

[246] See Baldensperger Diary, 30 September 1850; PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1605 (Jerusalem, 13 January 1861); *Die Warte*, 8 November 1866; ISA–DKJ, A.XXXVII.5.^{a} (Jerusalem, 6 November 1872 and 25 July 1873); ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Jerusalem, 20 March 1877); ISA–DKJ, A.XXII.1.^{c} (Jerusalem, 2 May 1883: Governor to Consul).

[247] *Die Warte*, 2 December 1875; *HL*, XX (1876), pp. 82f.; Conder, *Tent Work*, II, pp. 256 and 328f.; *TS*, 1879/80/81, pp. 147f.; Schick, "Landwirthschaftliche Verhältnisse," pp. 134f.; *SWP*, *Samaria*, pp. 407 and 444; ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.4 (Jerusalem, 24 March 1881); Thomson, *Southern Palestine*, p. 115; Oliphant, *Haifa*, p. 373; Neil, "Land Tenure," p. 189; Granott, pp. 84 and 287f.

Unlike the Sursuqs, the Bergheims were not native or Ottoman subjects, and in socio-political and legal respects until World War I they had constantly to defend their new possession on two sides: against the local upper class and against the village *fellahin*. The long chain of legal arguments which need not be recapitulated here began with the Bergheims' refusal to pay the *baqshish* (bribe) demanded by the Jerusalem land registration official 'Umar Effendi al-Husayni in the first registration. The argument with the *fellahin* began when they became aware that they were about to become agricultural workers for a European landholder; the first crisis came in 1884, when Peter Bergheim was murdered by village residents.[248] One should probably view these arguments within the context of the early protest against European colonization, as, for example, the protests of the peasants of Yazur (southeast of Jaffa), whose land was transferred in 1870 to the founders of the agricultural school Mikveh Israel.[249]

To the extent that the sources permit general conclusions, one can thus affirm that at least some of the new large landholders viewed the land not merely as an object of speculation, but made productive investments in order to profit from the new economic opportunities. In this way they undoubtedly contributed to the upsurge of agricultural production in Palestine.

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[248] ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Jerusalem, 3 May 1876); ISA–DKJ, B.I.82.^{c} (Jerusalem, 28 August 1909: written petition regarding Abu-Shusha); *Die Warte*, 2 December 1875.

[249] See in this regard Chouraqui, pp. 357–63 and 494f.; *SWP*, *Samaria*, p. 256; *Die Warte*, 29 September 1870.

The Development of the Cities and the Urban Economy

Preliminary Remarks

While we can illustrate general trends in the development of agricultural production by means of export statistics, we lack the corresponding sources for urban production. This production was oriented almost exclusively toward the local and regional market and was only descriptively covered by European observers interested in the Palestinian economy. Only intermittently do we have quantitative data available. Even the *salnames* contain very sparse information; only that of A.H. 1288 provides some systematic data, which are summarized in table 34. That they should be accepted only with great caution is demonstrated by the fact that precisely at Nablus, the center of soap production in Palestine, no soap factories are listed. Nevertheless, we hope that the general statements at which we will arrive can be viewed as adequately demonstrated.

Table 34: Data of the *Salname-i Vilayet-i-Suriye* for A.H. 1288 (A.D. 1871–72) regarding the "economic infrastructure" of Palestinian cities.

City	Shops	Warehouses	*Khans*	Mills	Ovens	Soap factories	Oil presses
Jerusalem	910	141	2	14	22	20	9
Hebron	250		4		18	1	
Jaffa	332	188	6	3	10	11	7
Ramla	96		1	1	8	7	7
Lydda	106		1		6	10	16
Gaza	785	35	6	1	9	6	19
Nablus	450		4	20			
Jinin	4			2	1		
Nazareth	176		2	10	4		
Haifa	160	70		6	5		
Acre	491	185	5	7	3		
Safad	227			15			4
Tiberias	130				8		

In the following, the construction development, employment structure, and commercial production (and their place in the local and regional trade) of those eleven places commonly appearing in contemporary sources as *the* cities of Palestine, shall be illuminated successively, to the extent that material is available. Table 12 should be consulted regarding the population development.

A certain categorization is necessary in considering these cities. We undertake this from the standpoint of our inquiry into the consequences of the European penetration. We first treat those localities which most directly changed under the European assault: Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth with the Christian "holy cities," and the port cities of Jaffa and Haifa, which developed under the conditions of the "Peaceful Crusade" and export orientation. Then we turn to the northern Palestinian cities of Acre, Safad, and Tiberias, which lay in the shadow of this development. In the case of Acre the question must be asked: How could the city have population losses, when in fact it remained the main export center for Hauran wheat? The third group to be considered is the urban population and local economic and trade centers of Nablus, Hebron, and Gaza, which, like Acre, were indeed washed by the European flood, but were not swamped by it to the extent that the cities of the first group were. Unlike the second group, however, a clear upward trend is evident here. It is fitting that we start with Jerusalem.

Jerusalem (al-Quds)

In the decades considered here, Jerusalem was not very important to the Palestinian economy either as a trading site or as a center of commercial production. The city lived chiefly from or for the "holy sites" of the Muslims, Christians, and Jews, from the institutions that arose or were built for their sake, and from the pilgrims and travelers who visited them.

The stream of pilgrims, tourists, "Palestine explorers," and finally colonists grew continuously with the end of the Crimean War. Confessional associations, which were founded in many European countries, organized pilgrimages under religious supervision (since 1853 from Marseilles, since 1855 from Trieste).[250] Starting in the 1870s there was an increase in the number of organized groups of travelers who did not want to journey to Palestine alone or to join the ranks of the "Peaceful Crusade."

As the pilgrims were housed almost exclusively in monasteries or hospices, which were run by religious institutions that kept the books, precise figures have been preserved for individual years and institutions. While in 1845 around 5,000 pilgrims had visited the "Holy Land," 9,854 were counted in February 1858, and 13,475 pilgrims in March of the same year.[251] In the ten years from 1850 to 1859 the Franciscans registered 55,763 pilgrims in their Palestinian inns and a total of 229,346 overnight stays.[252] In the 1870s during the "season," Jerusalem had to manage between 10,000 and 20,000 pilgrims annually.[253]

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[250] Sepp, I, p. XXV; *Titus Toblers Dritte Wanderung*, p. 361.

But here one should not assume that the pilgrims were themselves an important economic factor, comparable with the tourists of today. The great majority of them were eastern European and Christian, and the largest individual contingents were made up of Russian pilgrims who were anything but wealthy.[254] The pilgrimages were only one specific form of expression of the "Peaceful Crusade," the "conquest" of Jerusalem by Orthodoxy, Catholics, and Protestants from western and eastern Europe, while the actual conquest, above all starting since the 1870s, was by the Jews, who came to Jerusalem to stay.

We do not have reliable statistics regarding the number of Europeans who, after the Crimean War, settled with the already-present monastery residents and the few missionaries, merchants, and consulate employees in Palestine without becoming subjects of the sultan. *La Terre Sainte* once mentioned 40,000, then 30,000 persons for the period between the middle of the 1850s to the middle of the 1870s.[255] In 1877, Neumann listed 5,000 foreigners and protégés for Jerusalem,[256] the latter mainly Jews. According to Austrian sources, in 1856 there were about 1,800 Austrian subjects and protégés; in 1858 in Safad and Tiberias there were 400–500 families, almost exclusively Jews. According to statistics of 1877, there was a total of 1,416 Austro–Hungarian subjects in Jerusalem, Hebron, and Jaffa; the overwhelming majority were Jews.[257] The German consulate gave the number of "real German protégés" as follows: end of 1868, 231; end of 1873, 1,362; end of 1874, 1,554; end of 1877, 1,495. In the year 1882, the number of "members of the German Empire" in the consular districts of

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[251] Sepp, I, p. XXVI; *Titus Toblers Dritte Wanderung*, p. 369; see also MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 14 April 1857); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 8 (Jerusalem, 1 May 1864); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem 13 April 1858); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1448 (Jerusalem, 27 April 1859); HHSTA–Archive Jér., file 47 (Jerusalem, 11 May 1865).

[252] Pierotti, *Jerusalem Explored*, I, p. 275. 3,611 were registered in 1850, and 7,116 in 1859.

[253] *Die Warte*, 13 June 1872 and 22 May 1873; Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 216; *HL*, XXIV (1880), p. 201; a partial but detailed overview of the pilgrims lodged in various Jerusalem monasteries, hospices, and hotels in the season of 1879–80 is provided by Luncz, pp. 138–41.

[254] Regarding the Russian pilgrims, see Hopwood, passim, especially pp. 103 and 116, footnote 5.

[255] *TS*, 1875/6/7/8, pp. 240–42 and 830f.

[256] Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 217. At the start of 1874 the British consul spoke of 3,000 foreigners and protégés in Jerusalem: PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1047 (Jerusalem, 21 February 1874).

[257] HHSTA–Archive Jér., file 38 (Jerusalem, 30 September 1856); HHSTA–AR, F8/19 (Beirut, 28 February 1858); HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 6 (Jerusalem, 26 September 1877).

Jerusalem and Jaffa was given as 587, and that of "*de facto* subjects" was 375.[258]

Along with the non-Palestinian Ottoman subjects (Greeks, Jews, Lebanese, Armenians, and so on) who likewise began to reside in Palestine, the Europeans and their protégés played an important (sometimes determinant) role in the banking and credit system, in the import and export trade, as tax farmers and real estate brokers, and finally also as landholders. The economy (and the municipal area) of Jerusalem was changed by them through construction activities that they undertook, through the large number of handicraft and service businesses that they founded, and through the imports from Europe that they induced.

We do not need to recapitulate here the history of building in Jerusalem after the Crimean War; studies of that are available.[259] However, one must point to the enormous upsurge in the construction economy, which was the consequence of putting up stone buildings—a distinctive feature of European penetration—chiefly in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jaffa, and Haifa.

Around the middle of the nineteenth century, the city walls still formed the city limits of Jerusalem; within this area there were still empty spaces that were cultivated, piles of rubbish, and uninhabited, half-collapsed houses. In the 1840s English and German Protestants erected the first new buildings within the walls, among them the Christ Church, which was consecrated in 1849. During the Crimean War theirs were the first construction ventures in direct proximity to the city. However, the actual construction boom began in 1856. In the following ten years, 24 larger construction undertakings were completed inside and outside the city walls, including the Russian complex, larger than any previous building. Erected in the Maydan, the former exercise area of the Ottoman garrison in the west of the city, the complex "from a distance appears to strangers like a great central train station," Wolff wrote disparagingly.[260]

The new construction, alterations, and expansion of churches, monasteries, hospices, schools, hospitals, hotels, and consulates subsequently continued unabated. Starting in the late 1860s, construction of new residences inside the city and of Jewish residential colonies outside of the city intensified, as did the enlargement of existing residences. In the 1870s several Jewish resident construction societies arose for this purpose, erecting what contemporary observers referred to as "barracks-like" uniform row houses, in order to provide a roof over the heads of the Jews who were streaming in.[261] In the north of the city, starting in the 1870s Muslim notable families also began the construction of "more modern" residences.[262]

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[258] ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Jerusalem, 14 July 1875); ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Jerusalem, 20 March 1877); *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, p. 416.

[259] Ben-Arieh, "The Growth of Jerusalem," and Ben-Arieh, "Patterns of Christian Activity"; see also Wolff, *Sieben Artikel*, pp. 51–54 and 93–100; Wolff, *Flugblätter*, pp. 20–27; Wolff, *Jerusalem*; Wolff, "Zur neueren Geschichte Jerusalems"; Schick, "Die Baugeschichte der Stadt Jerusalem"; Bauer, *Volksleben*, pp. 329–42 [Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century]; Sarkis, pp. 195–98; Arif, *Al-mufassal*, pp. 303f.

[260] Wolff, "Zur Neueren Geschichte Jerusalem," p. 7.

For Jerusalem and the surrounding areas this construction boom was an economic factor that should not be underestimated. The financial means flowed largely from Europe into the country, and the spending for material and wages increasingly benefited the local populace. Lime-kiln operators and quarrymen had a permanent boom: "Day in, day out, whole trains of camels loaded with grain, wood, lime, or stones head toward Jerusalem."[263]

Masons and stonecutters initially had to be recruited outside of Palestine; those who built Christ Church, for example, came from Malta. But as the construction boom began in the early 1860s, the requirement for specialized workers could be satisfied locally,[264] although not in Jerusalem itself. Most notably in Bethlehem, Bayt Jala, and Nazareth, a professional specialization in the construction business began, especially since construction workers earned good money. Thus in the construction of the "Israeli Pilgrim and Paupers House on Zion," built under Austrian direction, the following daily wages were paid:[265]

Table 35: Daily wages in construction business in Jerusalem, 1861–63.

	Masons	Stonecutters	Laborer
October 1861	24 P.T.	11–16 P.T.	2–5 P.T.
May 1862	25 P.T.	13 P.T.	3–6 P.T.
August 1863	28 P.T.	18 P.T.	3 1/2–6 P.T.

Sources: See footnote 265.

Two hundred persons, 50 beasts of burden, and several carts brought in from Alexandria reportedly worked every day for months on the construction of the Austrian hospice.[266]

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[261] *HL*, XX (1876), pp. 83f.; Neil, *Palestine Re-Peopled*, pp. 28–31; Luncz, p. 192; Schick, "Die Baugeschichte," p. 268.

[262] Kark and Landman, pp. 119ff.

[263] Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, p. 304.

[264] *Titus Toblers dritte Wanderung*, p. 112; Klein, "Mittheilungen 1880," p. 108; Schick, "Die Baugeschichte," p. 267; Hanauer, pp. 125f.

[265] All the accounts on this construction project are in HHSTA–Archive Jer., no. 16 (Dossier, "Neweh Scholom, Israelitisches Pilger-und Armenhaus auf Zion").

[266] *Die Warte*, 29 January and 29 October 1857; Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 385.

The new Jerusalem was built mainly by Bethlehem residents. Among 792 independent craftsmen, dealers, and subcontractors at the start of the 1890s, 30 were masons, 250 stonecutters, 50 quarrymen, 6 plasterers, and 40 camel drivers for lime, stone, and goods transport; thus around half were employed in the construction business (see table 42). In Jerusalem itself, on the other hand, there were only 8 stonecutters, 2 masons, 2 local master builders, 2 European architects, and 7 Jewish construction contractors in 1877 (see table 37).

Special import requirements included lumber (see table 33)[267] and grooved tiles (from Marseilles).[268] After the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem had been expanded at the end of the 1870s, to the extent that this construction material could be transported by wagon without great difficulties, a new European-style construction arose: Starting in 1880 the walls of the new buildings outside the city were constructed less massively, the rooms were reinforced with wooden beams and board floors, then also with iron girders and flagstones, and the roof frame covered with tiles.[269] Especially in the west and northwest, a European-looking city began to rise right next to the "Middle Eastern" Jerusalem.

As the function of the city walls had become obsolete, starting in the 1870s the city gates remained open at night, and they were no longer closed on Fridays during the Muslims' mid-day prayer hour.

According to Ben-Arieh, the population development of Jerusalem was as follows:

Table 36: Population growth of Jerusalem, 1840–90.

Year	Muslims	Christians	Jews	Total
1840	4,650	3,350	5,000	13,000
1850	5,350	3,650	6,000	15,000
1860	6,000	4,000	8,000	18,000
1870	6,500	4,500	11,000	22,000
1880	8,000	6,000	17,000	31,000
1890	9,000	8,000	25,000	42,000

Source: Ben-Arieh, "The Growth of Jerusalem," p. 262 (excerpt).

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[267] Regarding the flourishing of the lumber trade, see *Die Warte*, 2 April 1874.

[268] Luncz (pp. 195f.) reported in 1881 of a Jew returned from Vienna who had learned the manufacture of roof tiles there. He was granted a loan from the Montefiore Testimonial Fund to establish such a business.

[269] Schick, "Die Baugeschichte," pp. 270f.

Thus, Jerusalem was undoubtedly a lively city, the character of which changed rapidly, but it was not an economically active city. Neither in the field of production nor in goods distribution was Jerusalem important for a larger market. Rather, the city was supplied with goods, the sale and processing of which, together with numerous other services, formed the chief activity of its inhabitants. This is evident from table 37, which was compiled from the detailed but uneven and unsystematic data of Luncz[270] regarding the occupational and employment structure of the populace of Jerusalem in the year 1877.

The data used for table 37 are to some extent complete and reliable only for the Jewish inhabitants of the city.[271] For Muslims and Christians they show obvious gaps in the area of services and handicrafts. Luncz counted a total of 2,190 business and service persons (without journeymen and apprentices), namely 631 Sephardim, 794 Ashkenazim, 382 Muslims, and 383 Christians (of these 81 Europeans). In 1876, Warren published statistics (table 38) similar to those of Luncz. Unfortunately, he does not say in what year he made the count, but it may have been the end of the 1860s or the first half of the 1870s. He counted in 1,320 businesses a total of 1,932 adult male traders and businessmen, around 500 Jews, 600 Christians, and 830 Muslims. (The numbers in his table are not entirely mathematically correct.) It is clear that his count of the gainfully employed Jews is very incomplete, but he did count the Muslims and Christians more completely than Luncz. According to Warren's figures there were: among the Muslims, 206 grocers and shopkeepers, 11 wheat dealers, 52 bakers, 33 butchers, 24 coffee grinders, 18 millers, 27 dyers, 51 shoemakers, 50 soap makers, 29 sesame oil producers, 29 confectioners, 37 bath workers, and 66 coffin makers; among the Christians, 77 grocers and shopkeepers, 22 bread sellers, 47 wine sellers, 28 tailors, 96 shoemakers, 26 soap makers, 83 smiths of all types, 23 carpenters, and 35 barbers.

If we look more closely at the data of Luncz, among the Sephardim and the Christians the share of dealers and craftsmen was approximately the same, while among the Ashkenazim it was craftsmen, and among the Muslims it was dealers who predominated. In comparison with the Sephardim and Muslims, the Ashkenazim and Christians performed the more modern and more complicated crafts. Viewed overall, the craft sector was dominated by the Ashkenazim, and in this field there was an oversupply.

At any rate, crafts were only rarely profitable, as the wages were lower because of this oversupply or the profit low.[272] At least among the Jewish craftsmen only a minority got ahead in the world. Even many of the relatively qualified Ashkenazim craftsmen found themselves unable to feed their families; they emigrated to Egypt in order to pursue their trade there.[273]

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[270] Luncz, pp. 33–60; see the nonstatistical description of the occupations of the city around the middle of the century in Tobler, *Denkblätter*, pp. 228–76.

[271] See also the precise overview of the occupational structure of the Jews in Jerusalem who belonged to the league of Austro-Hungarian subjects (1,207 persons), in HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 6 (Jerusalem, 26 September 1877).

[272] Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, pp. 303–305.

The Jewish traders had things relatively better.[274] Luncz wrote about the Sephardim:

> As they are familiar with the language and the customs of the country, they have almost the entire manufactured-goods business in their hands: most of their goods they order from Constantinople, Alexandria, Beirut and other Turkish port regions; only a few European businesses and some Mohammedan businessmen, who sell materials favored among the natives, are able to compete with them. Similarly, almost all of the money-changing business is in their hands, something which is not insignificant hereabouts, as travelers bring the coins of all nations here . . . . The rest mostly trade with the products of the country, the richest of them advance money to the fellahin (peasants), for which in time the harvest yield is delivered to them. Others take over deliveries for the government.[275]

And about the Ashkenazim businessmen this source says:

> They deal generally with articles for daily needs, which they buy here from the wholesale dealers: a few get their wares from Beirut and Constantinople, still fewer import wares from France or Austria and export some articles to these European countries . . . . The persons belonging to this class are all in good circumstances.[276]

The import business (from Europe) was mainly in the hands of a few Europeans and local Christians. There was no true local wholesale trade in Jerusalem. It was in the nature of things that a significant portion of total imports of Jaffa, growing with the expansion of Jerusalem, was meant for the "Holy City." However, no table can be compiled from the data available (mainly for the 1870s) because they are too imprecise and uneven.[277]

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[273] Luncz, p. 54; see also Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 377.

[274] See also HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 242 (Jerusalem, 23 July 1882).

[275] Luncz, pp. 40f.

[276] Ibid., p. 52.

[277] See the reports of the British consul in PP–1874, vol. LXVI (Jerusalem, 12 September 1873); PP–1874, vol. LXVII (Jerusalem, February 1874); PP–1880, vol. LXXIV (Jerusalem, March 1880); likewise the compilations of the Duisberg and Bergheim company for the German consul in ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Jerusalem, 11 January 1875, 2 April 1875, and 19 January 1876); ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Jerusalem, 13 February 1877 and 18 January 1878).

Table 37: Occupational and employment structure of the population of Jerusalem in 1877.

	Sephardim	Ashkenazim	Muslims	Native Christians	European Christians
Grocers			41	48	
Medicinal herb dealers	49	47			
Vegetable dealers	5		39	11	
Spice dealers			35		
Fowl and egg dealers	7				
Milk dealers		16			
Flour dealers		20			
Grain dealers		7			
Wine and spirits dealers	5	21			
Butchers and meat sellers	17	10	17		1
Bakers[a]	12 (23)	23	6	6	2
Millers	1 (3)	12 (18)	2	4	
Confectioners			8		
Coffee roasters, coffee and grist millers	2	9	6	1	
Tobacco dealers	4	10	36	38	
Tobacco manufacturers	1			6	
Sesame oil producers			7		
Soap makers				2	
Dealers in manufactured goods	58	3			
Clothing dealers			54		
Haberdashers	18	9	8		
Tableware and mattress dealers	6	2	7	7	
Coal dealers[b]	6	2	8		
Leather dealers and hide exporters		9			
Peddlers, junk dealers, second-hand dealers	26	4			
Booksellers	3	4		1	
Cotton dealers	2		2		

	Sephardim	Ashkenazim	Muslims	Native Christians	European Christians
Wood sellers				3	
Iron dealers		1			
Glass ornament dealers[c]			4		
Wax candle dealers				6	
Mother-of-pearl dealers				8	
Wholesalers				2	5
Tailors	27	46 (8)		8	4
Shoemakers and shoe menders	48	45 (17)	21	54	2
Hat makers and hat menders	3	3			1
Furriers		5			
Mattress makers	8				
Joiners and turners	3	77 (53)		12	4
Tinsmiths	21	11		2	
Mechanics	2				
Gunsmiths	1			2	
Blacksmiths		6		6	2
Gold and silversmiths	9	14 (4)		14	
Coppersmiths	4	3		10	
Engravers		6			
Potters		2			
Glass makers		5			
Mirror makers		1			
Book binders	3	11 (4)			
Typesetters	4	12			
Printers		10			
Dyers		3	11		
Weavers		2			
Saddlers		1			1
Umbrella makers		4			
Pipe makers			2		
Bag menders			4		
Broom makers	1				
Brass founders	3	2			
Painters		2			
Paper hangers		2			
House painters	5	10			
Stonecutters	1	3		4	

	Sephardim	Ashkenazim	Muslims	Native Christians	European Christians
Masons	1				1
Master builders/architects			2		2
Construction entrepreneurs		7			
Clockmakers		11 (3)			
Sewing machine operators		5			
Photographers				2	
Apothecaries		12		5	4
Barbers	3	8	9	14	
Auctioneers	3		3		
Brokers		10			
Interpreters and translators	3	2			
Scriveners	10	22	10		
Money-changers	24	3			
Bankers	2	2			2
Coffeehouse proprietors	2		23	6	
Proprietors of restaurants and bars	13		17	21	
Hotel proprietors					3
Domestic servants	12	6			
Day laborers and retainers		157			
Porters	51	6			
Water and oil carriers	6				
Streetsweepers	5				
Ass drivers and coachmen	4	3			
Musicians	3				
Employees of Jewish congregations[d]	88	255			
Chachamim	290				
Beggars	120	25			

a) Assistants and apprentices in parentheses
b) Meaning charcoal
c) Probably glasswares from Hebron
d) Including 17 Sephardic meat sellers
Source: Luncz, pp. 33–60.

Table 38: Trades in Jerusalem (Warren, *Underground Jerusalem*, pp. 491ff.).

	Jews	Moslems	Greeks	Latins	Protestants	Armenians	Total
Bakers	10	52	15				77
Bankers	4				2		6
Barbers	9	12	5	22		8	56
Bath-men		22					22
Bath (oven) heaters		15					15
Blanket sellers	2	1					3
Bookbinders	6	1					7
Book-shop	1					1	2
Boys' schools							
Bread-sellers		2	10	12			24
Butchers	7	29					36
Canteen-keepers		2					2
Carpenters	11	2	12	10	1		36
Charcoal-sellers	9	1	1				11
Chicken-sellers	6	2	1		1		10
China-sellers	6		3				9
Coal-factors			2				2
Coal-sellers(?)		7	1				8
Coffee-grinders	5	24	1				30
Coffin-makers		66	8	9		3	86
Cooks		1	4				5
Corn-sellers		11					11
Cotton-sellers		2	1				3
Customs-men	1	9	1	1		2	14
Dispensers (medicine)	5			3			8
Dyers	1	27					28
Farriers	1		3			2	6
Flour-grinders	3	18					21
General shopkeepers	69	53	8	5	7	1	143
Girls' schools							
Glass-sellers	2	16	1				19
Greengrocers	17	67	3		1		88
Grocers	51	86	28	13	7	4	189
Gunmakers			3				3
Khan-keepers		5					5
Kirby-makers		6					6
Lentil-seller		1					1
Lime-seller			1				1
Lodging-keepers		8	8				16
Meat-sellers	3						3
Meat-cutters		4					4

Meat-fryers			5				5
Mill-keepers	1		9				10
Money-changers	17			3		2	22
Hod-maker		1					1
Old clothes dealers	5	2					7
Oven storekeepers		3					3
Pedlars	2	5	3				10
Photographers			3		1		4
Pipemakers		3					3
Policemen		22					22
Post-official					1		1
Pottery-sellers		11					11
Saddlers		7					7
Shoemakers	83	51	41	22	6	27	230
Silkmercers	19					1	20
Simsim pressers		29	3				32
Skin-sellers		2					2
Smiths-black	7		3	18			28
Smiths-silver	15		29	9		4	57
Smiths-tin	34		2				36
Smiths-white	2	10	16			2	30
Snuffers-sellers	3		1				4
Snuff-sellers		3					3
Soap-factors		50	24		2		76
Soap-sellers		1	7				8
Stablekeepers		13	6			1	20
Stone-engravers	2						2
Stone pipe-sellers			2	4			6
Stone-storekeepers			6				6
Sugar-sellers	9		1				10
Sweets-makers		29	3				32
Tailors	34		10	10	2	6	62
Telegraphists	1					2	3
Tobacconists	5	14	16		1	1	37
Vase-seller	1						1
Watchmakers	19				2	2	23
Wax-sellers	1		9				10
Wheat-storekeepers				3			3
Wine-sellers	11		43	2		2	58
Wood-merchants	3		3				6
Wool-sellers		8					8
Letter-writers		7					7
Total	503	828	360	146	34	71	1,932

In Jerusalem, products from Bethlehem and Hebron as well as articles produced inside its own walls, especially soap, were sold primarily to pilgrims. The local and regional trade also used to supply the city. Jerusalem received vegetables, fowl, eggs and milk, sesame, tobacco, wood, and so on from the surrounding villages; charcoal, mainly from the region of Hebron; fruit from the orchards of Jaffa; salt, soda ash, and asphalt from the Dead Sea; simple robes of wool and camel hair from Bethlehem (and wool robes of better quality from Damascus and Baghdad); and silks from Damascus and Aleppo. Grains, animals for slaughter, and wool came mainly from beyond the Jordan, the sheep often from even further away.[278]

Salt was a central Transjordan trading partner for Jerusalem (as well as for Nablus).[279] Evidently purchases were also made directly there. Baldensperger gives a detailed report of a caravan that was assembling for wheat purchases in Salt, and which he himself joined in August 1858.[280] Even after the upsurge of grain production in the coastal plain, the rapidly growing Jerusalem remained not only an important sales market for sheep, but also for grain from East Jordan.[281] For better connections, since the start of the 1870s there was even a ferry across the Jordan north of the Dead Sea, "a large flat-bottomed boat, passed by a rope from shore to shore, not more than 60 yards across at this spot."[282] (The direct way from Nablus to Salt ran through the Damiya fort. The only bridge that ran south of Lake Tiberias across the Jordan was Jisr al-Majami'; south of Lake Hula there was also the Jisr Banat Ya'qub).[283]

The commercial production of Jerusalem was very modest. True, soap was produced there (as in Nablus, Jaffa, Ramla, Lydda, and Gaza), but in the course of the period under study soap production appears to have declined. In 1847 there were ten soap factories in Jerusalem.[284] According to a description of Elizabeth Finn, all the olive production of Bayt Jala at that time was mortgaged to a few Jerusalem *effendis*. (She offers six names, among them Sulayman al-'Asali, Musa al-'Asali, and 'Abdallah al-Khalidi.)[285] The author also reports of an *effendi* who wanted to rent a house for fifteen years and receive the entire rent (45,000 piasters) in advance, as he required capital to construct a soap factory.[286]

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[278] Tobler, *Denkblätter*, pp. 151–53; Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, chapter 2; PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 24 November 1857); *HL*, XI (1867), p. 89; Finn, *Byeways*, pp. 41 and 45f.; Zwiedinek, p. 52; Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 223; Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, p. 303; Tristram, *Pathways*, I, p. 116; "The Belka Arabs," p. 173; description of the bazaars of Jerusalem in Ebers and Guthe, I, pp. 34–42.

[279] Regarding the importance of Salt as a Transjordan trade center, see Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 141 and 545; Hergt, pp. 152–57; Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, pp. 200–205; *NNM*, 23 (1879), pp. 160f. Karak also was important for Transjordan trade, especially for Jerusalem and Hebron; see Hergt, pp. 184–92.

[280] Baldensperger Diary, 9–16 August 1858; see also Graul, p. 224.

[281] Klein, "Mittheilungen 1881," p. 78; *Die Warte*, 9 August 1877.

[282] Tristram, *The Land of Moab*, pp. 360f.; Merrill, p. 220.

[283] Lynch, pp. 115f. and 157; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 260 and 393; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 444 and 446; Tristram, *Pathways*, II, p. 64.

[284] MAE–CCC Jér., vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1 July 1847); the same information in Frankl, II, p. 146.

According to Neumann, even in the mid-1870s there were still nine or ten soap factories in Jerusalem, each of which annually produced soap worth a half million piasters. This was sold mainly at Easter time in great quantities. The pieces had "usually the shape of a disk or hemisphere, and usually the crescent, the Mount of Olives, or the Grave of Rachel were depicted on the surface; the finer ones were mixed with musk and amber."[287] The soap could thus also be a souvenir. Of course it is doubtful whether these factories were still all operating.[288] Gatt, who lived for many years in Palestine and whose data appear to be exact and reliable, wrote at the same time (1877) that soap production in Jerusalem had greatly declined and that many factories now stood empty.[289] According to Warren, there were seven soap factories with a total of 76 employees, five in Muslim and two in Christian hands.[290] Also the data of the British consul agree with this; according to him Jerusalem exported £6,000 worth of soap in 1874, but only £1,500 worth in 1879.[291]

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[285] The soap-maker Sulayman al-'Asali guaranteed himself oil deliveries, among other things, through moneylending. According to the description of a woman from Bayt Jala, her family became dependent on this Jerusalem *effendi* twelve years before, when her father-in-law could not pay his taxes: "He pledged his olive trees for 500 Piasters, and wrote a bond upon himself to pay fifteen jars of oil to Sulayman Assali; and if there is any deficient, he was to pay two jars of oil next year for every one. That year was also a bad one, and our olives were stolen, and we had only three jars of oil; so Sulayman wrote a bond upon my father-in-law for twenty-four jars of oil for the next harvest, and if any were deficient, two were to be given for every one . . . We now owe him still eighty jars of oil"; Finn, *Home in the Holy Land*, pp. 350–53.

[286] Ibid., p. 93; her husband reported in a consular report of a rich soap dealer of the city who was connected through marriage to the Simhan clan of the Jabal al-Quds: PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1032 (Jerusalem, 24 November 1854).

[287] Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 222.

[288] Neumann arouses suspicion because the section in question is very reminiscent of a passage in Robinson (*Biblical Researches*, I, p. 428).

[289] Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, p. 302.

[290] Warren, *Underground Jerusalem*, p. 501. According to this source the number of soap factories in Jerusalem and Jaffa listed in table 34 appears too high; this figure may include empty factories.

[291] PP–1875, vol. LXXVI (Jerusalem, February 1875) and PP–1880, vol. LXXIV (Jerusalem, March 1880).

In compensation, however, another "export product" of the city constantly grew in importance in the 1870s, namely devotional items of various types (exports worth £3,300 in 1874, and £11,000 in 1877).[292] But only a small portion of these were manufactured in the city; by far the largest portion of these articles came from Bethlehem. As in the case of the glassware from Hebron, Jerusalem was only the distribution center.

The production of sesame oil for consumption was of some importance in the 1870s when olive oil grew more expensive and scarce.[293] For heating, olive oil was supplanted in the cities, but also among the *fellahin*, by petroleum imported from the United States (cf. table 33).[294]

In the 1840s and the beginning of the 1850s, it appeared that the silk industry would also gain a foothold in the city. Evidently at Lebanese initiative, great mulberry tree plantations were started near Jerusalem, and particularly near Jaffa.[295] A local acquaintance of the Jerusalem banker Bergheim living in Ramla is supposed to have owned 14,000 mulberry trees; in 1850 he sought a partner for the silkworm breeding.[296] Initially the raw products were transported for further processing to Beirut and Damascus, but in 1854 a spinnery appeared near Jerusalem: *"La filature . . . est un vaste établissement; elle sera conduite par des hommes du pays."*[297] However, the author of an official French report had doubts that sufficient energy would be exerted to expand this production branch. In fact the efforts to introduce silkworm breeding and the silk industry ended in the early 1860s. The reasons are not known; one author cites a pestilence and the unsuitable climate as the causes.[298] Possibly, however, there was insufficient interest in this industry in Jerusalem, while in Jaffa since the mid-1850s energies were claimed by wheat, cotton, and orange production.

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[292] See the company reports in ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Jerusalem, 11 January 1875) and A.XXXIX.3 (Jerusalem, 13 February 1877 and 18 January 1878); see also the English reports cited in footnote 291.

[293] Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 222. Table 37 lists seven Muslim sesame oil producers; Neumann refers to fifteen presses. Warren (table 38) cites 32 presses involved in this branch.

[294] Klein, "Mittheilungen 1881," p. 82.

[295] Lynch, p. 289; *Die Warte*, 29 December 1853; Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 391; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 515 and 524; Tolkowsky, p. 160.

[296] Baldensperger Diary, 30 September 1850; see also *Die Warte*, 29 December 1853.

[297] "The spinnery . . . is a huge establishment; it will be run by local people." Gaudry, p. 295; in a report of 1 July 1847 the French consul in Jerusalem referred to several Europeans involved in silkworm breeding: MAE–CCC Jér. vol. 2.

[298] Anderlind, "Die Fruchtbäume" [The Fruit Trees], p. 83.

Jaffa (Yafa) and Communications with Jerusalem

As southern Palestine's only port city, and as the port that served Jerusalem, Jaffa was most directly affected by the European assault on the "Holy Land" after Jerusalem itself. Jaffa was and remained during the period under review the most important foreign trade and landing point for pilgrims and tourists. The development of this city was therefore of special interest to all Europeans, who after the Crimean War sounded a triple, uninterrupted litany of complaints: about the absence of a real port, about the expansion-limiting effect of the city walls and gates, and about the lack of satisfactory communications with Jerusalem. In the following years, it is true that the highway to Jerusalem was expanded, and in the mid-1870s regular wagon traffic was established; also, the city walls had to give way to city development. But none of the numerous port and railroad projects could be implemented before 1882.[299] (The Jaffa–Jerusalem train line went into operation in 1892.) We now want to examine these points in more detail.

The inflow and outflow of goods and persons at Jaffa[300] was an adventure, whenever it could happen at all. Off the city's coast, reefs projected from the water in a northeasterly direction; the longest reef formed a natural, 300-meter-long breakwater. A narrow entry at its northern tip formed the entrance to the "port" of Jaffa, in which only small sailing ships and barks could enter due to the shallow depth. All larger ships had to ride at anchor at least a half mile from the reef beds. In a stormy sea they could neither drop off nor take on cargo and had to go on without finishing their business. Even with only a heavy sea it cost the barks (which, with a crew of eight to twelve oarsmen, handled the traffic between the ships in the roadstead and the landing place) great effort not to miss the passage and be dashed to pieces against the reefs. The history of the landing place of Jaffa was therefore a history of catastrophes small and large. For example, in May 1873 eight pilgrims drowned while being transported to a steamer; in 1875 eight ships were shipwrecked near Jaffa.[301]

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[299] In addition there was a further project that occupied the Europeans throughout the period examined here, the advantages and disadvantages of which were heatedly discussed: the joining of the Mediterranean with the Red Sea by a canal from Haifa to the Jordan, the flooding or "filling" of the Ghawr and the Dead Sea, and a further canal through the Wadi 'Araba to 'Aqaba. In this way a Palestine inland sea would have arisen, Tiberias and many villages of the Marj ibn 'Amir and the Ghawr would have been submerged, and Jerusalem would have become a port city, as it were. Luckily this project was not earnestly undertaken. See in this regard Allen; Saulcy, "Note sur le Projet"; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 478; Sepp, I, pp. 653f.; Hornung; Neil, *Palestine Re-Peopled*, pp. 121f.; Thomson, *Southern Palestine*, p. 296; *TS*, 1875/6/7/8, pp. 448–50; *TS*, 1882/3/4, pp. 841f.; Burton, "The Proposed Jordan Canal"; Schick, "Der Jordan-Canal"; *NNM*, 28 (1884), pp. 40–48; Conder, *Heth and Moab*, pp. 417–20; Conder, *Palestine*, p. 77; Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 261–65; Verney and Dambmann, pp. 452f.; Kurd 'Ali, V, pp. 163f.

In the early 1980s the Israeli government tried to implement the old "dream" of a canal between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea. Regarding the discussion about it, see Paul Hirschhorn, "Dead Sea Canal: A Viable Plan?" *Israel Economist* 36 (1980), pp. 19–21; *Le Monde*, 29 August 1980, p. 7; Dan Darin, "The Mediterranean to Dead Sea Channel," *New Outlook*, January 1981; *Die Zeit*, 19 June 1981, p. 22 ("Ein Traum wird verwirklicht"); Harakat at-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (editor), *Al-mashru' al-sihyauni al-tawassu'i li-rabt al-bahr al-mutawassit bi al-mayyit*, u.p. 1981; Samir Ayyub, "Qanat al-bahrain al-mutawassit wa al-mayyit," *Samid al-Iqtisadi*, no. 35 (1981); Samir Jabbur, Yula al-Batal, and Randa Haidar, *Qanat al-bahrain al-mutawassit wa al-mayyit*, Beirut 1981.

[300] See especially HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 5 (Quadro statistico del distretto di Jaffa, 27 August 1872); Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 551f.; Guérin, *Description*, I, pp. 2f; Schwarz, pp. 44f; Bömches, pp. 42–46 (with sketch); Ebers and Guthe, II, pp. 147–49; Pierotti, *La Bible et la Palestine*, pp. 97–99; Verney and Dambmann, pp. 351–57; Kurd 'Ali, V, pp. 165f.

In addition, there were no piers or storage areas that were accessible to wagons. When the water was low, goods and persons had to be carried on the backs of stevedores from the barks to land. The wares were carried to the very confined customs warehouse where (at least in the 1870s) they were first piled up. "The customs-house is a wretched wooden hut . . . . The warehouse is a dark, wet vault in the lower floor of the Greek monastery with *one* window opening."[302] On "ship days," access to the city, like the narrow quay, was barricaded with luggage, orange crates, oil barrels, grain sacks, and so on.

With the rapid growth in the turnover of goods in the 1860s and 1870s, as well as of travelers (see table 39), which at the start of the 1880s were estimated at 80,000 annually,[303] the call for construction of a port facility must have grown ever louder. It is true that in 1864 a French association built a lighthouse and the Ottoman authorities undertook some improvements of the landing place,[304] but these measures no longer sufficed. However, before the end of the 1870s the Ottoman government gave no thought to development programs for its provinces. Hasan Fahmi's well-known report of 1880, in which European capital was solicited for the infrastructural development of Turkey and the Fertile Crescent, also contained the project for construction of a breakwater at Jaffa. For this £174,000 of a total of £52,463,602 of the "program" was earmarked.[305]

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[301] ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.1 (Jaffa, 30 June 1873) and A.XXXIX.2 (Jaffa, 31 December 1875).

[302] Schwarz, p. 45.

[303] Bömches, p. 44; Loehnis, *Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse*, p. 240.

[304] PP–1864, vol. LXI (Jaffa, May 1864); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1834 (Jaffa, 9 November 1864); *Die Warte*, 23 March 1865.

[305] *Rapport Adressé à S.A. le Premier Ministre*, p. 51; regarding the context, see Schölch, "Wirtschaftliche Durchdringung," especially pp. 437f. and 443f.

Table 39: Number of ships entering Jaffa, 1856-82 (tonnage in parentheses).

Year	Sailing ships	Steamships	Coastal ships
1856	39 (6,110)	72 (33,600)	97 (5,135)
1857	49 (13,031)		161 (35,344)
1858	34 (9,346)		326 (62,086)
1859	14 (2,477)	144	431 (111,192)
1860	21 (4,111)	144	200 (15,000)
1862	176 (13,555)	143 (59,500)	
1863	100 (13,871)	148 (86,032)	395 (12,000)
1873	22 (3,799)	171 (104,766)	1,034 (29,945)
1874	31 (4,451)	184 (164,700)	1,293 (15,997)
1875	76 (18,574)	168 (149,422)	1,215 (23,812)
1876	32 (5,942)	169 (170,272)	1,450 (25,460)
1877	28 (5,729)	133 (150,800)	1,200 (21,750)
1879	58 (7,549)	184 (188,016)	753 (18,272)
1880	30 (3,386)	249 (211,029)	941 (29,554)
1881	22 (4,120)	227 (195,798)	846 (25,217)
1882	23 (3,773)	242 (288,491)	436 (13,589)

Sources: PFO–F.P. 78, vols. 1221, 1296, 1387, 1449, 1537; PP–1863, vol. LXX; 1864, vol. LXI; 1874, vol. LXVII; 1875, vol. LXXVII; 1876, vol. LXXV; 1877, vol. LXXXVI; 1878, vol. LXXIV; 1880, vol. LXXIV; 1881, vol. LXC; 1882, vol. LXXI; 1883, vol. LXXII.

When we investigate why none of the many port and railroad projects were realized before 1882, even though concessions were repeatedly granted in Constantinople, the reasons are probably twofold. On the one hand, the Ottoman government did not pursue an autonomous economic and infrastructure policy worthy of the name. Besides, during those decades of the "Peaceful Crusade," they had no reason to facilitate access to Jerusalem, which in turn would merely have facilitated European penetration. On the other hand, these projects did require capital, and potential European investors' first question was not whether they would facilitate the pilgrimages or provide a service to Christendom, rather it was about profits. And when profitability calculations were made, the results were not encouraging. Thus, several Jaffa businessmen, who had become impatient because port construction never seemed to be imminent, joined together in an association and in November 1875 launched a small steam tug, purchased in Marseilles, for traffic between the landing place and ships lying in the roadstead. But the investment did not pay off, the association soon dissolved itself, and the ship was sold.[306]

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[306] *Die Warte*, 8 April 1875 and 21 October 1875; *HL*, XX (1876), p. 81; ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Jaffa, 31 December 1875) and A.XXXIX.3 (Jaffa, 31 December 1876); PP–1876, vol. LXXV (Jaffa, February 1876); PP–1878, vol. LXXIV (Jaffa, May 1878).

In August 1878 a French association had obtained the concession to build a port in Jaffa. In September 1880, de Saulcy, the president of the founding committee, turned to the chamber of commerce in Marseilles to gain its support. It was extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to raise the necessary 15 million francs privately without direct state support. Therefore the association wanted to offer the French government the construction of a naval base: *"La marine de l'état aurait dans le port de Jaffa un emplacement réservé à ses navires, et de vaste terrains pour y établir des dépôts de combustible et de matériel de rechange, en outre le Pavillon Français bénéficierait d'une réduction sur les tarifs de droits de port fixés par les décrets de concession."*[307] The Marseilles chamber of commerce wanted to support this "useful" project;[308] one cannot reproach the Ottoman government for its lack of enthusiasm for such a plan.

As early as the 1860s attempts were made to build a highway to Jerusalem. The first concession for this appears to have been obtained by Count Pizzamano, the Austrian consul in Jerusalem (1847–61). He tried to win over Montefiore for his project, but it was not realized.[309] While the European concession aspirants were competing with one another without result, in 1867 the Ottoman authorities began having a road built themselves, by means of compulsory labor, under the supervision of the Italian architect Pierotti, and in 1868 it was put in service.[310] Back in the 1850s, blockhouses had been built on the way to Jerusalem at regular intervals to protect the travelers. These military posts, "a number of black-painted towers, with narrow firing slits and surrounded by notched battlements,"[311] were then evidently renovated each time in the wake of the road improvements. Yusuf al-Khalidi, the Jerusalem municipality president, wrote in his autobiography that for three months there was even a wagon service on this road; but then at the urging of the new *mutasarrif* Kamil Pasha (since autumn 1869) he again had to sell the wagons and draft animals.[312] So it was not the Templars who introduced the first wagon service, as they always claimed! We also hear of the introduction of a wagon by Count Caboga, the Austrian consul in Jerusalem (1867–82), as well as the wagon service of an American living in Jaffa. But a transport association that introduced regular daily service was established first by the Templars in 1875, at the urging of the *mutasarrif* and after improvement of the road in 1874. The Schwabian transportation entrepreneurs very quickly had competition from Arabs and Jews. Because of the poor road condition, the regular service also had to soon be halted. After the road had been improved, each time before "important visits," it was repeatedly expanded under the supervision of various German contractors from 1876 to 1879, and partially rerouted. Three groups now sought a formal transport concession: the Templars, a Beirut group, and a French group. With the help of Yusuf al-Khalidi, only the Templars obtained a contract (1879). However, Arabs and Jews also did hauling. The road was again improved in 1881, and in 1882 about 30 to 40 wagons regularly traveled it. Later on, however, the Templars had to relinquish the field to their Arab and Jewish competitors, who were cheaper.[313]

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[307] "The state navy would have a site reserved for its ships in the port of Jaffa, and vast areas on which to set up depots for fuel and spare equipment; the French pavillion would also benefit from a reduction on the port customs duties fixed by the concession's decrees." Archives de la Chambre de Commerce, Marseilles: Dossier Jaffa, An XII–1880 (Letter of de Saulcy dated 3 September 1880).

[308] Chambre de Commerce de Marseilles, *Compte-Rendu des Travaux pendant l'Année 1880*, pp. 58–61.

[309] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1521 (Jerusalem, 5 January 1860); "Die Eisenbahn nach Jerusalem," *HL*, IX (1865), p. 48; Loewe, II, p. 110.

[310] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 9 (Jerusalem, 8 October, 22 October, and 22 November 1867); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1991 (Jerusalem, 28 November 1867); PP–1867/68, vol., LXVIII (Jerusalem, January 1868); Wolff, "Zur neueren Geschichte Jerusalems," pp. 5f.

[311] Wolff, "Zur neueren Geschichte Jerusalems," p. 6; see also PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1449 (Jaffa, 15 September 1859); *Die Warte*, 10 May 1860; ISA–DKJ, A.III.4 (Jerusalem, 24 October 1861); *HL*, VIII (1864), p. 130.

The Templars would always point to the wagons as a visible proof of their "civilizing mission" in Palestine, ignoring Yusuf al-Khalidi's earlier initiatives. A word should therefore be said regarding the spirit in which they fulfilled their "mission": In the first half of the 1870s they were in conflict with the local authorities of Jaffa, as the latter did not share the view that it was in the public interest for the Templars to drive their wagons through the narrow and crowded streets of Jaffa down to the harbor. For the head of the Templars, Hoffmann, the diagnosis and necessary treatment were clear: "It is simply the resistance of barbarism to the advances of culture," he wrote to the German consul in Jerusalem. "I must therefore seek refuge in the power of the German Empire."[314] Through the mediation of the consul, a compromise was reached in November 1874 by which, until the completion of a road to the landing place around the city, the Templars were allowed to pass through the main road for a period of three hours daily.

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[312] Khalidi, *Sura musawwada*. This version is confirmed in other sources; see HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 5 (Quadro statistico del distretto di Jaffa, 27 August 1872; according to this the wagon service even lasted longer than a year!); HHSTA–Archive Jér., file 54 (Report on production and communications on the occasion of the Vienna World's Fair); see also Ebers and Guthe, II, p. 164 and the later work of Yusuf al–Khalidi for a wagon service: *Die Warte*, 18 September and 18 December 1879.

[313] Wolff, *Seiben Artikel*, p. 108; *Die Warte*, 5 February, 16 April, 19 May, and 12 November 1874; 3 June, 17 June, and 21 October 1875; 13 January, 13 April, and 25 May 1876; 21 November 1878; 17 April, 18 September, 13 November, and 18 December 1879; 12 February and 13 May 1880; 21 April, 1 September, and 8 September 1881; ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Jaffa, 30 June 1875 and Jerusalem, 3 May 1876); ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Jaffa, 31 March 1875); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 14 (Jerusalem, 24 October 1879); *An Open Letter Addressed to Sir Moses Montefiore*, p. 65; Paulus, p. 40; Wolff, "Zur neueren Geschichte Jerusalems," p. 6; Bauer, *Volksleben*, p. 334; Carmel, *Die Siedlungen*, pp. 39f. and 43f.

The first seriously pursued project for a rail connection from Jaffa to Jerusalem right after the end of the Crimean War was directly related to the British project for a railroad from the Mediterranean through Syria and the Euphrates valley to the Persian Gulf.[315] In 1862 a special association finally was founded for the construction of a Jaffa–Jerusalem train line, the directors of which included Lord Dufferin, General Chesney, and Cyril Graham.[316] But the Ottoman government refused the concession.[317] Even before that, English experts on Turkey had advised against carrying the project further. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe doubted the profitability of the line, and Sir Arthur Slade, admiral in the Ottoman Service, pointed out that such a line was neither in English nor in Ottoman interests: "There would be a repetition of the Crusades under a milder aspect, and demands for extraterritorial rights would follow. The pilgrims would chiefly belong, as now, to the Roman Catholic Church and to the Eastern Churches, with a sprinkling of Hebrews. Protestants would be too few to influence opinion on the matter."[318]

The same fate befell the project of the Austrian railroad engineer and millenarian Zimpel.[319] On the one hand there was Ottoman disinterest; on the other there were doubts as to the profitability, and therefore no prospects for raising the capital. In Constantinople the promoter was given to understand that the Sublime Porte planned the construction of a line between Jaffa and Jerusalem at its own expense. Zimpel quotes the Grand Vizier Fu'ad Pasha as saying: "I will never grant the crazy Christians a road facility in Palestine, because if I did they would turn all of

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[314] ISA–DKJ, A.XXXVI.1 (Jaffa, 25 July 1874); regarding the controversies see also ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.1 (Jaffa, 29 June 1872) and A.XXXVI.1 (Jaffa, 28 July 1874); Jerusalem, 30 July and 23 November 1874).

[315] See Elath, pp. 415–22; Chesney.

[316] According to Elath, p. 420, Montefiore was the chairman of this association. However, according to Montefiore's diaries, his name was mistakenly mentioned among the directors in the prospectus: Loewe, II, pp. 133f.

[317] Regarding the dismissive attitude of the Muslims of Palestine, see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 1 January 1857); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 9 October 1858); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1692 (Jaffa, 25 August 1862); see also *Die Warte*, 15 October and 29 October 1857; Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 191.

[318] Citation in Elath, p. 421.

[319] See Zimpel, *Straßen-Verbindung*, pp. 26–47; "Die Eisenbahn nach Jerusalem," *HL*, IX (1865); *Die Warte*, 16 March 1865, 1 June 1865, and 4 October 1866; Schick, "Studien über Strassen- und Eisenbahn-Anlagen zwischen Jaffa und Jerusalem."

Jerusalem into a Christian madhouse."[320] It is indeed amazing that the same people who noisily preached the "Peaceful Crusade" demanded that Constantinople also support their undertakings!

A French concessionaire, who began in 1873 with great élan, also quickly failed.[321] In the mid-1870s, a French association was founded to build a harbor in Jaffa and a railroad to Jerusalem, and the architect and promoter Pierotti also received the papal blessing for this project. The tentative capital requirement was estimated at 30 million francs. "In just three years the first iron horse should arrive huffing at the walls of the Holy City," reported *Die Heilige Land*, again a vain hope. The *"croisade financière,"* which *La Terre Sainte* hoped to ignite for the project after the concession was issued for rail construction (but not for the harbor), came to nothing. The financial and construction associations which were to be entrusted with implementation (Comptoir d'Escompte, Société des Batignolles, Gouin et Cie., all well known from the North African speculation business) probably saw no cause to push through the project on their own.[322]

Too often the preliminary calculation was made that no profit could be hoped for from this train line. According to French statistics regarding the traffic of goods and persons between Jaffa and Jerusalem, in the year 1877,[323] there were about 10,000 pilgrims, 4,000 tons of imports, 1,500 tons of export goods, and 1,500 tons of fruit and vegetables to be transported to supply the "Holy City." The means of transportation and the road fees in the year 1877 are summarized in table 40; the estimated yearly income from the transportation business in 1881 appears in table 41.

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[320] "Die Eisenbahn nach Jerusalem," *HL*, IX (1865), p. 56; see also PP–1864, vol. LXI (Jerusalem, May 1864); *Die Warte*, 4 January 1866.

[321] *Die Warte*, 6 February, 27 February, and 13 March 1873; 5 February and 16 April 1874; *ÖMO*, 1 (1875), pp. 104–106; *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, p. 417.

[322] *Jaffa–Jérusalem* (a type of advertising brochure); *NNM*, 19 (1875), pp. 272–75; *HL*, XX (1876), p. 81; Neil, *Palestine Re-peopled*, pp. 174–76 (A Papal Railway in Palestine); "Le Chemin de Fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem," *TS*, 1875/6/7/8, pp. 36–38, 830f., and 842–44; MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 14 (Jerusalem, 5 November 1878); *Die Warte*, 9 January 1879; PP–1880, vol. LXXIV (Jaffa, February 1880).

[323] MAE–CCC Jér., vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 24 October 1879).

Table 40: Traffic between Jaffa and Jerusalem in 1877.

Conveyance	With cargo	Without cargo	Road fees
Wagons	1,550	850	26,550 P.T.
Horses and mules	22,000	11,000	27,500 P.T.
Camels	21,000	8,300	37,725 P.T.
Donkeys	25,200	23,500	18,475 P.T.
			110,250 P.T.[324]

Source: MAE–CCC Jér. vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 24 October 1879). P.T. = Turkish piasters.

Table 41: 1881 income from the transport business between Jaffa and Jerusalem.

Persons and freight wagons	6,640 T.L.
Cargo transport by camel	10,660 T.L.
Riding horses and mules	3,500 T.L.
Conveyance of passengers and goods on donkeys	3,150 T.L.
	23,950 T.L.

Source: Loehnis, *Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse*, p. 242. T.L. = Turkish lira.

True, it was always argued quite correctly that only a corresponding infrastructure would induce a stronger transportation yield. But that was an uncertain and long-term matter. Contemporary European investors were interested only in short-term and speculative investments in the Ottoman Empire.[325]

The harbor, the wagon traffic, the railroad: these were urgent problems for Jaffa because the economic life of the city was oriented primarily toward export and import trade and to business with the pilgrims. These activities, which in the course of the time under consideration constantly gained in importance, were largely dominated by Europeans, "Levantines," and local Christians.[326]

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[324] This total corresponds to the report of Paulus (1882), that the receipts of the City Council of Jerusalem "in road fees had grown from 500 to 1,200 Turkish lire in the last ten years due to greater frequency" (p. 40); see also *Die Warte*, 1 September 1881 and *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, p. 417.

[325] In 1888, one Navon Effendi received a new concession, which he transferred in 1889 to a French association. This began then in 1890 with the construction of the Jaffa–Jerusalem train line, which was inaugurated in 1892. See E. Toutain, "Notes sur les chemins de fer de la Turquie d'Asie (1900)," in MAE–MD, vol. 134; Verney and Dambmann, pp. 253–60; Pech; Cuinet, pp. 605–609; 'Arif, *Al-mufassal*, p. 304.

But the agricultural production of the immediate environs, especially the citrus plantations, and the preparation of the products for export (cottonball deseeding during the cotton boom, packing of oranges in crates, and so on) were also of great importance for the city. According to the British consul, in 1879 during the harvest season 5,000 persons were employed in the harvesting and packing of oranges. At any rate, the majority of the residents of Jaffa depended for their livelihood on export and import activities.[327]

Jaffa, together with Ramla and Lydda, formed, after Nablus, a second center of the soap and oil production (olive and sesame oil). Ramla and Lydda lay in the middle of extensive olive groves.[328] Soap production appears to be the single most important commercial production branch in these three cities.[329] In 1872 there were five soap factories in Jaffa.[330] In Lydda, according to Guérin, there were about 100 persons employed in soap production.[331] The large ash-heaps of Ramla, waste products of this production, entered the Palestine literature because the summer wind blew into the eyes of the European travelers en route to Jerusalem the fine, stinging dust that also caused the local populace so much trouble.[332]

Trade and the citrus plantations allowed Jaffa to prosper and expand. Before the city literally burst its seams in the 1870s,[333] it was like an amphitheater, rising in terraces from the sea, surrounded in a semicircle by a wall with a moat and crowned by a citadel. Only one gate led into the city, which was surrounded by a several-kilometer-wide girdle of gardens. European travelers who wandered through these felt as if they had been transported to the Garden of Eden.[334]

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[326] See PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1419 (Jaffa, 17 May 1856—"Answers to Queries"); *Die Warte*, 16 March 1876; HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 137 (Jaffa, 20 April 1877); Bömches, p. 44.

[327] PP–1880 vol. LXXIV (Jaffa, February 1880); HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 6 (Jaffa, 12 January 1877).

[328] "Situation économique de la Palestine"; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 515; *SWP, Samaria*, pp. 252f.

[329] See also table 34 and footnote 290.

[330] HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 5 (Quadro statistico del distretto di Jaffa, 27 August 1872).

[331] Guérin, *Description*, I, p. 323.

[332] See Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 531f.

[333] Regarding the city development of Jaffa, see *HL*, VIII (1864), 130; PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1834 (Jaffa, 9 November 1864); Furrer, pp. 6–10; *An Open Letter Addressed to Sir Moses Montefiore*, p. 64; Wolff, *Jerusalem*, pp. 3–6; Schwarz; *SWP, Samaria*, pp. 254–58; Guérin, *Description*, I, pp. 6f.; Ebers and Guthe, II, pp. 159f.; *Die Warte*, 23 March 1865, 15 December 1870, and 16 July 1874; ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.1 (Jaffa, 30 March 1872), A.XXXIX.2 (Jaffa, 30 June, 30 September, and 31 December 1874), A.XXXIX.3 (Jaffa, 31 March 1876 and 31 March 1877)—Quarterly reports of the German consul form a kind of chronicle of Jaffa during these years; PP–1876, vol. LXXV (Jaffa, February 1876); PP–1877, vol. LXXXIII (Jaffa, March 1877); PP–1878, vol. LXXIV (Jaffa, May 1878); HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 137 (Jaffa, 20 April 1877; 37 pages!); Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, IV/2, pp. 190–92.

The fortress facilities that Abu Nabbut (1807–18) had been the first to restore, now had to give way, step by step, before urban expansion, until the walls were completely flattened and the moat filled.[335] Even before this development began at the end of the 1860s, villas were built in the gardens and more rural suburbs arose. But now the activities of the city itself demanded more space. In 1864 a new gate was opened. In 1869, a portion of the wall in the southeast, towards the quarantine building and the Greek monastery, was torn down. As early as 1872 the German consul in Jaffa reported that the fortifications facing the sea, which had collapsed at several places, were to be sold as handy quarry, as it were, and the munitions that had been stored since Ibrahim's day in the powder magazine of the citadel were to be sent to Acre. In 1874 the powder magazine was transferred to Acre, and in early 1876 the citadel was sold to the Latin monastery.

In May and June 1874, the city acquired four more exits by breaking through the wall. They began selling the city walls and fortifications a piece at a time. Shops and houses were built with the cleared stones, usually outside the former wall. At the end of 1875 work was started on paving the main street of the city, Jaffa's actual market street;[336] this work took more than a year. The market place expanded to include the land on which the old city gate and a portion of the fortifications stood. It was now continued outside the city proper, along the roads to Nablus and Jerusalem, as a vegetable, fruit, and grain market. At least on the land side the appearance of Jaffa had indeed changed rapidly within a few years.

Bethlehem (Bayt Lahm)[337]

We have already noted that the Bethlehemites had a direct share in the development of Jerusalem. Around the middle of the century Bethlehem was still largely a peasant village surrounded by olive groves, vineyards, almond and fig trees, and grain fields. With regard to specialties, Bethlehem offered wine and honey, while sheep-raising was also important. The village was closely associated with the Ta'amira Bedouin, whose territory adjoined to the south and for whom Bethlehem was the economic center.

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[334] See the enthusiastic description in Guérin, *Description*, I, pp. 9–11.

[335] According to Tolkowsky (p. 162) this work was ended in 1888. (It was not begun in 1879, as he writes, but ten years earlier.)

[336] Description of the bazaars of Jaffa in Lortet, pp. 365–70.

[337] Tobler, *Bethlehem*, pp. 55–69; Furrer, pp. 200–10; Ludwig, pp. 26f.; Hergt, pp. 284–87; Delpuget, pp. 65f.; *HL*, XI (1867), p. 90; HHSTA-Archive Jer., file 54 (report of 58 pages regarding production in the consular region of Jerusalem on the occasion of the World's Fair of 1873); Thomson, *Southern Palestine*, p. 549; Guérin, *Description*, I, pp. 120–28; *NNM*, XX (1876), p. 38; *SWP, Judaea*, pp. 28f.; Ebers and Guthe, I, pp. 136–50; Vaux, p. 295; Lortet, pp. 242–353; Pierotti, *La Bible et la Palestine*, pp. 289–303; Palmer; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VIII/2, pp. 425–28.

Even at the start of the 1890s more than one-quarter of the inhabitants still depended on agriculture for their livelihood. But since the middle of the century Bethlehem had grown into a small city, in which a portion of the population—at least that portion that directly profited from the European penetration—had achieved relative prosperity, namely through the brisk trade in "Bethlehem wares" and the construction boom. Construction was also done in the city itself and in the adjacent Bayt Jala, but the real business flourished in Jerusalem.

Along with agriculture and the construction trades, the most important branch of industry of the Bethlehemites was the manufacture of devotional items and souvenirs. Crosses and rosaries were made from various materials, especially from olive wood and from *doum* palm seeds, which came from the Arabian peninsula. Great quantities of mother-of-pearl were brought from the Red Sea and likewise worked into crosses, rosaries, and medals. From the Dead Sea they brought so-called Moses stone (*hajar Musa*), a gleaming, black-gray bituminous limestone with a characteristic smell, which was made into drinking bowls, dishes, inkwells, and so on. The sale of these vessels was promoted by saying that the fluids drunk from them developed healing powers. Tobler spoke at the end of the 1840s of 400 "craftsmen," that is, probably employees, in this branch of industry,[338] and Lortet reported about 500 workers;[339] 129 business owners were counted in 1890 (table 42).

Some of these items were sold in Palestine to the pilgrims, and some were exported to Europe, especially to Russia. Through the Latin monasteries they reached the Catholic lands of southern Europe and South America. Starting as early as the 1870s merchants from Bethlehem undertook long commercial voyages to Europe and America to sell directly the products of their city, and to fill their chests with other wares for the return voyage.[340] At the World's Fair in Vienna in 1873, they even set up a sales counter.[341] The French consul gave the annual yield of devotional manufacture of Bethlehem and Jerusalem in 1886 as 600,000 francs.[342]

Table 42 gives Palmer's data on the industrial structure of Bethlehem at the start of the 1890s; but we can assume that such a statistic for Bethlehem in the early 1880s would not look substantially different.

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[338] Tobler, *Bethlehem*, p. 60.

[339] Lortet, p. 347.

[340] See Gatt, *Beschreibung über Jerusalem*, p. 304; Palmer, p. 91.

[341] Zschokke, p. 5.

[342] "Situation économique de la Palestine."

Table 42: Employment structure of Bethlehem (independent masters or business owners) about 1890.

Peasants and shepherds	300
Masons	30
Stonecutters	250
Quarrymen	50
Plasterers	6
Camel drivers for lime, stone, and goods transport	40
Carters and wagon owners	8
Producers and sellers of mother-of-pearl, olive wood, and Moses-stonewares	129
Lard, oil, and cheese dealers	69
Cheesemakers	10
Sheep dealers	16
Grain dealers	8
Wine dealers	6
Vegetable dealers	5
Millers (including one steammill owner)	41
Bakers and bread sellers	8
Butchers	7
Drapers	19
Silk dealers and haberdashers	8
Weavers	4
Dyers	4
Shoemakers	21
Leather workers	6
Bag makers	3
Basket makers	2
Joiners	5
Cartwrights	5
Gunsmiths	6
Tinsmiths	2
File cutters	5
Blacksmiths	7
Gold and copper smiths	4
Gardeners	2
Postman and porters	1
Barbers	5
Coffeehouse owners	5
Hotel owners	1
Money changers	3
Doctors	2

Source: Palmer, pp. 91–94.

Nazareth (al-Nasira) and the Khan al-Tujjar

Since the 1850s, the development of Nazareth was determined by three factors. The first was the population increase due to the influx of peasants from the plains, who exchanged their precarious existence for the relative security of Nazareth (and also that of other cities). It is true that Nazareth had no city walls, but its mountain location offered some protection. In addition, Nazareth was under the tacit "protection" of Christian Europe, primarily under the wing of Catholic France.[343] The second factor was the direct expression of European interest in Nazareth. As in Jerusalem, brisk construction activity began after the Crimean War, and changed the face of the town.[344] Soon nothing could be seen of the destruction from the earthquake of 1837.[345] The third factor was the blossoming trade with Europe, which opened up a new field of activity, especially for the Christian Nazarenes. In addition, the grain caravans from the Hauran, which passed by on their way from the Majami' bridge to Haifa and Acre virtually before the eyes of the Nazarenes, were an incentive to get involved in trade with the land east of the Jordan. It is thus not surprising that among the significant structures of the city there were also five caravansaries: Khan al-Basha, Khan Dayr al-Latin, Khan al-Kathulik, Khan 'Azar Habib, and Khan Tannus Qa'war.[346]

For direct exchange of West and East Jordan products, each Monday a great weekly market was held, not right in Nazareth, but east of the city near Mount Tabor, in the formerly significant Khan al-Tujjar (also called Suq al-Khan) flanked by a fortress, which was otherwise no longer used.[347] Here we would like to cite Thomson's lively description of a market day there *in extenso*:

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[343] Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 429; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 117f.; Tristram, *Pathways*, II, p. 56. Mansur (pp. 286f.) reports from the chronicle of Ya'qub Farah, that there was an exodus of Christian craftsmen and merchants from Nazareth (though he does not say when), because they were forced to pay a real estate tax, without profiting from the land. After they were relieved of that through the intercession of the French consul in 1855, over 100 Christian families returned to Nazareth within three years.

[344] Conder, *Tent Work*, I, pp. 138–40; *SWP*, *Galilee*, pp. 275–78; Guérin, *Description*, VI, pp. 87–92; *Die Warte*, 24 September 1874; Ebers and Guthe, I, p. 302.

[345] Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VII/2, p. 49.

[346] Schumacher, "Das jetzige Nazareth" [Nazareth Today], p. 243.

[347] Robinson, II, pp. 368f.; Guérin, *Description*, VI, pp. 381f.; sketch in *SWP*, *Galilee*, pp. 394–96 (in contrast to our other sources, it says there that the market took place every Thursday).

> On Monday of each week a great fair is held at the khans, when, for a few hours, the scene is very lively and picturesque. These gatherings afford an excellent opportunity to observe Syrian manners, customs, and costumes, and to become acquainted with the character and quality of Syrian productions. Thousands of people assemble from all parts of the country, either to sell, trade, or purchase. Cotton is brought in bales from Nablus; barley, and wheat, and sesamum, and Indian corn from the Huleh, the Hauran, and Esdraelon. From Gilead and Bashan, and the surrounding districts, come horses and donkeys, cattle and flocks, with cheese, *leben*, *semen*, honey, and similar articles. Then there are miscellaneous matters, such as chicken and eggs, figs, raisins, apples, melons, grapes, and all sorts of fruits and vegetables in their season. The pedlars open their packages of tempting fabrics; the jeweller is there with his trinkets; the tailor with his ready-made garments; the shoemaker with his stock, from rough, hairy sandals to yellow and red morocco boots; the farrier is there with his tools, nails, and flat iron shoes, and drives a prosperous business for a few hours; and so does the saddler, with his coarse sacks and gaily-trimmed cloths. And thus it is with all the arts and occupations known to this people . . . But long before sunset not a soul of this busy throng remains on the spot. All return home, or take refuge in some neighbouring village.[348]

In 1880 the market day at Khan al-Tujjar was still cited as the most important in Palestine; among other things up to 200 head of cattle were offered.[349]

The Christian merchants of Nazareth profited from the city's central position; they looked both to the East and also to the coast and on to Europe.[350] So it was inevitable that "progress" soon made its entry: Mary Rogers described her visit to a rich Nazarene who had had a new house built for himself of hewn stone, and who (probably at the end of the 1850s) had traveled to Marseilles to buy European furniture and other furnishings. Above all he fixed up part of his house as a French *salon* with mirrors and marble tables, in whose gleam he basked before the eyes of his fellow citizens, for whom he was for a time a prophet.[351] The "propertied middle class," wrote an outstanding connoisseur of conditions in northern Palestine three decades later, was much more numerous in Nazareth than, for instance, in Haifa or Acre.[352]

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[348] Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 442f.; see also Furrer, pp. 354f.

[349] Luncz, p. 6; see also Ebers and Guthe, I, p. 298; and Rückert, p. 341.

[350] Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 117f.; Furrer, pp. 308f.

Along with the trade, the pilgrims, and the Christian institutions, agriculture was also of great importance for Nazareth, directly and indirectly. On the one hand a portion of the working populace consisted of farmers, and on the other, the city was the supply center for agricultural tools. One must assume that this branch of industry flourished particularly in the 1870s. The business structure of Nazareth is examined in table 43.[353] We cite these data from the year 1890, as there is no reason to believe that the situation at the start of the 1880s was significantly different.

Thus one-third of the populace lived from agriculture, two-thirds from trade and business. Of the 550 self-employed persons or masters in the fields of trade, crafts, and services, 154 were dealers (about one-fourth) and 112 were employed in the construction business (one-fifth). A not inconsiderable fraction of the craftsmen worked primarily for the needs of the agricultural sector, such as the smiths, the cartwrights (who made plows and yokes, a special handicraft of the Nazarenes), the saddlers, felt makers, and sack makers (who made saddles, bridles, felt blankets, and so on).

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[351] Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 157f.

[352] Schumacher, "Das jetzige Nazareth" [Nazareth Today], p. 245.

[353] According to Schumacher, "Das jetzige Nazareth" [Nazareth Today], pp. 243–45; see also Tobler, *Nazareth*, pp. 77–80; and Mansur, pp. 285f.

Table 43: Employment structure of Nazareth (1890).

Peasants	300
Grain dealers, also large landowners[354]	24
Spice as well as lard, oil, and cheese dealers	56
Vegetable dealers	15
Bread sellers, restauranteurs, confectioners	6
Drapers	43
Iron, glass, and porcelain dealers	10
Butchers	8
Millers (five with steammills)	9
Joiners	15
Cartwrights	8
Blacksmiths and nailers	8
Farriers	12
Cutlers	18
Coppersmiths	7
Goldsmiths	6
Saddlers	9
Felt makers	8
Sack makers	8
Gunsmiths	8
Pipe bowl makers	7
Sieve makers	3
Tinsmiths	8
Weavers	10
Tailors	6
Dyers	10
Tanners	12
Shoemakers	39
Soap makers	1
Master masons	16
Master stonecutters	53
Quarrymen	22
Limeburners	6
Plasterers	15
Horse and donkey renters	8–10
Gardeners	24
Barbers	16
Coffeehouse proprietors	3
Publicans	10
Hotel proprietors	2

Source: See footnote 353.

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[354] "The most respected class," writes Schumacher; see also above, p. 114.

Haifa and the Templar Colonies

Haifa is the last of the five cities whose development must be discussed directly in connection with the commercial upswing and the European penetration of Palestine. But the rise of Haifa since the middle of the nineteenth century was the downfall of Acre.[355] Both places, the order of importance of which was now reversed, had specific advantages to offer: Haifa the more suitable harbor, Acre the greater security. Added to the damage to Acre in connection with the conquest of the country by the Egyptians in 1832 and their expulsion in 1840 was the fact that in the same period (the end of the 1830s), with the growing European interest in Palestine and the establishment of steamship lines to the ports of the Levant, the quality of the harbor became decisive. Haifa, which previously had been in the shadow of Acre, now began to cast a shadow on the fortress of Acre.

As early as 1850, 162 steam and sailing ships sailed into Haifa, not counting coastal barks (82 Greek, 24 French, 17 Turkish, 16 English, and 11 Sardinian).[356] Since the start of the 1850s passenger steamers of European shipping companies also regularly put into Haifa. At the end of the 1850s, the Russian government financed the construction of a 30-meter-long stone mole in the harbor of Haifa to assist its pilgrims who came from Nazareth or wanted to travel through Nazareth to Jerusalem.

It is true that right up to the start of the 1870s travelers describe Haifa within its city walls as a dirty dump,[357] but already in the 1850s busy construction activity had begun, which extended beyond the city walls starting in 1858. Around the nucleus of the new Carmelite monastery and under the protection of European consuls who settled here, a number of additional Christian churches and institutions arose.

From the middle of the century until 1882 the population tripled to around 6,000, primarily because of the influx of Christians and Jews from Turkey and North Africa. The Muslims became a minority compared with the total number of non-Muslims.[358] In 1869 the Templars founded their first settlement at Haifa, which we will speak about shortly. In the 1870s Haifa also received an influx from the economically less-active cities of northern Palestine (Acre, Safad, and Tiberias), especially of Christians and Jews.

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[355] This is based primarily on Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*. See also Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, passim; Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 10f.; Neale, I, pp. 154–71; Hergt, p. 65; *NNM*, XX (1876), p. 172; Guérin, *Description*, V, pp. 251f. and VI, pp. 403f.; *SWP*, *Galilee*, pp. 282–85; Oliphant, *Haifa*, passim; Ebers and Guthe, II, pp. 106–10; Lortet, pp. 170f.; Karmali, pp. 68–73; Bahri, pp. 9–16.

[356] Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*, p. 65.

[357] See Lynch, p. 61; Sepp, II, p. 455; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 92–94.

[358] Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*, pp. 71f. and 127f.

The main features of this upward development, which after 1882 accelerated further, can be seen as clearly as its causes: an upswing of export activities, a station in the framework of the "Peaceful Crusade," and the founding of the Templar colony. That portion of the city's populace that did not earn its bread in this context lived from agriculture, from handicrafts, and from retail trade. But statistical data are available to us only for exports through the harbor of Haifa and for the Templar colony there.

According to the view of the Templars themselves, as well as their like-minded European contemporaries, it was these Schwabian colonists who promoted the breakthrough of "progress" in Haifa as everywhere else in Palestine. Therefore a word must be said here about the "civilizing" activities of the Templars.

No matter how one judges a religiously-based colonizing undertaking in the age of imperialist expansion,[359] in the case of Haifa it would be nonsensical for one to deny that the Templars actually constituted an important factor for the material development of the city. But the permanent guerrilla warfare that the settlers had to wage against the Ottoman authorities and the Arab population demonstrates more than adequately that Palestine was not convinced of the need for the colonizing blessings from Schwabia. Nonetheless the Templars tended virtually to trip over themselves in their self-conceit when it came to their contribution to the "elevation of the country." Thus, for example, Paulus wrote in the year 1882 of the 28 "tradesmen" of the colony founded near Jerusalem in 1873: "To these craftsmen, trained in the German manner, the Holy City owes its industrial upswing."[360] Seibt likewise revealed his grotesque ignorance of the conditions of Palestine when he asserted: "The carving of olive-wood articles was first done by a Templar in Haifa; one of the most important branches of the Palestine souvenir industry developed from that."[361]

The writings of the Templars themselves do not help us to evaluate the role this colony played in the economic and technological development of the country any more than do the judgments of their German and English contemporaries, who propagated the colonization of Palestine.[362] Did this small company, which consciously separated its Schwabian-pietistic enclaves from the native population, and which, apart from the need for local workers, wanted to be economically self-sufficient, at this time really demonstrate to Palestine anything more than that which they understood to be "German order and cleanliness?"

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[359] Regarding the Templar settlements, see Carmel, *Die Siedlungen*; Paulus; Brugger; Seibt; Imberger; Mahafiza, *Al-'alaqat*, pp. 100–33; see also Rafiq and Bahjat, I, pp. 238–40 and 253–57.

[360] Paulus, p. 41.

[361] Seibt, I, p. 120.

[362] See for example Conder, *Tent Work*, II, p. 301–15 and Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 22–33.

In the period which we are studying, four colonies were founded: Haifa (1869); Jaffa (1869); Sarona, north of Jaffa (1871); and Jerusalem (1873). Individual Templars also settled in Beirut, Nazareth, Ramla, and Bethlehem. In 1882, the socio-economic structure of these settlements appeared as follows:[363]

The Haifa colony had 350 persons. There were 17 farmers, 12 vintners, 21 persons who farmed on the side, and 20 "professionals" (wagon makers, smiths, saddlers, tailors, shoemakers, mechanics, and joiners). The colony had a windmill, a soap factory, 3 commercial businesses (one a wholesale business), a canteen, a hotel, and a physician.

The Jaffa/Ramla colony included 205 persons, mostly "professionals" (2 tailors, 4 millers, 3 joiners, 2 bakers, 2 shoemakers, 1 saddler, 1 butcher, 1 clockmaker, 1 mechanic, 1 mason, 2 gardeners, and 2 farmers). There were 2 large businesses (the Breisch and Friedel companies), 3 mills, 1 apothecary, 1 physician, 1 bar, and 1 hotel.

Sarona, the only true "farming colony," numbered 194 persons. In addition to the farmers there were 2 wine dealers there, 1 grocer, 1 butcher, 1 carpenter, 2 joiners, 2 masons, 1 smith, and 1 shoemaker.

The colony near Jerusalem (257 persons) consisted largely of tradesmen: 4 masons, 3 joiners, 1 wood dealer, 2 mechanics, 2 millers, 1 baker, 2 butchers, 3 shoemakers, 1 tailor, 1 saddler, 1 plumber, 1 cutler, 1 sculptor, 1 apothecary, 1 architect, 1 innkeeper, 1 barkeeper, 1 gardener, and 2 physicians.

The value of the real estate of these colonies was estimated by Hoffmann in 1877 as follows: Haifa 1,182,400 francs, Jaffa 473,000 francs, Sarona 440,200 francs, Jerusalem 267,000 francs, scattered possessions in Nazareth and Ramla 40,000 francs, altogether 2,402,600 francs. The value of the personal goods was estimated at 540,000 francs.[364]

As for the effects of this colonial enterprise, we can identify three. First these Templars proved to potential emulators that European colonies in Palestine could in fact be established given adequate tenacity. They thus became a model for colonization-minded Jews, something which could hardly fill the native population with satisfaction. Second, the Templars reinforced the class of qualified craftsmen, who, in the three municipal centers in which they settled, were available above all to satisfy the needs of the Europeans and the native upper class. The modern agricultural and industrial machines that they imported went only to their own benefit; they had nothing at all to do with a "developmental stimulus." Finally one should mention the wagon traffic, described and applauded dozens of times, which the Templars established for persons and cargo on the

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[363] Paulus, pp. 37–41; a corresponding overview from the year 1889, which Carmel, *Die Siedlungen*, pp. 52–54, reproduces, shows no significant changes in this structure.

[364] ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX. 3 (Jaffa, 17 March 1877).

Haifa–Acre, Haifa–Nazareth, and Jaffa–Jerusalem routes, whereby they allegedly improved the Haifa–Nazareth road at their own expense. With regard to this contribution of the Templars in assisting "civilization" in Palestine in the 1870s, it should however be added that the Templars could not long hold their ground against Arab and Jewish competitors.[365]

Acre ('Akka)

Acre was the only city of Palestine that experienced a population decrease in our period. Because of the inadequate sources, this process cannot be illustrated with economic statistics. We do have statistics regarding exports via Acre, but only very scant data regarding the economic structure of the city itself.

Acre was an administrative, fortress, garrison, and penal city, with the "Bastille of the Near East";[366] nonetheless, or therefore, it made a very depressing impression on the visitors of the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s. There was a city gate on the landward side and one at the harbor. Building was not permitted outside the city walls, but there was also no need. No one had taken the effort to eliminate completely the traces of the bombardment of 1840 inside the walls; many houses, at least in the 1850s and 1860s, had still not been rebuilt. The fortress facilities were indeed impressive, but partially destroyed, and the guns were hopelessly outmoded.[367] The Ottoman garrison dominated the life of the city, even if Oliphant's assertion that three-quarters of the city's buildings were barracks and governmental buildings[368] probably was exaggerated. Conder wrote of Acre of the 1860s: "Its trade is now much reduced, and the bazaars are deserted . . . I found many of the bazaars turned into cavalry stables, and only about one shop in ten inhabited."[369]

On the other hand, however, we have seen that Acre in this phase remained a significant export point, above all for Hauran grain. At harvest time thousands of camel-loads of grain entered Acre. The beach between the city and the Nahr al-Na'amin became an enormous camel encampment.[370]

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[365] Carmel, *Die Siedlungen*, pp. 55 and 244.

[366] Kurdi, p. 124.

[367] Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, III, p. 91; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 309f.; Furrer, pp. 331–33; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 88f.; Conder, *Tent Work*, I, pp. 188, 190, and 192; *SWP*, *Galilee*, pp. 145, 164–67; Guérin, *Description*, VI, pp. 502–509, 525; Lortet, pp. 159–67.

[368] Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, p. 338.

[369] Conder, *Tent Work*, I, pp. 188f.

[370] Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 347; Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, p. 338; Conder, *Tent Work*, I, pp. 188f.; Furrer, pp. 336f.

Normally no attempt is made to resolve the contradiction that Acre remained, even in the 1870s, the main trading center for grain on the Syrian coast, even while its decline was evident. We know only the general statements that trade and business could not develop under the shadow of the Ottoman garrison, and that Haifa had gotten the better of its neighboring city of Acre. This was certainly an important factor. The old harbor of Acre was silted up, and the bay of Haifa had a greater depth and was safer.[371] One resident of Acre lamented that steamers were "the beginning of the end" for the city.[372] But this end did not come suddenly: Acre remained until the end of the century the port with the more lively shipping traffic (even if the tonnage of the ships was less),[373] and the steamship associations had divided up the ports: In the first half of the 1870s the Austrians went to Jaffa and Haifa, the Russians to Jaffa and Acre, the French only to Jaffa (see maps 5, 6, and 7).[374] An explanation can therefore not be sought solely at this level.

Rather, the fact must be emphasized that the more important commercial and financial transactions of Acre went into the hands of the active Beirut commercial and finance bourgeoisie—the same group that also began to control a substantial portion of the agricultural production of northern Palestine. It has already been mentioned that the overwhelming portion of the imports for the entire Syrian coast went through the large Beirut trading firms; Beirut had assumed a dominant position.[375] But also the most important export goods of Acre—grain, and up into the 1870s, cotton—were controlled by Beirut merchants.

> The most important export firms in Beirut, which conducted and ran the grain trade in the Syrian areas were Sursok fréres, Bustros et Neveux, Touaini, Tasso, Hassan, Hoss, Sagrandy, Scrini, Massauti, and Parodi . . . Most of the cotton houses in St. Jean d'Acre and Lattakia are affiliates of the Beirut houses: E. Peyron, Sagrandi, Assad, Melheme, Sursock fréres, Toueini, Boustros et Neveu. Deserving mention as independent houses in St. Jean d'Acre and Caifa: Datodi, Petrocochino and Schiropina, Avimino Christo,[376] M.A. Sropinich,[377] and Selim Huri.[378]

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[371] Ebers and Guthe, II, p. 90.

[372] Kurdi, pp. 123f.

[373] See ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.2 (Acre, 24 February 1876) and A.XXXIX.3 (Haifa, 25 January 1877); Cuinet, pp. 98, 105, and 108.

[374] *Annuaire Diplomatique de l'Empire Ottoman*, LIII; Zwiedinek, pp. 78–80; *Information for Passengers by the Austro-Hungarian Lloyd's Steam Navigation Company Trieste*, 1874 (in ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIV.10); *Paquebots-Poste Français, Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes, Livret d'Itinéraires et Tarifs des Lignes de la Méditerranée et de la Mer Noire*, 1874 (in ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIV.10).

[375] See also Neale, I, pp. 189f.; Zwiedinek, pp. 12f.

[376] This is probably the same person as the Vice Consul Avicrino mentioned on p. 105.

[377] This reference is to Scopinich, an Austrian consular agent.

[378] Zwiedinek, pp. 25 and 56; see these lists with the names on pp. 106f.!

Even the Acre district tax farming was in Beirut's hands at the end of the 1870s. Nominally the tax farmer was one Yusuf al-Mamluk from Tyre, but he was only the agent of several Christian Beirut houses, which are said to have provided him in 1878 with between 30,000 and 40,000 pounds sterling so that he could get the prize.[379] Thus large profits flowed away to Beirut from the export business and tax farming.

If we consider the overall situation of Syria and the role of the European consuls in those decades, the assessment of Thomson, for example, that the city was oppressed by its military nature,[380] becomes more clear. After the Crimean War European interest in northern Palestine was concentrated on Haifa (because of the presence of the Carmelites, the proximity to Nazareth, and the Templars). The European consuls settled in Haifa, although they had to take themselves to Acre, where the Ottoman government was present, to resolve any important official business.[381] In the best case only native consular agents resided there. And apart from the interests of the settlers and the religious institutions, the trade interests of the Europeans and their protégés could also be better pursued under the eyes of the European consuls in Beirut and Haifa than under those of the military commandants and the *mutasarrif* of Acre. Acre was thus undermined from two sides, from Beirut and from Haifa.

Safad and Tiberias (Tabariyya)

Safad and Tiberias,[382] along with Jerusalem and Hebron, were the four Jewish "holy cities" in Palestine. With regard to city development, in our period they presented a picture of stagnation. In the eighteenth century, together with Acre, they were centers of the dominance of the Zayadina (the family of Zahir al-'Umar). Both were crowned with fortresses; Tiberias was also surrounded by walls, but these were demolished by the earthquake of 1837, and were not systematically rebuilt. In Tiberias man and beast used a footpath that went over gate rubble into the city, instead of the southern road through the gate.

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[379] See PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1202 (Acre, 11 July and 12 September 1878; Aleih, 15 September 1878).

[380] Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 310.

[381] Regarding the "administrative rivalry" between Acre and Haifa, see Rafiq and Bahjat, I, pp. 280f.

[382] Regarding Safad, see Lewysohn, pp. 1–37 (Jewish life there); Frankl, II, pp. 336–42; Burton, *The Inner Life*, p. 509; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 272–76; Furrer, pp. 377–84; Hergt, pp. 43–46; Porter, pp. 263f.; Vogüé, pp. 106–12; *SWP*, *Galilee*, pp. 199f. and 248–50; Guérin, *Description*, VII, pp. 419–21; Ebers and Guthe, I, pp. 338–41; Vaux, p. 372; Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 85f. Regarding Tiberias, see Lynch, pp. 88f. and 93; Frankl, II, pp. 347–62; Bovet, pp. 356–60; Sepp, II, pp. 142f. and 146; Furrer, pp. 358–63; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 399f.; Hergt, pp. 80–82; MacGregor, pp. 355–57; Vogüé, pp. 112–16; *SWP*, *Galilee*, pp. 361f.; Guérin, *Description*, VI, pp. 250–52; Ebers and Guthe, I, p. 318–22; Rückert, pp. 350–54; Vaux, pp. 351 and 354; Livingstone, pp. 29f. and 40–52.

With regard to economic activities, there was nothing to report about Tiberias in this period. With respect to Safad, we have only scant indications of the processing of olives, grapes, and cotton (weaving and dying facilities). Because of the grotesquely different data regarding population, it is not even possible to establish when or if the resident Jews formed the majority of the population during our period.[383] But there can be no doubt that both cities grew again after the earthquake on the basis of Jewish immigration, and that the Jewish residents made their particular mark in both cities. They lived primarily from charity, small trade, peddling, and small financial businesses. A large portion of them were under British protection. As 400 to 500 families in Tiberias and Safad were Austrian subjects (mainly from Galicia and Bukovina), in 1858 an Austrian consular agent (Miklasiewicz) was appointed for both cities, residing in Safad.[384] France is alleged to have had 3,000 protégés in Safad and Tiberias. In 1874, one Samuel Abou from Algeria, a naturalized Frenchman, became chief rabbi of Safad and then also French consular agent for Galilee.[385] Otherwise, however, Europe was not much interested in this part of Palestine.

On the other hand, the Ottoman authorities tried to settle "immigrants" there: Algerians, and from 1878 on, Circassians and Tatars from Bulgaria and Rumelia. Behind this lay the double intention of creating a Muslim counterweight to the Jews, who were largely under European protection, and to give impetus to the development of these districts. Algerians who had followed 'Abd al-Qadir into exile were settled at the end of the 1850s north of Lake Hula, near Tiberias, and in Safad.[386] In the 1870s they are alleged to have made up half of the Muslims in this city.[387] Along with the Circassian-defended hamlets in the Golan Heights and in the Transjordan region (Amman),[388] Circassian settlements also arose around Tiberias and Safad. This undertaking was a failure, however. Many of those who did not fall victim to the climate emigrated. The rest were described as the "terror of the *fellahin*." The "refined" families settled in the two cities, where they were supported by the government. According to the "popular opinion" reported by Miklasiewicz, they lived from plunder that they had brought with them from Bulgaria.[389] At any rate no contribution to the economic development of Safad and Tiberias could be expected from these Ottoman settlement attempts. Thus, both cities remained in our period in a political and economic backwater. To be sure, however, around 1880 Lortet confirmed a marked upswing of Tiberias.[390]

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[383] Thus in *SWP, Galilee*, p. 199, the population of Safad is given as 3,000 Muslims, 1,500 Jews, and 50 Christians. Directly under that the data of Guérin are cited without comment: 7,000 Jews, 6,000 Muslims, and 150 Christians!

[384] HHSTA–AR, F8/19 (Beirut, 28 February 1858). This post remained until 1918 with this (Christian) family in Safad: Breycha-Vauthier, p. 125. Like many other Austrian consuls, Miklasiewicz was not happy with his Jewish protégés. That which Montefiore simply did not want to believe (Loewe, II, pp. 178f.) can be read in the Austrian documents in detail: Repeatedly Miklasiewicz complained in Beirut in unvarnished language about what he saw as the undignified conditions among the Jews of Safad and brought serious accusations against them because of their (as he saw it) illegal behavior: HHSTA–AR, F8/38 (Safad, 20 December 1864, 23 December 1864, and 9 January 1865).

[385] Slousch, p. 247.

[386] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1448 (Jerusalem, 19 December 1859); Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 261; Karmon, "The Settlement," p. 11; Bardin, pp. 15–17.

[387] *SWP, Galilee*, p. 199.

Nablus[391]

Nablus, at the outlet of a fertile, water-rich valley between two mountains, appeared to the Europeans of our period like a pearl among the cities of Palestine. In contrast to Safad and Tiberias, for example, all traces of the earthquake of 1837 had been completely eliminated by the middle of the 1850s. The city was surrounded by a wall—not very well fortified—with two main gates. All the more well-fortified and imposing were the city palaces of the dominant families, "defiant forts with iron doors,"[392] "comparable to the medieval family castles in Italian cities."[393] Regarding the largest building complex of Nablus, the palace of the Tuqan, it was said that it could house 1,000 soldiers.[394] The new governor's house, designed by Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi himself, seemed to Mary Rogers at the start of the 1860s as "the handsomest dwelling-house I had seen in Palestine. It is built of well-hewn fine limestone, and enriched with marble pavements, columns, and arches."[395]

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[388] Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, pp. 44–54 and 251–55; *HL*, XXIII (1879), p. 18; Schumacher, *The Jaulan*, pp. 57–59; Wirth.

[389] HHSTA–P.A. XXXVIII, box 228 (Safad, 13 November 1879 and Beirut, 6 December 1879); see also the invective of the Templars against the Circassians ("leeches," "robber bands," "plague," etc.) in *Die Warte*, 25 April, 9 May, 30 May, and 13 June 1878, and Lortet, p. 156. The attempt to settle the Circassians in and around Nablus was also a complete failure: AA–I.A.B.q. (Turkey) 126 (Jerusalem, 4 April 1878); ISA–DKJ, A.III.8 (Jaffa, 1 April 1878); ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.4 (Jaffa, 31 December 1878 and Jerusalem, 28 February 1880); PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1202 (Acre, 11 July 1878); *Die Warte*, 9 May 1878 and 23 October 1879; Nimr, III, pp. 35–39; Ramini, pp. 151f.; generally in this regard see Karpat, "The Status of the Muslim."

[390] Lortet, pp. 498–500.

[391] See Rosen, "Ueber Nablus"; Petermann, I, pp. 264–69; Busch, pp. 388–90; Mills, especially pp. 87–90; Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 334–37; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 470; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 137–39 and 400f.; Guérin, *Description*, IV, pp. 390–403 and 423; *SWP, Samaria*, pp. 166–68 and 203–10; Ebers and Guthe, I, pp. 255–62; Rückert, pp. 221f.; Lortet, pp. 194–97; Vaux, p. 311; Nimr, II, p. 272–74 and 284–98; Ramini, pp. 110–19.

[392] Sepp, II, p. 45.

[393] Rosen, "Ueber Nablus," p. 635.

[394] *SWP, Samaria*, p. 204.

The stately buildings of the city, many two and even three stories high, the mosques with their minarets (five large and a number of smaller mosques and prayer houses), the imposing roofed bazaar, a large number of fountains and springs that splashed inside and outside of the city, as well as streams that drove the mills, the situation in the midst of fertile vegetable fields, fruit and olive plantations: All this had charmed the Europeans. Nablus "is unrivalled in Palestine for beauty and luxuriance."[396]

> Its beauty can hardly be exaggerated . . . . Clusters of white-roofed houses nestling in the bosom of a mass of trees, olive, palm, orange, apricot, and many another varying the carpet with every shade of green . . . . Everything fresh, green, soft, and picturesque, with verdure, shade, and water everywhere. There is a softness in the colouring, a rich blue haze from the many springs and streamlets, which mellows every hard outline.[397]

The striking prosperity of Nablus was based on trade and industry. Nablus was, and remained in our period, the most important place for local and regional trade, the industrial production of soap and oil, and the processing of cotton. Apart from the fact that Nablus was the central point and market city for those districts, which up into the 1870s were economically the most important of Palestine, the city was also a junction and intermediary for trade in the north-south and west-east direction, from Damascus and northern Palestine to Jerusalem and southern Palestine, and from the coast to the region of East Jordan. (With respect to the trade between Haifa/Acre and the East Jordan region, the scity of Nablus, as we have seen, found a rival in Nazareth.) The city customs tax in the first half of the 1860s is said to have often brought in 10,000 piasters daily, occasionally up to 20,000.[398]

Along with the *khans* of Nablus, the great sales hall was conspicuous, rising up in the middle of an impressive bazaar street, which ran the entire length of the city. Mary Rogers described the main bazaar as

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[395] Rogers, *Domestic Life in Palestine*, p. 259; Ebers and Guthe, I, p. 262; see also the photos and descriptions in Nimr, II, pp. 441–62.

[396] *SWP*, *Samaria*, p. 204.

[397] Tristram, *Pathways*, II, pp. 31f.

[398] Mills, p. 87.

> the finest arcade in Palestine. It is rather wider and much more lofty than Lowther Arcade, and about five or six times as long. Here European goods are displayed, such as Manchester prints, Sheffield cutlery, beads and French bijouterie, very small mirrors, Bohemian glass bottles for narghilés, Swiss head-kerchiefs, in imitation of the Constantinople mundîls, crockery-ware, and china coffee-cups. But the brightest shops are those in which Damascus and Aleppo silks, and embroidered jacket and tarbouches from Stamboul, appear, with stores of Turkish pipes, amber rosaries, and bracelets from Hebron.[399]

Along with its function as local market and regional trade center, Nablus was the city with Palestine's most important industrial production, which was oriented toward a regional market.[400] The cotton of Nablus was renowned as the best in Syria.[401] No wonder that during the cotton boom[402] Nablus was a center for preparation for export: "The busy hum of the cotton-gins greeted us on all sides, and heaps of cotton-husks lay about the street . . . Though we had seen everywhere the signs of a nascent cotton-trade, yet in no place was it so developed as here."[403] Because of its quality, the Nablus cotton—like the fabrics of cotton, wool, and camel-hair produced inside the city and the silken passementerie goods—was sold in the Palestine, Transjordan, and central Syrian markets, even after the end of the boom and throughout the period under study, as we have already seen. Along with the weavers and dyers, the shoemakers and silver- and goldsmiths should be mentioned, who sold their products on both sides of the Jordan, and the producers of olive oil, whose product was prized far and wide for its quality.

However, the most profitable business was the production of soap, which, to the extent that it was not used in Syria, was exported primarily to Egypt and Anatolia. Nablus soap was considered even at the start of the twentieth century to be the best in Syria.[404] Petermann was told in 1852 that Nablus exported soap worth more than four million piasters annually. The total export duty in Nablus brought in 2.5 million piasters a year; the *miri* yield of the district was two million piasters.[405] Rosen wrote in

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[399] Rogers, *Domestic Life in Palestine*, p. 260.

[400] Nimr, II, unfortunately provides only very general or undated information in this regard. On page 286 he reports the numbers of businesses without saying the time of which he is speaking. On pages 292 and 295 he reports only a few names of soap makers and of merchants, the latter again without a time reference.

[401] Zwiedinek, p. 54.

[402] In 1863 in the district of Nablus four times as much cotton was produced as in the previous years: PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 771 (Jerusalem, 28 August 1863).

[403] Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 137f.

[404] Ruppin, p. 151.

[405] Petermann, I, pp. 266f.

1860 of 15 soap factories with an annual production of about 4,500 *quintals*.[406] Guérin spoke of an annual soap export of the city of 4,000–5,000 *quintals*.[407] The British trade report for 1882 speaks of around 30 soap factories in Nablus.[408] The same number is mentioned by Dabbagh for the last years of the nineteenth century.[409] Many of the soap-makers belonged to the *Ashraf* (descendants of Muhammad); among them was also the Naqib al-Ashraf (head of the Descendants of the Prophet in the city).[410]

Of the 40 soap factories that existed in the middle of the 1880s in Nablus, Jerusalem, Ramla, Lydda, and Jaffa, around three-quarters of them were located in Nablus. The total annual production at that time is given as 40,000 *quintals*.[411] Corresponding to the doubling of the number of Nablus soap factories during the period 1856–82 is the doubling of soap exports via Jaffa (see table 24) in this time period, from which Nablus must have profited the most. Thus, for example, a delivery of 300 sacks of Nablus soap to Egypt in 1877 had a value of 222,750 piasters. The value of one specific *tabkha* that year was 127,000 piasters. It is reported that two merchants founded a company to sell alkali and lime for the soap factories with a capital of 28,000 piasters.[412]

The economic upswing of Nablus also found expression in construction activities:

> An occidental style is revealed by . . . the three or four steep red-tile roofs, which tower over the flat white roofs and their small domes in some places in the city. Of new buildings of the last twenty years, we mention the military arsenal, the Latin monastery, the expansion of the Lutheran school, and the new construction of a Lutheran chapel, which to be sure is still lacking its tower, also a large *khan* and several residences, which bear witness to the growing prosperity of the city.[413]

In 1875 a new street to the city center was opened.[414] Overall, one has the image of a steady, although not dramatic upward development, as Nablus was able to affirm and extend its position as a local and regional trade and industrial center, and the merchants of the city participated in export-oriented activities.

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[406] Rosen, "Ueber Nablus," p. 638; 1 *quintal* = about 49 kg.

[407] Guérin, *Description*, IV, p. 399.

[408] PP–1883, vol. LXXII (Jaffa, March 1883).

[409] Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, II/2, p. 199; Rafiq and Bahjat, whose book appeared during World War I, report 29 soap factories (I, p. 119). Cuinet spoke of 15 soap factories (pp. 182 and 191), probably on the basis of out-of-date Ottoman *salnames*.

[410] Ramini, p. 112; Nimr, II, p. 292. (Regarding Ramini's book, according to Gaith [1981, p. 212], there is a critique by Nimr, which was not available to me: Ihsan al-Nimr: *Naqd risalat al-Ramini 'an Nablus*, Nablus, 1979).

[411] "Situation économique de la Palestine."

[412] Ramini, pp. 114, 117, and 139.

[413] Ebers and Guthe, I, p. 262; see also Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 441–44.

[414] *SWP*, *Samaria*, p. 203.

Hebron (al-Khalil)

Hebron was the highest city of Palestine: Its four city divisions lay on both sides of a *wadi* opposite one another in pairs.[415] Since there was no city wall, but the outside house fronts of these quarters practically assumed the function of city walls, and the entrances of the important streets could be closed by gates, Hebron still appeared as a tetrapolis in the middle of the century. At the end of the 1850s, the city began to recover from the afflictions that had visited it in the two preceding decades.[416] Hebron, which had been at the forefront in the rebellion against the Egyptians, was plundered in 1834 by the troops of Ibrahim, and partially destroyed; a portion of the populace lost their lives, and hundreds of the men were conscripted by force into the army. In 1837 the earthquake also did damage there. In the 1840s and early 1850s, the city was continuously drawn into local power struggles and revolts of the Jabal al-Khalil, and in 1846 again was plundered by Ottoman troops. Rosen writes that the disturbances in the first half of the 1850s "had reduced the amount of livestock by an extraordinary amount, so that the city now had only one goat herd."[417] After the Crimean War and the end of the local clashes, no special economic prosperity began, but the residents of the city could again develop their traditional activities, primarily viniculture, glass-making, and the production of water bags.[418]

Hebron was familiar to European pilgrims and travelers not only for its *haram* (holy sanctuary), but also because of its glasswares, especially the colorful lamps and jewelry such as bracelets, earrings, and necklaces. It is probably correct that glass-making did not have the same importance in the 1860s and 1870s as it did at the start of the century, when Seetzen reported 150 persons employed in this branch,[419] for competition had appeared for the residents of Hebron from European glassware exports to

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[415] See the map in Rosen, "Ueber das Thal," and Sepp, I, p. 489.

[416] See in this regard Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, II, pp. 80, 88, and 93f.; Guérin, *Description*, III, pp. 218 and 256; Spyridon, pp. 113f.; Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 118–23.

[417] Rosen, "Ueber das Thal," p. 497.

[418] See *Die Warte*, 13 March 1856; Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, I, p. 213, II, pp. 79–81 and 88; Rosen, "Ueber das Thal"; Hergt, pp. 248–55; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 583–85 and 596–99; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, p. 387; Furrer, pp. 104–15; Guérin, *Description*, II, p. 245; *NNM*, 22 (1878), pp. 127f.; Ebers and Guthe, II, pp. 214f.; Rückert, p. 65; Vaux, pp. 119f.; Lortet, pp. 317–33.

[419] Cited in Karmon, "Changes," p. 81.

Egypt and Syria. For example, in the 1870s glasswares from Bohemia and Hebron were side by side in the shops of Jerusalem and Nablus. But it is not correct that around the middle of the century "glass manufacture had almost completely disappeared," as Karmon writes.[420] The products of Hebron continued to be sold in the cities and villages of Palestine, particularly among the poorer populace, in great quantities, not least of all by travelling Jewish traders from the city.[421] They were sold in the regional market both to Bedouin and in large quantities also to Oriental and Eastern European pilgrims, especially in Jerusalem. Even at the World's Fair of 1873 in Vienna, Hebron was represented with glass ornaments.[422] A report from the French consul in 1886 suggests that glass-making remained an important source of income for Hebron, even if this branch did not develop further: Four factories were making 60,000 francs yearly, according to this. (No information was provided regarding the number of melting furnaces and employees.)[423]

However, Hebron lived first of all from agriculture, from viniculture, from sheep and goat herding, from trade with the Bedouin of the regions bordering the Jabal al-Khalil to the south and east, who brought their products (sheep, wool, camel hair, skins) to the Hebron market,[424] and from the further processing of these products.

Because of the varying terrain, the grape harvest around Hebron ran for almost a half year;[425] during this time fresh grapes came continuously to the market. The unconsumed portion of the harvest was dried or pressed and sold as raisins or *dibs* (a kind of syrup), and also sold beyond the borders of Palestine. But in contrast to the Christians of Bethlehem and Bayt Jala, the Muslims of Hebron did not produce any wine. In the aforementioned French consular report, the total area of the vineyards around Hebron is given as 800 hectares (those around Bethlehem and Jerusalem at 500 hectares).[426]

In addition, tanning and the production of water bags were of great importance for Hebron. Other industrial activities mentioned in various sources (dying, weaving, pottery-making) were less important.

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[420] Ibid., p. 83.

[421] Delpuget, p. 26. Hebron was one of the four Jewish "holy cities" in Palestine. The members of the Jewish community of the city were chiefly under British and Austrian protection.

[422] Zschokke, p. 5; see also the report on production in the consular district of Jerusalem assembled on the occasion of the World's Fair, in HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 54. The origin of the glass ornaments in the Constantinople Exhibition of 1863 is not clear from the remarks of the reporter: Dorn, p. 109.

[423] "Situation économique de la Palestine."

[424] Conder, *Tent Work*, II, p. 80; Morand, II, pp. 66f.

[425] Karmon, "Changes," pp. 71f.

[426] "Situation économique de la Palestine."

One can also see that the development of the city did not stagnate in the 1860s and 1870s, for at the start of the 1880s, the four quarters had largely grown together and, in terms of structure, now formed a unit.[427]

Gaza (Ghazza)

The economic activities of Gaza, the second largest city of Palestine, like those of the other cities were determined by the geographic situation, the agrarian production of the environs, and the industrial specialization of its inhabitants.

Like Jaffa, Gaza lay in the middle of a picturesque, irrigated tree and garden landscape, in which olive trees predominated. A portion of the city lay on a hill, the remaining quarters grew like villages at its feet, spilling into the gardens and palm, fruit, and olive plantations, which spread out for several kilometers in all directions. The old city walls and gates had long ago collapsed.[428] On the basis of its topography, the dominant construction style, and the employment structure of its populace, Gaza was quite rural in nature. Nonetheless, at the end of the 1850s there were about 50 mosques in the city, that is, one mosque for every 200 adult Muslim inhabitants.[429]

The greatest portion of the populace lived from agriculture. The two other main employments were the city handicrafts and trade. Gaza was a regional market center and an important base of trade between Egypt and the Fertile Crescent on the one hand and with Arabia (among other things for coffee and wool) on the other. The city was also directly linked to economic activities that were induced by the annual pilgrim caravan from Damascus to Mecca, which of course was also always a trade caravan. On the one hand Gaza profited from the trade which was thus furthered with Arabia, on the other the government grain warehouses in Gaza provided food to the pilgrim caravan, food which was transported by the Bedouin to Ma'an (in 1857, for example, 18,640 *kile*s of barley and in 1859 around 11,000 *kile*s of wheat and 23,000 *kile*s of barley). No wonder that Bedouin *shaykh*s were also among the owners of the greatest houses of Gaza! Gaza's status as a trading center was also suggested by the presence of many Egyptians and even Maghribis. The names of the great *khan*s were indicative: Khan al-Zayt (olive oil), Khan al-Kattan (fabrics), Khan al-

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[427] *SWP, Judaea*, p. 306.

[428] See Porter, pp. 204f.; Sepp, II, p. 528; Furrer, pp. 139–47; Wallace, p. 164; Tristram, *Pathways*, I, p. 5; Conder, *Palestine*, pp. 51f.; Conder, *Tent Work*, II, pp. 169f.; *SWP, Judaea*, pp. 234f.; Guérin, *Description*, II, pp. 178–94; Ebers and Guthe, II, pp. 183f.; Rafiq, *Ghazza*, pp. 10–36 and 74–76.

[429] Rafiq, *Ghazza*, pp. 25f., 28–30, and 36.

Qahwa (coffee), Khan al-Ghalla (grain), Khan Zawiyat al-Hunud (Zawiya of the Indians). Some *khans* bore the Egyptian designation *wikala* to identify them: the *Wikalat* Abu Sha'ban, Abu Khadra, and 'Ali Saqallah.[430]

In the 1850s, when the boom began in grain exports, the district of Gaza also became an important exporting and grain-growing region. Very soon the Bedouin were also involved in these activities. "Wheat, wheat, a very ocean of wheat," Thomson exclaimed at Gaza.[431] The city became an important trading center for grain, with numerous granaries and an important grain market. But since it had no harbor and no steamers at all and foreign sailing ships only rarely dropped anchor off Gaza, the grain export was mainly through Jaffa and the exporters there. From there imports from the Mediterranean were also ordered. In 1872, for example, only 20 European and 5 Turkish sailing ships and 96 coastal barks stopped at Gaza; in 1873, because the grain harvest was poor, only 9 foreign sailing ships and 128 barks stopped there.[432] Subsequently, however, the direct exports did increase. Local merchants remained largely middlemen, however; the wholesalers and exporters were chiefly in Jaffa.[433]

But with the expansion of ship connections between the Egyptian and Syrian ports, and after the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), the caravan traffic from and to Egypt through Gaza diminished greatly,[434] yet the city remained an important market and trade center, not least of all for the Bedouin of the Sinai and Negev.[435] As before, the bazaars of Gaza were described as extremely plentiful and variegated.

The names of the *suqs* indicate the local industrial and distributive activities: the potters' *suq*, the shoemakers', the saddlers', the joiners', the smiths', the spinners', the wool dealers', the coppersmiths', the perfume sellers', the vegetable dealers', the butchers', as well as the donkey market, the camel market, and the stone market. In addition, dying, soapmaking, and oil-pressing facilities are mentioned in the documents analyzed by Rafiq.[436] The most important branches of industry,[437] however, were weaving, pottery-making, and soap-making. The products of the first two industries, which were produced solely in family businesses, were sold especially in Palestine and among the Bedouin, the soap primarily in Egypt.

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[430] Ibid, pp. 28, 36, 47–54, 74, 77, and 80; see also Gatt, "Legende," p. 153.

[431] Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 556.

[432] PP–1874, vol. LXVII, p. 925.

[433] Vidal, p. 387; Gatt, "Der Getreidemarkt von Gaza" [The Grain Market of Gaza].

[434] *Die Karawanenstrasse von Aegypten nach Syrien* [The Caravan Route From Egypt to Syria], p. 40.

[435] Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, I/2, pp. 97f. and 100.

[436] Rafiq, *Ghazza*, pp. 54–59; Gatt, "Legende," pp. 153f.

[437] Only the works of Gatt provide adequate information here, especially "Industrielles aus Gaza" and "Legende zum Plane von Gaza," and Rafiq, *Ghazza*. The books by Meyer and Dowling are useless for our period and our areas of interest. See also PP–1874, vol. LXVII, p. 925; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 547 and 550; *SWP, Judaea*, p. 235; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, I/2, pp. 99–103; Sakik, pp. 44–49.

The pottery-making was the most conspicuous activity, as the potters had their own quarter in the upper city. At the start of the 1880s Gatt counted 16 workshops, each with three kilns and four wheels. In particular jugs and dishes of the most diverse style, small lamps, and various clay pipes were made. The latter were used in Gaza itself and in other Palestine cities in housing construction, for balustrades of roof gardens and roof cupolas. The distinction of the Gaza potters was that they fired their kilns with camel and sheep dung. This made the dishes grey-black and more durable; they were sought-after in all of Palestine and among the Bedouin. "Barks which bring wares to Gaza generally take on a cargo of dishes there," writes Gatt, who also reports of a dish dealer who was said to have earned a fortune of 30,000 francs.[438]

If the "black jugs" were the specialty of the city, the weaving was no less important: "The number of weaving mills is at least 100, with 2–300 looms; most produce material for striped cloaks, about one-third produce linen and only a few cotton fabrics."[439] The Bedouin provided wool, while flax and cotton were obtained from Egypt.

Finally there were three large soap-making facilities in Gaza. Two of them were run by Christians (the former Austrian consular agent Basala and the former Prussian consular agent Madbak), the third by the Muslim merchant Abu Sha'ban. The oil came from Gaza and the villages of the district, the potash from the Bedouin, the limestone from peasants of the Jabal al-Khalil. The three soap-making facilities operated only in the winter; during the summer months they served as grain warehouses. When the olive harvest was good, they could produce approximately 200,000 kilograms of soap with a value of around 100,000 francs.[440] It is not clear in Gatt if that corresponded to actual production. The export to Egypt at the time when Gatt wrote his report was largely not over the land route as before, but by the sea route via Jaffa. Gatt provides interesting reports regarding the organization of manufacturing, which deserve to be cited here:

> First the proprietor of the soap-making facility processes his supply [of oil]; then he satisfies his customers. Here he supplies the limestone and potash, and sees to the work, while the customers supply the oil. In compensation the proprietor receives a percentage of the soap; the rest is sent to the customers. Whoever could not put together a *tabkha* (a batch of processed oil) himself could join with others for that purpose. The work itself is done

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[438] Gatt, "Industrielles aus Gaza," p. 72.

[439] Ibid., p. 75.

[440] Ibid., p. 79.

> by transient bands of specialists under the supervision of a master, who bears the name *ra'is*. These wander from one soap factory to another, wherever there is work; they are Muslims; as wage they receive not money, but a percentage of the soap, which they then sell.[441]

However, the greatest fortunes in Gaza, according to the bequests studied by Rafiq for the years 1857–61, were made from trade (especially in textiles), moneylending (to individual city dwellers or collectively to indebted villages), and through investment in agricultural production. Rafiq affirmed an unequivocal capitalist penetration and exploitation of the hinterland through the numerically limited Gaza bourgeoisie.[442]

Summary

The economic development of Palestine during the second *tanzimat* period must be seen within the framework of efforts of the Ottoman government to establish effective control over its Syrian provinces, the European interest in the "Holy Land," and the European economic penetration of the southern and eastern periphery of the Mediterranean. To be sure, nothing that could be called an "Ottoman economic policy" was implemented either in Palestine or in the other Arab regions, but the Ottoman "law-and-order policy" with regard to local lords and Bedouin, together with the centralist administrative reforms, represented important improvements constituting the basic conditions for an economic upswing.

In the two and a half decades following the Crimean War, Palestine in fact experienced a significant economic upswing.[443] Apart from the construction business, the soap production, and the manufacture of devotional items, it was largely the agrarian and trade sectors that expanded. Even before the Crimean War, Palestinian agriculture had already reacted to developments in the external markets, and starting in the 1850s it became increasingly export-oriented. The area under cultivation expanded considerably,[444] and agricultural surpluses were produced for regional and European markets. Here the agrarian production remained flexible and diverse. Palestine was spared the development of a monoculture, which in the face of the natural (primarily climatic) conditions would have been catastrophic. Thus, Palestine was able not only to contribute to the food supply of central and northern Syria, but also to the "invisible" adjustment of the total Syrian trade balance; the trade through the ports of Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa was marked by high export surpluses.

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[441] Ibid., pp. 78f.

[442] Rafiq, *Ghazza*, pp. 65f. and 68.

[443] See also Gilbar for the time from 1865 to 1914.

[444] According to an American consular report from the year 1882, the grain cultivation area had expanded in the previous decade in the districts of Jerusalem, Hebron, Jaffa, and Gaza by 150,000 to 200,000 acres (Owen, p. 176). Owen assumes that this expansion affected mainly the Gaza district.

The cities that were the centers of the export- and import-oriented activities and the European religious and cultural penetration (Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jaffa, Haifa) grew and prospered. But also the cities in which the Europeans showed no direct interest (Nablus, Hebron, Gaza) shared in the general upward development, and did so on the basis of local and regional trade and specialized production for the local and regional market:[445] pottery making and weaving in Gaza; grape production and manufacture of water bags and glassware in Hebron; and soap-manufacture and cotton processing in Nablus. In this regard, specialization to meet the needs of the construction business and devotional manufacturing in Bethlehem as well as construction trades and manufacture of agricultural tools[446] in Nazareth should also be mentioned.

Thus, we can identify a general expansion of production for the local, regional, and European markets, and a change in the importance of production of specific agricultural goods corresponding to changes in the market. But during the period which we have examined, no products appeared either in the agricultural or in the industrial sector that were new or unknown in Palestine prior to this point, nor were basically new production methods used. The few machines that were used during these decades could be viewed as a negligible quantity. Also the exploration and use or export of mineral resources,[447] the existence of which was known, did not occur to any significant extent.

In the narrower economic area there was no fundamental restructuring or deformation in the wake of the European penetration in our period. To be sure, the import of British cotton manufactured goods in particular (see table 33), as everywhere in the Middle East, could not fail to affect local weaving,[448] for example that of Nablus. But this was not a serious economic problem for Palestine. First of all, none of the great regional centers of textile production in the nineteenth century was in Palestine, which on the contrary was always dependent on "imports" from Syrian cities. Second, the textile needs of the rural population continued to be met to some extent by the village home-weaving industry.[449] Third, even in Nablus, Gaza, or Majdal, weaving remained an important branch of industry, because it was oriented entirely toward local needs.

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[445] See also "Nushu' wa-tatawwur," no. 27, pp. 34–48.

[446] This was normally the business of village craftsmen, some of whom were itinerant; see Klein, "Mittheilungen 1881," pp. 68f. and Schumacher, "Der Arabische Pflug" [The Arab Plow], pp. 165f.

[447] In particular salt, sulfur, bitumen, alkali, potash, gypsum, copper, gems; see in this regard: MAE–CCC Jér., vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1 July 1847); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1419 (Jerusalem, 30 August 1856—"Answers to Queries"); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1875 (Jerusalem, 3 March 1865); HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 54, Esposizione 1873; ISA–DKJ, A.XXII.1.ᶜ (Jerusalem, 5 and 7 September 1877); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 14 (Jerusalem, 24 October 1879); Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, p. 223; Zwiedinek, p. 35; *Die Warte*, 4 April 1879; Fraas; Schick, "Landesproducte Palästinas," pp. 162–65; Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, p. 295; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 221, 224, 240–42, 316f., and 349f.; Azoury, pp. 16f.; Musil, I, pp. 18f. and II/1, p. 21.

[448] See also Avitsur, p. 486, and Baer, "The Impact of Economic Change," p. 495.

But the increased integration of Palestine in the world economy had two socio-economic effects that were significant for the further development of the country. One was the change in the agrarian ownership conditions, especially the rise of large landholding; the other was the development of a commercial and financial bourgeoisie whose capital also began to penetrate the agricultural hinterland. To this extent, therefore, the foundation was laid for the peripheralization of Palestine, for it is above all social groups such as large landholders and import-export merchants who, on the basis of their own interests, further a form of outward orientation of the peripheral economies in which the tendency toward external determination is inherent.

However, in our period, despite the export orientation, a relative diversification of agrarian production and an alignment of industrial production toward local and regional needs were retained. Peripheralization effects also remained limited because Palestine, in quantitative terms, could not interest Europe either in its primary products or as a market to the extent, say, of Egypt, Lebanon, central and northern Syria with Damascus and Aleppo, or Anatolia. Potential European capital investors saw the short-term profit opportunities in the "Holy Land" as too low, and the European powers were less interested in an intensive economic penetration than they were in a "fitting" involvement in political control of the country. Palestine was also a special case in that, within the framework of the "Peaceful Crusade," not inconsiderable sums flowed into the country through construction activity and religious, educational, and charitable institutions, which were at best "political investments."[450] These European activities initially entailed no fundamental social destructuration. But the power claims of European states on the one hand and the European colonization attempts on the other were starting points for developments that would soon catch Palestinian society unawares.

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[449] See *HL*, XI (1867), p. 90; Klein, "Mittheilungen 1881," pp. 68f.

[450] See for example Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 397f. The value of the German property in Palestine was estimated in 1877 as follows: Real and personal property of German private persons in Jerusalem, M 1.2 million; that of the German colonies M 3.4 million; property of the state and the facilities in Jerusalem M 2 million; capital in German commercial houses M 2.2 million; altogether M 8.8 million. ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3 (Jerusalem, 20 March 1877).

PART III:
Socio-political Development

5 Social Formation until the Mid-Nineteenth Century

The Problem

Before we describe socio-political change in Palestine under the twin pressures of the Ottoman centralization policy and European penetration, we must clarify the structure and character of the society whose transformation is the object of our research. I have discussed this problem in other publications and in a wider context; I would like to refer the reader to these studies.[451] They stand within the framework of the debate about feudalism and the discussion about social formation and the mode of production in the Ottoman Empire.

The necessity of determining the character of the economic, social, and administrative relationships in Palestine before the beginning of the Ottoman *tanzimat* policy and European penetration can be seen in *Sozialgeschichte Palästinas*, a book that was mentioned in the introduction. The author formulated his definitions by attempting to blend together Marx, Weber, Wittfogel, Mandel, Montesquieu, and other theoreticians.[452] In order to produce a characterization of Arab (or Ottoman) society in general and Palestinian society in particular during the Ottoman period, he put together a breathtaking terminological and conceptual potpourri, teeming with grave factual errors:[453] a feudal despotism marked by rentier capitalism; an Asiatic or Middle Eastern mode of production based on a hydraulic culture; a semifeudal structure with mercantile capitalist tendencies; an early feudal mode of production with early capitalist conditions of production in the first stage of development; prebendal feudalism with a sultanic stamp; Oriental sultanism combined with a feudal aristocracy; a feudal-military system with the ingredients of tax-farming and terror (this last from Montesquieu); theocratic rule; feudal anarchy; and so on and on. Faced with this terminological sleight of hand, we can see the urgent need for clarity: What kind of socio-economic and political-jural order are we actually talking about?

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[451] "Was There a Feudal System in Ottoman Lebanon and Palestine?" and "Zum Problem eines außereuropäischen Feudalismus."

[452] Irabi, pp. 7–15 and 30–42.

[453] Thus the Janissaries are confused with the *timar*-holding soldiers!

In the first place we must deal with the designation of Palestinian society during the Ottoman period as a feudal society. The feudalism abstraction in many ways serves to define socio-political and economic realities until as late as 1948. Thus, Hollstein characterized the Arab ruling class in Mandate Palestine as feudal (feudalists, feudalist class, feudal lords, feudalist clans, feudalist ruling stratum)[454] and asserted that "the socio-political backwardness of the Arabs in comparison with the Jews is what decided the national power struggle in Palestine. The European Jews brought capitalist conditions of production into a country with a feudal structure."[455]

What is more, we are confronted with the problem that the existence of a uniform social formation or mode of production for the entire precolonial Middle East is often (and all-too-casually) assumed. On the contrary, we must emphasize that in the broad geographic area that formed the Ottoman Empire we are not dealing with a uniform social and economic structure, certainly not one that remained unchanged for centuries. Rather, we are confronted with regionally bounded, distinct administrative, social, and economic relationships that the organization of the imperial administration took into account. The societies of the Balkan countries, Anatolia, the mountains of Lebanon, the urban regions on the edge of the Syrian desert, the Nile Valley and the Nile Delta, the Arabian peninsula, and so on, were all so essentially different that they simply cannot be measured with a single analytical yardstick. Nomadic, peasant, and highly developed urban societies existed side by side, and the structure of peasant society showed great regional differences.

The complexity of the military, political-administrative, and economic-fiscal organization of the empire corresponded to the geographical and anthropo-geographical complexity. Alongside the *sipahis*, the mounted troops who were supposed to be supplied by the possessors of the so-called military fiefs, or timariots (*timarli*), there were the elite infantry troops—the Janissaries—who had originally been recruited as slaves and were housed in barracks in the cities. There were also the mercenary units and local conscripts.[456] Alongside the *timar* system, the bestowal of the so-called military fiefs, there was a system of tax farming as well as direct collection of taxes and tribute by the administration.[457] In the provinces, in addition to the holders of *timar* lands, the governors who had been sent or appointed by Constantinople and the rural or urban local lords had power. When Hintze wrote, "I find feudalism in the full sense, as a system albeit with sharp divergencies and particularities, in only three places in the world [outside of western and central Europe]: in Russia, in the Islamic states, and in Japan,"[458] he was simply not adequately informed. He had focused his attention too exclusively on the Ottoman *timar* system, which had been in a process of disintegration since the end of the sixteenth century. There was neither a general Arab feudalism[459] nor a general Ottoman or Iranian feudalism.[460]

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[454] Hollstein, pp. 141–43 and 146.

[455] Ibid., p. 144.

[456] For Syria, especially, see Rafeq, "The Local Forces."

The point of departure for our discussion, rather, must be the fact that some areas of the Ottoman Empire were more strongly integrated into the imperial union than others that were only weakly penetrated by the administration in Constantinople. Mount Lebanon, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Palestinian highlands as well, belonged to the latter areas. Not least on account of natural conditions, forms of social and administrative organization could be retained or developed relatively autonomously there, the more so since a process of decentralization had already started in the empire by the end of the sixteenth century and did not reach its height until the eighteenth century.[461] These facts make it necessary to examine independently the individual regions in the empire. It would be absurd to expect that whatever can be said about the social structure of the Palestinian highlands would also be valid for the peasant society of the Nile Valley or the tribal society of Mesopotamia. Despite this, scholars always speak of *the* social structure, *the* mode of production of the Ottoman Empire or the precolonial Middle East.

If we ask, then, whether the widespread characterization of Palestinian society as a feudal society really applies, we must first make clear what the understanding of feudalism is that underlies this discussion. One cannot take for granted that there is a generally accepted scientific concept of feudalism, nor that everyone means the same thing when they speak of feudalism, a feudal society, or feudal system. Nevertheless, a relatively broad-based consensus has arisen that has as its goal the attainment of a synthesis that merges the earlier "triad of concepts of feudalism" into a synthetic concept. This is the concept of "feudalism as a (jural) articulation of relations by the nobility, as a type of society, and as a socio-economic global system (a mode of production)."[462] This is the path that we will follow here. Our orientation is based on the works of historians (of Europe and areas outside Europe) who are interested in theory, such as Anderson, Kuchenbuch, and Cahen. The result is the following definition, presented here in abbreviated form:[463]

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[457] See Lewis, "Ottoman Land Tenure" and the literature cited in Schölch, "Was There a Feudal System in Ottoman Lebanon and Palestine?"

[458] Hintze, p. 27.

[459] See Cahen; Rodinson, pp. 91–104.

[460] See Katouzian; Müller, chapter 3.2.

[461] See Rafeq, "Changes in the Relationship"; Hourani, "The Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century."

Agrarian production and the "peasant economy" form the economic basis of feudalism. The means of production are effectively in the possession of the peasants who, on their own, organize the working of the land. The "feudal lord," on whom they depend, appropriates the surplus of their labor in the form of rents—labor, in-kind, and money—by means of "extra-economic coercion" (relations of coercion and dependence being based not just on economic but on politico-legal factors). This rent tends to be used for consumption purposes. In return for the rent, the "feudal lord" protects the peasants. As for the rest of the land over which he exercises control, he either cultivates it himself or has it worked directly for his own account.

The nexus of politico-legal authority and economic control is the essence and consequence of the feudal organization of power. Its basic element is the parceling of sovereignty. The unity of a larger political entity is not brought about through a central authority, that is, a state bureaucracy, but via a network of loyalties. The sovereign authority is not divided up functionally but personally; the exercise of this authority is intrinsically linked to economic control over the individual "feudal parcels." In order to assume, or be legitimized in, an inherited or usurped position, the owner of such a "parcel" owes loyalty, especially military allegiance, to his overlord. Apart from this, he is present at the seat of his power. His authority rests on the coercive means at his personal disposal (armed horsemen) and on his jurisdictional authority, which is the central modality of exercising political power.

The feudal society is an *"Ensemble von Ständischen Klasser."*[464] This means that the social structure is not to be explained only in terms of control over the means of production; rather, it means that social differences are determined economically, politically, and legally. In the center stands the juxtaposition of a hierarchical, noble, and arms-bearing class—which legitimizes its position through its military functions—and the peasantry. The guiding principle of social relations is one of personal loyalty and allegiance, of personal protection and personal dependence, and while the social relations above the level of the so-called "immediate producers" tend to be symmetrical, those between peasants and lords tend to be asymmetrical. The logic of asymmetry on this level consists in the endeavor to bind the peasant to the soil they work.

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[462] Kuchenbuch and Michael, p. 18.

[463] See Anderson, *Passages*; Anderson, *Lineages*; Bloch; Brunner; Cahen; C.E.R.M.; Dobb; Hintze; Kuchenbuch and Michael; Sweezy; Wunder.

[464] A "medley of corporate classes." Kuchenbuch and Michael, p. 732.

Feudalism in Palestine?

In the two essays referred to earlier[465] I argued that when we study Mount Lebanon up until the mid-nineteenth century, we are actually dealing with a variant of feudalism. Lebanon was an autonomous tributary principality the political structure of which must in the first instance be defined internally and not with reference to Constantinople. The territory that the prince (*amir*) represented to the outside world was composed of *muqata'at*, that is, districts, the political-legal and socio-economic control of which was in the hands of large, influential clans (patrilineal kinship groups). At the apex of these districts stood the *muqata'aji*s, feudal lords who owed loyalty and military allegiance to the *amir* and who had to collect the tribute which the *amir* in turn had to deliver to Constantinople. Within the "zones of rule" parceled out to them, and with the help of the followers whom they personally equipped with weapons, the *muqata'aji*s exercised autonomous judicial, social, and economic control over peasants who were personally dependent on them. The economic basis was agricultural production and local handicrafts intended for personal needs and the limited regional system of barter. The peasants did not come into contact with the Ottoman tax administration. Rather, they were exposed to a multifaceted, partly irregular, and often excessive appropriation of the surplus product that they accumulated in the form of tribute in kind, "duties," and corvée labor, as well as the general extortion of tribute contributions by the *muqata'aji*s. The essential reference point among social relations was the peasants' association with or loyalty to the house of their feudal lord, who in turn was responsible for protecting them.

With regard to Palestine,[466] Porath's statement about the similarity of the social order in the Palestinian highlands and Mount Lebanon[467] at first has much to recommend it when we think of the way in which control was parceled out, that is, the staking out of socio-political and economic zones of control by the dominant clans; the socio-economic and political-jural relations of dependency between the peasants and the local lords; the self-perception of the eminent "noble" families,[468] their lifestyles and rivalries. But the differences already begin to appear when the two regions were originally integrated into the expanding Ottoman Empire. Because of its strategic and commercial importance (the military routes and commercial roads between Cairo and Damascus), Palestine (in contrast with Lebanon) was fully integrated into the administration soon after the conquest. It was quickly covered with *timar*s (yielding 3,000–20,000 *aqcha*s) and *zi'amat*s (large *timar*s yielding 20,000–100,000 *aqcha*s).

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[465] See note 451.

[466] See Abir; Baer, *Fellah and Townsman*, pp. 82–88; Barghuthi and Tautah; Barguthy, "Traces"; Cohen; Cohen and Lewis; Darwaza; Hoexter; Hütteroth and Abdulfattah; Macalister and Masterman; Mantran and Sauvaget; Nimr, I^2, pp. 81–342 and II, pp. 174–271 and 360–553; Sharon.

[467] "The social regime in Palestine during the Ottoman period and even earlier closely resembled that of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, but without an emir": Porath, *The Emergence*, p. 9.

But contrary to the still widely used terminology, it must be stressed that these so-called military Ottoman fiefs had nothing to do with a feudal system, since they served the immediate military and fiscal needs of the central administration. No system of "parceling out" autonomous "zones of rule" based on a network of personal dependence was established by means of the *timar*s. The *timar* holders stood on the side of the governors; they did not replace them. They had specific tasks to perform in a centralized state, but they exercised no seigneurial jurisdiction and played no immediate role in the agricultural domain. Characteristically, this system decayed with the decentralization of the empire. Thus, there were 7 *zi'amat*s and 427 *timar*s in Jabal Nablus at the beginning of Ottoman rule, while at the beginning of the nineteenth century there were still 5 *zi'amat*s and about 52 *timar*s. (The possessors of the five *zi'amat*s in 1833 were: Shaykh Muhammad al-Qasim, Shaykh Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi, Ahmad Agha al-Nimr, the Tuqan family, and Muhammad Bey 'Asqalan.) Under Ibrahim Pasha there had been eleven *zi'amat*s.[469]

It was only when this system went into decline, at the end of the sixteenth century (although in Palestine traces of it lasted into the nineteenth century), and when the governors' capacity to influence local events in the Palestinian highlands waned, that a development set in that could be called, with some reservations, feudalization. But the evolving sociopolitical structures rested in part on a tribal basis, as many of the new local lords—whose clans had immigrated from the south and the east during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries—were of Bedouin origin.[470] Nevertheless, the solidifying forms of local, political-jural, social, and economic control of the Palestinian highlands, which was parceled out in a way similar to that found in the Lebanese mountains, can be compared to a certain extent to the Lebanese relationships. Yet—and this is the second fundamental difference—no formalized, relatively closed general system having a hierarchical apex evolved in Palestine. The sultan or the Ottoman governors remained in this respect the direct points of reference for all local lords. There was no *amir* to deliver the tribute; rather, it was the governor of Damascus who collected, or tried to collect, taxes in an annual expedition (*dawra*). (The *miri* yield from the Palestinian highlands was devoted entirely to the financing of the *hajj*.)[471] On this occasion, also, the *shaykh*s and district governors were appointed, confirmed, or removed from office.

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[468] See for example Klein, "Mittheilungen 1883," p. 85; Canaan, "Vom arabisch-palästinischen Familienleben," pp. 13 and 17.

[469] Nimr, II, pp. 221–23; Ramini, pp. 102–104.

[470] Poliak; Hoexter, p. 251, note 3; Oppenheim, II, p. 11, speaks of "Bedouin land acquisition."

We also find in Palestine the heads of dominant families who controlled their districts from their fortresses (although the control of particular villages or districts was less stable than in Mount Lebanon). They appropriated the surplus produced by the peasants, part of which they had to hand over to the Ottoman governors as taxes. They also administered justice on the basis of customary local norms and practices, settled quarrels,[472] and fought over the control of human and material resources. Finally, they fulfilled their military obligations, in particular contributing to the protection of the annual pilgrimage caravan from Damascus to Mecca with their followers and levies of peasants.[473] But they fulfilled these obligations as district *shaykh*s, as Ottoman district governors.

When we speak of feudalization, then, we do not want to describe a system but to characterize a process which led to the emergence of a fragmented power structure, to the usurpation of governing functions, combined with the direct socio-economic control of a dependent peasant population. Here the nonbureaucratic, personal element which distinguishes this process from forms of mere administrative decentralization and regional autonomy was predominant. The "rule of the *shaykh*s" in the Palestinian highlands thus differed from that of the *muqata'ajis* of the mountains of Lebanon and also from the rule of Zahir al-'Umar and Jazzar Pasha, while it can be compared to the position of at least part of the *a'yan* and *derebey*s of Rumelia and Anatolia.

Concerning the social relationship between *shaykh*s and peasants, tribal structures and patterns of behavior were obviously more pronounced in the Palestinian mountains than in the mountains of Lebanon. In Palestine it was more a clan or tribal solidarity (*'asabiyya qabiliyya*) than relations of feudal protection and allegiance. Contemporary observers from neighboring areas were sometimes astonished by the blind obedience of the peasants to their *shaykhs*.[474] But this is less a question of a fundamental difference than it is a matter of the intensity of this *'asabiyya qabiliyya*. In Palestine its significance had to do with the relatively recent tribal origin of many Palestinian clans and with their frequent direct contact with Bedouin tribes whom they encountered as enemies, whom they sought as allies in their feuds, or with whom the peasants also sought protection occasionally.

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[471] See Barbir, pp. 122–25; Ramini, pp. 120f.; Nimr, II, pp. 270f. and 376f.

[472] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1454 (Jerusalem, 1 January 1859); Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions*, pp. 208–11; Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 216; *SWP, Special Papers*, pp. 336–38; Finn, *Palestine Peasantry*, pp. 20–23; Barghuthi, "Judicial Courts," p. 42; Nimr, II, pp. 494–504.

[473] See Barbir, chapter 3; on the *hajj* in the nineteenth century, see Grant, pp. 219–34. We hear of the last levies of peasants under their local rulers used outside of Palestine in 1852; 4,000 men from the Palestinian highlands are said to have taken part in the expedition sent by the *sar'askar* of Damascus against the Druze of the Hauran in that year; see, especially, Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 260–63.

On the other hand, large landholding seems to have been less pronounced in the Palestinian mountains than in the Lebanese mountains, although this is again a question of gradual distinctions. But in large parts of the highlands the economic dependence of the peasants on their *shaykh*s was more of a "tributary" nature,[475] that is, the peasants did not work for the *shaykh*s directly.

In the sphere of production there is a further problem. If communal forms of property and cultivation are a constituent hallmark of the Asiatic mode of production, one must ask what was the significance and distribution in the Palestinian highlands of the *musha'* system, whose socioeconomic and political-administrative structure we are trying to classify. This property and cultivation relationship was a mixed form. It was communal in the sense that a customary periodical redistribution of the plots of land took place within the village community, each plot being allotted according to its future holder's ability to cultivate it. The working and usufruct of the plots, however, were on an individual/familial basis. But, as Weulersse maintains, this form of land use generally had not penetrated the mountain regions of Syria;[476] at least, it was practiced there only to a very limited extent in Ottoman times. This is also true for the Palestinian highlands. In any case, neither olive plantations and vineyards nor mulberry groves were redistributed. Therefore, we can assume that individual/familial forms of property and cultivation predominated in the highlands. The significance of the *musha'* system in the lowlands of Palestine in the late Ottoman and Mandatory periods is not a problem that concerns us here.

During the Ottoman period we thus find feudal elements in the socioeconomic and politico-legal structures of the Palestinian highlands, but not a fully developed system that would allow us to speak of a variant of feudalism. Administratively, the Palestinian districts were to a considerable extent incorporated into the Ottoman context. Social relations were marked by tribal structures and modes of interaction; the appropriation of surplus production had a thoroughly tributary-fiscal character. Rather than feudal lords, the *shaykh*s of the Palestinian highlands should therefore be called local lords.[477] They were anchored in the tributary structure of Ottoman rule over the Arab regions, within which they constituted a crucial link. The main concern of imperial government, that is to say the governor in Damascus, was the fiscal and military contributions made by the Palestinian highlands to the execution of the *hajj*. The local lords were primarily interested, within the context of their administrative functions, in enriching themselves at the expense of the peasantry, and in their service during their local feuds. That they got their money's worth is demonstrated by the fact that, when Shaykh Muhammad al-Qasim fell in the battle against the Egyptians in 1834, he left behind a fortune of 800,300 piasters and real estate valued at 14,763 piasters.[478] (The two largest fortunes in cash and real estate that Rafiq has found in the records of Gaza for the years 1857–61 were that of the merchant, moneylender, and landowner Husayn al-Dabbagha and that of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Shawwa; after their debts were paid off, they amounted to 61,306 piasters and 36,393 piasters, respectively.)[479]

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[474] See Darwaza, p. 224; Nimr, II, p. 371; see also Darwaza, pp. 126, 131, 135, 140, 141, 231, 251, 253, 269, and 281.

[475] This concept has been borrowed from Samir Amin; Amin, pp. 115–31.

[476] Weulersse, pp. 98–109; see also Baldensperger, "The Immovable East," *PEFQS*, 1906, pp. 192f.; Granott, pp. 174–79 and 213–48; Klat, "Musha Holdings"; Firestone, *Faddan and Musha'*; see also note 220.

Before we turn to the study of the Ottoman government's destruction of the local power structures, we must present an overview of the districts and their local lords in the middle of the nineteenth century. Map 1 should help us orient ourselves.

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[477] Even Consul Finn had occupied himself with this question. "They are freehold owners of their lands and houses," he wrote, describing the rural population of the Palestinian highlands. "Feudal tenure and feudal responsibility are not known beyond the Lebanon, even if those terms are properly applicable there. With us in the South the rural relations are clannish; young and old men are bound by their system to be ready, without reason or thought, for hostilities, at the bidding of their leaders, the Shaikhs; no more at liberty to refuse or delay than the Highlanders at the summons of Roderick Dhu's fiery cross, or the Irish Septs at the circulation of the lighted turf sod" (*Stirring Times*, II, p. 183).

[478] Ramini, pp. 31 and 138. See also the description of the gleaming interior of the seigneurial palaces of the 'Abd al-Hadi family in 'Arraba and Nablus (1856) in Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 281–305 and 338–40.

[479] Rafiq, *Ghazza*, pp. 65f.

6 The Local Lords and Their Districts[480]

Galilee

In the eighteenth century the influential local families in Jabal Safad were the Banu Husayn and the Banu Nafi'. The seat of the Husayn family was the fortress of Jiddin, from where they controlled the western part of the *jabal.* The Nafi' family resided in the castle in Safad itself; the surrounding villages fell inside their sphere of influence. Moreover, a member of this family resided in the castle of al-Bi'na.[481] The positions of both clans were undermined, however, during the rule of Zahir al-'Umar (1746–75) and Jazzar Pasha (1775–1804). In the nineteenth century we hear nothing more about influential local lords in Jabal Safad. The Egyptian occupation certainly did what it could to hinder the reestablishment of local centers of power. After the expulsion of the Egyptians, the new "local lord" in lower Galilee was of a different origin, as we shall see.

The Banu Madi were the most influential family in southern Galilee and on the coast during the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.[482] They were of Bedouin origin, from the region around Beersheba. In the eighteenth century their influence extended to Nazareth and its environs, Marj ibn ʻAmir, Haifa, the coastal strip south of Carmel, and the western slopes of Jabal Nablus, as well. Their heyday appears to have been in the period between the end of Jazzar Pasha's rule and the Egyptian occupation. On the eve of the Egyptian invasion, Masʻud al-Madi had built an imposing house in Acre and was the governor of Gaza. He does not appear to have been popular, however; the *qadi* of the city is supposed to have said that he had an unquenchable thirst, like the sand of the desert; the wealth of the country flowed into his treasury like the water of the rivers flowed into the sea.[483] The "area of origin" of the Madi family was the coastal region south of Carmel and the western slopes of Jabal Nablus. Their primary seat was Ijzim, the largest locality in this region.[484] Masʻud al-Madi lost his life because of his participation in the anti-Egyptian uprising of 1834;[485] other members of the clan were put in prison, some were able to flee to Constantinople. After the return of the Ottomans some members of the family were appointed as *shaykh*s or governors in Ijzim, Haifa, and Safad.[486] Yet by the 1850s the Madi family no longer constituted a local power that was at all comparable to those in Jabal Nablus or Jabal al-Khalil (the Hebron mountains). ʻAqil Agha had taken their place.

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[480] This compilation was beset with great difficulties because of the imprecision of the sources. The bases of this study are the following maps and written works: C. W. M. van de Velde, *Map of the Holy Land* (1:315,000), Gotha 1858; C. R. Conder and H. H. Kitchener, *Map of Western Palestine* (1:168,960), London 1881; the volumes of the *SWP* with the 26 sheets of maps that go with them (one inch to a statute mile); Matar, pp. 152–62; Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, chapter 9; Macalister and Masterman, 1905, pp. 352–56 (based on contemporary local Arabic manuscripts); Barghuthi and Tautah, pp. 265–67; Nimr, II, pp. 183f.; Darwaza. See also Badran, *Al-ta'lim*, pp. 24–33; Hoexter; Abir, pp. 287–89.

[481] Darwaza, p. 334; 'Abidi, *Safad*, pp. 72 and 78; Mu'ammar, pp. 57–59.

In Galilee and the coast of northern and central Palestine the local centers of powers were either absorbed by the rule of Zahir al-ʻUmar and Jazzar Pasha, or they were more destroyed or hindered in their development by Egyptian rule than were those in the central mountains of Palestine. Local centers in the higher elevations remained intact and could be regenerated after the Egyptian withdrawal: one reason for this was their geographical position. Access to the central mountains was difficult, and they were farther away from the strong arm of the central government's representatives than were Galilee and the coast.

In the following pages, the *nahiya*s (administrative districts) that existed in the third quarter of the nineteenth century serve as a framework for our overview of the local power relationships in the mountains of central and southern Palestine around the middle of the century. We will move through them step by step from north to south.

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[482] On this point see Rogers, *Notices*, p. 31; Rustum, *The Royal Archives*, pp. 21 and 70; Nimr, II, pp. 411f.; Darwaza, pp. 335–43; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VII/2, pp. 656f.; ʻAudat, p. 564.

[483] Darwaza, p. 342.

[484] British Consul Rogers estimated the population of Ijzim at 1,000 souls in 1859: *SWP, Samaria*, p. 41; there is a description of the fortress and a photo in Müinen, "Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Karmels," 1908, pp. 202f.

[485] Rustum, "New Light," pp. 11–15.

[486] We find Muhammad al-Madi as the governor of Haifa as late as 1855: PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1120 (Sidon, 29 September 1855).

Jabal Nablus

The *Survey of Western Palestine* (*SWP*) identified forty-six inhabited localities in the district of al-Haritha al-Shimaliyya (Bilad Haritha). Its original local lord had been an *amir* named al-Harithi. After his family had died out, the Jarrar and Tuqan families competed for the control of this region. The ʻAbd al-Hadi family won the upper hand during the Egyptian occupation,[487] but after that the district fell to the Jarrar family.[488]

The dominant clans in the region known as the "two Shaʻrawiyyas" (al-Shaʻrawiyya al-Gharbiyya and al-Shaʻrawiyya al-Sharqiyya) were the ʻAbd al-Hadi family,[489] whose ancestral seat was in ʻArraba, and the Jarrar family,[490] who had their fortresses in Jabaʻ and Sanur. Both clans were of the same tribal origin;[491] they had migrated to Palestine from east of the Jordan in the seventeenth century.[492] Like all of the large clans' ancestral seat, ʻArraba distinguished itself by its advantageous military-strategic position. Its water supplies were guaranteed by springs that flowed within the immediate area. The seat (*kursi*) of the ʻAbd al-Hadi family was surrounded by a wall equipped with iron-plated gates and flanked by small towers.[493] Jabaʻ and Sanur were the *kursi*s of two branches of the Jarrar clan. Sanur, situated on an almost completely isolated hill, had been expanded to make an impressive fortress.[494] Secret pathways were carved into the hills, and the high, massively constructed houses were encircled by a wall with towers. Jazzar Pasha had beseiged the fortress, but in vain; he was unable to take it. Only ʻAbdallah Pasha (1818–31), with the help of the *amir* Bashir, succeeded in capturing it, in 1830. Sanur also could not hold out against the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha.[495] According to the *SWP* the region called al-Sha'rawiyya al-Gharbiyya contained 19 inhabited localities, while al-Sha'rawiyya al-Sharqiyya contained 14. According to Macalister and Masterman the "two Sha'rawiyya's" and the district of al-Haritha al-Qibliyya altogether contained a total of 58 villages.

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[487] Barghuthi and Tautah, p. 267.

[488] Darwaza, p. 243.

[489] Ibid., pp. 252–63; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, III/2, pp. 75–80.

[490] Darwaza, pp. 230–51; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, III/2, pp. 117–26.

[491] Darwaza, p. 258.

[492] Most of the notable families of Nablus insisted to Jaussen that they had already arrived in the country with Saladin. Some families had genealogies that "proved" their descent from the companions of the Prophet (Jaussen, pp. 131–42).

[493] Rogers, *Notices*, p. 13; Finn, *Byeways*, pp. 217–19; Guérin, *Description*, V, pp. 218f.; *SWP*, *Samaria*, p. 154; Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, p. 281 (on pp. 281–305 she describes the glistening interior and the lordly lifestyle in the *harim* of the palace of the ʻAbd al-Hadi family in 1856).

[494] The fortifications and the fort of Sanur are still impressive today (in 1981, when the author visited them). As is the case for other *kursis*, there is an urgent need to do something to preserve these historic monuments!

The *SWP* reports that 27 inhabited localities belonged to the district of al-Haritha al-Qibliyya (also known as Mashariq al-Jarrar). As the district's alternative name indicates, it was controlled by the Jarrar family.

The local lords of Wadi al-Sha'ir were the Burqawi family, and their rivals in Burqa, the Ahfat family. The Burqawis belonged to the Al Sayf clan and controlled the western side of the wadi, from Shufa and Dannaba,[496] while the Ahfats were masters of the eastern side of the district. The Al Sayf had migrated to Palestine from Tarabulus al-Sham (Tripoli, now in Lebanon) in the eleventh century of the Islamic calendar; the Ahfat originally had come from the Hijaz.[497] The district contained 20 inhabited localities (*SWP*).

The ruling clan of the Bani Sa'b district were the Jayyusi family, who had their fort in Kur. Their control extended over 24 villages.[498] According to the *SWP* the district had 30 inhabited localities. Once there was even a *shaykha* here; in the middle of the twelfth Islamic century, after the death of Shaykh Hasan, his sister Saliha al-Jayyusi "governed" (for how long it is not said) the district of Bani Sa'b.[499]

The district of Bilad al-Jamma'in or Jurat Marda was divided into halves. Twenty-two villages in the eastern part of the district were subordinate to the Qasim al-Ahmad family, whose ancestral seats were Bayt Wazan and Dayr Istya. Twenty-two villages in the western half were controlled by the Rayyan family from their fortress in Majdal Yaba.[500] Both clans were branches of the Bani Ghazi, who had immigrated from Transjordan in the seventeenth century.[501] According to Darwaza, then, this district contained 44 inhabited localities; 47 according to Finn,[502] 58 according to Macalister and Masterman, and 37 according to the *SWP*. The discrepancy between the last two sources named here can be explained by the fact that the district of Jurat ʻAmra, which the *SWP* says had 15 villages, is obviously included in the figure given by Macalister and Masterman.

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[495] Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 307–11; Matar, pp. 160f.; Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 155f.; Furrer, p. 293; Guérin, *Description*, IV, pp. 344f.; *SWP*, *Samaria*, pp. 155–58; Macalister and Masterman, 1906, p. 36; Tibawi, *A Modern History*, p. 62.

[496] Their fort in Dannaba is still impressive today (1981, when visited by the author).

[497] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I. p. 242; Darwaza, pp. 281–85 and 289–90; Nimr, I^{2}, pp. 162–64; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, II/2, pp. 416f. and III/2, pp. 294f. and 310.

[498] *SWP*, *Samaria*, pp. 165f.; Darwaza, pp. 149–56 and 201; Nimr, I^{1}, p. 285 and I^{2}, pp. 157f.; Khalidi, *Ahl al-'ilm*, pp. 85f. and 193; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, III/2, p. 374.

[499] Nimr, II, p. 336.

[500] Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, III, p. 140; Guérin, *Description*, V, pp. 131f.; *SWP*, *Samaria*, pp. 286 and 379 (the family is called "Beit el Jemaîny" here); Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, IV/2, p. 549; in 1850 Finn found "the village and the castle in a very delapidated condition" (*Byeways*, p. 128).

[501] Darwaza, pp. 264–80; Nimr, I^{1}, p. 285 and I^{2}, pp. 161f.; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, II/2, p. 340.

The districts of Mashariq al-Baytawi and Mashariq Nablus included 5 and 16 inhabited localities respectively, according to the *SWP*. Macalister and Masterman name the Duwaykat, in Bayta, as the "ruling family" of Mashariq Nablus. As for Mashariq al-Baytawi, which is called Mashariq Dar al-Hajj Muhammad here, the Mansur clan in Jalud was the "ruling family." However, they were only a branch of the Al al-Hajj Muhammad. The other available sources also name the Al al-Hajj Muhammad (in Bayt Furik) and the Bani Shamsa (in Bayta) as the dominant clans; they were rivals for the control of these two districts.[503]

Two names are missing from the list of the local lords of Jabal Nablus in the mid-nineteenth century: Tuqan and Nimr. These families played an important role in the developments that we want to describe and which are familiar through the literature on that period.[504] The reason for their absence here is simple: They were not clans with a stable, permanent rural base. Darwaza is basically correct, especially in the case of the Nimr family but also for the Tuqan family, when he says that they were not local lords whose positions of power were anchored in one of the districts and in clan solidarity; rather, they were "government officials."[505] The Nimr family had come to Nablus around A.H. 1068 (A.D. 1657–58) as Ottoman soldiers (charged with protecting the pilgrimage to Mecca and "restoring order" in the Palestinian highlands). According to Ihsan al-Nimr they were even related to the Ottoman ruling house.[506] In subsequent years their power was based largely in their command of the *sipahi* troops. Nimr certainly had a peculiar understanding of the role of these troops, since he wrote first that they were the basis of Jabal Nablus' autonomy (*al-istaqlal al-dhati*) and then, immediately afterwards, that they were the admired, heroic part of the Ottoman army.[507] Members of the Tuqan family had only been *shaykh*s of the Bani Saʻb district from the second half of the eighteenth century until the beginning of the 1820s.[508] This difference aside, their power base was the same as that of the Nimr clan: Their position in Nablus, where the two families competed for appointments to the highest military-administrative posts. Both families had come to Palestine in the eleventh century A.H. and had erected fortified palaces in Nablus. In the local source reproduced by Macalister and Masterman, which were obviously composed during the Crimean War, the city of Nablus is listed as the eighteenth and last of the local dominions, under the Tuqan family. As far as the Nimr family was concerned, we should take into account the fact that Ihsan al-Nimr greatly exaggerates the significance and role of his ancestors, as Darwaza has convincingly demonstrated by contrasting Nimr's description with other sources. In the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth century, the Jarrar family was a much more important rival of the Tuqan family for the governor's seat in Nablus.[509] Since the beginning of Egyptian rule the 'Abd al-Hadi family and the Tuqan family had been rivals for this administrative position, which was the highest one in the *jabal*.

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[502] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 240.

[503] Darwaza, pp. 200 and 286–88; Nimr, I^1, p. 285 and I^2, pp. 165f.; Barghuthi and Tautah; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, II/2, pp. 310 and 322f.; Hoexter, p. 271.

[504] Darwaza, pp. 160–229; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, II/2, pp. 157–63.

[505] Darwaza. pp. 163–65, 171, 188, and 205; Nimr's reply: II, pp. 427–29.

[506] Nimr, II, pp. 199–203.

[507] Nimr, II, pp. 207f. and 210; see also II, pp. 520–53.

[508] Darwaza, pp. 152–54 and 211; Nimr I^2, pp. 239 and 286f.; II, pp. 400–402 and 415.

Jabal al-Quds

The local lords of the district of Bani Zayd were the Baraghitha (plural of Barghuthi), with their seat in Dayr Ghassana. According to al-Barghuthi (who gave Darwaza the relevant information), they controlled the district until the middle of the thirteenth century A.H.—in other words, probably up until the Egyptian occupation—as well as the districts of Bani Murra, Bani Salim, and Bani Harith. They originated in the Hijaz and are said to have come to Palestine during the time of the Crusades.[510] The *SWP* lists 20 inhabited localities in this district. According to Guérin, the *shaykh* of Dayr Ghassana exercised "a sort of suzerainty over some fifty neighboring villages or hamlets."[511] Nimr disputes the significant role of the Baraghitha and reproaches al-Barghuthi for exaggerations. He highlights the role of the Sahwil family in Bani Zayd instead, and in appreciation of this a *shaykh* of this family wrote a *qasida* in 1961.[512] Thus were the old clan rivalries carried on in the historical literature of the twentieth century!

There were 7 villages in the district of Bani Murra (*SWP*). According to the source on which Macalister and Masterman's work is based, Ahmad Abu 'Abdallah, from al-Mazra'a al-Sharqiyya, was *shaykh* of this *nahiya* until the Egyptian occupation. Ibrahim is said to have divided the district and appointed two *shaykh*s: ʻAbd al-ʻAziz al-Ansawiya (?) in al-Mazraʻa al-Sharqiyya, and Muhammad Abu Mubarak in Silwad.[513]

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[509] Darwaza, p. 251; Ramini, p. 180.

[510] Khalidi, *Ahl al-'ilm*, pp. 132f.; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VIII/2, p. 268; Darwaza, pp. 132–35. The number of 48 villages cited in Darwaza's book agrees to a great degree with the numbers in the *SWP*: Bani Zayd 19 (*SWP*: 20), Bani Murra 8 (*SWP*: 7), Bani Salim 4 (*SWP*: 4), Bani Harith 17 (*SWP*: 18).

[511] "Une sorte de droit de suzeraineté sur une quinzaine de villages ou hameaux voisins." Guérin, *Description*, V, p. 150.

[512] Nimr, I^2, pp. 169–72 and II, pp. 407–10 and 603 (text of the *qasida*).

Macalister and Masterman name "ed-Daykah" in Kafr Malik and `Abd al-Hamid Abu Ibrahim in Dayr Jarir[514] as *shaykhs* in the district of Bani Salim, which included only 4 inhabited localities (*SWP*).

The district of Bani Himar is not listed in Macalister and Masterman. According to *SWP* it included 25 inhabited localities. Its *shaykh*s were the Khawaja family, which originally had come from Iraq; their fortress was in Niʻlin.[515]

Thirteen villages belonged to the district of Bani Harith al-Shimaliyya (*SWP*), and to Bani Harith al-Qibliyya only five (*SWP*). The local lords of northern Bani Harith were the Simhan family, with a seat in al-Janiyya and in Ra's Karkar (or al-Ra's); their fortress stood in the middle of this place.[516] They originated in the Hijaz.[517] Macalister and Masterman name the Kaʻraja family (in Dayr Ibziʻ) as *shaykh*s of southern Bani Harith.

The local lords of the district of Bani Malik were the Abu Ghawsh family; their *kursi* was the village of Qaryat al-ʻInab. The Abu Ghawsh family were of Circassian origin. According to al-Barghuthi (in Darwaza), their influence also extended to the districts of Bani Hasan, Jabal al-Quds, and al-Wadiyya, the *shaykh*s of which became dependent on them.[518] We shall see, however, that their "suzerainty" over the district of Bani Hasan was by no means undisputed. The locality of Qaryat al-ʻInab distinguished itself by its strongly built stone houses and the well-preserved remains of a Crusader church, which was being used as a stable,[519] as the royal stables, as it were, for the Abu Ghawsh family. The seat of the family, al-Burj, was striking, however; it was a "real palace . . . like a stronghold."[520] According to Macalister and Masterman, some 20 villages belonged to the district of Bani Malik; the *SWP* lists 22 inhabited localities.

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[513] In *SWP*, *Samaria*, p. 291, Silwad is listed among the villages of Bani Zayd district.

[514] Dayr (or Dar) Jarir appears in *SWP*, *Samaria*, p. 291, among the villages of Bani Murra, but with the annotation that according to another list it belonged to the district of Bani Salim.

[515] Darwaza, p. 142; Nimr, I², pp. 172–74; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, IV/2, p. 557.

[516] The fortress of Ra's Karkar is still impressive today (visited in 1981). The villagers will tell you that the word "*karkar*" is an onomatopoeia for the noise caused in earlier times by the stones that they would roll down the steep, rocky slope on enemies that were attacking from below!

[517] Finn, *Byeways*, pp. 135–43; *SWP*, *Samaria*, pp. 294f.; according to Guérin, *Description*, V, p. 83, "ce cheikh commande à une quinzaine de villages" [This *shaykh* rules over some fifteen villages]; according to Barghuthi they had seized this area from the Baraghitha (Darwaza, p. 142); Nimr, I², pp. 167–69 and II, pp. 404–407; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VIII/2, p. 344.

[518] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 230; Darwaza, pp. 135–38; Nimr, I², p. 168, note 1; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VIII/2, pp. 114–17.

[519] *SWP*, *Judaea*, pp. 18 and 132–34; Guérin, *Description*, I, pp. 62–71 and 279f.

[520] Sepp, I, p. 50; illustration on p. 45; see also Tischendorf, pp. 165f.

Macalister and Masterman name the Darwish family (in al-Walaja) as *shaykh*s of the district of Bani Hasan, which included about 10 villages.[521] The *SWP* lists 11 inhabited localities in this district.

The district of al-'Arqub, to which 24 villages belonged (*SWP*), was controlled by the Lahham family, who had their seat in Bayt 'Itab. This place was situated on a barren rocky hill; at its center rose a high stone structure, al-Burj. In earlier times an underground passage was said to have led from the fortress to a spring at the foot of the hill. A large cavern in the rock may have served as a place of refuge.[522]

The district of Jabal al-Quds included 21 inhabited localities (*SWP*) and was divided into 4 subdistricts, according to the source given by Macalister and Masterman. According to that source, their *shaykh*s were 'Abd al-Latif Simhan al-Kiswani (in Bayt Iksa),[523] Ahmad 'Ali (in Dayr Dibwan),[524] 'Abdallah Hasan (in Baytuniya), and 'Amr al-Shamma' (in Bira).[525] Barghuthi, in contrast, names the following families of *shaykh*s: the Khatib family (in Bayt Iksa), the Al al-Hashshash (in Dayr Dibwan), the 'Abdallah Hasan family and the Baytuni family (in Baytuniya), the Qur'an family and the Tawil family (in Bira).[526]

The *shaykh*s of the district of al-Wadiyya[527] were the 'Urayqat (in Abu Dis). They were of Bedouin origin and came from the other side of the Jordan.[528] According to Macalister and Masterman 8 localities belonged to this district; *SWP* cites 9 localities.

Jabal al-Khalil

The 32 inhabited localities of Jabal al-Khalil (*SWP*) were controlled by three clans. The most significant of them, the 'Amr clan, provided the local lords of the district of Qaysiyya al-Fawqa with a seat in Dura. They had immigrated to Palestine from Karak and originally had come from the Hijaz.[529] Dura's location was very advantageous strategically; Guérin describes two "barracks"—more exactly, large fortified buildings—that were there.[530]

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[521] Barghuthi counts the Al al-Shaykha (in Maliha) among the influential families of Jabal al-Quds: *"wa zu'ama'uhum al-yawm Al Darwish."* Darwaza, p. 142; Barghuthi and Tautah, p. 266.

[522] *SWP, Judaea*, pp. 22–24 and 83; Guérin, *Description*, II, pp. 381–83; Darwaza, p. 142.

[523] Barghuthi names the Khatib family, who belonged to the Zayadina clan, as *shaykhs* here; Barghuthi and Tautah, p. 266; Darwaza, p. 142.

[524] Barghuthi: Al al-Hashshash (Darwaza, p. 142).

[525] Barghuthi: Al al-Qur'an and Al al-Tawil (Barghuthi and Tautah, p. 266; Darwaza, p. 142).

[526] See notes 523–25.

[527] In *SWP, Judaea*, p. 27; it is mistakenly called El Kerâdîyeh (the letter *waw* being read as *qaf-ra'*).

[528] Barghuthi and Tautah, p. 266; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VIII/2, p. 148.

The 'Azza family controlled the district of Qaysiyya al-Tahta from Bayt Jibrin. They had come to Palestine a long time ago from the Egyptian province of al-Sharqiyya.[531] Bayt Jibrin stood on the edge of Jabal al-Khalil and was well-concealed and well-protected; there was a number of spacious caverns in the vicinity. In the middle of the locality stood the two-story stone house of the *shaykh.* The remains of a Crusader fortress still served for defensive purposes.[532] Furrer was very impressed by the "castle" or "manor," as well as by the *shaykh* of Bayt Jibrin, in 1863. According to the *shaykh*'s statements, he was in command of 16 villages and was pledged "to provide as many as 2,000 men to the government if necessary."[533]

The 'Azza family's rivals were the 'Amla, who had their seat in Bayt Awla but controlled only 5 villages.[534] Around the middle of the century Muhammad 'Abd al-Nabi al-'Amla was known as *'Azra'il*, the "death angel," of Jabal al-Khalil, because of his strength and excellent aim.[535]

It appears that there were decidedly weak *nahiya*s, as far as the number of villages and the stability of local power structures were concerned. In particular, the eastern districts of Jabal Nablus and Jabal al-Quds (Mashariq al-Baytawi, Mashariq Nablus, Bani Murra, Bani Salim, Jabal al-Quds, al-Wadiyya) were as good as satellites of the western districts. The sources differ sharply when giving an account of the most influential families in these *nahiya*s, because there were no solidly established, long-term, powerful local lords here.

The most significant local lords of Jabal Nablus in the mid-nineteenth century, then, were the Jarrar, 'Abd al-Hadi, Burqawi, Jayyusi, Qasim al-Ahmad, Rayyan, al-Hajj Muhammad, and (in a different sense) the Tuqan families. In Jabal al-Quds they were the Baraghitha, Simhan, Abu Ghawsh, and Lahham families, and in Jabal al-Khalil the 'Amr and 'Azza families.

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[529] Morand, pp. 140–43; Darwaza, pp. 140f.; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, V/2, pp. 197f.

[530] Guérin, *Description*, III, pp. 353–55; *SWP, Judaea*, pp. 304f. and 328.

[531] Darwaza, pp. 138–40.

[532] Van de Velde, II, p. 157; *SWP, Judaea*, pp. 257f. and 266–74; Guérin, *Description*, II, pp. 307–309.

[533] Furrer, pp. 118–25.

[534] Darwaza, p. 142.

[535] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 235 and 265; Macalister and Masterman, 1905, p. 353.

7 Qays and Yaman

For the sake of acquiring, maintaining, and expanding local positions of power in the districts, and in order to obtain the obedience of their inhabitants and control their fiscal resources, a permanent rivalry between the dominant clans was perpetuated. This often led to bloody feuds and sometimes degenerated into downright local wars. In disputes between rival *hamula*s within an inhabited locality, feuds between neighboring villages or districts, and larger conflicts in the *jabal*s, the parties often opposed each other under the flags of Qays and Yaman, especially in the districts north and south of Jerusalem. For this reason some remarks must be made at the outset about the concrete significance of this division into parties. For us the genealogical and anthropological aspects of this phenomenon are of lesser interest.

The division into parties was rooted in the tradition of dual descent of the Arabs. The northern Arabs (Qays) and the southern Arabs (Yaman) traced their origin back to two different early ancestors, the former to ʻAdnan, the latter to Qahtan. Genealogical systematization of this fictitious descent only occurred *ex post facto*, however, after the expanding Arab tribes had split into two factions on the basis of "half-forgotten and new symbols of community."[536] In the name of this already largely unrealistic dichotomization into northern and southern Arabs, lengthy and self-destructive conflicts took place during the first two centuries of Arab-Islamic history. After that the division into parties lost its immediate

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[536] Caskel, p. 12.

The disintegrating character of the party division is expressed in yet another example from daily life. Toward the end of the 1850s, the French consul—who was accompanied by his native escort, a Qaysi—wanted to spend the night in Ramla. But this was a "Yamani" location, and for this reason the man preferred to sleep in nearby Lydda, which was "Qaysi." This was not out of hatred, he said; the party division was just a God-given and ancient tradition.[547]

Why did it still have socio-political significance in Palestine, at least in the 1850s and 1860s, and why did it lose this significance in the following decades? The answer to both questions is to be sought in connection with the disputes over the control of the districts in the *Jabal*s. The mythical party division, with its symbolic emblems of colors and flags, was deployed for the local power struggles in the highlands, in both individual districts and individual villages.[548] And because the dichotomy was the instrument rather than the essence of these struggles, individual clans (or parts of them) changed their banners whenever they could expect to gain direct advantages by doing so. For example, in the 1850s when a segment of the Qaysi Lahham clan in the 'Arqub under 'Ata'allah revolted against 'Uthman al-Lahham, the only way that this 'Ata'allah could call up followers and support from outside was to go over to the Yamani side.[549]

And it is also much more likely that, when the Nimr family and the Tuqan family in Nablus declared themselves Qaysi and Yamani, they did so in order to mobilize followers in the countryside. It was not, as Darwaza thinks, that the party division had played a role in the development of their rivalry.[550] Oppenheim confirms that, for the Bedouin of Palestine, also, "the party division of Qaisi-Yemeni . . . has only been inherited in a few cases. Usually it is much more a matter of grafting the division onto relations of proximity and friendship. For this reason the genealogical affiliation does not always coincide with party affiliation, and tribes of the same genealogical origin are distributed between both parties."[551]

To be sure, the banners of Qays and Yaman united Muslims and Christians as well as Bedouin, town dwellers, and *fellahin* (peasants). But they divided clans, villages, and districts in the interests of competing local lords. The peasants, who were summoned to battle by the heads of the dominant clans, hardly profited from their "party affiliation." The beneficiaries were the victorious clans, the allied Bedouin, who thus could "legitimately" take part in robbery and plunder, and, in Jabal al-Quds, those Jerusalem *effendis* who were allied with the local lords. The dualism of Qays and Yaman made it possible to transcend the *'asabiyya*

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[547] Saintine, pp. 21–23.

[548] See also Shamir, "Belligerency," pp. 80–83 and Tamari, pp. 181–85.

[549] ISA–DKJ, A.III.4. (Jerusalem, 15 March 1858).

[550] Darwaza, pp. 169 and 211; see also Nimr, II, pp. 415f., and Hoexter, pp. 279f.

[551] Oppenheim, II, p. 13.

(solidarity) of the clan and constitute a legendary, mythical, more comprehensive super-*'asabiyya*, even though it was driven, again and again *ad absurdum*, by a constant changing of fronts.[552]

Thus when the *"rule of the shaykhs"* came to an end in the 1860s and the local centers of power merged into new administrative structures, the party division into Qays and Yaman lost its political and quasi-military significance. It was reduced more and more to its folkloric elements. As before, there were still feuds between villages or within villages in which the parties involved opposed each other as Qays and Yaman,[553] but these conflicts could no longer be expanded and the party division could no longer be put in the service of local power struggles.

We can dispense with any attempt to specify the affiliations of single villages or clans with either of the two "parties" or describe the details of their conflicts and changing battle fronts, as Miriam Hoexter has already prepared a detailed inventory of the scattered pieces of information that relate to this. But some indication must be made of the regionally varying significance of the party division. We have virtually no information regarding Galilee and the coastal plains, with the exception of Ramla and Lydda. This once again indicates that the dualism of Qays and Yaman only played a role in those places where conflicts among local lords took place into the 1860s precisely in the central highlands. Some contemporaries viewed the party division as a problem only in southern Palestine.[554]

For various reasons, the Qays–Yaman dualism was of less significance in Jabal Nablus and Jabal al-Khalil than it was in Jabal al-Quds.[555] This traditional identification existed in Jabal al-Khalil, to be sure, but local rivalries and struggles could not be played out on the Qays–Yaman front because the inhabitants of Jabal al-Khalil had declared themselves almost exclusively as Qays.[556] (The two regions, the control of which was at issue, were called Qaysiyya al-Tahta and Qaysiyya al-Fawqa in the sources used by Macalister and Masterman.) But the party division did play a role in conflicts with clans in the districts that bordered the *Jabal* to the north.

In Jabal Nablus the local power structures were different from those of Jabal al-Quds in that conflicts in Jabal Nablus often involved not only the political-military significance.[537] "It is only in two places," writes Caskel, "that the opposition of Qays and Yaman . . . has persisted in its full intensity and with unbelievable tenacity to the threshold of the present, in Lebanon and Palestine."[538]

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[552] On the function of *'asabiyya* in the Middle East generally, see Dudin.

[553] See for example Lutfiyya, pp. 36f. (about 1880).

[554] See Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, II, pp. 17f.; Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 407; Conder, *Heth and Moab*, p. 377.

[555] An anonymous contemporary from Bir Zayt wrote a report about the battles between Qays and Yaman in the first half of the nineteenth century, particularly in Jabal al-Quds; he is paraphrased in Macalister and Masterman, 1906, pp. 33–50; see also Qadura, pp. 30–33.

[556] See Morand, II, p. 64; Haddad, p. 213; Barghuthi and Tautah, p. 266; Husayni, *Al-tatawwur*, p. 81.

If we want to comprehend the problem, we cannot restrict our discussion to nomenclature alone, however. For Patai, the "dual organization"—which he says is rooted in the primeval dichotomy of Qays and Yaman—represents a fundamental anthropological category for understanding social structures and relations in the Arab and Islamic Orient. The dual organization, the political-genealogical dichotomy, is thus supposed to be a general characteristic of "Near Eastern culture."[539] Chelhod also derives the dualistic foundation of Bedouin society from the *"bipartisme colossal d'une historicité douteuse."* [540]

Patai's phenomenology is of no further help to us, however, when we want to understand the subjective and objective meaning of this division into parties in Palestine during the second half of the nineteenth century. More than once in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Palestinian and European authors traced the origins of the Qays/Yaman opposition back to pre-Islamic times. Yet when they questioned those in the country itself—those who were still living in the tradition of this division, for whom its militant and harmless manifestations were still extant in the form of customs and practices—those questioned either seemed perplexed or recited very diverse legends and myths about the origins of this dualism, which were linked either with events in Islamic history or with the heroic figure of 'Antar.[541]

Their perplexity when trying to explain this phenomenon was a consequence of the fact that the division into the parties of Qays and Yaman transcended all other forms of social existence and social groupings. There were peasants, town dwellers, and Bedouin, as well as Muslims, Christians, and Druze, on both sides. The party division also cut across districts and localities and even split single clans. Accordingly, it was simultaneously a principle of social affiliation and disintegration. Regarding this point, Nieuwenhuijze has tried to explain the social function of such party divisions. He stresses the complementarity of the dual social organization, the "cohesive and antagonistic impulses" of kinship and faction. "The binary faction can be seen as a corrective to the kinship principle *qua* determinant of the social system. It remedies an excessive diffusion in articulation . . . by allowing relatively isolated units to enter into relationships on terms other than kinship." But it is by no means a problem-free complementarity, as conflicts of loyalty demonstrate.[542] With the formation of new loyalty relationships (pan-Islamism, nationalism, modern parties) this old factionalism of necessity had to lose its socio-political meaning. This is, however, only a partial explanation in the context of social organization. What was its concrete socio-political meaning in Palestine during the nineteenth century?

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[537] See *EI*^{2}, 'Adnan and Kahtan; Barghuthi and Tautah, pp. 263–68; Husayni, *Al-tatawwur*, pp. 80f.; Oppenheim, I, pp. 280f. and II, p. 7; Caskel, pp. 12–18; Patai, pp. 181–86; Nimr, I^1, pp. 55–62 and II, pp. 430–32; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, II/2, pp. 59–62.

[538] Caskel, p. 18; for Lebanon, see Polk, pp. 11f. and 17f.; Harik, pp. 30f.; Touma, I, pp. 61–75 ("Les deux plus anciens partis politiques: Les Qaysi et les Yamani").

[539] Patai, pp. 177–250 ("Dual Organization").

[540] Chelhod, especially pp. 27f.; also pp. 43–52, 369–84, and 406f.; quotation from p. 43.

[541] Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions*, pp. 264–67; Haddad, p. 210.

It appears that at the end of the nineteenth century the party division had largely become just a component of folklore. It had been rendered harmless, amounting to hardly more than functionally meaningless handed-down customs and practices, just like those that are practiced out of a sense of tradition, perhaps because they add fun and color to the grayness of everyday life. The notion of color can even be understood literally here: red stood for Qays and white for Yaman. During feuds, wedding processions, and so on, banners that had the corresponding colors were carried, and clothing also was chosen with this in mind. For example, the "real" Qaysi turban was dark red with stripes of yellow, while the Yamani turban was white with rose-colored stripes.[543] Differing local variations of the practice followed during weddings between a Yamani man and a Qaysi woman (and vice versa) have come down to us. For example, if a Qaysi woman married a Yamani man from another village, "she would be wrapped in a garment that was red on the outside and led away from her home village on a camel. As soon as she crossed the boundary of her future residence, the groom (who waited for her at the boundary) ordered his relatives to take off the garment, seemingly by force, and turn it inside out, so that the white color of its lining would show, or, he had them give her a white garment."[544]

If a Yamani man were the guest of a Qaysi man, and if he were served *haytaliyya* (a milk dish), the Qaysi man would pour honey or *dibs* (date syrup) on top of it, to cover up the Yamani white.[545] And it was not mere folklore when, during a dispute between the two "parties" in Bira, some Yamani women struck a red rooster within sight of some Qaysi women. Whereupon these latter caught a white rooster and beat it, in turn. This symbolized mutual scorn and dishonor.[546]

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[542] Nieuwenhuijze, pp. 668–71 ("Dual Factions"); quotation from p. 670.

[543] Finn, *Stirring Times,* I, p. 227.

[544] Bauer, *Volksleben*, pp. 98f.; for similar practices, see also Saintine, pp. 22f.; Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions*, pp. 268f.; Haddad, pp. 213f.

[545] Haddad, p. 214.

[546] Ibid.

control of one district but also the predominant position in the entire *Jabal*, that is to say, the post of governor in Nablus. Thus powerful rivals like the Jarrar family, the ʻAbd al-Hadi family, and the Tuqan family could hide their followers behind the red or white banners less and less; moreover, they did not need to do so. They were powerful enough to constitute broader parties under their own names. (In Lebanon the two "parties" were no longer called Qays and Yaman as early as 1711; rather, they were Yazbak and Jumblatt.) Nonetheless, peasants were mobilized in the name of Qays and Yaman, even in Jabal Nablus, because this party division was still present at least in the consciousness of a part of the population.[557]

In Jabal al-Quds it was not a question of controlling the entire highlands or even Jerusalem. The *effendis* of the city were a different social group from the rural local lords, even though, to be sure, they tried to profit from ties with the clans and factions of the surrounding districts. In this way the *effendis* reflected the party division or, at least, made use of it. Thus the Khalidi family were held to be Qaysi and the Husayni family Yamani.[558] In the highlands around Jerusalem it was primarily a question of narrow local positions and not a matter of "governing" the *Jabal* from its urban focal point. Thus it was essential to have a stake in the Qays–Yaman dualism, in order to make alliances and mobilize the peasantry.[559]

Another factor may likewise have played a role: The populations of Jabal Nablus and Jabal al-Khalil were overwhelmingly Muslim, but in Jabal al-Quds there was a significant Christian component that was not really permitted to bear arms. Under the banners of Qays and Yaman, however, the distinction between Christians and Muslims was meaningless. In this restricted sense, then, the party division even had a socially integrative function. European consuls, who tried to strengthen religious *ʻasabiyya*, viewed this with displeasure. The French representative remarked indignantly that for the Catholics of Bayt Jala the divisive "party affiliation" was a stronger factor than common confessional affiliation.[560]

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[557] See also Hoexter, p. 283.

[558] MAE–CCC Jér., vol. 3 (Jerusalem, 5 August 1857); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 962 (Jerusalem, 11 August 1853); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1032 (Jerusalem, 24 November 1854); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 30 July 1857); HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 40 (Jerusalem, 28 April 1858); ISA–DKJ, A.III.4. (Jerusalem, 29 April 1858); Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 146 and 196f.; Haddad, p. 213. These sources strengthen the claim that M. Hoexter (p. 304, note 272) wants to weaken, namely, that the party division certainly was present in Jerusalem also, or encroached upon the city.

[559] See also the concluding remarks in Hoexter, pp. 309–11.

[560] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 12 December 1853).

8 The Disempowerment of the Local Lords

Preliminary Remarks

One of the most important aspects of the socio-political transformation of Palestine in the second half of the nineteenth century was the decline of the local centers of power, that is to say, the disempowerment of the local lords and their integration into the new administrative structures that were created during the second *tanzimat* period. This policy was pursued with determination during the decade that followed the Crimean War. Local lords in the Arab provinces generally, and the *shaykh*s in the Palestinian highlands in particular, were viewed as obstacles to centrally planned and directed reforms; they had to be removed. Constantinople was convinced that the *Khatt-i Humayun* of 1856 and the administrative and socio-political reorganization of the empire, for which the edict was to be the guiding principle, could only be accomplished by a strong and decisive central government. For the Porte, the necessity of a seamless and uninterrupted political and military control was manifested yet again during the "Syrian crisis" of 1860. For this reason, one of the most important goals of Ottoman politics in Syria after 1860 was to undermine the influence of the "established families" and break their socio-political power.[561]

But in Palestine as in other provinces, such a policy—if it was to be effective and have a lasting effect—depended on state use of the means of coercion. Governors continued to deal according to the maxim "*divide et impera*," and conducted politics with a stick in one hand and a carrot in the other, because the military forces that they had at their disposal were not always adequate for the job.

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[561] See Abu-Manneh, *Some Aspects*, p. 148.

After 1856, the consuls of the Western powers were instructed to side with the central government when local conflicts broke out. (They could do this only on the condition that the interests of the central power did not run counter to those of the Christians, Jews, and other minorities that had to be "protected.") The governors could count on European support and diplomatic assistance as they strove to establish "law and order" and to "pacify" Palestine—if they were not already acting under foreign pressure. Some even sought the approval and applause of the consuls openly, since they knew what the consuls' reports to Constantinople might mean for their careers. Thus, as early as the summer of 1855, Kamil Pasha had invited the consular corps of Jerusalem to a *promenade militaire* in Jabal al-Khalil. In the presence of "representatives of Europe," the village of Idhna, to which an insubordinate local lord had withdrawn, was shelled and plundered (see below). British Consul Finn reported that in the spring of 1859 'Arraba, the ancestral seat of the 'Abd al-Hadi family—where they had entrenched themselves at the time—was captured with the help of two field cannons and demolished. Finn also acknowledged that the Ottoman administration had not taken such forceful measures in the country since 1840 (see below).

Yet the attitude of the Europeans remained ambivalent. On the one hand, they supported the Ottoman governors and pressed them to reestablish "law and order," yet they flattered particular local lords and even gave them support against the governors when it was a question of promoting immediate European interests, or the interests of European protégés. By the end of the 1870s, as the great European powers' interest in Palestine changed and they began to aim for direct control, they began to complain about a policy that after 1856 had found official support: the destruction of local power centers. Conder sketched out the vision of a Palestinian counterpart to Mount Lebanon: Palestine under the rule of old, established families and under British protection. "The policy of the Turk has been directed to the breaking up of all the native power of Syria. The old families have been ruined or degraded . . . and quietness and peace reign in the land because a sturdy race, who within the present century were practically their own masters, have been cowed and ruined so that there is no longer any spirit left in them." Yet it was just these families to whom the government of the country should be returned: "There are not wanting men who are honoured and respected by the people, though reduced to poverty and impotence by the Turks. Such is the pious and respected Bek of the Tokan family at Nablus, such are the sheikhs of the Beni Jarrar, of the Jeiyusi, the Lehham, and other old families, the survivors in Galilee of the proud race of Dhahr el Amr, and many others." Under the supervision and guarantee of the European powers (that is, England), they should be led towards self-government. Why? It was England's mission to set up "a strong native State between the [Suez] Canal and the northern danger"![562] This was an early vision of the British Mandate—except that, then, the collaborating elements upon which British rule in Palestine during the twentieth century rested were not the "respected Beks and Sheikhs" that Conder had in mind. And in northern Palestine the "proud race" of Zahir al-'Umar, about whom Conder enthused, had long ceased to be reckoned with.

'Aqil Agha in Lower Galilee

As we have seen, by the middle of the nineteenth century there were no longer any influential local lords in Galilee who could compare with those of the central highlands. The rule of Zahir al-'Umar, Jazzar Pasha, and finally Ibrahim Pasha had left what amounted to a power vacuum there, and during the first *tanzimat* period—the period between the reconquest of Palestine and the Crimean War—the Ottoman administration had not yet been able to fill it. It was 'Aqil Agha, whose rise and fall will be described here, who acted as a local lord for almost two decades (1847–64) and who tried to a certain extent to follow in the footsteps of Zahir al-'Umar.

'Aqil (or 'Aqila)[563] was a Bedouin of the Hanadi tribe. In 1814, his father, Musa al-Hasi, left Egyptian territory, and afterwards lived in Gaza, where he died in 1830. Like his father, 'Aqil and his following took service with various masters, among them Ibrahim Pasha. In 1843, 'Aqil took on the post of chief of a body of irregulars in northern Palestine. In 1845, in a local struggle for influence among the Latins of Nazareth, he took side against the *qa'im maqam* of Acre. In the course of this conflict he left Nazareth with his following and joined the Bani Sakhr east of the Jordan.

The beginning of his military-political influence, of his local power position in Galilee, can be dated to the year 1847,[564] when he was recalled and entrusted with the command of seventy-five *bashibozuq* (irregular auxiliary troops). Their field of activity was lower Galilee, from Haifa and Acre in the west to the Ghawr, Baysan, and Tiberias in the east, with Nazareth in the center. 'Aqil first of all made his headquarters in 'Ibillin, a former stronghold of the Zayadina, and an ideal strategic location about equidistant from Acre, Haifa, and Nazareth.

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[562] Conder, *Heth and Moab*, pp. 375f., 396f., and 399; see also Conder, *Tent Work*, I, pp. 104f. and an early French lament over the crushing of local rule by the Ottomans: Poujoulat, *La Vérité*, pp. 279–94.

[563] Most information on him contained in the more recent literature indirectly comes from one main source: a history of 'Aqil found among the papers of the Nazarene clergyman Mikha'il Qa'war which forms the basis of the relevant paragraphs of As'ad Mansur's history of Nazareth, *Tarikh al-Nasira*, Cairo 1924, pp. 73–80 and 91–93. See also Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 414–32; Macalister and Masterman, 1906, pp. 221–25 and 286–91 (this account is probably based on the same manuscript as that by Mansur); 'Arif al-'Arif, *Tarikh Ghazza*, pp. 187f; Oppenheim, II, pp. 30–32; Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 138–40; Zenner; Makhkhul, II, pp. 15–17. The following account is also primary based on Mansur; therefore only additional sources will be quoted, above all the contemporary reports of the European consuls.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, together with Shafa'amr and Tamra, 'Ibillin had controlled the most important cotton growing area in the district of Acre. Zahir al-'Umar had assigned this village to his brother Yusuf, who had established there a sizable mosque from the minaret of which one could get a clear view of the coastal plain of Acre, of the Carmel, and of the Nazareth area. He had also surrounded 'Ibillin with a wall and towers. In the time of 'Aqil, the village had between 600 and 800 inhabitants, mainly Muslims and Greek-Orthodox Christians (the latter consecrated there a Church of St. George).[565]

But 'Ibillin did not become the permanent "residence" of 'Aqil Agha. If only for reasons of protection against harassment from the Ottoman provincial governors, he erected his camp at changing places in Galilee, and he was also at home in Nazareth.[566] The fortification of 'Ibillin, however, symbolized his claim to power. It was there that he negotiated the protective agreement with Lynch, the commander of the American Jordan expedition, in 1848, which made 'Aqil for the first time known in the United States and in Europe.[567] In 1863, during his conflict with the Ottoman administration (see below), he refused to comply with the request to come to Acre; instead, he asked his opponents to come to negotiate with him in 'Ibillin. And it was there where he was buried after his death in 1870.[568] Still in 1979, one of Aqil's grandsons lived in 'Ibillin.[569]

'Ibillin and the memories of Zahir al-'Umar's rule, still alive in Galilee at that time, certainly did not fail to impress 'Aqil Agha. Had not Bedouin families who had immigrated into northern Palestine already seized power in this area on two occasions and maintained their positions vis-à-vis the Ottomans for decades—the house of Turabay[570] in the seventeenth century and the Zayadina[571] in the eighteenth century? And had not the Madi family also been of Bedouin origin? Lynch believed that 'Aqil did have corresponding ambitions. He suspected that the *bashibozuq* commander nourished the dream of shaking off the Ottoman yoke at the head of a confederation of Bedouin tribes, and that he wished to ascertain whether there was a possibility of getting outside support.[572]

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[564] Lynch, p. 71. 'Aqil escorted Lynch's expedition. His personality and his role in 1848 were closely observed and described in detail by Lynch, though with a tendency to romanticize. Perhaps unconsciously, Lynch made of 'Aqil, whom he calls "a magnificent savage" (p. 68), a dignified and wise Indian chief.

[565] Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, III, pp. 103–105 and 110; Guérin, *Description*, VI, pp. 420f; *SWP*, *Galilee*, pp. 269f.; Cohen, p. 12 and p. 85, note 25; Makhkhul, II, pp. 11–15; Mu'ammar, pp. 291f.

[566] The dreaded Bedouin chief in Nazareth about whom La Princesse de Belgiojoso (*Asie Mineure et Syrie*, pp. 253–55) tells a fitting story, certainly was 'Aqil Agha.

[567] Lynch, pp. 77–80.

[568] Mansur, pp. 78 and 80. In former times, sick horses were led around 'Aqil's grave, an act that promised recovery. The former fortifications of 'Ibillin unfortunately cleared out recently. (I thank Mr. 'Izzat Da'ud from 'Ibillin, who in September 1981 guided me through the site and also the cemetery.)

[569] Makhkhul, II, p. 17.

But one is entitled to doubt whether even under different timely conditions 'Aqil really would have become a second Zahir al-'Umar, as Oppenheim thought.[573] Whereas already Zahir's father had become sedentary, 'Aqil would not hear of such a step. Landed property and agricultural production, commerce, and urban life meant nothing to him. When this question was once raised, 'Aqil answered by asking a counter-question: "Would you have me disgrace myself, and till the ground like a fellah?"[574] He also did not endeavor to build up positions of authority or influence in the towns of the *liwa'*. It is true that a relative of 'Aqil for some time headed the administration in Tiberias,[575] and his brother Salih[576] exercised considerable influence in the district of Haifa, but 'Aqil relied exclusively on his tribesmen and on alliances with other Bedouin tribes on both sides of the Jordan.

In one respect, however, 'Aqil had grasped the possibilities of the time; he was on the lookout for European protectors for the preservation and strengthening of his position. Especially after 1860, he posed as an ally of France, cherishing the illusion of active French support. He once boasted to the British Consul Finn: "I am a Frenchman!"[577] And through the French consul in Beirut he had sent a tiger as a present to "his Emperor."[578] At the beginning of the 1860s, new rumors about his political ambitions came up. He was said to seek every opportunity to convince other Bedouin *shaykh*s "that the land is their own, that the Turks keep them out of their right, and that they may win it from these conquerors again . . . . Some fancy that the end which he may have in view is to form a confederacy of Arab tribes under the protectorate of France."[579] But he had to assert his claims of power vis-à-vis the Ottoman administration on his own—and in the end was a loser.

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[570] See Carmel, *Geschichte Haifas*, pp. 18f.; Oppenheim, II, pp. 51–54; Darwaza, pp. 143–48; Sharon, pp. 26–30.

[571] See the recent works by Cohen and Mu'ammar.

[572] Lynch, p. 238.

[573] Oppenheim, II, p. 32.

[574] Lynch, p. 117.

[575] Ibid., p. 89; in 1863 a brother-in-law of 'Aqil was governor of Hebron: Saulcy, *Voyage en Terre Sainte*, I, p. 159.

[576] A visit to the camp of Salih Agha is described in Farley, *Two Years in Syria*, pp. 317–26. Mary Rogers graphically describes a banquet in Shafa'amr, to which she and her brother, vice-council Rogers, together with Salih Agha, were invited, as well as a gazelle hunt at the invitation of Salih Agha (Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 229–40).

[577] Finn, *Byeways*, p. 81; Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 425.

[578] Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 444f.

The influence, even power, which 'Aqil Agha acquired in Galilee after 1847 increasingly aroused the Ottoman governors' suspicions. In 1852 he was sent across the Jordan against the rebellious Druze, probably with the intention of getting rid of him. If this was the aim of the provincial authorities, the maneuver failed. 'Aqil returned a victor and threatened to become more powerful. The Ottoman authorities, therefore, fell back upon well-tried methods: 'Aqil was lured into a trap, accused of being an accomplice of the Druze rebels, and imprisoned in the fortress of Widin on the Danube.

After a year, however, 'Aqil managed to escape and to return to Syria. It is said that he was helped by a Christian bishop, something 'Aqil never forgot.[580] He first remained in the Aleppo area. When his brother Salih got word of his return, he joined him with 500 horsemen whom he was supposed to lead into the war against Russia. In a country that was stripped of nearly all troops because of the war, 'Aqil now had a considerable force at his disposal. As in 1847, therefore, the authorities preferred entrusting him with an official function rather than having to reckon with his enmity. Thus in 1854, 'Aqil was reinstated as commander of the *bashibozuq* in the *liwa'* of Acre.[581] Then the European consuls began to court him directly. In 1854, Finn sent him a letter admonishing him "to avoid oppression" of Christian and Jews in Galilee, and the French consul general in Beirut, de Lesseps, paid a visit to 'Aqil in Haifa. The French were mainly concerned about the safety of the Latin convents in Nazareth and on the Carmel, the British about the well-being of their Jewish protégés in Safad and Tiberias and of the Protestants of Nazareth.[582]

After the Crimean War, which the empire could weather due to the support of the Western powers, the authorities could again think of subduing 'Aqil. Irregular units of Kurds under the command of Muhammad Sa'id, a son of the well-known Kurdish chief Shamdin Agha,[583] were called out against 'Aqil. They camped on his territory in the district of Tiberias, and Hasan Agha, a brother of Muhammad Sa'id, was entrusted with the administration of the district. Already by the spring of 1856, 'Aqil had repelled inroads into his territory by the 'Abd al-Hadis in a bloody skirmish;[584] he now also accepted this challenge. On 30 March 1857 he faced the Kurds with his irregulars and with Bedouin allies on the Crusader battlefield of Hittin.[585] 'Aqil came out of this struggle victorious. About 150 dead remained on the battlefield, among them Hasan Agha. 'Aqil's position in northern Palestine was now stronger than ever before. He seemed to be the actual ruler of Galilee, and he attached importance to furnishing proof of his power to Europeans and their local protégés.[586]

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[579] Dixon, I, p. 184.

[580] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 427 (Greek bishop); Macalister and Masterman, 1906, p. 288 (Latin Patriarch).

[581] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1032 (Jerusalem, 27 July 1854)—hence not in 1855, as Mansur says (p. 75).

[582] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 421–27 and 430–32.

[583] For more about the Shamdin family, see Schatkowski-Schilcher, *The Decline of Syrian Localism*, pp. 209–12.

His most spectacular engagement in this respect was the protection he offered to the Jews and Christians of Galilee during the crisis of 1860, and in particular the obligation to protect the Christians of Nazareth which he undertook. Yet we are fully justified in doubting that they really stood in need of his protection, as in this context what was meant was not general protection from Bedouin incursions and similar dangers, but protection from Muslims. In Palestine, however, complete tranquility prevailed during the civil war in Mount Lebanon and the massacre in Damascus; no Christian was harmed.

Nevertheless, because of proximity to the scenes of conflict, members of religious minorities in northern Palestine were in a state of unrest, even seized with panic. Christian and Jewish families fled from the interior of the country to the coastal towns; some retreated from there to Alexandria and Athens. Here and there, their anxiety seems to have been exploited. There were reports of intimidation of Christians and Jews in Acre and Safad: A placard which was offensive and threatening to Christians was pinned to the portal of the Greek Catholic church in Acre. The Jews of Safad had to accept the "protection" of the city by the *Shaykh al-Shabab*[587] of the city and his followers as a precautionary measure; the Chief Rabbi organized a banquet for forty Muslim youths.[588] Local oral tradition has preserved other instances of danger to Christians in Galilee and Acre which are said to have been averted mainly by 'Aqil.[589]

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[584] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 2 May 1856).

[585] Detailed reports on this event are to be found in HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 39 (Acre–Haifa, 3 and 10 April 1857, in Italian); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 8 April 1857). Macalister and Masterman, 1906, pp. 289 and 291, erroneously give the date as 30 March 1858.

[586] See for example, PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1521 (Nazareth, 10 August 1860); *Damas et le Liban*, pp. 35–38.

[587] In the Lebanon mountains and apparently in the hill country of the Galilee, the "strong man" of the village or a small town, who commanded a group of armed young men; see Havemann, pp. 245–47.

[588] ISA–BCJ, J22/15 (Acre, 22 June, 11 August, and 31 August 1860); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1521 (Jerusalem, 31 August 1860); Macalister and Masterman, 1906, p. 289. The Austrian consular agent recounted a veritable epic to travelers in later times, according to which he and 700 armed men had protected Safad (Furrer, p. 381; see also Rückert, p. 404).

[589] Makhkhul, I, p. 59 (facsimile of a letter) and II, p. 16.

The Christians of Nazareth were also in a state of unrest. Tannus Qa'war, a Greek Orthodox, went to 'Aqil in order to make sure that no danger would come from him and to win him over as protector. Qa'war also hinted to him that Europe would take revenge if any "Christian blood were shed." In any case, 'Aqil promised his protection. In addition, the British consul in Jerusalem, Finn, sent word to 'Aqil that he would shortly be happy to have protected Christians and Jews when he heard how murderers fared.[590]

In certain respects, Nazareth did need special protection. The city had no walls and lay outside the spheres of influence of the local lords beginning at the southern edge of the Marj ibn 'Amir. It was certainly not coincidental that the inhabitants of this city (three-quarters of whom were Christians) created their "*contrat social*,"[591] which has been analyzed by Fritz Steppat, as a protective and defensive pact in 1854, at a time when Palestine was not only stripped of its regular troops, but also when 'Aqil Agha was deprived of his position (1853–54). This interconfessional covenant of 1854 obviously maintained its validity during the 1860 crisis. When the town appeared to be threatened by an attack of the Bani Sakhr in July of that year, the inhabitants themselves, Christians and Muslims hand in hand, prepared the defense of Nazareth.[592] Fortunately, the feared Bedouin assault turned out to be a false alarm. Apparently, Qa'war's approach to 'Aqil with a request for protection was criticized by the Muslims of the town. In 1968, an old man from Bi'r al-Maksur told an anthropologist how, according to oral tradition, the Fahum (the leading Muslim family of the town) tried to prevent Tannus Qa'war from approaching 'Aqil.

> Oh, Tanus, why are you going to Agiili? You, why? You heard a dog barking and you go. God knows where he (Agiili) comes from. Don't you think that if he attacks any Christian, any little Christian, that he is attacking my *lafi* [turban] on my head? I will leave every family in this country; I'll collect all the Muslims against him. Why are you going to give him a present? When you hear a dog barking, do you answer? Isn't that a shame. And where are you from? You are from Nazareth and we are from Nazareth. If I am safe, you are safe.[593]

Apart from the fact that the "protection" of religious minorities was profitable business for 'Aqil,[594] he allowed himself to be admired by Europeans after 1860, and he tried to make use of the attribute of "rescuer of the Christians" in order to strengthen his position.[595] In France it was initially believed that a second 'Abd al-Qadir had been found in Syria, (the more so since 'Aqil was widely considered to be of Algerian descent). Napoleon III had 'Aqil decorated with the award of the Legion of Honor on board a French warship anchored off the coast of Haifa, and he had him presented magnificent weapons and luxurious garments.[596] In 1862, the Prince of Wales paid a visit to 'Aqil and also made him presents.[597]

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[590] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1521 (Nazareth, 10 August 1860).

[591] Steppat, "Ein Contrat Social."

[592] Mansur, p. 93; see also PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1521 (Jerusalem, 19 June 1860).

[593] Zenner, p. 176.

[594] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1521 (Jerusalem, 2 August 1860); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1588 (Jerusalem, 2 July 1861).

But 'Aqil, like 'Abd al-Qadir, could not hope for effective French support for far-reaching political ambitions. French policy was still a "policy for all eventualities" with a tendency to inner contradictions, as evidenced in the above-cited working papers of the foreign ministry in January 1863 (see footnote 95, p. 55). He was soon to experience how little French protection could help him. The decisive turn of events, the end of his position of power in northern Palestine, came in the years 1863–64.[598] The new *muhafiz* (district governor) of Acre, Hasan Effendi, was no longer content with the control of the city of Acre; he was no longer willing to leave the rest of the *liwa'* to 'Aqil. (For his part, 'Aqil had not dared to enter Acre since his escape from exile in 1854; instead he had a permanent representative to the authorities in the town.) Furthermore, the rather dubious position of 'Aqil as a special protégé of the French consuls was a thorn in the side of the Ottoman authorities. In exchange for payment, 'Aqil undertook to protect merchants, pilgrims, travelers, monasteries, Christians and Jews in general; the nonpaying peasants, however, had to fear him and were exposed to the requisitions of 'Aqil's followers and to the encroachments of their lieutenants, in particular of 'Aqil's brother Salih. Probably with good reason, the *muhafiz* complained to the *mushir* (provencial governor) in Beirut that the *bashibozuq* wrought as much havoc as the Bedouin from whom they were supposed to be protecting the population of the *liwa'*. In addition—and this was to become a decisive factor—'Aqil either could not or would not always repel the Bedouin. It is reported, for instance, that in September 1858 he remained inactive in Nazareth while fighting occurred between various tribes in the Marj ibn 'Amir.[599]

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[595] See *HL*, IV (1860), pp. 97 and 137; *HL*, V (1861), p. 46; Tobler, *Nazareth*, p. 98; Guérin, *Description*, VI, p. 102.

[596] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1588 (Jaffa, 12 April 1861; Jerusalem, 2 July 1861); Tobler, *Nazareth*, p. 98; Hardy, pp. 227–29; Makhkhul, II, p. 16; Schlicht, pp. 131f., note.

[597] Macalister and Masterman, 1906, p. 289; Makhkhul, II, p. 16.

[598] The following description of these events differs considerably from Mansur's account. Our account is primarily based on the comprehensive documentation found in the Austrian and British archives: HHSTA–Archive Konst., Konsulatsberichte 1863 (reports in German, Italian, and French, altogether 81 pages, from Safad of 26 July, 30 July, and 27 September 1863; from Beirut of 9 August, 23 August, and 4 October 1863; from Jerusalem of 12 August 1863; from Haifa of 18, 27, and 29 September 1863; from Nazareth of 23 September 1863; from Tiberias of 25 and 28 September 1863); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1752 (Jerusalem, 7 July, 16 September, 29 September, and 28 October 1863; Haifa, 25 September and 22 October 1863); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1816 (Haifa, 8 January and 15 December, 1864; Beirut, 27 December 1864); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1872 (Haifa, 30 December 1864); see also *HL*, VII (1863), pp. 102 and 125, and VIII (1864), p. 14; Dixon, I, pp. 32, 42f., and 170–86; Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 108f., 123f., 407f., 442–44, 478, and 563f. (1863–64).

In summer 1863, Bedouin from across the Jordan raided the Tiberias area, causing great damage. 'Aqil could not prevail against them, but he remembered the striking success the Ottoman authorities had had in the area of Tiberias with a weapon not at his disposal, that is, with field guns. The battle of Hittin (1857) still had been largely fought with spears and swords! 'Aqil now demanded regular soldiers and field guns from Hasan Effendi. A regular force of 2,000 men from Acre and Damascus was indeed concentrated near Tiberias; the mere news of the approaching and dreaded field artillery caused the Bedouin to retreat.

But 'Aqil quickly understood that this operation was also directed against himself. He saw not only his position, but himself in danger and submitted his resignation in Beirut. He hoped that his offer of resignation would not be accepted and that his position vis-à-vis the *muhafiz* of Acre would thus be strengthened. He sent a delegation of Jews from Tiberias to the *mushir* who petitioned for his confirmation in office;[600] above all, he had the French consuls in Haifa and Beirut on his side. But Qabuli Pasha, the *mushir*, accepted his resignation. He shared the ideas and plans of the *muhafiz* of Acre, who wanted to make Galilee safe and to protect the hinterland from Bedouin incursions by posting regular troops in the interior of the country and especially on the Jordan where fortified military posts were to be erected. 'Aqil was to be made dispensable.

Two factors, however, prevented this policy from succeeding in 1863. The first was the ruthless action, accompanied by atrocities, of the authorities of Acre against the Bedouin, which antagonized also the more or less peaceful tribes settled in the *liwa'*. Having been robbed of their cattle and their other belongings, they hardly had another alternative than to make common cause with tribes from east of the Jordan, with whom they now fell upon *fellahin* villages. Troops under the leadership of 'Aqil's brother Salih advanced up to Nazareth; 'Aqil himself retreated to the Gaza area where he married one of his daughters to one of the leading Bedouin *shaykhs*. (In the years Rafiq examined, 1857–61, 'Aqil paid the highest dowry registered in Gaza: 11,000 P.T.!)[601] The second factor was the recruitment campaign which had just been started in Palestine. Many of those liable for military service in the district and town of Tiberias did not hasten to the Ottoman banners, but preferred to join the Bedouin.

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[599] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 29 September 1858); see also the complaints in *Rambles in the Deserts*, p. 220.

[600] The Jews of Tiberias and 'Aqil obviously had common material interests: see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 8 April 1857): "The English-protected people of Tiberias, all Jews, are well wishers to the cause of Akeel Aga, from fear—he having of late years protected them in their farming of the taxes on receipt of a share in their gains."

[601] Rafiq, *Ghazza*, pp. 51f.

Furthermore, the merchants and consuls throughout the country, on the point of exporting the Hauran grain and Palestinian cotton and fearing large economic losses because of the political turmoil, began pressing the authorities. With military reinforcements, Qabuli Pasha therefore again proceeded to northern Palestine where he had already stayed in August, while the *serasker* set out from Damascus for central and southern Palestine with a cavalry unit. Thus in October 1863, quiet prevailed in Galilee. Yet Qabuli Pasha began to have doubts about Hasan Effendi's policy, in other words, about the permanent availability of large military forces to protect the area. Apart from that, he was under the pressure of the French consuls who had been joined by the British consul in Haifa, Sandwith, to reinstate 'Aqil in order to put a quick end to the disorders. At the end of 1863, Qabuli took this step,[602] though he was probably firmly determined to get rid of 'Aqil for good, and as soon as possible.

The solution to this task fell to Qabuli's successor, Khurshid Pasha, who continued the anti-Bedouin policy even more energetically. He planned, for instance, to erect four forts armed with guns in eastern Galilee. 'Aqil knew what was in store for him. At his request Sandwith offered to mediate between him and the *mushir*. But in spite of this, 'Aqil was dismissed in 1864. Two hundred Kurds arrived in Tiberias to protect the district from the Bedouin. Strong military forces from Beirut and Acre were concentrated in Galilee. 'Aqil just managed to escape across the Jordan. His role had come to an end; a local power factor in northern Palestine had definitely been eliminated.

After his expulsion, 'Aqil made his way to Egypt. Through the good offices of the Egyptian ruler and of 'Abd al-Qadir he was allowed to return to the Galilee in 1866;[603] but he did not regain his former position of power, and he no longer had ambitions of this kind. The Porte granted him the bread of charity until his death in 1870.[604] At the end of 1869, during the visit of the Austrian emperor to the "Holy Land," he once more received a European decoration, the *"Goldene Verdienstkreuz mit der Krone"* of the Hapsburg Empire.[605]

For nearly two decades, 'Aqil had been an important power factor in Galilee. At the time of his return to northern Palestine in 1866, the government had nearly reached its goal of undisputed direct administration over all Palestine. From now on, too, the development of the Galilee was determined by different forces: The most fertile part of the region, which ‘Aqil had controlled, became the property of business people from Haifa and Beirut in 1869 and 1872. Instead of a *bashibozuq* commander of Bedouin origin, the banker Sursuq became the new "master" of the Marj ibn ‘Amir. This reality, more than anything else, makes clear the transformation that took place in Palestine during the period examined here.

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[602] It was probably during this stage of the conflict that 'Aqil, in 1863, paid a visit to Beirut with a large retinue and with an express guarantee of the French consul for his well-being (Mansur, p. 78): "He came to pay his respects to the pasha but had the air of a sultan." (Jessup, I, pp. 273f.)

[603] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1927 (Beirut, 7 February 1866); the Egyptian ruler was then Isma'il, not Sa'id as Mansur (p. 80) says.

[604] Not in 1866 or 1867, as Macalister and Masterman (1906, pp. 290f.) say.

[605] HHSTA–Archive Jer., note 16, Dossier "Reise S.M. des Kaisers, 8.–14.11.1869."

We may assume that ‘Aqil's aim had been the building up of a relatively autonomous power position in northern Palestine. In his time, Galilee was perhaps the only area of Palestine where such an attempt had any chance of success. Jabal Nablus, Jabal al-Quds, and Jabal al-Khalil were "occupied." The plains and hills of lower Galilee, however, seemed to have been awaiting a new master ever since the downfall of Jazzar Pasha. But ‘Aqil had not nearly the stature of his predecessors as local "ruler" of northern Palestine, and hardly had a chance to put his ambitions into practice. He was neither willing to change his way of life, nor able to resist Ottoman policies that were backed by Europe; whatever hopes he had for European support were illusory.

‘Aqil had no chance because a non-Bedouin life was beyond his imagination. He did not want to "immobilize" himself by adopting an urban, let alone a peasant, way of life. He thus stood in the way of the Porte, which was determined to establish a "modern" administration controlled from the center. ‘Aqil could not be integrated into the new structures because a basic component of the government policy was the suppression of nomadic life and the pushing forward of the frontier of settlement.[606] This was a period of peasant *reconquista* under urban control. This was not a development which ‘Aqil could either absorb, so as to profit from it, or resist. He was unable to stand up to the growing government power on both sides of the Jordan, and at the same time the Ottoman anti-Bedouin policy made him dispensable.

In summary, if one wished to characterize ‘Aqil's role in the history of nineteenth-century Palestine, one would be hard pressed to discover among his accomplishments socio-economic development in the area where he had spent nearly all his life or advances in the well-being of the population of "his" territory. Nowhere were the *bashibozuq* known as benefactors of the peasants.[607] Yet despite this fact, his role has been judged rather positively both in contemporary sources and in local tradition. The written accounts, however, are from the pen of Nazarene clerics and European consuls who were biased in ‘Aqil's favor because of his role as the "protector of the Christians," an image that seems to continue to the present day among the Christians of Galilee.[608] In oral tradition, the fact that 'Aqil, an Arab, had tried to defy the Ottoman government and had been successful in this time after time for nearly two decades also may have played a part.

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[606] See Lewis, "The Frontier of Settlement."

[607] See for example, Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions*, pp. 257–63.

Jabal Nablus

European interest in 'Aqil, and the way in which he was courted, grew out of a specific situation. During an unsettled time and in the midst of a kind of power vacuum, he appeared to defend the interests of the native Christians and the European protégés in the Galilee. The local lords in the central Palestinian highlands could not expect any similar sympathy. Just as the European diplomats saw as the root cause of the events of 1860 the "yoke of feudalism" that had burdened the population of the Lebanon mountains, and hence declared that the "abolition of the feudal system" was a prerequisite for a reorganization,[609] so they believed that the Palestinian *jabal*s could only be "pacified" if the Porte would root out the "feudalism that persisted there" and put its own authority in its place.[610] As long as the "old feudal lords" or the "old *derebey*s" (as the French consuls frequently called the local lords)[611] kept their power, the country would remain ungovernable. Reforms had to be applied to what appeared to be "a sort of undefined feudal system."[612]

The 1850s and the early 1860s were permeated not only by constant local feuds, but also by subjugation expeditions of the governors. Rivalries over the control of the districts were played out in Jabal Nablus mainly between the 'Abd al-Hadi family and the Tuqan family; in Jabal al-Quds between the Abu Ghawsh family and the Lahham family; and in Jabal al-Khalil between two factions of the 'Amr family. The Ottoman governors stood in opposition to them and, with the support of the consuls, prepared to subjugate them—but not without setting them against each other and trying to profit personally from the feuds.

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[608] See Makhkhul, I, p. 55 and II, pp. 15f.; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, VII/2, p. 564.

[609] See the Rapport de la Commission Internationale sur la Réorganization du Liban, in HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 139.

[610] HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 122 (Beirut, 18 October 1858).

[611] See MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 14 September 1855, 17 May 1856, 7 July 1856); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 6 (Jerusalem, 20 July 1858).

[612] As John Bowen put it in a report about Jabal Nablus for the British ambassador in Constantinople, dated 2 April 1856. He characterized this "undefined feudal system" thus: "A variety of claims to levy contributions in money or kind on the villagers constantly affords pretexts for disturbances to the partizans of the two factions of Tokan and Abd El Hadi which divide the mountains. These demands are sometimes made as hereditary rights, sometimes by virtue of being Sub-Governor of a few villages"; PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 524.

The most influential families of Jabal Nablus had not arrived there until the second half of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. They were the Tuqan family, the Nimr family (in the context of an Ottoman military expedition), the Jarrar family, the 'Abd al-Hadi family, the Qasim family, and the Rayyan family (both in connection with the Bedouin penetration of the *jabal* from the eastern side of the Jordan). In the first half of the nineteenth century they had decisively strengthened their economic and socio-political positions. Above all, they had profited from the new bestowals of *mahlul timar*s and from the transmission of inheritable *iltizam*s (lands assigned to tax farmers).[613]

Under Egyptian rule the 'Abd al-Hadis had risen to become the dominant family of Jabal Nablus. They had allied themselves with the occupying power and had supported its administrative, economic, and minority policies. It was easy to foresee that after the return of the Ottomans those local lords who had been neutralized or supplanted under Egyptian rule would raise their heads and try to regain their old positions. The political changes in many districts generally seemed to offer the possibility for settling old scores and fighting for new claims, since the structure of local rule that had arisen in the entire *jabal* under the Egyptians was now at their disposal.

Consequently, the 1840s and early 1850s were distinguished by battles and feuds with circumscribed, shifting coalitions, which flared up again and again. The Ottoman governors tried to gain mastery over them by means of sporadic punitive actions and through the deportation of individual local lords, without changing the basic pattern of the rivalries and local power relations. During this phase there was no consistent Ottoman policy with the goal of forcing long-lasting political-administrative structures of any sort in the *jabal*s. On the contrary, the governors, like the "mediating" *effendi*s of Jerusalem, fomented instability by seeking to derive personal pecuniary benefits from the feuds. The instability of local rule became a business for them. The peasants of the *jabal*s, who lost not only their belongings and property (or even their lives) while fighting for the local lords, also had to come up with the bribes for Jerusalem and the financial expenses of the local wars. And on top of all this they suffered at the hands of the Bedouin who were brought into the highlands as auxiliary troops.

Although there were many local battles in Jabal Nablus during the 1840s and 1850s that were independent of one another, there also existed a conflict of a higher order, so to speak, between the Tuqan family and the 'Abd al-Hadi family, for predominance in the entire *jabal*, or for the governor's post in Nablus. The Ottoman position up until the mid-1850s was trenchantly characterized by Finn:

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[613] Nimr, II, pp. 223 and 261; Hoexter, p. 263.

> The Turkish visible Government at this time in the Nabloos district was barely a mere scarecrow with scarce any terrors. There was just power enough for the levying of the taxes, and as for the rival factions, so injurious to the well-being of the peasantry, they were but as two scales, now up, now down, as the beam of the balance within the Seraglio at Jerusalem was sloped either way by means of bribery, or as the factions themselves were affected by the results of their sanguinary fightings.[614]

After the start of the Crimean War, at the end of 1853, the battles escalated into a downright "civil war" between two more or less stable coalitions. This war determined the course of events in Jabal Nablus until the spring of 1859.[615] It was already a time-honored pattern: Whenever the Ottomans were forced to withdraw troops from Palestine, local feuds blazed up or became more violent, and the Bedouin appeared on the scene. This pattern was still partially valid until the beginning of the 1880s, even though the era of local wars in the *jabal*s was definitely over by the start of the 1860s. At least it was true for the Bedouin who surged around the edge of the highlands and in times of external or internal turmoil spilled into the *jabals*.[616]

Seen from Jerusalem, the party division during the "civil war" in Jabal Nablus, which lasted from 1853 to 1859, even acquired the tint of a conflict between two political tendencies. Finn writes that the Tuqan family "were considered as of the old Turkish faction or party . . . inclined rather to the old conservative tone of local politics." The 'Abd al-Hadi family, on the other hand, were said to be "of the Egyptian school of progress . . . . This latter party professed more of liberalism in practice, i.e., in cunning at keeping up with Constantinople progress, and bidding for popularity with the European Consuls."[617]

French consul Barrère provided a similar evaluation, relying partly on information passed on to him by Kamil Pasha, then governor of

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[614] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 409f.; for information on the conflicts until 1853, see also the report by Jacob Esh Shelaby (Rogers, *Notices*). A list of the governors of Nablus in the nineteenth century can be found in Ramini, pp. 180f.

[615] Nimr, I^1, pp. 271–304 (*al-harb al-ahliyya*). Regarding the arming of the peasantry in the Palestinian mountains, see Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 339 and II, pp. 197f.; Bauer, *Volksleben*, pp. 4f. Regarding the active role of women in the battles, see *SWP*, *Special Papers*, pp. 339–42; Finn, *Palestine Peasantry*, pp. 24–31; Nimr, II, pp. 334f.

[616] There were also, however, "natural" reasons for the Bedouin to leave their tribal areas—for example, the drought in the years 1863 and 1874; see 'Arif, *Kitab al-qada'*, p. 218.

[617] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 239; similarly, p. 409.

Jerusalem, and partly on what he learned from the French consular agent in Nablus, Muhammad Amin al-Qasim. Here one must take into account the fact that the Qasim family was one of the chief supporters of the ʻAbd al-Hadi faction. According to Barrère, then, the leaders of the Tuqan family were "*anciens seigneurs féodaux*" who had earlier joined the battle against the Egyptians and now opposed the Porte. The ʻAbd al-Hadi family, on the other hand, were "*des hommes nouveaux,*" faithful supporters of the central government. Their faction was supposedly the "*parti du Gouvernement*" and that of the Tuqan family the "*parti féodal.*" These "old *derebeys*" dreamed of the restoration of their position as feudal overlords.[618] And in a report to Constantinople about the incidents of April 1856 in Nablus (see below), a copy of which he gave to the French consul, Kamil Pasha wrote that the country had to be freed from the Tuqan family; otherwise the reform edict of February 1856 could never be implemented.[619]

These evaluations were probably correct to the extent that the ʻAbd al-Hadi family had supported the reform policy of the Egyptians, and if it put the Ottoman governors on their side, the ʻAbd al-Hadis did not find it at all difficult to present themselves as adherents of the *tanzimat* policy.[620] Likewise, they were interested in cultivating their contacts with the Europeans, both because of their economic activities—their investments in grain exports during the Crimean War have already been mentioned—and because they hoped to gain local political advantages. This was apparent from their conduct during the incidents of 1856. It was certainly to their advantage that a member of the Qasim family (with whom they were allied) was a French consular agent.[621] Meanwhile, the Tuqan family was accused of providing some of the ringleaders for the anti-European riots of 1856. At the beginning of the 1850s, Finn visited a *shaykh* of the Jarrar faction, which was a chief supporter of the Tuqan coalition, having its seat in Jabaʻ. Finn reported: "That bigoted old Shaikh Ahmed Jerar, of Jeba . . . immediately on my entering his house, had growled out, 'So the Sultan is giving away all the land of Islam, bit by bit, to the Christians.'"[622]

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[618] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 17 May, 10 June, and 7 July 1856).

[619] There is a translation of the report in MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 17 May 1856).

[620] We find Muhammad ʻAbd al-Hadi as the *qa'im maqam* of Gaza in 1849; Finn, *Byeways*, pp. 167 and 171.

[621] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 6 April and 17 May 1856). Consul Finn constantly complained not only that the governor of Jerusalem, Kamil Pasha, was a tool of the French consulate (and the French did not deny that they had influence), but that through the Qasim family, French influence had spread to Nablus: "The youthful agent for the French, Emeen Mahhmood el Kasim, has been allowed five protected persons for his office, one of whom is Joseph Nahhâs, the official secretary of the Governor of Nablus—thus in that place as well as in Jerusalem connecting the French with the government authority": PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 14 March 1856). In September 1856 Barrère was able to present "le brevet et les insignes d'officier de l'ordre impérial de la légion d'honneur" to Kamil Pasha: MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 1 and 17 September 1856). At the same time a French naval officer reported with satisfaction that Kamil Pasha was completely under the influence of Barrère: MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Rapport du Commandant Bonie relatif à son voyage sur les côtes de Syrie, à Chypre et à Rhodes. September and October 1856).

Thus was the image of the two coalitions as seen through European lenses. The formation of the parties in the "civil war" can no more be explained in terms of a political opposition between the two leading families—no matter how deep or superficial this may have been—than it can be explained in terms of the opposition between Qays and Yaman. It was first and foremost a matter of local interests and relations of loyalty among the clans of the local lords. But there are other reasons for questioning the European consuls' categorizations of the Tuqan and ʻAbd al-Hadi coalitions. It was the Tuqan family, whose members' power was preeminently based on their urban administrative positions, who were supposed to be the representatives of the "*parti féodal*," while the ʻAbd al-Hadi family, whose members had extensive land holdings and great influence among the peasantry (as the French consul himself reported), was supposed to figure as a supporter of the central power. It is at the very least doubtful that one can attach any actual political-ideological meaning to the labels "liberal," "progressive," and "conservative." This also applies to the designation "pro-Egyptian." True, the consuls occasionally reported on an antipathy for the Turks and on pro-Egyptian sympathies among the population of Palestine.[623] But if Finn wrote that the members of the ʻAbd al-Hadi family "were even now looked upon as partisans of Egyptian policy,"[624] one must ask who regarded them as such and what this actually meant. The consular sources do not give us any particulars.

In the local war of the 1850s, which had to do both with the control of individual districts and with primacy in the entire *Jabal*, the following clans with their adherents faced each other under the banners of the ʻAbd al-Hadis and the Tuqans, or of the Qays and Yaman:[625]

ʻAbd al-Hadi/Qays: The ʻAbd al-Hadi/Qays faction included the ʻAbd al-Hadi family (in the two Shaʻrawiyyas), a section of the Jarrar family (in the northern Bilad Haritha), the Jayyusi family (in Bani Saʻb district), the Qasim family (in the eastern Bilad al-Jammaʻin), the district of Jurat

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[622] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 263.

[623] For instance, Sienkiewicz reports from Jerusalem on 22 December 1868: "Leurs sympathies sont toutes pour l'Egypte" (MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 10).

[624] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 239.

[625] See Nimr, I^1, pp. 247f.; II, pp. 415–27; Darwaza, pp. 199–201, 220, 242f.; Hoexter, p. 268; see also Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 242, although he makes a number of obviously false assertions, and Macalister and Masterman, 1906, p. 36. Maʻoz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 114f., erroneously represents the ʻAbd al-Hadi faction as Yamani and the Tuqan faction as Qaysi.

'Amra (under the leadership of the Qasim family?), the Ahfat family (in eastern Wadi al-Sha'ir), a section of the al-Hajj Muhammad family (in Mashariq al-Baytawi), and the Nimr family in Nablus.

Tuqan/Yaman: The Tuqan/Yaman faction comprised the Tuqan family (in Nablus), the Rayyan family (in western Bilad al-Jamma'in), the Burqawi family (in western Wadi al-Sha'ir), a section of the Jarrar family (in the southern Bilad Haritha), and a section of the al-Hajj Muhammad family (in Mashariq al-Baytawi).

Finn, who described the makeup of the first coalition in 1854, remarked: "The patron of this faction is always, beyond dispute, the 'Abdul Hadi of the time being."[626] He wrote, nevertheless, that the coalition was known by the name of Nimr. This can easily be explained: Among his informants, the opponents of the Tuqan family were still identified as Nimr, the name of the Tuqan family's old urban rivals, even though the opposing coalition had long ago come under the domination of other clans. The passage in Finn's book by no means supports Ihsan al-Nimr's contention (disputed by Darwaza) that al-Nimr's ancestors continued to have a leading role in Jabal Nablus. No source other than Nimr ascribes any great significance to this family after the middle of the century.[627] In most contemporary accounts it is not mentioned as one of the important families of the city of Nablus.[628] This is significant in the fact that it suggests caution when using Nimr's account.[629]

Nothing indicates that conservative–liberal (progressive), or alternately, "feudalist"–centralist dichotomies could have played any role in the two coalitions. Nor was there a clear geographical front. Not only the *nahiya*s but also the villages were divided. In any event, the partisans of the Tuqan family were more strongly grouped around Nablus than those of the ʻAbd al-Hadi family. It is also clear, however, that the ʻAbd al-Hadi family led the stronger coalition. In the beginning, probably twice as many villages supported them than supported the Tuqan family. According to Nimr, the Qaysi faction could mobilize 20,000 armed men.[630]

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[626] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 242.

[627] In Nimr, I^1, p. 267, the chapter concerning the 1840s and 1850s is entitled "*'asr 'Abd al-Fattah Agha*" (The Era of 'Abd al-Fattah Agha [al-Nimr]). The latter is characterized as a local authority of the highest order always arbitrating and above petty party battles(I^1, pp. 272–74; II, p. 398). This can hardly be reconciled with his reputed leadership of the Qaysi faction (I^1, p. 284). Nimr himself wrote (I^1, p. 286) that the party division was given different names in the various parts of Jabal Nablus. In the north it was called Jarrar–'Abd al-Hadi; in the west, 'Abd al-Hadi-Tuqan; in the south, Qasim–Rayyan; in the east, Qays–Yaman; and abroad (Finn) Tuqan–Nimr. He adopted this designation himself. In Volume II (pp. 417f.) he wrote that the party division was named in the following ways: in the north, Jarrar-`Abd al-Hadi; in the south, Qasim–Rayyan; in Wadi al-Sha`ir, Sayf–Hayf; in the west, Jayyusi–Burqawi; in the east and in Jabal al-Quds, Qays–Yaman; but in general, Tuqan–Nimr. Proof of this is again Finn.

[628] See for example Rogers, *Notices*, p. 13; Poujoulat, *La Vérité*, p. 290; Rosen, "Ueber Nâblus," p. 635; Sepp, II, p. 45; see also Rustum, *The Royal Archives*, p. 21.

[629] The four-volume work by Nimr is without doubt an important source. Because there are so few publications of this kind about Palestine in the nineteenth century, Nimr's account tends to be accepted all too uncritically.

The "civil war" began in the summer of 1853 with conflicts over the control of Bilad al-Jammaʻin. In 1851 Shaykh Muhammad al-Sadiq al-Rayyan was exiled to Trabzon, along with other local lords (Sulayman Tuqan—the governor of Nablus—as well as ʻAbdallah Tuqan, Mustafa Tuqan, Ibrahim al-Burqawi, Muhammad Husayn ʻAbd al-Hadi, and Yusuf Sulayman ʻAbd al-Hadi).[631] Mahmud ʻAbd al-Hadi had become governor of Nablus, his brother had established himself in Jinin,[632] and control of the entire Bilad al-Jammʻin had fallen to the Qasim al-Ahmad family, whose territory really consisted of only its eastern half. According to Finn, the Rayyan family had bribed the *majlis* (council) and the pasha in Jerusalem with 47,000 piasters early in 1853[633] to regain their territory (the western part of Bilad al-Jammaʻin). The governor of Jerusalem appointed one of his Turkish officials as *shaykh* of the other half. He was soon put to flight, however, because in July of 1853 the Qasim al-Ahmad family rose up against and overthrew their rivals, with the support of the governor of Nablus, Mahmud ʻAbd al-Hadi. According to the reports of the British consul, seven villages were burned down; the Rayyan family alone were said to have had 17 dead and 40 wounded. Then the governor of Jerusalem intervened. Mahmud ʻAbd al-Hadi was relieved of his post. ʻAli Tuqan was ordered to take charge of it in the interim until a Turkish governor would arrive in Nablus. The Qasim al-Ahmad family vacated Dayr Istya and were said to have sought refuge with the Nimr family in Nablus. A Turkish *mutasallim* actually entered Nablus, but he was only laughed at, as Finn said in a report to Constantinople in the beginning of 1854. The warlike conflicts continued.[634]

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[630] Nimr, II, p. 426. As mentioned earlier, Finn reported that there were 30,000 men in Jabal Nablus who were able to bear arms; *Stirring Times*, I, p. 238.

[631] Nimr, I^1, p. 277; Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, III, p. 123.

[632] Finn wrote a report about his stay in Jinin in the summer of 1853: ʻAbd al-Hadi, "as usual, courting our notice, came and gossipped about the improvements he was making there, and exhibited his mills, canals, gardens, etc."; *Stirring Times*, I, p. 296; see also II, p. 9.

[633] Here and later in this book, we repeat the figures for the bribes that are mentioned in the sources with the proviso that they probably have a symbolic value. The French consul Botta also once made use of this expedient. In 1854 he asked Paris for approval—after the fact—for having paid out a *baqshish* of 1,000 francs. He had sent it to the *diwan* of the governor in connection with a gift of land that had been made to the Latin Christians of Bayt Jala: MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 27 September 1854).

[634] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 962 (Jerusalem, 29 August and 12 September 1853); vol. 1032 (Jerusalem, 28 January 1854); Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 240f.; Nimr, I^1, pp. 277–79.

The next "round" began after Muhammad Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi, disguised as a dervish, had succeeded in escaping from his exile in Trabzon. He returned to the ancestral seat of his family.[635] Both the 'Abd al-Hadi family and the Tuqan family then attempted to persuade the governor of Jerusalem—by means of pecuniary incentives—to appoint one of their number in the place of the Turkish *mutasallim*. Ya'qub Pasha then appointed 'Ali Tuqan (whose brothers Mustafa and Sulayman were still in exile) in July 1854—allegedly because 'Ali had made the larger offer: 3,000 pounds. The 'Abd al-Hadi faction reacted by staging an uprising under the leadership of Muhammad Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi in 'Arraba, and also summoned the Bani Sakhr Bedouin to their aid. Obviously, with the approbation of Ya'qub Pasha, the Tuqan family, for its part, allied itself with the 'Adwan and Bani Saqr Bedouin, who were ready and willing to plunder villages—and not necessarily those of the opposing party alone. The 'Abd al-Hadi faction had to suffer great material and human losses. The governor was able to catch two members of the 'Abd al-Hadi family in Nablus and three kinsmen of the Qasim al-Ahmad family (one of whom was arrested in Jaffa); he brought them into "exile" in Jerusalem. However, he had only managed to take weak members of both clans as hostages. He did not possess the forces needed to attempt an attack on the fortress of 'Arraba, where the arsenal of the 'Abd al-Hadi family was located.[636]

The war dragged on, but the 'Abd al-Hadi family never admitted defeat. Their strategy now was not to drive the Tuqan from the governor's post in Nablus in order to take it over themselves, but rather to demand a Turkish governor, who would then favor their faction, since they now were acting as the "*parti du Gouvernement*." Toward this end Yusuf Sulayman 'Abd al-Hadi and 'Uthman Qasim al-Ahmad "intrigued," as Finn wrote, for half a year in late 1854 and early 1855 in Constantinople, until the appointment of a Turkish governor was recommended there. The Tuqan faction was said to have offered the pasha of Jerusalem 50,000 piasters if he could devise some way to block this, the 'Abd al-Hadi faction offered 45,000 piasters (which were allegedly passed on to him through the French consulate) so that it would be easier for him to comply with the wishes of Constantinople. This the pasha was glad to do, and he took the smaller sum. The new Turkish *mutasallim/qa'im maqam*[637] was then stopped by a Tuqan force on the road to Nablus, but was allowed to pass after he had pledged not to infringe on any other Tuqan position.[638]

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[635] See also Rogers, *Notices*, p. 37.

[636] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1032 (Jerusalem, 8 February, 7 July, and 27 July 1854; Nablus, 28 July 1854); Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 454; II, pp. 6, 9.

[637] In the sources, alternative designations are used for leading officials, just as for administrative entities.

[638] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1120 (Jerusalem, 15 January and 27 April 1855); Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 168–73.

It would therefore have been an illusion to believe that he was in a position to "pacify" Jabal Nablus. He certainly could not fulfill the expectations of the ʻAbd al-Hadi faction. Obviously the ʻAbd al-Hadi family hoped to seize a portion of the Bilad Haritha—with his support—from the Jarrar family, and the Qasim al-Ahmad family believed that they could establish their control over the entire Bilad al-Jammaʻin. When they found that their expectations had been disappointed, the hostilities continued, and both sides renewed their calls for help from the Bedouin. Kamil Pasha, the new governor of Jerusalem,[639] did not seem to be seriously disturbed by this. He told the consuls that he had nothing more to do than to keep quiet "and let the naughty children injure each other." Finn also affirmed that there was not the slightest danger to Turkish rule. There was no general Arab cause to be championed in Palestine and no great Arab leader.[640]

Because of the war, the last soldiers were supposed to be withdrawn from Nablus in the first days of 1856 and the position of the Turkish *qa'im maqam* appeared to become indefensible. Thus, Kamil Pasha announced that, for better or worse, he would now have to appoint either a member of the Tuqan faction or a member of the ʻAbd al-Hadi faction as governor. As for the price of this, he was open to negotation. While bloody battles raged in Jabal Nablus,[641] representatives of both factions were in Jerusalem in January 1856, trying to strike a deal. Finn correctly predicted that the pasha, with the support of the French consulate, would name Mahmud ʻAbd al-Hadi as *qa'im maqam*. Rumor had it that the pasha received 500 *kis* (at 500 piasters per *kis*) from the latter; 150 *kis* from Yusuf Jarrar (who installed himself in Jinin); a very large sum from Yusuf al-Jayyusi; and 50,000 piasters from the Qasim al-Ahmad family (to whom he awarded the entire Bilad al-Jammaʻin). Even if these numbers were more or less figments of the imagination, one can nevertheless assume that a very large bribe was involved. At the beginning of February 1856, Kamil Pasha held an official meeting (*diwan*) during which the seizure of power by the ʻAbd al-Hadi family was publicly given a seal of approval. The leaders of the opposing party, the "*parti féodal*," Darwish Tuqan, Muhammad Burqawi, Abu Khalil Jarrar, and Muhammad Sulayman, who had been invited, but for good reason did not show up, were declared rebels. Salih ʻAbd al-Hadi became the new governor of Haifa.[642]

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[639] Two sharply diverging list of the governors of Jerusalem can be found in ʻAwad, *Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds* (dissertation), p. 341, and ʻArif, *Al-mufassal*, pp. 317–28; ʻAwad's list for the years 1840–1914 is more complete, but one can probably rely on neither.

[640] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1120 (Jerusalem, 25 June 1855).

[641] Finn reported 35 dead and 49 wounded on both sides in battles near Tulkarm; Rogers reported 47 dead: PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 19 January 1856; Nablus, 13 March 1856).

[642] Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 243, 251, 280.

The battles, however, continued undiminished, and shifting alliances with the Bedouin were contracted as before. At the same time, the politically victorious faction exacted bribes from the peasantry; the ʻAbd al-Hadi family and the Jayyusi family were especially active in the western Shaʻrawiyya area. In ʻArraba the members of the ʻAbd al-Hadi family flaunted before Rogers, the British consul in Haifa, the enormous booty that they had taken. The complaints that Rogers lodged about this with Kamil Pasha in Nablus were brushed aside. He protected the ʻAbd al-Hadi faction. Their predatory incursions apparently did not only involve the villages of the opposing party. During the looting of Shuwayka, especially, some 70 to 80 people were said to have lost their lives. The survivors from this village escaped to Dayr al-Ghusun, but the ʻAbd al-Hadi family did not let them get away. Dayr al-Ghusun was also looted and then demolished by brick masons who had been brought from Nablus.[643] (Three years later the same thing befell ʻArraba, the ancestral seat of the ʻAbd al-Hadi family.) The Qasim al-Ahmad family primarily exacted their contributions from a portion of the Bilad al-Jammaʻin that was actually the territory of the Rayyan family—but they had just purchased dominion over this land from them. Each village in this district had to pay between 1,000 and 2,000 piasters.

Thus, it may well be true that four peasants had summoned up their courage and had told Kamil Pasha when he was in Nablus that the country was being exhausted by the tyrannical, extortionate demands of the rival *shaykh*s, and that they were disgusted with these native upstarts and wanted a Turkish governor. Consul Rogers, who visited ʻArraba, Sanur, and other villages, reported in a similar vein.[644] Not only the peasants, but even Ibrahim Jarrar (of Sanur) had told him that everyone wanted a Turkish *qa'im maqam*—but in Nablus, not in Sanur.[645] According to the unequivocal reports of Consul Rogers, during this phase of the conflict the fortress of Sanur (to which even some Tuqan family members had fled) was held by the Jarrar faction, under the leadership of Shaykh Ibrahim, and was allied with the Tuqan party.[646] The portion of the Jarrar clan that was allied with the ‘Abd al-Hadi party was led by Yusuf Jarrar.

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[643] On 14 March 1856, Finn sent a list to London that contained the names of 42 men, 3 women, and 3 children who were said to have died during the looting while the pasha of Jerusalem tarried in Nablus; in addition, 35 men were said to have been seriously wounded (PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217).

[644] Finn wrote that at the end of 1854 a peasant had pointed at ʻArraba and said to him, "There lies the mother of all our miseries; the world will never be at peace till that is levelled with the ground": *Stirring Times*, II, p. 168.

[645] Mary Rogers reported how she and her brother had stopped a military unit sent by Kamil Pasha from trying to enter Sanur, because Ibrahim Jarrar would have prevented this by force. The commander told the consul and his sister that Kamil Pasha had resolved to destroy Sanur and had put 30,000 piasters on the head of Ibrahim Jarrar. Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 311–16.

[646] As early as 1854 the Jarrar family in Jinin and Sanur already appear to have belonged to the Tuqan faction: Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 9.

On 19 March 1856, Kamil Pasha returned to Jerusalem. He thought that he had firmly installed the *"parti du Gouvernement"* in Jabal Nablus, where he had evidently spent almost two months. After the regular troops had been withdrawn, he had placed members of the ‘Abd al-Hadi faction at the head of the *bashibozuq*. He brought ‘Ali Tuqan to Jerusalem as a kind of hostage. But the insurrection in the city of Nablus on 4 April 1856 put an end to this fragile "peace."[647]

The events in Nablus will be described below. Here only one fact needs to be recorded. The English side initially interpreted the assault on European institutions and on their representatives in Nablus exclusively as a reaction against the *tanzimat* policy and the related advance of the Europeans into Jabal Nablus; they held "Muslim fanaticism," incited by the *‘ulama’* of the city, responsible for it.[648] In the view of the governor, Kamil Pasha, and the French consulate, however, the incidents had a different dimension. According to them, the Tuqan family was seizing the moment to discredit the dominance of the ‘Abd al-Hadi family and so destabilize it.[649]

Whether or not the above-mentioned report by Kamil Pasha about the events in Nablus was passed on to Constantinople as the French consul rendered it, it nevertheless does capture the partisan attitude of the governor, which Rogers also portrayed in detail. According to Kamil Pasha, the Tuqan faction used the death of a beggar, shot by the British missionary Lyde, as a pretext for stirring up the mob. Then a son of Sulayman Tuqan, who was still in exile in Trabzon, as well as Darwish Tuqan, Muhammad Burqawi, Abu Khalil Jarrar, and Muhammad Sulayman Rayyan (i.e., all the leaders of the Tuqan faction who had been declared rebels by Kamil Pasha) mobilized their allies, summoned Bedouin for help, and fell upon a few villages (probably of the opposing party). Under the leadership of Muhammad Husayn (the nephew of Mahmud ‘Abd al-Hadi, governor of Nablus) one of the governor's brothers, and Muhammad Qasim, 200 *bashibozuq*, and a huge levy of *fellahin* (the French consul spoke of 1,000 peasants) moved against them and drove them back. 'Abd al-Rahman Jarrar was killed when this happened, as were others. The "rebels" then pulled back to Sanur and had implored 'Aqil Agha for support, which he in fact gave them. Muhammad Sulayman Rayyan fled to the refuge of the Prophet David's tomb in Jerusalem. Kamil's conclusion was that peace would not return to the country until the leaders of the Tuqan family, who wanted to rule the entire Jabal Nablus under the leadership of 'Ali Tuqan, and the leaders of the Jarrar family were removed. But he did not have enough military power to be able to carry out this necessary measure.[650]

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[647] Regarding the reestablishment of the ‘Abd al-Hadi faction and the related events in Jabal Nablus during the first three months of 1856, see the detailed reports of Consuls Finn and Rogers in PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 7 January, 19 January, 26 January, 13 February, 21 February, 23 February, 3 March, 14 March, and 21 March 1856; Nablus, 27 February, 1 March, 4 March, 9 March, and 13 March 1856); see also MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 17 May 1856); Busch (according to consul Rosen), pp. 391–96; Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, chapters 9 and 10; Nimr, I^1, pp. 288f.

[648] See for example PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 10 April 1856—Finn, 11 April 1856—Lyde, 14 April 1856—Rogers); vol. 1221 (Jaffa, 8 April 1856—Kayat).

[649] In Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 433f., we see something similar: "The meaning of all this was that the fanatical party of Tokân had been stirred up as a means of embarrassing the Governor, who, with his family, had always been of the Liberal party, both during the Egyptian régime and since. The putting up of the English bell and of the flags had served as pretexts for the faction hostile to Abdu'l Hâdy to create a disturbance."

French Consul Barrère's report to Paris was written in the same vein. His British colleague Finn, he wrote, could not rightly take a position against the Tuqan because they supported the construction of a Protestant mission in Nablus.[651]

As we can see from the detailed reports of Consuls Finn and Rogers, bloody conflicts arose in Marj ibn 'Amir between a force loyal to 'Aqil Agha and the troops of the 'Abd al-Hadi family, led by Muhammad Husayn. At the time a member of the 'Abd al-Hadi family (Salih Husayn) was the *mutasallim* of Haifa. He supported Muhammad Husayn and for this reason was removed from office by the *mushir* in Beirut and replaced by a Turkish agha.[652] Furthermore, Muhammad Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi (who had escaped from exile in Trabzon dressed as a dervish and who was characterized by Finn as "by far the most dangerous man of his faction")[653] evidently had already attacked the Jarrar family's fortress of Jaba', even before the incidents in Nablus took place; he was defeated and suffered great losses.

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[650] Translation in MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5.

[651] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 17 May, 10 June, and 7 July 1856). Finn (*Stirring Times*, I, p. 470) wrote that the *qadi* of Nablus and some members of the Tuqan family had visited the English church in Jerusalem in 1854 "and expressed their delight at the absence of images and pictures." He reproached the French consulate for taking sides (with the 'Abd al-Hadi family in Nablus, with the Lahham family in the 'Arqub district, with the 'Abd al-Rahman 'Amr family in Hebron) in the battles of the Palestinian highlands. He himself claimed to be strictly neutral. He wrote concerning Jabal Nablus:

"Strange as it may seem, the Abdu'l Hâdy looked upon themselves as in some way French partisans. Their reasoning was of this kind: Our clan supported the Egyptian cause during the occupation of Syria by Ibrahim Pashà. The French supported Ibrahim Pashà and his father, Mehmet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt; therefore, as we belong to the Egyptian, we belong to the French party. Not only Abdu'l Hâdy, but all the natives of the country took this view of the matter, and the French in some sort admitted the Abdu'l Hâdy claim to a kind of friendly patronage. Their rivals, the Tokân, on the contrary, having been throughout loyal to the Turks, who reinstated them in power on the restoration of Syria to their rule, were looked upon as Turks, and therefore by some at least as entitled to English countenance . . . . Although I steadily discouraged all idea of partisanship, and was on terms of equal civility with both clans . . . natives of the country would take it for granted that we English must have a special regard for the Tokâns as Turks." (*Stirring Times*, II, pp. 431f.)

John Bowen went on record—in his already mentioned report of 2 April 1856 to the British ambassador in Constantinople—as being in favor of allowing the exiled Tuqan family members to return, because they supported the construction of a Protestant school in Nablus and because Mustafa Tuqan sent his son to this school (PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 524).

Thomson had gotten involved in these battles. He presented his observations in a report dated 1 April 1857:

> Bedawîn from the Ghor, and from Jebel 'Ajlûn, east of the Jordan . . . have been brought over by the Beits Jerrar and Tokân to aid them against 'Abd el Hâdy; and there has been a skirmish during the night, near Jeb'a, with the partisans of the latter from 'Arrâby. The people of Jenîn, who are of the Jerrar party, say that 'Abd el Hâdy was beaten; but the bloody work is still going on, and the smaller villages are being deserted. If you look out along the paths down the mountains, you will see women and children hastening hither with their miscellaneous furniture on donkeys, mules, and camels. This place [Jinin] is safe only because 'Akil Agha, who refuses to join in this war, lies encamped out on Esdraelon . . . . The women about us are terribly enraged against 'Abd el Hâdy. Some of his party not long ago attacked the villages in the district of Er Rohah, killed some of the people, burned their houses, and drove off their cattle and flocks. But what most excites their wrath is, that these wretches maltreated, and even killed women and children. This is an enormity which they loudly declare has never been known among them before.[654]

These actions by the 'Abd al-Hadi faction alienated that segment of the Jarrar family which until then had stood on their side. Henceforth the Jarrar clan began to act in concert once again and placed themselves as a unified body on the side of the Tuqan faction. This was of great significance for the following developments, which led to the disempowerment of the 'Abd al-Hadi family. The *mutasallim* of Jinin, Qasim al-Da'ud Jarrar, swore to Rogers that if the members of the Jarrar faction were not able to recover their rights, "they will make one last effort which shall be recorded in the annals of history all over the world."[655] To neutral observers, it seemed that the Jarrar family had even become the chief opponents of the 'Abd al-Hadi faction; that is, they supplanted the Tuqan as representatives of the opposing party.[656]

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[652] See also Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, p. 453.

[653] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 2 May 1856).

[654] Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 464f.

[655] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Haifa, 9 March 1856; when this report was copied, however, it must have been incorrectly dated in Jerusalem, because it was written by Rogers *after* his stay in Jabal Nablus. It should probably be dated 9 April, not 9 March).

Now the further development of the conflicts in Jabal Nablus was essentially determined by two administrative measures that were taken in 1857: the replacement of Kamil Pasha by Thurayya Pasha in Jerusalem, and the subordination of the governor of Nablus to the *mushir* in Beirut.

Kamil Pasha seemed to know that he was about to be recalled, and for this reason at the beginning of 1857 he tried to be favorably reported on in the *mazbata*s (the protocols or *procès-verbal*) of the *majalis* in Jerusalem and Nablus. But he had to leave Jerusalem; on 2 May 1857 Thurayya Pasha entered the city.[657] It is understandable that Finn did not mourn the departing governor, whom he considered a puppet of the French consulate. But Finn also criticized him for not being familiar with the country, its native population, and its leaders, and for not being capable of keeping order there. He did not want to undertake anything without a larger fighting force. He was constantly complaining, "What can I do? The people are all savages."[658]

In contrast to Kamil Pasha, Thurayya Pasha was in favor of modern administrative principles, although he opposed excessively rapid progress and supported a consistent centralization policy, as Finn reported a few months after he took office. He called himself a student of the "great Reshid," the *tanzimat* politician and grand vezir in Constantinople.[659] He refused to enter into relations with the *effendi*s and rarely appeared in the *majlis* of Jerusalem. Although he received French newspapers, he did not like the French. Above all, he was a patriotic Turk. As a result of his attitude, Turkish was once more used as an administrative language.[660] The French consulate, for its part, deplored the fact that the new governor was surrounded exclusively by his predecessor's opponents. But Barrère noted with satisfaction that Thurayya Pasha sought him out and assured him that he would pacify the country by defeating and arresting the most important "*derebey*s."[661]

But under his direction this program could only be carried out in Jabal al-Quds and Jabal al-Khalil; Jabal Nablus was taken out of his administrative jurisdiction. Earlier, soon after his arrival in Palestine, he had stayed in Jabal Nablus for over a month, "put things in order," collected taxes, and wrote a report to the central government.

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[656] Concerning this restructuring of the coalition, see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Haifa, 9 March, [9 April?] 1856; Jerusalem, 28 April, 2 May, and 12 May 1856): HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 122 (Beirut, 18 October 1858); Poujoulat, *La Vérité*, p. 290.

[657] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 31 January, 14 March, and 6 May 1857); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 14 April 1857).

[658] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 14 March 1857).

[659] Finn wrote his report a few days before the death of Reshid Pasha on 7 January 1858; see Davison, p. 83.

[660] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 1 January 1858); see also Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 495f.

[661] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 19 June 1857); vol. 6 (Jerusalem, 20 July 1858).

The French consul believed that, as far as political conditions were concerned, Thurayya Pasha, inspired by British Consul Finn, would name a member of the Tuqan faction as the governor.[662] But in fact, he confirmed Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi in his office. He declared that this confirmation was a temporary measure that would remain in effect until a Turkish governor could be sent to Nablus. Moreover, to Finn's regret he still did not take strong action and punish the *'ulama'* and the *majlis* of Nablus for the events of April 1856, a *majlis* that had displayed a kind of behavior "which seemed suited to the regions of Canton or Japan rather than to Palestine under the *tanzimat*."[663]

One part of the secret behind the maintenance of the status quo in Jabal Nablus appears to have been that Thurayya Pasha not only collected taxes there, but also pocketed a huge bribe from the 'Abd al-Hadi faction—the British consul in Jaffa, Kayat, spoke of 1,000 *kis*—which again was collected from the peasants.[664] Consul Rogers stumbled across one of these "extraordinary tax campaigns" by the 'Abd al-Hadi family at the end of 1857, while he was looking for Salih Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi in 'Attil, in the western part of the Sha'rawiyya district. He and Salih Husayn shared the tax farming rights from a village. He found four of the leaders of the clan (Salih Husayn, Muhammad Husayn, 'Abd al-Qadir, and Yusuf Sulayman) assembled in 'Attil with a group of followers on horseback: "I found that the . . . members of the family of Abd ul Hady whose power is absolute in those districts were collecting money in the villages, and upon making enquiries, I found that they took the sum of five thousand [piasters] from each of these small villages—that they remained in a village with thirty or forty horsemen until the sum required was paid." The 'Abd al-Hadi family collected money that they had paid out as bribes or for other "charitable causes," "seeing that the villagers must also bear their share, the money having been chiefly spent for their benefit." The peasants reported to Rogers that they were afflicted by such collections all too often. "Considering the numerous drafts upon their purses, and the civil wars among themselves instigated by the people in authority," it was no wonder that the population in this region was in decline and that their economic condition was worsening. Only their olive groves and gardens kept them alive. Publicly it was claimed that Kamil Pasha had pocketed 250,000 piasters in the previous year and that Thurayya Pasha had collected 342,000 piasters in the summer of 1857. Thurayya Pasha must have already known that Jabal Nablus would be placed under the administration of Beirut. And now the 'Abd al-Hadi family were trying to requisition 450,000 piasters from Jabal Nablus.[665]

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[662] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 21 July 1857).

[663] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1295 (Jerusalem, 14 February 1857).

[664] Concerning the governor's stay in Jabal Nablus, see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 4 July and 22 July 1857); vol. 1296 (Jaffa, 3 July 1857—Kayat's report).

Even Thurayya Pasha complained to the central government, in a report on his stay in Jabal Nablus that he showed to Finn, that it was the customary practice of native governors to extort three times the amount of the legal tax from the peasants. Naturally, it was questionable whether the report was sent to Constantinople unchanged. But because Thurayya Pasha's recommendations were translated into action relatively soon after he made them, they will be reproduced here in the form in which Finn transmitted them to the embassy in Constantinople.[666]

First of all, Thurayya Pasha confirmed that the population of Jabal Nablus consisted of the followers of 7 prominent families who were led by about 20 people, and that these were again divided into the Tuqan and 'Abd al-Hadi factions. In the course of their conflicts during Kamil Pasha's administration, approximately 1,500 people had died,[667] and terrible atrocities had been perpetrated. Thurayya Pasha had hardly set foot on the soil of Palestine at Jaffa when petitions against the 'Abd al-Hadi family were submitted to him by the Tuqan and Jarrar families.[668] He had consulted the *majalis* of Nablus and Jerusalem in this regard, but did not trust their members and did not receive reasonable advice from them. When taken aside individually, however, each had expressed a wish for a Turkish governor for Nablus (naturally!). That was why he had gone to Nablus himself. But at that moment he could do little else other than confirm Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi in this office, and appease the Jarrar family with the post of governor of Jinin and 'Ali Tuqan with that of Ramla. 'Ali Tuqan, however, would have been just as great an evil as governor of Nablus as Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi. If he had appointed one of his officials governor of Nablus, the 'Abd al-Hadi family would simply have gone back to 'Arraba and revolted. But leaving Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi in the position for long would bring harm to the Ottoman government and contradict the principles of the *tanzimat*. The current arrangement could only be regarded as temporary, because factional battles would soon break out again anyway. It would be necessary to transfer two battalions of regular troops to Nablus for 1 or 2 years and then arrest some of the local lords, among them Muhammad Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi, or else he himself should be given a completely free hand in subduing the district.

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[665] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Haifa, 3 December 1857).

[666] PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 524 (Jerusalem, 12 August 1857).

[667] Finn wrote that in the years 1854 and 1855, some 300 to 400 people had probably lost their lives during the battles in Jabal Nablus: *Stirring Times*, II, p. 173. John Bowen wrote, in his report to the British ambassador in Constantinople of 2 April 1856, that during the previous eighteen months "at least 250 people must have been killed in what are there called wars"; PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 524. Busch (according to Consul Rosen) spoke of 700 dead in the spring of 1856 (p. 396).

[668] 'Ali Tuqan suggested to Finn that an Ottoman should govern Jabal Nablus: ISA–BCJ, J22/1 (9 April 1857).

There can be no doubt that these recommendations were marked on the calendar, as it were, even though it was Khurshid Pasha (in Beirut) who was responsible for carrying them out. In autumn 1858, after bloody conflicts between the Jarrar and 'Abd al-Hadi factions had broken out once again, once more with Bedouin involvement, troops were sent from Damascus to Nablus. Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi and Qasim Da'ud al-Jarrar were ordered to go to Beirut and were imprisoned there. 'Abd al-Fattah, a nephew of Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi, and Muhammad Husayn, the "strategist" of the clan, organized the resistance. They entrenched themselves in 'Arraba with their armed followers and their "family treasure."

In April 1859, the 'Abd al-Hadi family was facing a calamity in the form of a fighting force that was put together south of 'Arraba: 400 infantrymen, 200 cavalrymen, 80 riflemen, 2 field cannons, and a peasant levy of the Tuqan–Jarrar faction. On 17 April 'Arraba was stormed. The leading members of the 'Abd al-Hadi family fell, fled, or were taken prisoner. The place was plundered, the fortifications were razed, and the houses were partly demolished by brick masons brought to 'Arraba for this purpose. Soldiers were quartered in some of the buildings.[669] According to a report from Damascus, there were some 200 dead and wounded on the side of the besieged party and about 30 on the side of the Ottoman troops.[670]

It appears, however, that the conduct of this campaign did not go according to plan. After the first engagement the 'Abd al-Hadi family was ready to capitulate, and they obtained a corresponding agreement from the commander of the Ottoman troops. But the Jarrar family was apparently not satisfied with this. They had sworn to avenge the destruction of Sanur by 'Abdallah Pasha, for which they held the 'Abd al-Hadi family partially responsible. They wanted to see 'Arraba in ruins and ashes. For this reason their followers are alleged to have seized the fortress on their own initiative and by means of this plot had triggered the general storming of 'Arraba. If this did happen, the Jarrar family played an important role in sounding the death knell of local rule in Jabal Nablus.[671] Qasim,

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[669] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 14 September, 29 September, and 9 October 1858); vol. 1454 (Jerusalem, 14 April and 26 April 1859); HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 122 (Beirut, 18 October 1858); Poujoulat, *La Vérité*, pp. 290f.; Busch, pp. 398f.; Guérin, *Description*, V, p. 218; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, III/2, pp. 79f.; Ramini, pp. 64f.

[670] PP–1860, vol. LXIX, pp. 530f. (Damascus, 27 April 1859).

[671] Tristram had already written (*The Land of Israel*, p. 403) that the *shaykhs* of Sanur "are now humbled and poverty-stricken." The *shaykh* of Sanur later lamented to Conder about the Turks: "They rob and impoverish me . . . . Are my women to carry wood and fetch water? Are my sons to plough the ground?" (Conder, *Tent Work*, I, pp. 99–105, quotation from p. 104).

Ahmad, and Ibrahim Jarrar are said to have been imprisoned later because of their plot, and after some time a *shaykh* of the 'Abd al-Hadi faction attacked Jaba' and other villages that belonged to the Jarrar family in order to avenge the fall of 'Arraba.[672]

The storming of 'Arraba was the last large military confrontation between the Ottoman administration and the local lords of Jabal Nablus, for which a new historical epoch had begun. An outward sign of this transformation, aside from the Ottoman garrison that would henceforth be stationed in Nablus, was the quartering of soldiers from the regular army in the various villages of the *Jabal*. The old *sipahi* unit was disbanded for good.[673] Finn reported to London with satisfaction that the Ottoman administration had not taken such forceful measures since the expulsion of the Egyptians, and had not been as secure and strong during the previous two decades as it now was after the storming of 'Arraba.[674] This policy deserved support. Six of the children of Salih 'Abd al-Hadi, a friend of Consul Rogers and his sister, sought refuge in the British vice-consulate in Haifa. When the Ottoman officials demanded that they be turned over to them, Finn admonished Rogers to give in to this demand and not intervene between the Ottoman government and its subjects. "This is not the way to promote English influence in your neighbourhood."[675] Ultimately the children were taken to Acre.[676]

Although most of the members of the 'Abd al-Hadi family were able to return to Nablus soon thereafter,[677] Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi remained in Beirut, hoping for better times. Poujoulat wrote:

> Every day I see the unfortunate Mahmoud-bey in Beirut, at Canon Square. He is a noble old man with a sweet countenance. An expression of deepest sadness appears on his brow. He is always followed by a Turkish soldier who never lets him out of sight. This man, who used to live splendidly in Nablus or in his residence of El-Arrabi and who used to offer fine hospitality to European travellers (and especially to French travellers) is now reduced to living on the little that his relatives send him. The confiscation of his property will come next, if this is allowed, and the Sublime Porte will give him a pension. Two years ago he demanded to be judged for the wrongs that may have been imputed to him, but he was given no response. The arrival of the French in Beirut has restored his hopes.

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[672] Darwaza, pp. 234f.; Nimr, I^1, pp. 274, and 295–304; II, p. 416. Poujoulat also reports about the capitulation, *La Vérité*, p. 291. He says nothing about the Jarrar family, however, but speaks of a breach of faith by the Ottoman commander.

[673] Nimr, II, p. 212.

[674] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1454 (Jerusalem, 26 April and 17 November 1859); vol. 1521 (Jerusalem, 4 January 1860).

[675] ISA–BCJ, J22/14 (Jerusalem, 22 and 25 April 1859).

[676] Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 500–508, dramatically portrays this moving affair in detail.

[677] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1588 (Jerusalem, 1 and 23 March 1861).

> He waits for Kurchid-pascha's head to fall; the Kurchid-pascha whom he regards as the cause of all his misfortunes—without thinking, poor man, that the cause is in Constantinople itself.[678]

But the hope that the "French connection" could change his fate was as vain for him as it had been for 'Aqil Agha.

When the "civil war" was over, wrote Nimr, "the *iqta'* epoch and its chivalrous heroism (*'ahd al-iqta' wa furusiyyatuhu*)" came to an end; the Ottoman foreign rule (*al-hukm al-ajnabi*) came after autonomy (*al-hukm al-dhati*).[679] Henceforth Jabal Nablus would be administered only from the official seat of government (*saraya*). (The local lords had previously carried out their business as governors from their private urban palaces.)[680] Until the end of the nineteenth century not a single native governor was appointed. Similarly, the office of *qadi* or *na'ib shar'i* of Nablus was no longer filled exclusively by local personalities; rather, the preference was for functionaries sent from Constantinople.[681]

Most of the local lords' clans and the urban *effendi*s were able quickly to build up new political-administrative and economic positions, however, and like the 'Abd al-Hadi family, the Jarrar family, the Tuqan family, and the Nimr family, managed to carry over their power and influence into the new era. But as for the Rayyan family in Majdal Yaba (and likewise the Simhan family in Ra's Karkar), the *SWP* stated that they were "now ruined by the Turkish government."[682] The Rayyan family had still not recovered by the beginning of the Mandate period; it was known to be impoverished, as was the Qasim family. "*Dâr az-zâlimîn kharâb* [the home of the oppressors is ruined]," said the peasants when they passed by their *kursis*.[683]

Jabal al-Quds

Whereas the conflicts among the local lords of Jabal Nablus went beyond the struggle for control of individual villages and districts to the struggle for dominance, or for the governor's post in Nablus, such a factor played no role in the mountains around Jerusalem. With its urban *effendi*s and Ottoman officials, Jerusalem had a unique power structure. For the most part, the members of the native upper class attached importance to the claim that their ancestors had arrived in the country at the time of the first Islamic conquest or with Salah al-Din (Saladin). Their positions were based above all on the control of religious offices and extensive *waqf*s, and on their membership in the administrative committees of Jerusalem.[684]

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[678] Poujoulat, *La Vérité*, pp. 291f.

[679] Nimr, I^1, pp. 269 and 303f.

[680] Nimr, II, p. 182.

[681] See Ramini, pp. 33f., 59, 65, and 180–83. Unlike Jerusalem, where the politically dominant families also held socio-religious or jurisdictional offices there was a clear division among the local rulers of Nablus between the political-administrative elite of the local lords and the socio-religious elite (*naqibs, muftis, na'ibs*); see Nimr, II, pp. 149, 529f.; Ramini, pp. 32–46.

[682] *SWP*, *Samaria*, p. 379.

[683] Jaussen, pp. 138 and 141.

In the context of rural conflicts, however, the urban "patricians," "nobles," or "aristocrats," as the Europeans called them, and the *shaykh*s of the surrounding districts dealt with each other in such a way that the *effendi*s, through the urban *majlis*, tried to influence the decisions of the governors for the benefit of their respective partners and in return received pecuniary donations. For the Jerusalem *effendi*s, then, it was not a question of direct rule over the surrounding country but rather a matter of patronage. Finn wrote that the Muslim members of the *majlis* had virtually parceled out Jabal al-Quds among themselves. Every *effendi* family maintained a relationship with a group of villages that was similar to that of the Roman *patronus* with his *clientes*. Thus the villages or districts had advocates in the *majlis* who were always paid in cash or in kind whenever they had to take action. On holidays one brought them presents.[685] It was an important source of income for the *effendi*s to incite quarrels between districts or clans[686] so that the ringleaders could be summoned or brought to Jerusalem and, in the negotiations that followed (especially those concerning the release of people who had been arrested), bribes would be picked up by members of the *majlis*. Another possibility was to see to it that the control of a subdistrict would be transferred to weak members of an old *shaykh* family, against the will of the family head. This appointment, first of all, would have to be paid for. Second, conflicts would erupt without fail and would in turn have to be brought before the *majlis*. Yet another source of income ("a gold mine," as Finn says) was, finally, patronage over non-Muslim communities or institutions. This factor played a certain role in the *effendis*' relations with the surrounding Christian villages and monasteries.[687] Just such a patronage relationship existed, for example, between the Khalidi family and the Greek Orthodox community and also between the Dajani family and the Armenians.[688]

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[684] HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 40 (Jerusalem, 28 April 1858); Wartensleben, pp. 32f.; Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 235; Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 180f.; Zaydan, "Filastin," p. 346; `Arif, *Al-nakba*, II, p. 490, note 3; Nimr, I^{2}, p. 167, note 5; Khayat, p. 99, note 17; Furlonge, pp. 6f.; Baer, "The Dismemberment"; Baer, *Jerusalem's Families*.

[685] The advocate, intermediary, and protective role of the *effendi*s in the closing Ottoman period is described in a rosy light in Furlonge, pp. 7–9, 14f., and 18.

[686] The French consul Botta concurs with this: *"Les éffendis qui composent le Divan de Jérusalem . . . sont véritablement la honte de l'Islamisme, ils ne vivent que des querelles qu'ils font naitre et des discordes qu'ils fomentent exprès pour se faire payer par l'un ou l'autre parti l'appuis qu'ils leur donnent"* ["The *effendi*s who make up the *diwan* of Jerusalem . . . are truly the disgrace of Islam; they live off of the quarrels that they cause and the discord that they foment expressly for making one or the other party pay for the support that they give them"]: MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 23 January 1854).

The party division between Qays and Yaman played a stronger role in Jabal al-Quds than it did in Jabal Nablus. The leaders of the Yamanis were the Abu Ghawsh family (in the district of Bani Malik). Their influence extended over the districts of Bani Himar, al-Wadiyya (including Bethlehem), part of the Bani Hasan district, and part of the Jabal al-Quds district (including some of the inhabitants of Ramallah and al-Bira), whose populations were Yamani. North of the mountains around Jerusalem, the Simhan family (in Bani Harith district), the Baraghitha (in Bani Zayd district), and part of the population of Ramallah and al-Bira were Qaysi. In the south, the Lahham family (in 'Arqub district) and part of the district of Bani Hasan, including the inhabitants of Bayt Jala, were also Qaysi. They often received support from Qaysi *shaykh*s of northern Jabal al-Khalil.[689]

The principle conflict of the 1850s was the permanent dispute between the Abu Ghawsh family (in Bani Malik district) and the Lahham family (in 'Arqub district) concerning the control of the district of Bani Hasan. But the Abu Ghawsh family also was feuding with the Simhan family (in Bani Harith). The *shaykh* of the Abu Ghawsh family was the aged Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman, "weazened in appearance . . . always twitching the corners of his mouth, pale of face, and dressed in white." The political-military leader, however, was his nephew Mustafa, "a person of commanding presence."[690] The members of the Abu Ghawsh family were not of Arab origin. Their ancestors were Circassians who were said to have arrived in 1516 with Sultan Selim and settled west of Jerusalem.

After the Abu Ghawsh family had brought the village of Qaryat al-'Inab on the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem under their control, they were in a good position to demand "protection money" from the pilgrims who were winding their way up to Jerusalem. Through the travel literature of the first half of the nineteenth century they became known in Europe as "highwaymen." Wealthy European travelers soon were even giving them presents voluntarily,[691] while the monasteries of Jerusalem purchased with regular payments free passage for the less well-off pilgrims. Under Egyptian rule this business ceased. After the restoration of Ottoman rule, however, the Abu Ghawsh family was officially appointed as guards of the highway from the city walls of Jerusalem as far as the plains. Finn claims that they received 40,000 piasters per year for this, and tax exemptions for their villages as well.[692]

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[687] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 962 (Jerusalem, 10 and 11 August 1853) and vol. 1521 (Jerusalem, 19 June 1860); see also Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions*, pp. 104–12, and 'Awad, "Filastin," pp. 231–33.

[688] See Furlonge, pp. 9f.; see also Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt*, p. 231.

[689] See the compilation in Hoexter, pp. 285–88.

[690] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 229f.

[691] See Chateaubriand, I, pp. 327–31; "Lady Stanhope, le brigand Abougosh et M. de Lamartine," *TS*, 1882/3/4, pp. 129f.

In the year 1843, however, the Abu Ghawsh family ambushed two brothers from the Simhan family, with whom they were feuding, and murdered them on this very road. The Simhans were district heads of Lydda and Ramla at the time. It was not until 1846 that the governor of Jerusalem, Qibrisli Pasha, was able to punish the Abu Ghawsh family for this bloody deed. He succeeded in taking Mustafa Abu Ghawsh by surprise and exiling him, along with other local lords from Jabal al-Quds and Jabal al-Khalil. Yusuf Abu Ghawsh was also sent into exile in 1848 and was interned in the fortress of Widin-on-the-Danube, which appears to have been the favored security installation for insubordinate local lords. Although Yusuf died there, Mustafa was able to return to Palestine from Constantinople in 1851 after his family had made the blood payment (*diya*)[693] to the Simhan family. For a decade European consuls deplored the fact that Mustafa Abu Ghawsh had been permitted to return; they thought he was chiefly responsible for the feuds that had endured during those years.

The year 1853 was filled with endless conflicts over the villages in the district of Bani Hasan. Finn, who especially after the beginning of the Crimean War saw himself particularly as a kind of co-administrator of Palestine, became an active go-between for the parties in these struggles until he was in fact recalled because of his constant involvement in "local squabbles."[694] In the spring of 1853, the governor of Jerusalem managed on two occasions to arrange a cease-fire between the Abu Ghawsh family, who were acting as leaders of the Yamanis, and the Lahham family, who lined up under the flag of the Qaysis. He then ordered both ringleaders, Mustafa Abu Ghawsh and 'Uthman al-Lahham (whom Finn characterized as "a mere coarse, hard-headed peasant")[695] to come to Jerusalem. Abu Ghawsh showed up; but he remained a free man, having allegedly bribed the "Yamani" *effendis* with 17,000 piastres. 'Uthman al-Lahham, fearing a trap, did not respond to the "invitation." (He had likewise been exiled in 1846 but had managed to escape to Cyprus.)

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[692] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 232; in a report to London in 1859 he spoke of 50,000 piastres in "yearly salary": PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1448 (Jerusalem, 17 February 1859).

[693] Robinson, *Biblical Researches*, III, p. 157; Poujoulat, *La Vérité*, pp. 288f.; Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 228–35; Sepp, I, p. 516; Finn, *Home in the Holy Land*, pp. 305–11; Macalister and Masterman, 1906, pp. 46f. For the feud between the Simhan family and the Abu Ghawsh family, see also Qadura, pp. 30–33.

[694] For this understanding of himself, see the books written by Consul and Mrs. Finn and also the "Official Journal" of the consulate, in which Finn records his activities and conversations with local rulers and effendis: ISA–BCJ, J22/1. I have used the original. The "Official Journal" was also published by A. Blumberg (see under the documentary editions).

[695] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 235.

Thus, in the summer and fall of 1853 the struggles could continue (with the participation of the Bedouin). A primary bone of contention was the village of ʻAyn Karim. Because of the Franciscan monastery and the "Latin" residents there, the conflict caught the attention of the French consul, who, Finn claimed, had taken sides with the Lahham family. Because of this Abu Ghawsh had again "made up his mind that the English consul would surely espouse the opposite side of any cause taken up by the French—more especially as the French were Latins and the English were Protestants. But he had reckoned without his host."[696]

In the beginning of August 1853, 'Uthman al-Lahham was finally persuaded, with the help of both consuls and under Finn's express guarantee of his security, to come to Jerusalem. A three-month cease-fire was worked out, which involved a small exchange of populations. The areas controlled at the time by the two factions were supposed to be reshaped so that they would be equal in size, and portions of the populations of "mixed" villages (such as ʻAyn Karim and Walaja) were to be exchanged.

But in the beginning of October 1853 the battles flared up anew, even before the cease-fire had expired. Bedouin also reappeared on the stage. Abu Ghawsh and his allies—according to Finn some 1,000 men strong—even "occupied" Bethlehem for two weeks during this conflict, while the Lahham faction entrenched itself in nearby Bayt Jala. The governor of Jerusalem, pressed by the consuls to do something, did not know of any other way to help himself than to send four companies of infantry with two cannon to the village of Walaja, where fighting was going on, on 12 November 1853, and had it shelled and destroyed.[697] For a time after this, peace reigned in the south and west of Jerusalem.

The Abu Ghawsh family shifted their activities to the north and moved once again against the leaders of the Qays faction there, the Simhan family. In February 1854 battles broke out between them in Bira. It appears that members of both clans were subsequently banished from Palestine; Finn wrote that autumn that the chief of the Simhan clan was at the moment in Constantinople, while the French consul had reported in the spring of 1854 that the Porte had allowed the "family" of Abu Ghawsh to return and was paying them 1,000 piasters per month. This they owed to the support of an *effendi* faction in Jerusalem.[698]

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[696] Ibid., p. 312.

[697] Concerning the conflicts of the year 1853, see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 962 (Jerusalem, 19 July, 9 August, 10 August, 6 October, 28 October, and 18 November 1853); Dupuis, II, pp. 28–32; Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 266, 305–26, 370–82, and 390f.; the data found in Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions*, p. 273, about the number of participants in the battles (8,000–12,000 on the side of Abu Ghawsh, 6,000–9,000 on the side of the Lahhams) and damages (20,000 grape vines, 9,000–10,000 olive trees, and 1,000 fruit trees destroyed, and 3,000 head of cattle lost) are based more on a fanciful estimate than on an actual count.

In the beginning of 1855, the local war in 'Arqub started up once again. The cause was that Muhammad 'Ata'allah in Bayt Nattif, a cousin of 'Uthman Lahham, contested the latter's rule over the 'Arqub district, and in order to create a following and gain the support of the Abu Ghawsh family, Muhammad 'Ata'allah changed sides and went over to the Yamanis. The old man 'Uthman Lahham is said to have been enraged. He raised a fighting force and fell upon Bayt Nattif on 3 January 1855. The village lost 21 dead. According to an eyewitness description by the horrified British consul, Finn, their corpses were terribly mutilated.

In February 1855 the counterblow fell. The Abu Ghawsh family came to the aid of 'Ata'allah, conquered Bayt 'Itab, and imprisoned 'Uthman Lahham in his own house. The so-called "Azra'il," or "death angel," Muhammad 'Abd al-Nabi al-'Amla and his followers, whom he had summoned for help, had left him in the lurch. With the help of Mustafa Abu Ghawsh, Finn was able to negotiate a two-month cease-fire between the 'Ata'allah and Lahham factions in Bayt 'Itab.[699] But this cease-fire applied only to the 'Arqub district, allowing local feuds to carry on in the Bani Hasan district, particularly the feud between the Ahmad 'Isa and 'Ali Shaykha clans.[700]

The great extent to which the Qays-Yaman party division was a makeshift construct is clear in the case of the Lahham and Abu Ghawsh families. The members of the Lahham family had been Yamanis, but they acted as ringleaders of the Qaysi during this period. One *shaykh* from the clan became a Yamani again in order to gain influence for himself. Abu Ghawsh, who was not Arab but Circassian, acted as the leader of the Yamanis. And now the vanquished 'Uthman Lahham appealed to the victorious Abu Ghawsh family on the basis of their common Yamani origin![701] The fiction of this group affiliation was kept alive by the *shaykh*s as an instrument of control. The peasants were deceived by it; they appeared to have demonstrated an even greater readiness to march into battle for their local leaders.

Three years of relative peace reigned in 'Arqub. With the consent of the pasha of Jerusalem, the district was divided between Muhammad 'Ata'allah and 'Uthman Lahham. Thurayya Pasha's policy of consolidating

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[698] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 30 March 1854); PFO–F.O. 78, vol. 1032 (Jerusalem, 27 February and 24 November 1854); see also Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions*, pp. 271f.

[699] There is a translation of the treaty in Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 209f.

[700] Concerning the events of 1855 see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1120 (Jerusalem, 15 January and 5 February 1855); ISA–DKJ, A.III.4. (Jerusalem, 15 March 1858); Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 193–219.

[701] See also Hoexter, pp. 289f.

Ottoman control over the local districts, step by step, led to a last rebellion by the *shaykh*s in 1858–59. According to Finn, Lahham was dropped toward the end of 1857 and a Turkish *agha* was appointed in his place. According to the Prussian consul, Rosen, Thurayya dropped both of the local lords of ʻArqub district and named a subordinate *shaykh* of the ʻAta'allah clan as the district *nazir* (governor). Be that as it may, in the spring of 1858 the governor's intervention resulted in the renewed confrontation along the old party divisions between the two sides in ʻArqub. Once again, the Bedouin and Abu Ghawsh faction participated, raising the banners of Qays and Yaman. The pasha could do little more than arrange a temporary cease-fire. He complained that he could not employ the regular army without permission from Damascus and that his pacification plans were being sabotaged by his military authorities, who were taking sides with the Qaysi. As Thurayya confided to the French consul, these pacification plans provided for the exile of the local lords, the chiefs of the Abu Ghawsh, Lahham, ʻAta'allah, Simhan, and ʻAzza families.[702]

In the fall of 1859, however, Thurayya Pasha got the green light. Probably emboldened by the successes in ʻArraba, he prepared to take possession of the districts of Bani Malik, Bani Hasan, and ʻArqub both administratively and militarily, by stationing soldiers and *bashibozuq* (irregular troops) there. ʻUthman Lahham, who had by then reached the age of ninety, and Muhammad ʻAta'allah were both deported to Cyprus and the remaining members of the family were resettled in Ramla. No similarly drastic measures were taken against Abu Ghawsh, to be sure, but by the beginning of the 1860s he was, in Finn's words, "greatly shorn of power."[703] The local wars of the old style were over in Jabal al-Quds. "Thus the country at last obtained rest from the oppression and quarrelsomeness of the sheikhs," the chronicler from Bir Zayt concluded in his report about the sometimes bloody battles of half a century.[704]

Whereas an ancestor of Abu Ghawsh, the ringleader of the Yamanis during the time of Abu Nabbut (governor of Jaffa from 1807 to 1818), was venerated as a saint by the local populace,[705] the Abu Ghawsh family *kursi* (seat) became a tourist attraction in the 1860s for European and

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[702] Concerning these events see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 1 January, 18 March, and 13 April 1858); PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 604 (Jerusalem, 3 June 1858); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 6 (Jerusalem, 20 July 1858); ISA–DKJ, A.III.4. (Jerusalem, 15 March, 11 April, and 29 April 1858); HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 40 (Jerusalem, 28 April 1858).

[703] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1454 (Jerusalem, 27 June and 17 November 1859); vol. 1588 (Near Jaffa, 12 April 1861).

[704] Macalister and Masterman, 1906, p. 50. Barghuthi gave an account to Darwaza of the passive resistance of the Baraghitha against the Ottoman policy of reform and centralization that was being put in place. But these were running fights: Darwaza, p. 134.

[705] Conder, "The Moslem Mukams," p. 100; Chizik, p. 7.

American pilgrims and travelers. One asked the pilgrimage leaders to expound on the history of their terrible deeds while on the road to Jerusalem, and to sing the hymns that ring out in the Crusaders' church in Qaryat al-'Inab, which was acquired by France. Travel reports would always include the obligatory reference to the Abu Ghawsh family. And since one got to see none of these audacious figures, "the gloomy stone habitations of the family of the terrible Abu Ghaush" were described instead. One traveler went so far as to say, "I have never seen any buildings that have such a wicked physiognomy as their grim houses."[706]

Jabal al-Khalil

The local power structure in Jabal al-Khalil was different both from that of Jabal al-Quds and that of Jabal Nablus. In the southern highlands it was unequivocably *one* family that dominated, the 'Amr family, while the 'Azza family and the 'Amla family were both in second place. Frequently the 'Amla family became involved in the feuds of the 'Arqub district. The Qays–Yamani party division could not play any role in Jabal al-Khalil, because this region was overwhelmingly Qaysi. As in Jabal Nablus, however, there was a question of influence in the central location, of control over Hebron. Yet Hebron did not have the dominant position that Nablus had. In terms of power politics the city was more an appendage of its rural surroundings.

In the conflicts of the southern highlands, there was a clear external front and a secondary internal front. The local lords opposed the Ottoman governors on the external front. The internal front was created by a rivalry between two brothers from the 'Amr clan; this rivalry was strongly stirred up and exploited by the Ottomans. In 1854 the formation on both sides of the internal front looked as follows:[707] Gathered around the head of the 'Amr family, 'Abd al-Rahman, were his brothers Mahmud and Ibrahim, as well as Muslih al-'Azza ("the giant of Bayt Jibrin") and his brothers 'Abd al-'Aziz and Isma'il.[708] His opponent Salama 'Amr was backed by his four other brothers (Ahmad, Husayn, 'Umar, and Muhammad) as well as Najih 'Azza, Muhammad 'Abd al-Nabi 'Amla (the "death angel"), and his cousin Nimr al-'Amla. This faction was supported by 'Uthman Lahham from the 'Arqub district (whose motto was: You help me and I'll help you!). It goes without saying that both sides also had Bedouin confederates.

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[706] Warner, "From Jaffa to Jerusalem," p. 12.

[707] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 235f.; II, pp. 42f.

[708] For information about them see Finn, *Byeways*, pp. 176–83 (in 1849 an elderly *fellah* from the district entreated Finn to somehow let the sultan in Constantinople know how severely the peasants were oppressed and exploited by Muslih al-'Azza and his family).

'Abd al-Rahman, *"cet ancien seigneur féodal,"*[709] "the foul, bull-necked leader"[710] of the 'Amr family, made himself governor of Hebron in 1840, when the Egyptians were forced to pull out, and "governed" Jabal al-Khalil until the campaign by Qibrisli Pasha in 1846. He was deported in 1846, along with Muslih al-'Azza, and Muhammad 'Abd al-Nabi al-'Amla (and local lords of Jabal al-Quds as well), but he managed to return in 1848. By the beginning of the 1850s all of the *shaykh*s in the Hebron highlands were back.

In early 1852 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Amr once more fell into the hands of the Ottoman officials, but was able to escape from Jerusalem. He declared that the Turkish *mutasallim* of Hebron was dismissed and began to collect "taxes" in the city. The Jews there, who were especially affected by this, turned to the English and Austrian consuls for help, and both consuls set out for Hebron to take care of their protégés. The *mutasallim* had barricaded himself in his house, while 'Abd al-Rahman held court in his city home. His followers were said to have included 500 armed men and many *shaykh*s, among them Muslih al-'Azza. 'Abd al-Rahman explained to the consuls that 300,000 piasters that he collected were needed for bribes, chiefly to Jerusalem *effendi*s (who evidently had helped to free him from the city's dungeon).[711] If the English consul could come up with this sum for him, he would leave Hebron in peace and pull back to his village of Dura.

Once back in Jerusalem, both consuls pressed the governor to send regular troops to Hebron; but in order to do so he had to obtain authorization from Damascus. Not until August 1852 did the governor of Jerusalem appear in Hebron at the head of a governmental fighting force. But he did not remove 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Amr; the latter remained lord of Jabal al-Khalil. (In order to discharge all of his "governmental responsibilities" he engaged a Coptic secretary.)[712]

The cat-and-mouse game with the Ottoman officials continued. 'Abd al-Rahman was supposed to be deported (to Constantinople) again in 1853 but he escaped in Beirut and then entrenched himself in Dura. In 1854 Ya'qub Pasha, the governor at the time, appointed him *nazir* of the districts around Hebron (but not the city itself), evidently for the requisite payment.[713]

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[709] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 14 September 1855).

[710] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 236.

[711] See in this connection along with Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 252, also PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 962 (Jerusalem, 11 August 1853).

[712] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 228, 236f., and 248–60; ISA–DKJ, A.III.4. (Jerusalem, 19 August 1852).

[713] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 962 (Jerusalem, 16 March 1853); vol. 1032 (Jerusalem, 9 February and 27 July, 1854); Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 264, 392, and 452; II, pp. 33–35.

In 1855 Kamil Pasha made more serious efforts to subdue Jabal al-Khalil. Above all, he wanted to show the allied Europeans that the Ottoman state knew how to assert itself. For this reason he invited the consuls to send representatives to take part in a *promenade militaire* in Jabal al-Khalil. The occasion for this was the conflicts between the two factions of the 'Amr family. Salama had broken a cease-fire, which prompted 'Abd al-Rahman to announce something like a general mobilization, seize Halhul, and besiege Hebron, cutting it off from the outside world. This brought the pasha of Jerusalem onto the battlefield. He thought that at the same time he could also collect the taxes for the district, which were many years in arrears.

Kamil Pasha set out for Hebron on 27 July 1855 with 300 regular infantrymen, the available mounted *bashibozuq*, and four cannon. He was accompanied by the English vice consul, Rogers, and by the dragomen for the French, Prussian, and Austrian consulates. When he arrived in Hebron, Kamil first ordered the *shaykh*s of the surrounding villages to come to his camp. The *shaykh*s of three villages, including the villages of Idhna, refused to obey and declared that they would only pay their taxes through their local leader, 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Amr. In response the governor declared 'Abd al-Rahman *persona non grata* (*maghdub al-dawla*) and named his brother Salama as the *nazir* of the district. After the order had come from Constantinople to apprehend 'Abd al-Rahman, dead or alive, a reward of 25,000 piasters was put on his head.

Leaving a part of the infantry and two cannons in Hebron as a "garrison," the pasha marched, with the rest of his fighting force and with a levy of peasants under the command of Salama al-'Amr, against Idhna, to where some insubordinate *shaykh*s had withdrawn, and where they had even dug trenches. Rogers and the French dragomen accompanied the pasha. After a few days' siege the place was shelled on 4 August 1855 and then stormed, plundered, and destroyed. The French representative reported 22 dead, many wounded, and 70 prisoners. Rogers, in a report to Finn, spoke only of 64 prisoners, among them 'Abd al-Rahman's brother Ibrahim.[714] 'Abd al-Rahman himself escaped to the Bedouin on the other side of the Dead Sea. The prisoners were brought to Hebron and put on display there.

Kamil Pasha remained in Jabal al-Khalil for a time, collecting taxes and taking oaths of loyalty from the *shaykh*s, including those under the rule of Muslih al-'Azza in Bayt Jibrin.[715] "This Hebron expedition, with the taking of Idna and the fact that 'Abderrahhman was a fugitive far away in the desert," Finn said in summary, "raised the reputation of Kiamil Pasha, and preserved the peace of the country for a considerable time afterwards."[716]

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[714] In Finn's description in *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 301–304, Rogers is the actual conqueror of Idhna, because he was supposed to have uncovered dark machinations and prevented sabotage.

[715] Concerning this expedition in the year 1855, see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1120 (Jerusalem, 6 June, 6 August, and 30 August, 1855; Hebron, 4 August and 5 August 1855—report from Rogers to Finn); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 18 August

In fact, relative quiet did reign in Jabal al-Khalil for four years. True, as early as November 1855, 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Amr appeared in Bethlehem with the Ta'amira Bedouin, and made contact with the authorities through his son Yahya. But the city of Hebron remained under the control of the Ottoman administration, and Muslih al-'Azza and Salama al-'Amr remained the *nazir*s for both the districts of the *jabal*.[717]

In May 1859, however, Thurayya Pasha dismissed Salama for unknown reasons and appointed 'Abd al-Rahman in his place. The Prussian consul reported that the basis of this reconciliation had been a large bribe, which 'Abd al-Rahman now would have to extract from the population of the highlands. It was no wonder, then, if the rural population longed for another Egyptian occupation, under which they enjoyed greater security of life and property. The insubordinate *shaykh*s themselves rightly claimed that they were not quarreling with the Porte but rather with the current pasha of Jerusalem.

As expected, Salama did not accept his dismissal, and Jabal al-Khalil was once again in insurrection. Thurayya Pasha set out for Hebron with a fighting force, suppressed the revolt, stormed Dura, and brought Salama to Jerusalem in chains. But 'Abd al-Rahman could not rejoice at this development; moreover, he could no longer recoup his expenses from the population. In the fall of 1859 he found himself in exile in Constantinople, together with Salama, while Thurayya Pasha even took steps to disarm the peasants of Jabal al-Khalil.[718] Three years later, in the autumn of 1862, when the villages around Hebron resisted the recruitment action that was being carried out at the time, the two 'Amr brothers found themselves still in exile. In their absence the peasants selected a son of 'Abd al-Rahman's to be their leader, to protect them from the evil of military service.[719]

Despite this, the era of local lords, the "rule of the *shaykh*s," had also come to an end in Jabal al-Khalil. As the 1860s approached the southern

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1855); ISA–DKJ, A.III.4. (Jerusalem, 20 June 1859); Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 286–91, 298–315.

[716] Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 313.

[717] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1120 (Jerusalem, 26 November 1855); vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 8 July 1858); Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 391f.

[718] ISA–DKJ, A.III.4. (Jerusalem, 20 June 1859); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1454 (Jerusalem, 23 June, 27 June, and 17 November 1859); Poujoulat, *La Vérité*, p. 290. According to *HL*, VIII (1864), p. 43, and 'Awad, "Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds awakhir al-'ahd al-'uthmani," p. 129, their place of exile was the island of Rhodes.

[719] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1676 (Near Solomon's Pools, 9 October 1862; Jerusalem, 1 November 1862).

highlands were "pacified." There were, as usual, local feuds and battles between two *hamula*s in a village or between two villages, which brought the governors from Jerusalem to the battlefield. But these were not of the same nature as the struggles of the local lords and their factions for control of the highlands during the 1840s and 1850s. So it was that Khurshid Pasha, the successor of Thurayya Pasha, had to take troops into Jabal al-Khalil in the summer of 1863 for a short time in order to stop the violent and bloody conflicts between the 'Isa family and the Dudin family in Dura.[720] In 1882, Ra'uf Pasha used military force to suppress a feud that had gone on for years between the villages of Yatta and Sammu' near Hebron.[721]

The 'Amr family reappeared in connection with the conflicts between the Tarabin and Tiyaha Bedouin in 1877. It was common practice for the local lords of the *jabal*s to bring the Bedouin up to the highlands as auxiliaries, but now this practice was reversed: The Tiyaha recruited allies from Hebron and the villages in its vicinity. In March 1877 some 101 men on the side of the Tiyaha are supposed to have fallen in a pitched battle, among them 36 peasants and 3 residents of Hebron. Among the Tarabin there were said to be 12 dead. The fatalities on the side of the Tiyaha included "four men of the once powerful and still influential house of Amr, of the town of Doura."[722]

New Functions

The British consul's characterization of the 'Amr family's position in the year 1877, "once powerful and still influential," was a fitting formulation of the situation of most of the *shaykh* families of the Palestinian highlands after the mid-1860s. The majority of them were successful in salvaging their socio-political positions; they integrated themselves into the administrative structures of the *tanzimat* and took on important functions as members of the new boards.

At the lowest levels, the central government tried to replace the *shaykh*s or to undermine administratively their families' positions in the countryside by means of the new office of the *mukhtar*, or "mayor," which was created by the *vilayet* law of 1864 and the law of 1871 concerning the administration of the *vilayets*.[723] A *mukhtar* was supposed to be appointed for every *hamula* or every confessional community or, even better, for every village community altogether. But the realization of this project proceeded only at a slow pace. The process of laying the administrative foundation at the village level still had not been completed by the start of the twentieth century.

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[720] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1752 (Jerusalem, 7 July and 23 July 1863); *HL*, VII (1863), pp. 44 and 99; see also Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, pp. 369–73.

[721] HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, file 242 (Jerusalem, 15 and 23 August 1882); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 15 (Jerusalem, 23 August 1882).

[722] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2615 (Jerusalem, 15 March and 6 April 1877); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 13 (Jerusalem, 15 March 1877).

On paper, the *mukhtar* was the lowest administrative official. He was supposed to work under the direction of higher-ranking officials in all administrative matters. It was his duty to preserve law and order and to collect taxes. Tax collection through the *mukhtar*s was never realized in Ottoman times, however. On the contrary, the system of tax farming continued until World War I, even though experiments in direct tax collecting were carried out a number of times. Thus, the *mukhtar*s were mere shadows of the old *shaykh*s. They no longer had any jurisdictional functions, nor were there means of coercion at their disposal. For these reasons the influence of the *shaykh*s decreased only gradually until the outbreak of World War I.

The office of *mukhtar* was completely unattractive for the families of one-time local rulers of the *nahiya*s. If they wanted to reestablish firmly their influence, they had to shift the center of gravity of their efforts from the countryside to the cities, and gain a foothold in the newly constituted political-administrative boards—most importantly the administrative council (*majlis al-idara*) and the courts of law, and secondarily the municipal council (*al-majlis al-baladi*) and the commercial arbitration boards. Socio-political power in the Palestinian highlands shifted very rapidly from the *kursi*s of the local rulers to the urban *majali*s. Jerusalem and Nablus, especially, became top-ranking administrative centers.

This urban orientation also became necessary because the allocation of tax farming was put into the hands of the administrative councils there. The rural *shaykh*s had to compete with the urban notables for these prebends. They got the short end of the stick, at least in the southern highlands, because the *effendi*s in Jerusalem constituted a firmly established, closed group that could be penetrated only with difficulty.[724]

The situation in Nablus was different. Here there was a distribution of offices among the families of the old local, urban rulers, the traditional socio-religious elite of the city, and the local rulers of rural origin.[725] This can be illustrated by the example of the presidents of the municipal

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[723] Regarding this point, see Baer, *Fellah and Townsman* pp. 109–45. ("The Office and Functions of the Mukhtars" and "The Economic and Social Position of the Mukhtars," especially.)

[724] See also Porath, "Social Aspects," pp. 93–100; on the *majlis* system in Syria, see Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria," pp. 360–63.

[725] See the list of names for the members of the new *tanzimat* boards in Jabal Nablus, in Nimr, III, pp. 17–20, 27–32, and 53–55.

council (*ru'asa' al-baladiyya*) established in Nablus in 1868: Shaykh Muhammad Tuffaha (1869–72), Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Hadi (1873–74), Shaykh Ahmad Hilmi (1874–76), 'Abd al-Fattah al-Nimr (1876–78), Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Hadi (1879–85), Sharif Tuqan (1886–87), 'Abd al-Latif Sa'id 'Abd al-Hadi (1887–94), Bashir Tuqan (1894–96), Badawi 'Ashur (1896–97), 'Abd al-Latif Sa'id 'Abd al-Hadi (1897–1900).[726]

The *majalis* in Jerusalem remained in the hands of the old, established *effendis* and the representatives of the various non-Muslim communities. To obtain a deeper impression of the transformative phase in Palestine that we are studying, let us turn to the following description of the career and actions of the Jerusalemite president of the municipal council, Yusuf al-Khalidi.

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[726] Ramini, p. 49; see also Nimr, III, pp. 25–35. In the spring of 1881 declarations of loyalty to the Porte came in from Damascus, Beirut, Hama, and Nablus, which were intended to give the lie to "false rumors in foreign newspapers." Shortly thereafter a shower of honorary decorations descended on the notables of Nablus. The following persons received a *Majidiyya* decoration: Shaykh Muhammad Tuffaha, Shaykh Munir, Sa'id 'Abd al-Hadi, Halim 'Abd al-Hadi, Amin Qasim, 'Abd al-Qadir Agha Nimr, 'Abd al-Karim Agha Nimr, Mustafa Jayyusi, `Abd al-Qadir Jarrar, Salim Tuqan, *"wa kulluhum min a'yan Nablus wa ashrafiha"* ["all of whom are from the notables and *sharifs* of Nablus"]: *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, from 9 April 1881 to 21 April 1881, in HHSTA–Archive Konst., Consular Report, Beirut 1880–1894.

9 A Palestinian Reformer: Yusuf al-Khalidi[727]

Directing attention to an individual historical personality and analyzing his position in society and his political-administrative work require an initial justification. There are two aspects to such a justification.

Until the mid-1860s Jerusalem was not a political focal point or administrative center of outstanding significance. Socio-political confrontations in Palestine were concentrated in the local power centers of Jabal al-Khalil, Jabal al-Quds, Jabal Nablus, and in the lower Galilee. Only after the defeat of these rural power centers by the Porte, and within the framework of the fundamental administrative reorganization of the provinces since 1864, did Jerusalem become a significant political-administrative center (initially, to be sure, of only southern Palestine), since the establishment of a *vilayet* encompassing all of Palestine foundered in 1872. Instead, the *mutasarrifliq* of Jerusalem received a privileged status in 1874; it was subordinated directly to the Porte. Yusuf al-Khalidi embodied, as it were, this rise of Jerusalem in the *tanzimat* period following the Crimean War. For many years he was president of the municipality (*ra'is al-baladiyya*), which had been established back in 1863 by a special *firman*[728] of the sultan, and from 1877 to 1878 he represented the *mutasarrifliq* in the short-lived Ottoman parliament. By examining in detail his career, his activities, and his views, we can gain an insight into the socio-political transformation process in Palestine during that decisive period.

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[727] An earlier version of this chapter appeared in 1980 in *Der Islam*. To my pleasure this essay was translated into Arabic and used by a Palestinian historian for the article on Yusuf al-Khalidi in the series "A'lam min Filastin fi al-qarn al-tasi' ashar" in *al-Fajr al-Adabi*; see Manna'.

[728] Gutmann, 45; 'Awad, *Mutasarrifiyyat al-Quds* (dissertation), p. 43; Khalaf, p. 212; for the development of the municipalities, see Ortayli generally, pp. 163ff.; on Jerusalem see Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality."

The second aspect of our justification has to do with the sources, which make it necessary to focus on certain examples. In the biographic references for the Arab Middle East in general and for Syria and Palestine in particular, we find only scant information on representatives of the Palestinian intellectual and social elites of the nineteenth century. Of these, we are familiar with only a few written accounts of their careers, their social position, or their political views. But regarding the quest for source material about Yusuf al-Khalidi, the most prominent political member of the upper class of Jerusalem of his time, two political autobiographic texts have been brought to light, in addition to numerous documents from European archives (including his personal documents from the former Oriental Academy in Vienna). The following presentation is based on these sources, which until now have gone unused.

Yusuf Diya'addin al-Khalidi was the scion of one of the two old noble families of Jerusalem who contested one another for rank and influence during the nineteenth century: the Khalidi and the Husayni. The Husayni were the larger and wealthier of the two families, but according to the German consul the Khalidi made up for this through greater unity and intelligence.[729] The influence of the Khalidis in the city was anchored institutionally in the position of the *bashkatib* and *na'ib* of the *shari'a* court, which the family held continuously through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[730] Yusuf's father, Muhammad 'Ali al-Khalidi, administered this office for six decades.

Born in 1842, Yusuf Effendi[731] was around 14 years old when the Ottoman reform edict of 1856 was proclaimed in Jerusalem. We can assume that the implications of this decree were thoroughly discussed in his father's house, and that the maturing philosophical and political convictions of the young Yusuf were influenced by such discussions. At age 17, so he wrote one and a half decades later in his autobiography, he began to ponder the state of the world and the dignity of man, and to reflect on what one must do so as to be able to view oneself as a free man. At the same time he realized that the Europeans were surrounding the Middle East on all sides, and robbing it of its material as well as spiritual treasures. He saw as the cause of this condition the deficient knowledge in the Middle Easterners, or the superior knowledge of the Europeans. The Middle East lacked qualified philosophers, physicians, teachers, and historians. Too many useless things were studied, which brought only vanity, and were not directed toward the interests of the country.

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[729] ISA–DKJ, A. III.9. (Jerusalem, 11 November 1879); see also Zaydan, "Filastin," p. 346.

[730] On the question of family origins, see Asad, pp. 25–34; on their role in the eighteenth century, see Husayni, *Tarajim*, pp. 103–108; see also Little and Turgay, pp. 47 and 67–69.

[731] The description of his career here follows his autobiography (*Sura musawwada*), when no additional sources are mentioned. There are short biographical references in Zirikli, 1979, VIII, p. 235; Mujahid, No. 943; 'Arif, *Al-mufassal* p. 297; al-Hawari, no. 1561; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, X/2, pp. 359–62. No reference is made here to errors and inaccuracies in these short biographies.

He wanted to take a different path. First he asked his father to send him to an Egyptian school. When the latter explained to him that this would require an invitation from Egypt, he asked to be allowed to travel to Europe. His father denied this wish. Thereupon Yusuf ran away from home with his cousin Husayn. They got as far as Malta, where they were admitted to the Protestant college there through the mediation of the Anglican Bishop Gobat of Jerusalem. (Long before the first Protestant institution in the "Holy Land" was established, Malta had been chosen as the base for the missionizing of the Middle East.[732]) After two years, Yusuf's brother Yasin succeeded in getting him away from Malta to Constantinople, where he entered the Imperial Medical School. (This was most likely the school for military doctors mentioned in the literature.[733]) However, Yusuf was not at all satisfied with this institution. It could not offer what he sought; it brought no fulfillment, no "salvation." After a year, therefore, he transferred to Robert College, the American school at Bebek, outside Istanbul, founded in 1863.[734] He was a student there for one and a half years, then the death of his father called him back to Jerusalem.

His thirst for knowledge and his personal initiative had led the young Jerusalem *effendi* on a remarkable educational journey. Perhaps more important than the English missionary and the American and French influence (the last in the medical school) was the contact with the *tanzimat* supporters and their enthusiasm for new "useful" educational institutions of all sorts which he came to know in Constantinople. He wanted to establish similar institutions in Jerusalem as well. In the year A.H. 1283 (A.D. 1866–67) he began preparations for the founding of a *rushdiyye* school (state middle school) in his home city. In his autobiography he lamented the fact that at first he found no support at all for this plan. He traveled to Damascus to secure an order for the *mutasarrif* in Jerusalem to found such a school (probably from the reform-governor Rashid Pasha). From Muslims and Christians Yusuf Effendi then collected 12,000 piasters, and with this sum had an old *medrese* restored. When the school was opened in A.H. 1284 (A.D. 1867–68), he initially suffered a bitter disappointment. He had hoped to be appointed a teacher or administrator of the school, but a Turk was brought in from Constantinople. Instead of that, however, he was installed as president of the renewed municipality, which (according to his own testimony) he subsequently headed for a total of nine years.

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[732] See Hajjar, *L'Europe*, passim; Tibawi, passim (especially p. 87).

[733] See Lewis, *The Emergence*, pp. 84f.; Davison, pp. 27, 44, and 277.

[734] Lewis, *The Emergence*, p. 122; Davison, p. 245.

In this office, Yusuf al-Khalidi devoted himself especially to the improvement of city streets, the construction of a water main from the Pools of Solomon to Jerusalem, and the construction of the first road from Jaffa to Jerusalem, which he began with the governor. After completion of this road, wagon traffic actually ran for three whole months between these two cities. Unfortunately, the *mutasarrif* was then transferred and his successor, Kamil Pasha, initially wanted to do everything completely differently from his predecessor. A conflict arose between Khalidi and the new *mutasarrif* regarding this wagon traffic. He was forced to sell the wagons and draft animals, as Kamil Pasha thought the undertaking too primitive. After an intense argument, Khalidi was dismissed, and only after six months—during which he traveled through Syria—could he return to his office under a new *mutasarrif*.

In early 1874, Rashid Pasha, the foreign minister, reformer, and former *vali* in Damascus, brought Yusuf Effendi to the translation office of the Porte[735] in Constantinople. This does much to explain the close contact between the Khalidis and the Ottoman reformers. (Yusuf's brother Yasin was a mainstay of Rashid and later also of Midhat in Syria, and generally the Khalidis were known as supporters of the "Reform Party" [*hizb al-islah*].[736])

Yusuf Effendi worked in the translation bureau for six months; then he was sent as the Ottoman consul (*shahbandar*) to Poti on the Russian Black Sea coast, where again he was able to remain only six months. When Rashid lost his foreign ministry post, Yusuf Effendi was also let go, and as he bitterly lamented, replaced by an illiterate *agha*.

Since Yusuf al-Khalidi was already on Russian soil, he wanted to get to know that country more closely. Via Odessa, Kiev, and Moscow he traveled to St. Petersburg, and from there ultimately arrived in Vienna in January 1875, where in the meantime Rashid Pasha had become Ottoman ambassador. Through his mediation, Yusuf Effendi was offered a position at the Oriental Academy, which was looking just then for one instructor of Arabic, and one for the "fine Ottoman colloquial language."[737] For free room and board and a wage of 90 florins (fl.) a month, Yusuf Effendi temporarily assumed both jobs. He did not want to undertake a final long-term obligation until he had settled some family matters at home.

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[735] For the significance of this institution, see Davison pp. 28–30, and 188f.

[736] See Khalidi, *Al-muqaddima*, I. Regarding the reform policy of Rashid Pasha in Syria (1866–71) see Schatkowski-Schilcher, "The Hauran Conflicts," pp. 172–75; regarding the policy of Midhat Pasha in Syria (1878–80) see Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria"; Shamir, "Midhat Pasha"; Saliba.

[737] Regarding the work of Yusuf Effendi in Vienna, see his personal documents in HHSTA–AR, F 8, box 292.

Toward this end he set out for Jerusalem in August 1875.[738] His hoped-for return to Vienna was put off, but still in the summer of 1876 he declared his readiness to assume the post again, although in the meantime he was again practicing his former office of "mayor." (At this opportunity he demanded a future wage increase to 100 fl., which the administration of the Oriental Academy was prepared to allow.) But all the same Yusuf Effendi's next field of action was to be Constantinople.

In early 1877 the administrative council of Jerusalem named him as representative of the *mutasarrifliq* in the Chamber of Deputies of the Empire, which had been convened in Constantinople. A provisory voting regulation of the Porte of 16–28 October 1876[739] had established that the local administrative councils should send the deputies, since a law regulating the general elections had still to be enacted. Since the councils came from popular elections, as they were euphemistically called, such a delegation of deputies had the same value as direct elections. The election would also be "indirect" for the second and last session of the Chamber of Deputies, namely in the administrative councils of the *mutasarrifliq* (in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Hebron, and Gaza). Yusuf Effendi, against whom 'Umar Effendi 'Abd al-Salam al-Husayni ran, remained the delegate. In Jerusalem he received 8 of 14 votes, including that of the governor.[740]

In Constantinople the Jerusalem delegate proved to be a devoted constitutionalist and a loyal Ottoman. Khalidi's main actions as deputy,[741] even in the first public session of the Chamber, were directed against violations of the young constitution by the sultan. Such an institution, he was clearly convinced, made sense only if all of its decrees were observed strictly without reservation. Because of his daring he was termed one of the leaders of the opposition in the Chamber and even counted by officials among the four "most dangerous" deputies. When the sultan dissolved the parliament in February 1878 because he could no longer put up with its critical attitude, Yusuf Effendi was one of the ten deputies whose immediate expulsion from Constantinople was ordered. He arrived in Jaffa on 4 March.[742]

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[738] He was by no means relieved of his position, as the German consul asserted: AA–I.A.B.q. (Turkey) 108, vol. 9 (Jerusalem, 25 January 1877). On the contrary, they were very much hoping for his return in Vienna.

[739] Sublime Porte: *Instructions concernant le mode d'élection provisoire et pour un an des membres qui doivent composer l'Assemblée Nationale de l'Empire,* in AA–I.A.B.q. (Turkey) 108, vol. 8; also in Aristarchi, V, pp. 306–309.

[740] See in this regard the reports of the German consul in Jerusalem of 25 January and 30 November 1877, in AA–I.A.B.q. (Turkey) 108, vol. 9 and vol. 13. The second document is a later copy and was erroneously dated 1878. In 1877 the Khalidis enjoyed the full favor of the governor, while one of the Husayni had even been jailed; he was freed through the intercession of the British consul, among others: PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2615 (Jerusalem, 14 April 1877).

[741] See Devereux on his activities there, pp. 148, 156f., 166f., 182, 199, 204, 241–43, 247f., and 267.

It should be stressed that Yusuf's criticism in the Chamber had been directed only against administrative arbitrariness and corruption, and against the unconstitutional actions of the sultan. It was certainly not the criticism of the representative of an Arabic province against Ottoman rule. He considered himself entirely an Ottoman in the sense of the 1869 law on Ottoman nationality.[743] This is expressed clearly in a long letter written a month before the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, under the depressing impact of the Russian advance to the proximity of Constantinople, to the Orientalist Wahrmund.[744] In it he called Jerusalem his homeland (*watani al-Quds al-Sharif*), but the nation (*al-milla*) to which he belonged was the Ottoman nation, and the country, the state in which he lived (*biladuna, diyaruna, dawlatuna*) was the Ottoman Empire. He also spoke of the empire generally as his fatherland (*watan*).[745]

Yusuf Effendi attached great importance to the integrity of the empire, but the empire was threatened from without and within. Now that hopes in particular for English assistance during the just-concluded military actions had been dashed, an immediate alliance with England and Austria was required, he wrote, in order to be able to fend off the onslaught of the "barbarians from the North." However, the empire was also threatened by complete collapse unless an end was brought to the process of dissolution of the nation (*al-milla*) fomented from without, particularly by Russia, in all portions of the empire, even in Syria and Egypt.

Successful consolidation of the empire required above all an intellectual regeneration, the realization of a new political philosophy. The centuries of ignorance (*jahiliyya*) must now finally be left behind; now was the time to ascend the steps of knowledge to personal freedom (*li al-hurriyya al-shakhsiyya*), the foundation of all happiness. It was the individual duty of every statesman to strive for this, to distinguish himself through his knowledge of useful sciences (*al-'ulum al-mufida*), to become versed in the affairs of other states, and to be patriotic and dutiful, with a Bismarckian turn of mind (*afkar bismarkiyya*).[746] Then things would again progress.

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[742] ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.4 (Jaffa, 1 April 1878).

[743] Text in Testa, VII, pp. 526f.; see also ibid., pp. 532–34 and 542–45, as well as Young, II, pp. 223–29, and Davison, pp. 243 and 262f.

[744] Reprinted in Wahrmund, I, pp. 180–83.

[745] When in connection with Wahrmund's Arabic-German dictionary he also speaks of friendly ties between the two *peoples* (*al-qawmayn*), he most likely means the Arab and German people.

[746] If genuine, another example of Bismarck's reputation in the Middle East as an enlightened statesman was an early 1877 petition to Bismarck from Midhat Pasha, in which he sought support against Russia: *Denkschrift Midhat Pashas an Fürst Bismarck*. Published by Baron C. Dirckinck-Holmfeld after the French text, 1877, in AA–I.A.B.q. (Turkey) 108, vol. 9.

There is no evidence that Yusuf Effendi strayed essentially from his former imperial allegiance after the dissolution of the parliament and his banishment from Constantinople. Of course he did notice that five of the ten expelled deputies came from Syria (one, he himself, from Jerusalem; two from Beirut; two from Aleppo).[747] In any case, however, he would have lamented the setback for the reform policy that he supported. He and his family were soon to feel the effects of the new political course on their own persons.

After his return to Jerusalem, Yusuf al-Khalidi first resumed his work as president of the municipality. In October 1878 he was even sent by the *mutasarrif* Ra'uf Pasha to Karak at the head of 40 horsemen to maintain order there.[748] But the rule of the Khalidis and the Husaynis in the city was a thorn in the governor's side. According to the detailed reports of the German consul, he had long petitioned Constantinople to be allowed to put an end to the "patrician rule." The opportunity came in autumn 1879,[749] when reorganization and "re-election" of the local court and administrative bodies were impending. With the express authorization of the Porte to appoint the *majalis* of Jerusalem according to his own judgment and discretion, the *mutasarrif* relieved all the Khalidis and some influential members of the Husayni family of their offices. He accused them of disloyalty, dereliction of duty, and corruption, and even had some of their property titles scrutinized.

The two families thereupon forgot their rivalry for a time. At the initiative of the Husayni, they assembled on 9 October 1879 to form an ad hoc alliance to fend off the frontal assault on their positions in the city. In several telegrams they lodged complaints (on 9, 10, and 11 October) with the Porte regarding the illegal action of the *mutasarrif* and demanded his recall. A petition was sent with the same demands, which allegedly bore the signatures of 8,000 of their followers. Finally they also lodged complaints with the European consuls, in hopes of gaining their support.

Jerusalem was in an uproar, and a suprapersonal, political dimension was ascribed to the action of the *mutasarrif*. According to a report from the French consul, the signatures were collected with the argument that Ra'uf's action was unequivocally anti-Arab in nature. The Arabs, in particular the two concerned families who were descendents of the Prophet, were to be driven from their offices and replaced by Turkish officials. These would then complete the ruin of the country already begun with the high material and personal sacrifices demanded of Palestine during the war against Russia. In his letter to Wahrmund, Yusuf Effendi wrote that of the more than 100,000 dead in the war, more than 50,000 had been Arabs; Palestine and the Balqa' alone had more than 10,000 to mourn.

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[747] Devereux, p. 248, note 25. This fact may also have given new impetus to the 1877–78 independence and/or autonomy movement of Syrian notables, which probably held its conference in Damascus after this expulsion and with which at least one former deputy (Husayn Bayhum) was in contact; see Steppat, "Eine Bewegung unter den Notabeln Syriens" [A Movement among Syrian Notables].

[748] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2849 (Jerusalem, 28 October 1878); allegedly this was the first time that a Turkish armed force had entered Karak.

[749] The description of these events is based on the following consular reports: ISA–DKJ, A.III.9. (Jerusalem, 11, 13, and 25 October 1879); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 14 (Jerusalem, 19 November 1879; one report to Paris and one to the embassy in Constantinople); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2992 (Jerusalem, 26 November 1879).

Such arguments assuredly fell on fertile ground. Again and again the European consuls (in this case the German) reported that Turkish rule in Palestine was "neither respected nor popular." The Turks were considered usurpers, and the populace still pined for the Egyptian regime, which it mistakenly remembered as an Arab rather than a Turkish one. However, they lacked the unity, as well as a leading personality the likes of the Maronite Yusuf Karam, to promote a resistance movement that could pose serious difficulties for Ottoman rule.[750]

In fact the situation in Jerusalem soon quieted down when it became evident that it was primarily the Khalidis who were to be affected. After these replacements the Husayni continued to be represented in the Jerusalem administrative council, Tahir al-Husayni remained *mufti*, and 'Umar, the former rival of Yusuf al-Khalidi for the delegate mandate in the Ottoman parliament, was even appointed the successor of Yusuf Effendi in the office of municipal president. A vote of confidence, which Ra'uf Pasha had organized as a response to the petition of the *effendi*s complaining of him, was even signed by the Husaynis remaining in office!

Although biased action such as this was perhaps not Ra'uf's original intention,[751] the *revirement* quickly revealed itself as a punitive action against the Khalidis. Since the *mutasarrif* operated with the full consent of Constantinople, we can probably assume that he was even compelled from there to this one-sided weakening of the Khalidis, the family of one of the "opposition leaders" in the dissolved parliament.

As for the consuls, the German and the French representatives, at least, fully supported the *mutasarrif*, who was depicted as a capable and energetic administrator fighting against the nepotism and corruption of the "*effendi* clique." The French representative gave a delegate of the Khalidi seeking support from him to understand that the family deserved no other treatment.[752]

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[750] Regarding his activities in those years, Steppat, "Eine Bewegung unter den Notablen Syriens" [A Movement among Syrian Notables], pp. 637–40.

[751] 'Ali Ekrem, governor in Jerusalem from 1906 to 1908, later wrote approvingly of Ra'uf to the Interior Ministry: "From the time when Rauf Pasha was appointed Governor of Jerusalem he put into effect a system aimed at liquidating the domination of these parasites over the common people and showing these influential people of the province . . . what their limits are": Porath, "Social Aspects," p. 99.

It appears that with this blow the long political-administrative dominance of the Khalidi family came temporarily to an end. Among the 16 mayors whom the city saw between 1877 and 1914, 6 were Husaynis, 4 'Alamis, 3 Da'udis, and only 2 Khalidis,[753] namely Yusuf Effendi until 1879 and his brother Yasin at the end of the 1890s, but only for a short time between two tenures of a Husayni.[754]

Yusuf Effendi remained in Ottoman service. We see him in 1881 as *qa'im maqam* of Jaffa,[755] at the end of the 1880s as governor of a Kurdish district in the province of Bitlis[756] and in the 1890s as *qa'im maqam* at Hasbayya and in Jabal al-Duruz.[757] But a Khalidi would not play a similarly important role such as Yusuf Effendi's on the political stage of Palestine until 1908, namely when Ruhi al-Khalidi (1864–1913)[758] was elected to the new Ottoman parliament. By then Yusuf al-Khalidi had already died (1906). His last known, practically prophetic political act was a letter to the French head rabbi, Zadok Kahn, a friend of Herzl, written in the spring of 1899. In it Yusuf al-Khalidi expressed his fear that the Zionist movement would jeopardize the friendly association of Muslims,

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[752] The French representatives in Jerusalem had nothing good to say of Yusuf al-Khalidi anyway. Back during the war of 1870–71 he was accused of a pro-German and anti-French attitude. When Yusuf Effendi lost his mayoral post temporarily in 1873 (see above), this too was ascribed by the French to his alleged anti-French and anti-Latin attitude: MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 11 (Jerusalem, 7 August 1873). What this is supposed to have consisted of is not known. One possible indication is an extremely spiteful report in the periodical *Das Heilige Land* regarding the role that Yusuf Effendi played as an exective organ of the governor Kamil Pasha in a conflict of officials with a monastery under French protection: "Gloreiche Heldenthaten Sr. Excellenz des Paschas von Jerusalem," *HL*, XIV (1870), pp. 191–95.

Nor do we know how the alleged pro-German attitude manifested itself. We only know that on the occasion of the visit of the Austrian emperor in 1869, Yusuf Effendi was decorated with the Knight's Cross of the Order of Franz-Josef (HHSTA–Archive Jer., n. 16, Dossier, *Reise S.M. des Kaisers*, 8–14 November, 1869) and that he told people that he had been overlooked during the usual order awards on the occasion of the visit of the Prussian crown prince in the same year. He was granted the Order of the Crown Second Class five years later, in May 1874, by the Germans, but it could not be presented, as Yusuf Effendi was then consul at Poti! See ISA–DKJ, A.XXIV.4 (Hannover, 28 September, 1871; Pera, 7 May 1874; Jerusalem, 30 May 1874).

[753] Gutmann, p. 53; see also Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, X/2, p. 201.

[754] Abu Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem," p. 32, note 47.

[755] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 14 (Jerusalem, 17 November 1881); ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.4 (Jaffa, 31 March 1881).

[756] Zirikli, VIII, p. 235.

[757] Friendly note of Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher (to English archives).

[758] Regarding him, see Asad, pp. 35–46; Khalidi, *Al-muqadimma*, I–V; Mujahid, no. 1071; 'Audat, pp. 155–60; al-Hawari, no. 545; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, X/2, pp. 363–69; Mahafiza, "Attayyarat," p. 316.

Christians, and Jews in Palestine, and out of a "holy duty of conscience" and "in the name of God" appealed to the Zionists to leave Palestine in peace.[759] This letter was passed on to Herzl, who answered it on 19 March 1899 from Vienna. In his letter he stressed the great benefit that the Ottoman empire in general and *"la population non juive en Palestine"* in particular would derive from Jewish immigration to Palestine. He hoped that the sultan understood this. To this he added, threateningly, *"S'il n'acceptera pas nous chercherons et croyez moi nous trouverons ailleurs ce qu'il nous faut."*[760]

Yusuf Diya'addin al-Khalidi was, next to his nephew Ruhi, undoubtedly one of the most educated, intelligent, and enlightened leaders that Jerusalem produced in the nineteenth century.[761] His literary training, his linguistic knowledge, and his practical linguistic abilities were stressed unanimously by all unbiased contemporaries. It is no coincidence that he worked in the Translation Bureau of the Porte, and at the Vienna Oriental Academy. In Vienna he edited a volume of poems, in Constantinople he founded a literary circle, and as the fruit of his tenure in the Bitlis *vilayet* he wrote a Kurdish-Arabic phrase book.

The core of his thought and his convictions was not Muslim theology, but philosophical-humanist in nature. Evidently Yusuf's enlightened philosophizing was too atypical to find favor among many of his European contemporaries, who would rather complain of "Muslim fanaticism." The German consul Baron von Münchhausen, one of those overbearing representatives of the *"lords of human kind"*[762] in the Near East, called Yusuf Effendi a "notorious babbler"[763] and criticized his "constant declamation of half-understood humanitarian principles."[764] The American representative in Constantinople, on the other hand, reported that Yusuf Effendi was "the finest orator and the ablest debater in the Chamber."[765]

Yusuf's first question was not how he could become a reformer and remain a good Muslim, but rather what was his task as an educated, unprejudiced, free man. The worst sin was ignorance, and right after that the accumulation of irrelevant, useless knowledge. His religious tolerance extended so far that contemporaries even reported a flirtation with Christianity.[766] This was undoubtedly groundless; one can scarcely imagine Yusuf Effendi as a near-convert. Religious confession for him was simply in no respect a dividing line within human society. According to the American consul general in Constantinople, Yusuf Effendi was "almost as liberal as a French Republican, both in politics and religion."[767] During his time as delegate, he lived in a Greek monastery in the capital,[768] and when the topic in parliament was a reduction in state spending, he urged the elimination of state wages for mosque prayer leaders, as they were quite capable, as he put it, of earning their bread themselves.[769]

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[759] See Mandel, pp. 47–49. Khalaf, p. 214, maintains that Yusuf al-Khalidi was the first Arab who pointed out in the parliament the danger of Jewish usurpation. He mixes this up with the letter to Zadok Kahn.

[760] "If he will not accept it, we will search and, believe me, we will find elsewhere what we need." Herzl, pp. 484–86.

[761] See also the biography of Khalil al-Khalidi (1866–1941) in al-Hawari, no. 477, of Raghib al-Khalidi (born 1866) in *al-Shakhsiyyat*, p. 40, and of Muhammad Yusuf Amin al-Khalidi (born 1881), ibid., p. 44.

[762] Kiernan. However, one must ungrudgingly concede a certain diplomatic wit to Baron von Münchhausen. When Midhat Pasha, the governor of Damascus, wrote a letter in October 1879 to the German consul addressed to "Monsieur Schonhausen," Baron von Münchhausen directed his response to "Son Altesse Damas Pasha" (ISA–DKJ, A.XXII.4).

[763] ISA–DKJ, A.III.9 (Jerusalem, 11 October 1879).

[764] AA–I.A.B.q. (Turkey) 108, vol. 9 (Jerusalem, 25 January 1877).

[765] Devereux, p. 267, note 40.

Yusuf al-Khalidi was, so to speak, an Ottoman reformer from the provinces. By his lights *tanzimat* politics had to have five goals: construction of an educational system oriented toward European models; elimination of administrative ineffectiveness and arbitrariness; establishment of religious tolerance; assurance of constitutional rights and freedoms; and infrastructural improvements. In his attempt to realize these goals, Yusuf remained a loyal Ottoman. We have no indication that his attitude changed fundamentally after the disappointments of the late 1870s. As was elsewhere the case, loyalty to Constantinople was not shaken in Palestine until after 1908, as a result of Turkification.[770]

Thus, Yusuf Effendi was a Palestinian representative of the *tanzimat* period, but he was certainly not a prototype of the social and intellectual elite of Jerusalem or even of Palestine of his day. As an individual, he was, in the literal sense, an extraordinary representative of the social stratum from which he sprang. His career and his deeds made two things clear, however. They show that the politics of reform and renewal of the 1860s and 1870s fell on fertile ground, at least for some members of the Muslim upper class of Palestine. Yusuf Effendi even tried to implement them with greater élan than many a Turkish reformer. Thus a "progressive" integrative function for holding together the empire might have befitted a continuous, comprehensive *tanzimat* policy. Instead, from 1878 Abdulhamid took the path of repression and pan-Islamism. When the conservative Husaynis gained the upper hand in Jerusalem after the Khalidis, that accorded quite well with the political change of course in Constantinople.[771]

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[766] In Vienna Doughty noticed "two Semitic strangers in red caps in the public places." He learned from the Orientalist von Kremer that they were a merchant from Basra and Yusuf al-Khalidi. He wrote of the latter: "He was a literate Moslem, a school-teacher (a vaunter of his noble lineage, who has some-turns [*sic*] made profession of Christianity) in Jerusalem, who had some smattering of European languages": Doughty, p. 448.

[767] Devereux, p. 267, note 40.

[768] Probably he could live there for free. 'Arif reports (*Al-mufassal*, p. 274) that during the Greek struggle for independence, an order of the sultan to execute the monks of the Greek monastery, who were accused of collaboration with the rebels, was thwarted by Yusuf's father Muhammad 'Ali, then *na'ib* (judge) in Jerusalem. They never forgot the al-Khalidi family for this. In the great hall of the monastery there still hangs an oil painting of Muhammad 'Ali al-Khalidi. See in this regard also Spyridon, pp. 66–73.

[769] Devereux, pp. 204 and 267, note 40.

[770] See also note 726 and Shamir, "Midhat Pasha."

Within the Palestinian framework, the role of Yusuf Effendi also documented something else, however, namely the rise of Jerusalem, indeed, of the urban elites of Palestine in general, and the corresponding decline of the rural power centers. Since the mid-1860s it was no longer the *shaykh*s of 'Arraba, Sanur, Qaryat al-'Inab, and Dura in the northern, central, and southern part of the Palestine highlands who determined local events and claimed the entire interest of the European observers. In the 1870s their place was taken by, among others, the mayor and parliamentary delegate of Jerusalem, a scholar, politician, and administrator committed to the *tanzimat* idea.

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[771] See Abu Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem," pp. 27f.

10 Ottoman Reforms: Taxes and Soldiers

To the extent that they were implemented at all, the Ottoman reforms were introduced at the administrative, fiscal, and military levels during the second *tanzimat* period. They created the framework which in Palestine, as elsewhere, contributed to the improvement of public safety, the expansion of communications capacities, and an economic boom. At the same time, during the years in question here, there was still no real policy dealing with infrastructural, economic, social, and educational matters. The development of a state school system did not begin until toward the end of the period under study, when state middle schools (*rushdiyye*) began to arrive in cities other than Jerusalem to take their place alongside the traditional *medreses* and the European educational institutions, these last largely of missionary origin. Given the military distress, indeed the threat to the existence of the empire and the financial problems closely related to this (which led in 1875 to state bankruptcy),[772] Ottoman interest in the Syrian provinces and, within this framework, in Palestine, remained largely fixed on the fiscal and military reform—i.e., on the improvement of the taxation and recruitment system. Thus, the burden of taxes, payments, fees, and contributions, both regular and irregular, became ever more oppressive, the recruitment of soldiers ever more effective and massive. In the eyes of the local populace, as well as objectively, there was no corresponding service in return for this removal of financial and human resources: What people saw was the fruit of their labor disappear into the pockets of greedy tax farmers or tax collectors and corrupt provincial officers, or into the state treasury in Constantinople, which was like the cask of the Danaides. They could only conditionally identify with the wars that the sultan waged in far-off lands. During the Crimean War Finn spoke in Jinin with an old *fellah*: "'Look at my poverty,' said he, showing his thin and ragged clothing; 'this comes from the Osmanli Government taking all our money from us to carry on *their* wars, not *ours*, while doing nothing to defend us from the Bedaween savages!'"[773]

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[772] See Schölch, "Wirtschaftliche Durchdringung" [Economic Penetration].

The Ottoman tax policy in Palestine, including the fiscal and monetary manipulations, showed no striking peculiarities in comparison with the policy in other regions of the empire. It therefore does not need to be presented here *in extenso*.[774] In what follows I will attempt to assemble the statistical data available for Palestine (tables 44–49). There is no need to emphasize again that when taken individually, even these figures should be viewed with caution. However, some general conclusions can be drawn from them. In the process one should be aware that the information regarding revenues represents only a fraction of what was actually squeezed from the populace. "I can safely say from close observations I have made during nearly ten years' farming in the Sharon plains near Ramleh," wrote Bergheim, for example, "that the amount collected by an 'Ashar [tithe collector] rarely, if ever, averages under one third of the whole crops, instead of the legal tenth, viz., 33 per cent instead of 10 per cent."[775]

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[773] Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 24.

[774] Regarding the tax system in the Ottoman Empire in general, see Engelhardt, II, pp. 44–56; Young, V, passim; Schulman, pp. 93–129; Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System." Regarding Syria in general see PP–1872, vol. LVIII (Beirut, March 1872); PP–1875, vol. LXXV (Damascus, 31 December 1874); PP–1877, vol. LXXXI (Beirut 11 July 1876); PP–1880, vol. LXXIV (Damascus, 13 March 1880); PP–1881, vol. XC (Damascus, 14 March 1881); Kurd 'Ali, V, pp. 88–100; Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria," pp. 363–67. The daily tax practice in Palestine is reflected in ISA–DKJ, document files A.XXII. (A special document for each of the different taxes, fees, and payments), A.XXIII.2. (Tax farmers and collectors in the Jaffa district) and A.XXXVI. (Tax complaints by and against German subjects); see also *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, pp. 417f.; Bauer, *Volksleben*, pp. 186–92; Auhagen, pp. 32f.; 'Arif, *Al-mufassal*, pp. 330–33.

[775] Bergheim, p. 198; see also Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, p. 320, and PP–1877, vol. LXXXI (Beirut, 11 July 1876). Regarding the exploitation of the Palestinian peasants by tax farmers and tax collectors, see Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 320f. and 334; PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 727 (Haifa, 5 December 1862); *HL*, XVI (1872), pp. 44–47; PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1202 (Acre, 12 September 1878); Schick, "Landwirthschaftliche Verhältnisse," pp. 98–100; Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, pp. 319f.; Klein, "Mittheilungen 1881," pp. 77f.; Smith, pp. 222–30; Post, pp. 106f.; Bergheim, pp. 197–99; Dalman, III, pp. 165–69.

Table 44: Revenues in piasters in the *liwa*'s of Acre and Balqa' according to the provincial *salnames* for the years A.H. 1283–1301.

Salname[a]	*Liwa'*	Tithe	Land and building tax	Livestock tax[c]	Military exemption tax	Other	Total
1283	Acre	5,456,772	1,906,533	371,313	159,150	642,410	8,536,178
	Balqa'	3,608,917	1,738,418	549,832	26,805	553,529	6,477,501
1288	Acre	3,664,081	1,686,306		158,114	934,274	6,442,775
	Balqa'	3,637,218	2,456,672		34,313	864,100	6,992,303
1289	Acre						
	Balqa'	3,637,218	2,456,672		34,313	789,789	6,917,992
1293[b]	Acre	5,456,772	1,906,533	371,313	159,150	642,410	8,536,178
	Balqa'	3,608,917	1,738,418	549,832	26,805	553,529	6,477,501
1294	Acre	4,612,938	2,038,247	456,877	159,185	547,641	7,814,888
	Balqa'	3,443,751	1,807,115	568,787	50,805	247,176	6,117,634
1295	Acre	6,557,046	1,782,180	476,316	123,130	563,970	9,502,642
	Balqa'	3,665,865	1,774,885	576,572	50,805	155,400	6,223,527
1296	Acre	9,994,150	1,978,645	465,799	179,520	689,495	13,307,609
	Balqa'	7,570,000	1,790,965	503,797	51,963	117,150	10,033,875
1297	Acre	3,064,643	1,736,455	398,794	180,159	472,990	5,853,041
	Balqa'	3,723,975	2,036,928	743,263	53,268	158,430	6,715,864
1298	Acre	3,802,000	1,831,495	424,374	176,908	192,600	6,427,377
	Balqa'	6,074,617	2,155,275	877,125	54,278	177,000	9,338,295

(continued)

Salname[a]	*Liwa'*	Tithe	Land and building tax	Livestock tax[c]	Military exemption tax	Other	Total
1299	Acre	3,757,617	1,821,287	437,639	176,156	255,475	6,448,174
	Balqa'	5,100,798	2,140,257	856,258	54,278	334,145	8,485,736
1300	Acre	4,877,859	1,696,796	526,090	175,749	278,878	7,555,372
	Balqa'	5,026,631	2,069,635	901,813	54,278	230,000	8,282,357
1301	Acre	3,275,000	1,785,934	562,877	175,725	124,925	5,924,461
	Balqa'	4,409,273	2,072,885	942,926	30,278	60,000	7,515,362

a) The information refers each time to the fiscal year preceding the *salname* year.
b) The information is identical to that in the *salname* for 1283!
c) Taxes for mutton, sheep, and goats.

Table 45: Outlays in piasters in the *liwa*'s of Acre and Balqa' according to the provincial *salnames* for the years A.H. 1288–1301.

Salname[a]	*Liwa'*	Internal adminis- tration	Finan. adminis- tration	*Shari'a* adminis- tration	Justice adminis- tration	Educa- tion	Other	Total
1288	Acre	1,366,187	203,440	158,900			84,556	1,813,083
	Balqa'	1,631,614	85,603	112,800			33,000	1,863,017
1289	Acre							
	Balqa'	894,579	129,724	106,800				1,131,103
1297	Acre	480,914	208,026	66,402	97,254	22,860		875,456
	Balqa'	365,082	207,856	37,692	13,338	12,520		636,488
1298	Acre	366,457	242,207	50,700	86,196	18,288		763,848
	Balqa'	178,996	245,347	34,488	10,800	13,040		482,671
1299	Acre	377,468	170,488	50,700	103,212	20,304	43,366	765,538
	Balqa'	176,548	169,880	34,488	97,116	13,040	3,528	494,600
1300	Acre	399,049	160,296	51,900	165,180	20,304	31,973	828,702
	Balqa'	209,914	189,383	41,688	108,000	17,840	1,008	567,833
1301	Acre	428,972	158,825	87,900	168,740	19,344	31,973	895,754
	Balqa'	227,914	192,542	59,688	109,910	17,840	1,008	608,902

a) The information refers each time to the fiscal year preceding the *salname* year.

Table 46: Incomes and outlays in piasters in the *liwa*'s of Acre and Balqa' according to the provincial *salnames* for the years A.H. 1283-1301.

Salname[a]	Acre		Balqa'	
	Incomes	Outlays	Incomes	Outlays
1283	8,536,178		6,477,501	
1288	6,442,775	1,813,083	6,992,303	1,863,017
1289			6,917,992	1,131,103
1293	8,536,178		6,477,501	
1294	7,814,888		6,117,634	
1295	9,502,642		6,223,527	
1296	13,307,609		10,033,875	
1297	5,853,041	875,456	6,715,864	636,488
1298	6,427,377	763,848	9,338,295	482,671
1299	6,448,174	765,538	8,485,736	494,600
1300	7,555,372	828,702	8,282,357	567,833
1301	5,924,461	895,754	7,515,362	608,902

a) In each case the information refers to the fiscal year preceding the *salname* year.

Table 47: Budgets in piasters of the *sanjaq/liwa'/mutasarrifliq* of Jerusalem A.D. 1840–82/83.

Year	Incomes	Outlays
1840[a]	4,985,067	3,975,468
1870/71[b]	10,316,774	6,348,630
1875/76[c]	13,750,000	2,321,000
1882/83[d]	11,867,765	

Sources:

a) Sabri, pp. 10–12.

b) *Salname–i Vilayet–i Suriyye* for A.H. 1288.

c) PP–1877, vol. LXXXI (Beirut, 11 July 1876).

d) *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1883, II, pp. 417 f.

Table 48: Budget in piasters of the *liwa'* of Jerusalem according to the provincial *salname* for A.H. 1288 (A.D. 1871/72).

Incomes		Outlays	
Tithes	3,627,500	Internal admin.	5,126,318
Land taxes	3,549,151	Financial admin.	654,964
Military Exemption taxes	142,564	Legal system	209,680
Other	2,997,559	Public works	199,268
		Commerce	144,908
		Education	13,492
Total	10,316,774	Total	6,348,630

Table 49: Budgets in piasters of the Syrian *liwa*'s according to the provincial *salname* for A.H. 1288 (A.D. 1871/72).

Liwa'	Incomes	Outlays
Damascus	17,133,691	15,150,585
Jerusalem	10,316,774	6,348,630
Tripoli	9,104,269	2,157,064
Hama	7,794,469	2,193,513
Balqa'	6,992,303	1,863,017
Acre	6,442,775	1,813,083
Beirut	5,943,451	2,700,122
Hauran	3,814,204	2,732,909
Total	67,541,936	34,958,923

The main conclusion to be gained from the above tables is that the overwhelming portion of the sums that flowed into the accounts of the Palestinian *liwa*'s was not spent there, but was paid out to Damascus or Constantinople, and that the share that remained in Palestine continued to shrink over the years. In the 1870s "only" around half of the revenues were transferred to Constantinople from the Syrian *liwa*'s in general, as the expenditures of the province also included the costs of the Fifth Army Corps and the *hajj*. But even this share meant a drain of wealth. In his analysis of the revenues and expenditures in Syria and Palestine in the fiscal year 1875–76, the British vice consul, Jago, complained: "Expenditure, regulated solely by the ever-pressing demands of Constantinople, has been cut down far below efficiency, . . . besides the total exclusion of any portion of revenue to the relief of the inhabitants, to public works, or to the development of the country."[776] The highest expenditures, both in absolute and percentage terms, were in the administrative and/or economic centers of Damascus, Jerusalem, and Beirut, as well as in the restless Hauran.

The lion's share of the taxes had to be raised from the peasants (tithes, land taxes, livestock taxes), but expenditures in the "hinterlands" were minimal. (In the *liwa'* of Acre at the end of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s, between 11 and 15 percent of the revenues were spent there, in the *liwa'* of Balqa' it was between 5 percent and 9.5 percent.) In addition, these expenditures were almost entirely swallowed up by the local administration. In light of this, one realizes the extent to which the urban centers, with their military and administrative apparatus, lived at the expense of their rural hinterlands (just as Constantinople benefited at the expense of the provinces).

In the period examined here the military expenditures especially exceeded the financial capabilities of the empire. The greater the financial burdens and the recruiting pressures placed upon them, the harder it became to convince the Palestinian peasants that the sultan was also defending their interests in remote theaters of war. The *shaykh*s of the highlands had quarreled with Ibrahim Pasha as early as April 1834 regarding the recruitment problem. In the *Annals of Palestine,* one finds the following depiction of this discussion:

> On the 4th day of Diakainesimos (Easter Wednesday), April 25th, Ibrahim Pasha convoked all the leading men and notables of the districts of Samaria and Judaea and put to them the following questions: "As we, Moslems, have as perpetual enemies the Nazarene nations, is it or is it not necessary for us to have a big standing army?" They replied, "Yes, undoubtedly it is necessary."
>
> The Pasha continued: "If so, from whom shall we take men for this army, from the Christians or from the Moslems?"
>
> They replied: "From the Moslems, assuredly."
>
> He said: "You have answered rightly. Therefore it is necessary for you, if you are true Moslems and wish the welfare of the nation, to send in your young men from every city and from every village, so that they may learn from their youth the art of war and be trained in it, and so be ready in case of need."
>
> Silence fell upon the meeting and for long they thought of the reply: "Your order be upon our heads, but there is no need for us to give our boys and young men for war. When the enemy of our religion enters our country, all of us young and old, will go out and fight and willingly shed our blood for our faith and our fatherland."

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[776] PP–1877, vol. LXXXI (Beirut, 11 July 1876).

> The Pasha replied: "How do you expect to wage war if you know not the art thereof?"
>
> They replied: "This art of war, known to our grandfathers, who withstood the enemy and defended their country until now, is also known to us, and as they once did, so we also hope to do in the future."
>
> The Pasha replied: "War is not the place of a herd of useless men: technique and skill are required. This is my decision. One young man shall be taken from every five Moslems, who shall be trained in the regular tactics of war. This order I want carried out without delay, beginning here in Jerusalem."
>
> Briefly, the idea of the Pasha was to get 3,000 young men from the three districts, of Jerusalem, Judaea, and Samaria, and a proportionate 200 from the city of Jerusalem.
>
> All the Moslems of these districts were greatly disturbed and knew not what to do. Coming together, some of them decided to revolt, saying: "It is far better to die with our arms in our hands than to give our beloved children to everlasting slavery, without the hope of ever seeing them again."[777]

Mindful of the Egyptian experience, Constantinople largely spared Palestine from general recruitment campaigns for a decade after its reconquest of the Egyptian territory. The peasants of the highlands sought to escape isolated recruitment actions through active and passive resistance, fleeing to the Bedouin, and, in extreme cases, through self-mutilation. Mrs. Finn wrote of a *shaykh* from Maliha who brought his younger brother to the English hospital in Jerusalem in the 1840s; a doctor was asked to remove part of the young man's thumb to exempt him from military service, and when the doctor refused, the young man cut it off himself. "Fond of fighting as the fellaheen are when they can fight in their own fashion, and upon their own native mountains," commented the author, "they abhor being taken away from home to be put into the regular army, subjected to drill, and compelled to wear a uniform."[778] However, the will for collective revolt was broken in the 1860s when the regular Ottoman levies started. Only in Jabal al-Khalil did the people rally, in 1862, behind a certain 'Amr to offer organized resistance to recruitment.[779]

On paper, according to the *tanzimat* laws, all Muslim men between the ages of 20 and 40 had to serve at least five years in the regular army (*nizam*); afterwards they belonged for two years to the active reserve (*ihtiyat*), seven years to the inactive reserve (*redif*), and eight years to the "militia" (*mustahfiz*). In each campaign, conscripts could buy themselves free for one year. In 1845 the ransom sum was set at 150 pounds and then reduced several times. In the 1870s only 50 pounds were demanded. In principle, non-Muslims eligible for recruitment had to pay 50 pounds in military exemption tax. This sum was not imposed by lottery on a few unlucky victims, but levied on all non-Muslim men between ages 20 and 40; in 1875, the age range of those required to pay was extended by decree to include all men between the ages of 15 and 75. The collection of the required sums fell to the community leaders.[780] In the early 1870s the non-Muslims of Jerusalem were released from payment of the military exemption tax because, like the residents of Mecca and Medina, they lived in a "Holy City." This was rescinded in 1875, however. Among the Christians, the monasteries stepped in and paid the required amounts in a lump sum for their particular communities.[781] (Tables 44 and 48 cover only these military exemption taxes of the non-Muslims; the sums which the recruitment officers collected from Muslims flowed directly into the account of the War Ministry in Constantinople or, even more directly, into the pockets of the officers themselves.)

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[777] Spyridon, pp. 89f.

[778] *SWP, Special Papers*, p. 334; see also Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 316; Finn, *Palestine Peasantry*, pp. 14–18; Hoffmann, "Einiges über die Fellachen," pp. 94–96.

[779] See above, p. 237.

The number of recruited Muslims of military age depended on the political and military situation. Lots were drawn to determine who was conscripted. For the members of the commissions assigned this task, this procedure was a prized source of income. The first major, systematic recruitment campaign after the Crimean War appears to have been conducted in Palestine in the year 1862. In the entire country, somewhat more than 1,000 men were to be levied, including 34 from Jerusalem and environs.[782] For some months this campaign kept the country in suspense. To the Europeans the recruitment regulations seemed very mild, as only a few of the young men 20 to 25 years old were to be conscripted, while only sons and sole breadwinners of a family were spared, and one could ransom oneself with 10,000 piasters. But the populace saw it differently. On the one hand, the recruitment was carried out with great arbitrariness, and on the other hand it was assumed that the recruits who were led away would probably not return home. The peasants therefore fled in hordes to the east and south to the Bedouin. Many self-mutilations were recorded (chopping off of the right thumb, blinding one eye). They dug up their last piasters to bribe officials. Those overtaken by fate tried to flee while in the barracks or en route to the ports.[783]

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[780] See "Die Askarie oder Soldatensteuer," *HL*, XXX (1886), pp. 199–201; Young, V, pp. 275–77; Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms," pp. 430–32.

[781] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2401 (Jerusalem, 16 July 1875); *Die Warte*, 26 August 1875; *HL*, XXX (1886), p. 200.

[782] HHSTA–PA XII, box 77 (Jerusalem, 6 March 1862); Finn's numbers were 1,090 and 33; PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1676 (Jerusalem, 1 November 1862). Regarding the recruitments in Syria in the early 1850s see Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 81–86.

[783] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1676 (Near Solomon's Pools, 9 October 1862; Jerusalem, 1 November 1862); Furrer, pp. 121 and 137.

In Jaffa, 300,000 piasters, collected by Muslim urban notables, were alleged to have been given to the general who was in the city in June 1862 to raise recruits. Therefore, when 55 men were assembled to draw lots, only one drew the dreaded black card; all the rest drew a white card, that is, they were spared. Of course there were worries that the general might "forget" that he had received such a high bribe and repeat the entire exercise.[784]

In the *pashaliq* of Acre, originally 324 recruits were supposed to be raised. According to the investigations of the British consul in Haifa, Sandwith, 262 men were recruited, and 103 ransomed themselves for 10,000 piasters each (see table 50). However, to the 1,030,000 piasters in cash that the action brought in, at least another 400,000 piasters in bribes should be added—overall a sum that weighed heavily on the rural populace.[785]

In the summer and autumn of 1863, the recruitment campaign also provoked great unrest in Palestine. Again, Jabal al-Khalil was the area of the country where resistance was the most stubborn.[786] Sandwith again conducted a thorough research into the recruitment campaign of 1864–65 in the *pashaliq* of Acre. One out of ten men of "recruiting age" was

Table 50: Result of recruitment in the *pashaliq* of Acre in July 1862.

District	Number of recruits	Number ransoming themselves for 10,000 piasters	Total
Acre	15	1	16
Sahil Acre [Plain of Acre]	21	7	28
Jabal [highlands]	22	7	29
Shaghur	29	11	40
Safad	21	13	34
Tiberias	38	2	40
Nazareth	41	32	73
Shafa'amr	12	15	27
Haifa	63	15	78
Total	262	103	365

Source: PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 727 (Haifa, 5 December 1862).

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[784] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1692 (Jaffa, 11 June 1862); regarding the lottery see Baldensperger, "The Immovable East," *PEFQS*, 1906, pp. 17f.; Nimr, III, pp. 8f.; Ramini, pp. 92f.

[785] PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 727 (Haifa, 5 December 1862).

[786] *HL*, VII (1863), pp. 100f.; PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1752 (Jerusalem, 16 and 29 September and 28 October 1863).

supposed to be conscripted. In the Nazareth district, 587 men were supposed to draw lots, but only 133 actually did so. Of these, 56 held a ticket that condemned them to military service. Only three actually reported, the rest bought themselves out of it for 10,000 piasters each. (Table 51 shows how the individual localities were affected unequally by this system of recruitment.)

In the Haifa district, Sandwith lamented that he had not received such detailed information again, as the authorities had grown suspicious. The recruitment there brought the following results: From 26 villages, 87 recruits were demanded; 31 reported, 16 bought their way out, 40 fled. The Acre district provided over 200 recruits, although 150 bought their way out. The consul described the "preliminary selection" in the Haifa district as follows: First the young men caught in the villages were put in jail in Haifa. Through three Muslim notables of the city, who "cooperated" with the military doctor and the recruitment officers, it was then

Table 51: Result of recruitment in the district of Nazareth, October 1864 to February 1865.

Place	Number supposed to draw lots	Number who drew lots	Number of recruits to be raised	Number who drew lots requiring service
Nazareth	109	5	10	2
Saffuriyya	130	50	13	23
Rayna	20	6	2	3
Mashad	20	9	2	3
Kafr Kanna	25	7	2 1/2	3
Tur'an	37	8	3 3/4	3
Ba'ina	17	4	1 3/4	1
'Azir	14	—	1 1/2	—
Rummana	3	—	1/3	—
Kaukab	10	—	1	—
Kafr Manda	17	3	1 3/4	2
'Ayn Mahil	10	2	1	1
Dabburiyya	35	1	3 1/2	1
Iksal	35	—	3 1/2	—
Yafa	26	10	2 2/3	4
Mujaydil	37	12	3 3/4	6
Ma'lul	20	9	2	2
'Aylut	22	7	2 1/4	2
Total	587	133	58	56

Source: PFO-F.O. 78, vol. 1872 (Haifa, 21 February 1865).

possible for the relatives of the prisoners to free them with a *baqshish* of 1,000 to 3,000 piasters before the lottery was held, by having the military doctor find them unsuitable. Many peasants had to go into debt with local merchants in order to raise the *baqshish*. According to his research, the merchants advanced a total of 150,000 piasters for these bribes.[787]

However, the recruitment campaigns of the 1860s and early 1870s, which were simultaneously taxation actions by the War Ministry, were only a preliminary to what was to befall the population of Palestine in the second half of the 1870s because of the wars in the Balkans and against Russia. According to the British consulate in Damascus, 115,000 men were recruited in the Syrian provinces in 1877–78.[788] Consul Moore in Jerusalem spoke of 12,000 war participants from the *liwa'* of Jerusalem alone, of whom no more than a quarter had returned in the summer of 1879.[789] According to Yusuf al-Khalidi, Palestine and the Balqa' had a total of more than 10,000 war dead to mourn.[790] These were orders of magnitude unprecedented in the country's history. As the non-Muslims were not affected by it, and since the Muslim middle and upper class bought their way out of military service, it was mainly the poorer Muslim countryfolk who had to shoulder the burden of the war. Their plight and their despair are described in many reports. More than half of the able-bodied men, from many villages, fought in the war.

From spring 1876 to January 1878, one transport after another left Palestine, some on Turkish warships, some on regular and chartered steamers of the Austrian Lloyd lines. The port cities swarmed with soldiers. The look of the recruits was not likely to inspire enthusiasm:

> The mounted soldiers fetch the men in question from their villages and rope them to one another. From here [Jerusalem] they are likewise bound together in rows. Many of them have their hands tied together behind their backs by the thumbs with string. At the side of a row is a horseman, to whose horse the flank man is tied by a rope, usually around his neck.[791]

Initially came the levy of the normal contingents. As early as the summer of 1876, the authorities started with the transport of the inactive reserve; then they went after the militia. At the beginning, the price of a recruit's freedom was the legal 50 pounds (plus *baqshish*). Soon the country was so drained that freedom could be purchased with only 30 or 40 pounds. By the end of 1876 the first return transports of wounded were already reaching Jaffa. While in the spring and summer of 1878 almost every arriving steamer had war casualties from Europe on board, the regular recruits (i.e., the new yearly contingents) were already being shipped to Yemen.[792] The recruits of the years 1876–80 were then again sent to Rumelia and Thessaly. In the levies of early 1881 we hear of "excesses" against recruiting officers and of the spirit of resistance born of soldiers' experience during the war against the Russians.[793]

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[787] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1872 (Haifa, 21 February 1865).

[788] Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria," p. 379. Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, p. 321, spoke of 150,000 men from Syria and Palestine.

[789] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2992 (Jerusalem, 30 July 1879). Murad, the German consul at Jaffa, reported in his quarterly reports from the summer of 1876 to the beginning of 1878 a total of more than 10,000 *nizam*, *redif*, and *mustahfiz* transported from Jaffa; see source information in note 792.

[790] See above p. 250.

[791] *Die Warte*, 22 June 1876.

Palestine was not a theater of war, but from 1876 to 1878 the country took part in major wars for the first time since the rebellion against the Egyptians (1834) or since their expulsion. The populace could rejoice just as little over the ability of the Ottoman authorities to raise a mass levy as it could over the greater effectiveness of the tax administration. Were those really their wars for which soldiers from Palestine had to die in the Balkans and against Russia? Did they see in Russia an enemy who threatened them? Assuredly many doubtful questions were asked. Much indicates that the more or less forcibly recruited Palestinians did not return home as Ottoman patriots, to the extent that they saw their homeland again at all. Naturally they wished for the sultan's victory over what Yusuf al-Khalidi called the "barbarians" in the north; but that Palestine had become embroiled in the war to such an extent was a calamity that provoked at least short-term resentment against Ottoman rule.

Unfortunately we have only a few sources that mention the development of political consciousness in Palestine during the period from 1856 to 1882. Nonetheless we shall try in the last chapter to trace Palestinian reactions to the Middle Eastern crises of the time.

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[792] Regarding recruitments in the years 1876–78 see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2494 (Jerusalem, 21 July 1876); vol. 2615 (Jerusalem, 15 March, 26 May, 9 June, 21 June, and 24 August 1877); PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1153 (Acre, 7 June 1877); MAE–CPC Jér. vol. 13 (Jerusalem, 18 January and 21 June 1877); ISA–DKJ, A.XXXIX.3. (Jaffa, 30 September 1876, 31 March, 30 June, 1 October, and 31 December 1877); A.XXXIX.4. (Jaffa, 1 April, 1 July, and 1 October 1878); HHSTA–PA XII, box 113 (Jerusalem, 11 August 1876); box 120 (Jerusalem, 20 June 1877); *Die Warte*, 22 June, 28 September, 28 December 1876; 18 January, 8 February, 22 February, 22 March, 12 April, 17 May, 28 June, and 20 December 1877; 17 January and 21 March 1878; *HL*, XXI (1877), pp. 92f.; *HL*, XXII (1878), pp. 53f.; *NNM*, 21 (1877), pp. 101–103; *NNM*, 22 (1878), pp. 25f.; Brugger, pp. 83f.; *SWP*, *Special Papers*, p. 335.

[793] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 3131 (Jerusalem, 21 July 1880); HHSTA–Archive Konst., Consular Reports, Beirut 1880–1894 (Beirut, 7 December 1880); ISA–DKJ, A.III.9. (Jerusalem, 16 February and 1 March 1881; Haifa, 16 February 1881).

11 Palestinian Reactions to Middle Eastern Crises

O Tempora, O Mores!

At dawn of 27 September 1855, twenty-one cannon shots announced to the awakening city of Jerusalem the fall of Sevastopol and with it the victory of the sultan over the archenemy Russia. To be sure, this victory was achieved only through the help of the Western European powers, above all France and England. Kamil Pasha, the governor of Jerusalem, was therefore ready to celebrate the victory with the European representatives. The English, Austrian, and Spanish consuls raised their national flags; "Thus was the Union Jack displayed officially in Jerusalem, the first British flag since Sir Sidney Smith had hoisted his in 1799."[794] The French tricolor was even raised with a 21-gun salute in the presence of the governor and the high officials and notables of the city "to compensate, as was announced, for the dishonour done to it in the City in 1843, when a Moslem mob, resenting the attempt to display any Christian flag in the Holy City, had risen, torn it down, and dragged it in the mud."[795]

In the afternoon a solemn *Te Deum* was celebrated in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, in which the French consul, the Ottoman governor, and the military commander of the city participated side by side. For three days and three nights the victory was celebrated in Jerusalem with illuminations, fireworks, thanksgiving services, cannon fire, and military spectacle. "Amid such exciting scenes who could refrain from asking, Is this Jerusalem? Any other city in the world it may be, but is it, can it be, Jerusalem?"[796]

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[794] Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 362.

[795] Ibid., p. 364.

After Kamil Pasha had accompanied the French consul to a *Te Deum*, he let the British representative know that he would also like to participate in a solemn divine service in Christ Church. This event took place on the Feast of the Epiphany, 6 January 1856. The bell pealed, the British flag waved, and the governor stood at the side of the British consul during the *Te Deum*, in his hand the Anglican Prayer Book in Turkish translation.[797] *O tempora, O mores!*

In the first half of April there were again numerous causes to celebrate. The birth of the French crown prince was proclaimed by cannon shots from the citadel, and Kamil Pasha again went with the French consul to a *Te Deum* in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. On 7 April the *Khatt-i Humayun* was solemnly proclaimed on the terrace of the governor's residence in the presence of the consuls and notables of the city. On 14 April the news of the conclusion of peace was announced and ingeniously celebrated with a military parade in the *maydan*. Military theater, the rumbles of cannon, and illuminations galore ensued.[798]

From September 1855 there had been one spectacle after another in Jerusalem, and the "allied consuls" enjoyed official attention as never before. The Europeans could hoist their flags, sound their bells, strike up their *Te Deums*, and show their uniforms to their heart's content. In 1855 the *Haram al-Sharif* (the holy district around the Dome of the Rock and the Aqsa Mosque) was made accessible to European visitors, a fact that was counted as a downright sensation by contemporaries.[799] A new day seemed to have dawned; on the basis of the war alliance, consular and missionary activities appeared henceforth without limits. The colleagues of the Jerusalem consuls and clerical dignitaries in the other cities of Palestine likewise wanted to share in the radiance of the new day. However, in Nablus the new order resulted in a confrontation.[800]

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[796] Ibid., p. 367; see also MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 6 October 1855); *Reminiscenses of Mrs. Finn*, pp. 142–47; *Die Warte*, 8 November, 15 November, and 20 December 1855.

[797] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 7 January 1856); Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, p. 406; *Reminiscenses of Mrs. Finn*, pp. 150f.

[798] *Reminiscenses of Mrs. Finn*, pp. 152–54; Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 375–77 and 381–83; MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 6 April 1856).

[799] See PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 8 May 1857); *Reminiscenses of Mrs. Finn*, pp. 128–32; Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 235–57; Mayer, pp. 236–43.

When Protestant Bishop Gobat received the news of the proclamation of the *Khatt-i Humayun* at Constantinople, he had nothing better to do than to pack up a small bell, rush to Nablus, and have it installed with the consent of the local governor over the Protestant school there. Some days later, on 2 April 1856, the French consular agent, the young Muhammad Amin al-Qasim, decorated his house with small flags to celebrate the birth of the crown prince. The British consular agent, the native Protestant 'Audah 'Azzam, wanted to do no less, and put little British flags on his house.

Two days later (on Friday, 4 April), an English missionary with a loaded shotgun rode into Nablus. Attempting to fend off an importunate beggar, he fired a shot which struck and killed the man. For what then ensued we rely on the report of the British vice consul, Rogers, who was sent by Finn to Nablus on 6 April. This document may be biased and exaggerated as well; but it has the advantage of proximity to the events, and it is even refreshingly different from the stories, written later and from a distance, of "fanatic Nablus," a characterization that became a new theme in Palestine literature and that molded the image that the European travelers had had of the city's residents. In the following years, whoever arrived in Nablus with a European guidebook in hand would feel a shiver run down his spine.

According to the Rogers' report, the unfortunate missionary went with the relatives of the dead man to the office of the governor, Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi, who personally settled the matter, evidently without the missionary paying the *diya*, the blood money.[801] But the *'ulama'* allegedly were not satisfied with this solution and provoked the uprising. They supposedly forbade the burial until the *diya* had been paid, and closed the mosques (on a Friday!). Thereupon, a crowd of demonstrators went to the governor's seat and demanded that the missionary be handed over, which Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi naturally refused to do. Now the mob sought other targets: It looted and destroyed the houses of the French and British consular agents, the Protestant school, and the house of the English Protestant missionary, the Greek church, and the house of the Greek deacon. The house of the Prussian consular agent, on the other hand, was protected from the looters by the Muslim residents of the quarter. But worst of all, the father of the Prussian consular agent (Sa'id Qa'war, a native Protestant) was killed while visiting the house of 'Audah 'Azzam.

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[800] Regarding the events of April 1856 in Nablus see PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 10 April 1856—Report of Consul Finn; Jerusalem, 11 April 1856—Report of the missionary Lyde; Jerusalem, 14 April 1856—Investigation report of Vice Consul Rogers); PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1221 (Jaffa, 8 April 1856—Report of Consul Kayat); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem 17 May 1856—Translation of the report of Kamil Pasha); Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, pp. 377–80; Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 424–31; see also *Die Warte*, 8 and 15 May 1856 (In the atrocity story of the templar organ are reports not only of six dead Christians, but also of, among other things, the "horrible mistreatment" of women and children, while Consul Finn expressly emphasizes that nothing of the sort happened.); Mansur, pp. 88f.; Tibawi, *British Interests*, pp. 115f; Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 226f. (With numerous inaccuracies; he also uncritically accepts it from contemporary British authors that the Muslims of Nablus were "notorious for their conservative and intolerant spirit."); Carmel, *Christen als Pioniere*, pp. 97–100 (copy of a letter from Bishop Gobat to the British ambassador in Constantinople dated 8 November 1856 regarding events); Ramini, pp. 163f.

[801] See in this regard Albengo, pp. 1–11; *SWP*, *Special Papers*, pp. 343–45; Finn, *Palestine Peasantry*, pp. 32–36.

Whatever persons or groups of persons (whether the *'ulama'* or, as mentioned above, the Tuqan) were to be held responsible for this outbreak of violence and vandalism, the most significant thing was the targets of the "popular rage": consular and missionary buildings. Probably those who moved through Nablus destroying and looting did not know the precise content of the *Khatt-i Humayun* and its potential consequences, although the edict had already been read in Nablus. But they had gathered that the Europeans were trying to change their traditional order. The missionaries' bells and the consular agents' flags had shown them the way when they looked for an object to lend drastic expression to their misgivings. What the Europeans planted as symbols of their political and religious claims, they aptly saw as symbols of external dangers. Therefore, contemporary observers were correct to see the events in Nablus as a Muslim reaction to the fact that the consuls—and under their wing the native Christians—were presuming all too much after the proclamation of the reform edict.[802] The events are to be classified with other examples of general protest against the domestic-policy consequences of the foreign-policy alliances of the Ottoman Empire.

In Nablus, however, great qualms immediately arose, as the people realized what had been done. Loot was secretly returned, and the city authorities and notables begged the French consular agent to put on the tricolor again. But Barrère, the French consul in Jerusalem, ordered that as long as the guilty parties were not punished, *"la ville de Naplouze est indigne de l'honneur de voir flotter sur notre agence consulaire le drapeau de la France."*[803]

Thus Nablus had to go without the honor of viewing the tricolor for a time. But the great punishment of the "guilty parties," whoever they might be, did not occur. This fact was for Consul Finn the start of all the evil that Palestine encountered up to the end of his tenure. For months, indeed for years on end, he entered in his reports again and again, the *ceterum censeo* that the evildoers of Nablus must still be brought to an accounting.[804] For the Ottoman authorities the argument, at least the argument with the English representatives, appeared to have been settled when in 1858 they paid the relatives of the dead beggar 10,000 piasters *diya* and the British consul general in Beirut 55,000 piasters in damages, which the authorities wanted to recover from the Nablus residents who were "involved." Also, a solemn hoisting of the British flag in Nablus was to take place, and it was promised that the culprits of the uprising would be strictly punished at a later time.[805] Possibly there were similar settlements with France and Prussia, but we know nothing about them.

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[802] Regarding the discriminating clothing and behavior regulations for Christians in Nablus in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Ramini, pp. 160f.

[803] "The city of Naplouze is unworthy of the honor of seeing the flag of France fluttering over our consular agency." MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Jerusalem, 17 May 1856).

Gaza, likewise a largely Muslim town, which had recently been blessed with a "consular corps," gained the reputation of being an especially "fanatical" place in 1856 and 1858. In 1856 there were Austrian, English, Persian, and Prussian consular agents in the city. The "representative of Prussia," the Greek Orthodox merchant and landholder Ya'qub Ibrahim Madbak, had bombarded the consulate in Jerusalem since autumn 1855 with complaints about the city authorities. In October 1856 he complained in particular that the consular agents and their protégés had to submit to unjustified tax demands of the *qa'im maqam*.[806]

Finn wrote dramatic reports of alleged attacks on Christians[807] in general and underhanded dealings against consular agents in particular. The governor of Jerusalem had received a petition from Gaza to the effect that the city did not require agents of foreign powers. Finn therefore categorically demanded that the *qa'im maqam*, the mufti, and Khalil Shawwa from Gaza be brought to an accounting.[808] However this demand appears to have remained ineffectual.

In the summer of 1858, nevertheless, a major incident took place after a group of Muslim zealots, referring to old legal strictures, destroyed the gate of the Greek Orthodox monastery in protest against structural changes to the monastery and paint work on the church. The governor of Jerusalem rode hurriedly to Gaza and (according to the account of the French consul) brought nine *'ulama'* and city notables whom he had seized back home with him, in order to detain them for a time in Jerusalem as punishment. In a report to Constantinople, the Austrian consul suggested that the dispatch of a warship to Palestinian waters might do some good, because of the unrest and the irritated mood among the Muslims.[809]

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[804] In June 1856, he handed over to the embassy in Constantinople a list of the evildoers in English and Arabic: 13 *'ulama'*, including the Mufti, who had come together with a certain *shaykh* Salah—the riot had started with this group; 5 "suspects," including 'Abd al-Fattah Agha al-Nimr, as well as his son and brother, who nevertheless had distinguished themselves in protecting the missionary later on, 12 culprits, who had destroyed the house of the English consular agent and killed Qa'war there: PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 524 (Jerusalem, 6 June 1856).

[805] Testa, VI, pp. 49f. (Note of Consul General Moore to Khurshid Pasha dated 17 April 1858 and his reply); Rogers, *La Vie Domestique*, p. 380; Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, II/1, p. 180.

[806] See ten reports in ISA–DKJ, A.VIII.4.

[807] At that time in Gaza there was no actual Christian quarter; see Rafiq, *Ghazza*, pp. 38f.

[808] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1217 (Jerusalem, 1 September 1856) and vol. 1218 (Jerusalem, 7 and 10 November 1856); PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 524 (Gaza, 8 December 1856); ISA–BCJ, J22/1 (21 August 1856).

This contemporary consular assessment of events may appear exaggerated to us, but they were symptoms of a general unrest in Palestine as a consequence of the forced European penetration. We know (from the work of Davison and Ma'oz, among others) that the 1856 reform edict encountered the resistance of Muslims, who viewed it as a serious assault by Europe on traditional social life as it created a privileged position for the protégés of the increasingly determined consuls, and that the edict was not exactly received with enthusiasm by non-Muslims either. Their clerical dignitaries lamented the curtailment of their previous authoritarian powers (in particular the right of laymen to have a say in the "administration of worldly matters" of the various religious communities), while the ordinary non-Muslim taxpayers initially feared recruitment, and then complained, when it turned out that there was no intention of that, that the new military exemption taxes were more oppressive than the old head tax.[810] The regulations of the edict could therefore be implemented only very slowly in Palestine as well.

It was mainly Consul Finn who meticulously recorded all examples of the new alienation between Christians and Muslims, and also between the Muslim populace and the Ottoman authorities. The Muslims showed a defiant attitude against "Turkey," which was reproached "that she is now adopted into the family of European nations" (through the 1856 Paris Peace Treaty).[811] Vice Consul Rogers reported in June 1858 a verbal confrontation with the *qadi* of Nazareth, who had uttered threats against a native Protestant from Kafr Kanna because he had admitted a Muslim to a Bible reading; the *qadi* pointed out that the penalty for apostasy was death. Rogers argued that the edict of 1856 granted freedom of conscience. The *qadi* replied that one had to obey the sultan only as long as his orders were in accord with the *shari'a*.[812] Even a common camel driver, according to Finn, had stated to an English protégé living near Jerusalem that the country no longer could be considered to belong to the Turkish sultan, as he had made illegal concessions to the Christians.[813]

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[809] See PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem 20 July, 22 July, and 19 August 1858); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 6 (Jerusalem, 3 August 1858); HHSTA–PA XII, box 64 (Jerusalem, 22 July 1858).

[810] In 1856 an attempt was made to exact 5,000 piasters individually from Christians and Jews for nonrecruitment; see ISA–BCJ, J22/15 (Acre, 7 August 1856); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 5 (Rapport du Commandant Bonie, Autumn 1856).

[811] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 22 July 1857).

[812] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Haifa, 18 June 1858); see *Die Warte*, 19 May 1859 in this regard.

In a sense, even the governor, Thurayya Pasha, swam in this current. He confided to Finn's dragoman that he considered it his mission to roll back the European influence. "Because Europeans are Christians, and Europeans are to be checked, the independence of the Turkish Empire is to consist in the independence of Mohammedanism."[814] There was now much talk of independence; the natives had their own ideas of that, however: "namely, not the independent action of central Ottoman dominion in reference to European and other Powers, but independence of the natives from Turkish control over them, the Turks being now looked upon as Europeans—'one of the European family of nations.'"[815]

Thus the Ottomans were reproached because they had entered into cooperation with the European powers, and thus shared responsibility for the growing influence of the Europeans in the provinces. The native Christians had occasion to feel ill at ease about this development. They had placed unrealistically high expectations in the new *tanzimat* era and acted all too boldly, at least the European protégés among them. When they then encountered barriers, they complained that since 1856 things were worse for them than before.[816] Thus, Finn summarized, it was only the Christian subjects and merchants in the port cities who profited from the reforms.[817] The consular and missionary activities, and the attempts to implement the edict of 1856 through constant pressure on the authorities "in the European spirit," in many areas led mainly to tension and disputes.

The Trauma of 1860

When the news arrived in June 1860 of the battles in Lebanon, and in July of the bloodbath in Damascus, the events were recorded by the Europeans and the native Christians in Palestine initially as one great massacre of Christians. What had started small in Nablus now appeared to have reached a terrible climax in Damascus. We have already seen that a mood of panic reigned, particularly among the Christian population of Galilee, and that 'Aqil Agha was engaged there as "protector of the Christians."

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[813] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 8 July 1858).

[814] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 8 November 1858).

[815] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1384 (Jerusalem, 13 September 1858).

[816] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1383 (Jerusalem, 8 November 1858).

[817] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1454 (Jerusalem, 1 January 1859).

But neither in Galilee nor elsewhere in Palestine did a spark of the Damascus fire leap over.

To be sure, wild rumors circulated, started not least of all by the Europeans in the country—of course, the Ottoman authorities and the local upper class were thought to be capable of the worst[818] — but as even Finn recognized, the fears were entirely groundless. The Jerusalem *effendi*s, for example, had much too great a material interest in the Christian pilgrims and institutions to foment unrest. In addition they feared that once the peasants had fallen on the Christians, they would then turn on their real enemies, the *effendi*s.[819] The rural population was in turmoil because Palestine was being flooded by European Christians of all types.[820]

When the news of the punishment of Fu'ad Pasha in Damascus reached Jerusalem, Finn once more applied his *ceterum censeo.* He suggested to the British consul general in Beirut that Fu'ad should also scourge those who had transgressed in Nablus and Gaza in 1856.[821] This remained an impious wish.

Events in Lebanon and in Damascus appear to have acted as a cold shower, as it were, throughout the Syrian provinces. The atmosphere of nervousness and irritation of the years 1853–60, during which the disempowerment of most of the local lords was also effected, began to relax. In a time of economic boom, the Ottoman authorities set about the implementation of administrative reforms. Palestinian society appeared to come to terms with the course of events, including the increasing European penetration. A certain composure, indeed a feeling of living in a time of construction and "progress," began to spread.

But the Europeans in the country, and their native protégés, continued to feel the shock of 1860 in their bones. Therefore in the mid-1870s, on the basis of the financial ruin and threat to the very existence of the Ottoman Empire, when belief in "progress" began to waver, and a new, protracted crisis period began, the recollection of 1860 contributed a great deal to exacerbate the mood in the country. The 1875–76 uprisings and wars in the Balkans, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, and the British occupation of Egypt found a lively echo in Palestine.

As early as the start of 1876, Consul Moore reported from Jerusalem that the Muslim upper class was profoundly disturbed by the situation in the Balkans and in general by the intensifying European pressure on the Porte.[822] Events such as the murder of the French and German consuls at Salonika in May 1876, together with the vivid memory of the events of

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[818] See *Reminiscenses of Mrs. Finn*, pp. 218–23; HHSTA–Archive Jaffa, file 1 (Jaffa, 23 July 1860).

[819] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1521 (Jerusalem, 31 July 1860).

[820] Ibid. (Jerusalem, 14 August 1860).

[821] Ibid. (Jerusalem, 12 September 1860).

[822] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2494 (Jerusalem, 17 February 1876).

1860, led to a panic on 2 June 1876 among the Christian populace of Jerusalem. It was said that bullets had been issued to the police troops. Thereupon the rumor suddenly spread that a Christian massacre was to be staged after the Friday prayer. The Christians hastily locked up their houses and shops and fled to the monasteries. The Muslim notables of the city saw themselves compelled to send a memorandum to the governor in which they hotly disputed that there was any animosity against the Christian residents of the city.[823] Fear and uneasiness among the native Christians and the Europeans were reported also from Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa.[824] In Haifa the local populace in particular made no secret of their dislike of the German colonists. According to a report of the Jerusalem consulate, "a virtual state of war" reigned there in July 1876.[825]

In the spring of 1877 the irritation reached a new height. In Lydda the Muslim populace participated in the Russo–Turkish War by breaking the windows of St. George's Church and throwing in garbage. In the market of Ramla, a *shaykh* delivered diatribes against the "unbelievers." In Acre, the call to battle against the unbelievers resulted in threats and abuse of the Christian populace. The German consul in Jerusalem sent a letter to the governor in which he demanded that energetic steps be taken. This was ultimately a political war, not a common religious war. In Lydda a large number of persons were arrested, to the satisfaction of the Europeans.[826]

Naturally there are numerous detailed reports concerning these events, which can only be mentioned here briefly, in the consular documents. An especially large number of documents resulted from an incident in Haifa at the end of June 1880. A Christian wedding procession was attacked by Muslims. There were casualties, among them Christian notables of the city. The British consular agent (the German national Dr. Schmidt) immediately howled "massacre of Christians." Muslim notables were identified as the alleged instigators, among them the merchants Sa'id al-Khatib and Khalil Maghribi. Under European pressure the authorities had to "crack down hard." Three dozen persons were arrested and sent to jail in Acre. Guilty verdicts and sentences of up to 24 months were brought against 45 persons. However, the prosecutor in this case was a Christian

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[823] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2494 (Jerusalem, 4, 10, and 30 June 1876); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 13 (Jerusalem, 7 June 1876); ISA–DKJ, A.III.8. (Jerusalem, 5 June 1876); HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 57 (Jerusalem, 5 June 1876); *HL*, XX (1876), pp. 85–87.

[824] PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1113 (Acre, 20 June and 26 October 1876); ISA–DKJ, A.III.8. (Jaffa, 9 June and 30 December 1876).

[825] ISA–DKJ, A.III.8. (Jerusalem, 22 July 1876).

[826] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 2615 (Jerusalem, 4 and 18 May 1877); PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1153 (Acre, 15 April, 19 April, and 7 June 1877); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 13 (Jerusalem, 10 May 1877); ISA–DKJ, A.III.8. (Jerusalem, 5 May 1877; Jaffa, 4 and 9 May 1877); *Die Warte*, 7 June 1877; see also HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 216 (Beirut, 14 April and 14 May 1877); and *HL*, XXI (1877), pp. 93f.

(Salim Milki); therefore the verdicts, aimed "one-sidedly against the Muslims," caused bad blood. They had to be reviewed, and a number of the convicted, among them, naturally, the notables, were freed on appeal.[827]

In another incident at Ramla in early November 1881, a Muslim crowd attacked the Franciscan monastery because the monks, with approval of the authorities, were building a new monastery gate. These structural alterations could not be borne. Because of the intervention of the French consulate, here again they had to "crack down hard." Thus the chief of the municipality and the *khatib* of the local mosque each received jail terms of a month. The French representative reported proudly that this was perhaps the first time that a *khatib* was jailed in Palestine.[828]

What did these and similar incidents mean? First it should be noted that the alarm signals of the Europeans and local Christians ("massacre," "persecution," "hatred of Christians") by no means corresponded to the realities. The consuls tended to cite the European warships, which cruised Palestinian waters more and more frequently, to explain the fact that there had been no serious incidents. Was the explanation "still" (two decades after the proclamation of the reform edict of 1856) to be sought in "Muslim fanaticism," which the Europeans strove with all their might to keep in check?

This explanation was in flagrant contradiction with the insights at which the consuls arrived when they issued less excited dispatches, and with the discoveries of Palestine researchers who studied "popular life in the land of the Bible" (Bauer) of that time. Thus, Finn wrote in his report for the year 1856 that regardless of the events at Nablus and despite appearances to the contrary, there were few countries in the world in which so much practical religious tolerance was practiced as in Palestine.[829] Many observers extolled the "synchretism"[830] of the inhabitants of the "Holy Land" which was demonstrated above all in daily Christian and Muslim religious life. For this same reason, the Austrian representative lamented the low level of both Muslim and Christian religious life in the country. Muslims had their children baptized in Greek churches in order to allow them to share in the blessing of the Christian God. The

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[827] PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1306 (ten reports from Schmidt in Haifa, from Dickson in Beirut and from the commander of the British warship "Bittern" from 28 June to 9 September 1880); AA–I.A.B.q. (Turkey) 140 (a file just for the incident!); HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 232 (Beirut, 3 July, 18 July, and 1 August 1880; Haifa, 28 June and 11 July 1880); *Die Warte*, 12 August 1880.

[828] MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 14 (Jerusalem, 3 November, 17 November, and 1 December 1881).

[829] PRO–F.O. 78, vol. 1294 (Jerusalem, 1 January 1857).

[830] Bauer, *Volksleben*, pp. 224f.

Greek priests appeased their consciences in such "baptisms" by immersing only hands and feet in the water. In return, at least in the countryside, Christians attended mosques without pang of conscience.[831]

Numerous studies were published about the "religion of the *fellahin*" of Palestine, the forms of superstition, the veneration of the saints, local cults, and "local divinities."[832] The upshot for the Europeans was always that the *fellahin* were practically heathens,[833] that they were Muslims in name only.[834] "The so-called Moslem is found worshipping at shrines consecrated to Jewish, Samaritan, Christian, and often Pagan memories . . . . It is in the worship at these shrines that the religion of the peasantry consists. Moslem by profession, they often spend their lives without entering a mosque, and attach more importance to the favor and protection of the village *Mukam* than to Allah himself, or to Mohammed his prophet."[835] (On the *SWP* map about 300 *maqamat* [shrines] were marked; Musil counted over 80 such shrines in Gaza and environs.)[836]

The local *maqamat* and the local veneration of "holy men" thus were seen as the quintessence of *fellahin* religiosity, as an expression of the local, unorthodox, indeed "un-Muslim" faith and notional world of the Palestinian rural populace above all.[837] Nonetheless, when needed, the prejudice of the "Muslim fanatics" who were always inclined to a Christian massacre was invoked without hesitation.

One must note, however, that the incidents played up by the Europeans usually occurred in cities in which the institutionalized orthodoxy rested on more stable foundations. But the long tradition of religious "live and let live," even in the Palestinian cities, was by no means shaken. Socio-religious coexistence in a small land on which the attention of members of three world religions was focused was also a necessity of life. This applied especially to Jerusalem. Mention has already been made of the genuine religious tolerance of its temporary mayor Yusuf al-Khalidi. Counted among the signs of "progress" in Jerusalem also was "the construction of a Freemason lodge, in which Mohammedans also participated."[838] However, coexistence with non-Muslims proved fatal for one other prominent *effendi*, the *naqib al-Ashraf* 'Abd al-Muttalib al-'Alami. He secretly took religious instruction from the Latin patriarch and subsequently was baptized in Rome (1870). According to a sort of hagiography that *La Terre Sainte* published, he entered the military service of Pius IX, to fall later on as a "soldier of Jesus Christ" in Spain.[839] If in this case the climate of Jerusalem led to personal adventurism, the tradition followed in 1861 with great extravagance of handing over the keys to the city for a brief time to the Jewish residents at the death of a sultan,[840] was an indication of respect for Jewish feelings toward Jerusalem.

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[831] HHSTA–Archive Jer., file 43 (Jerusalem, 3 October 1861).

[832] See Baldensperger, "Religion of the Fellahin"; also, "Folklore Palestinien"; Bauer, *Volksleben*, pp. 219–32; Canaan, *Mohammedan Saints*; Clermont-Ganneau, *La Palestine Inconnue*, pp. 50–55; Conder, *Tent Work*, II, pp. 218–35; Lees, pp. 16–29; Jaussen, chapter VI.

[833] Lees, p. 20.

[834] Finn, *A Third Year*, p. 222.

[835] Conder in *PEFQS*, 1877, pp. 89f.; see also *SWP*, *Special Papers*, pp. 258–73 and 315–30.

[836] Musil, II/1, p. 199; for Jabal Nablus see Nimr, IV, pp. 164–80.

[837] In general the activities of the "dervishes" were also counted in this. Regarding *sufis* and "saints" in Palestine in the time in question here, see Baldensperger, "Orders of Holy Men"; Bliss, chapter 5; van Ess; de Jong; Pierotti in *TS*, 1875/6/7/8, pp. 269–71; Saintine, pp. 174–76; "A Zikr Ceremony," *PEFQS*, 1882, pp. 160–63; see also Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 208; Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, pp. 299f.; *Die Warte*, 17 May 1877; Oliphant, *Haifa*, pp. 141f.

The political and military crises of the Ottoman Empire were thus experienced intensely in Palestine, especially in the cities. Political tensions and atmospheric aggravation led repeatedly to unfortunate incidents, which looked a great deal as if they derived from religious antagonism. But basically it was rather clear to most Europeans who reported on it that these were undifferentiated, unconsidered forms of expression of a feeling of social and political menace from without. The patronizing European political treatment and military menace to the Middle East, and the protection and privileges given to native, mainly Christian, "bridgeheads" of Europe, formed the background. But when the Europeans and their protégés in the second half of the seventies and at the start of the eighties still feared the worst from the Muslims, this was not the expression of the socio-religious reality in Palestine, but of the trauma of 1860.

Sympathies for 'Urabi

We have already seen that during the decades under study there was a many-voiced choir calling for the colonization and occupation of Palestine by European powers. A parallel theme that appears in the Palestine literature is that the population wished nothing more ardently than an end to the corrupt, inept, and oppressive rule of the Ottomans. Again and again the comment was voiced that the inhabitants of the country identified much more with other Arabs than with the "Turks." *"Leurs sympathies sont toutes pour l'Egypte,"* asserted the French consul in 1868.[841] In connection with the "disempowerment" of the Khalidis in Jerusalem in 1879, the German consul described (as already mentioned) how much the Egyptian regime was mourned.[842] But these were scarcely more than scattered sentiments without specific political force, no more than statements of displeasure about the nature and the effects of Ottoman rule.

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[838] Wolff, *Sieben Artikel*, p. 108; regarding Freemasons in Palestine see Morris, passim, especially pp. 212, 215–18, 259, 266f., 310, 386, and 416f.; Zaydan, *Tarikh al-masuniyya*, pp. 200f.

[839] *TS*, 1875/6/7/8, p. 84 ("Un Fils de Pacha Converti au Catholicisme et Mort Glorieusement"); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 9 (Jerusalem, 28 March 1867); vol. 10 (Jerusalem, 2 February and 24 March 1870).

[840] Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, pp. 117f.; Pierotti's description of the ceremony in the year 1861 in *TS*, 1875/6/7/8, p. 307; Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions*, pp. 75–77.

This dissatisfaction could also be vented in sighs such as: "Oh, if we were only ruled by the Europeans!" It was mainly English contemporaries who constantly misinterpreted such sighs as earnest wishes for European (specifically English) rule,[843] especially since they disputed the existence of any patriotism among the Palestinian populace.[844] However, such a finding was valid only to the extent that the European authors understood the term "patriotism" as national consciousness and nationalism by European lights. If there had to be a test of the alleged "longing for Christian/European rule" at all, the British occupation of Egypt was instructive. Where were the Arabs of Palestine who applauded the British?

All reports[845] speak unanimously of the sympathy, indeed the high expectations, with which the population of Palestine followed the endeavors of the Egyptians. Even though they generally behaved calmly and discreetly, in their hearts they were entirely on the side of 'Urabi, the Egyptian folk hero, who also enjoyed great sympathy in Palestine. The events in Egypt raised the self-esteem of the country's Muslims, and the national Arab movement had influence even among the rural populace. "It is quite certain," Consul Moore stated, "that the native Moslems profoundly sympathized with Arabi, both as a Mohammedan fighting against unbelievers, and more especially, as the champion of the Arab Mussulman race, upon whose success they based possibilities affecting the future of their race other than the mere repelling of the invasion of Egypt."[846] Miklasiewicz reported, in his own characteristic language, from Safad that because of events in Egypt the Muslims had "fallen into such evil and wildness, that one cannot deal with them, or hear a good word from them." They revealed a hostile attitude toward the British and French, "while on the other hand they are even idolizing the name of Arabi Pasha and writing various triumphal poems in his praise."[847]

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[841] "Their sympathies were entirely with Egypt." MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 10 (Jerusalem, 22 December 1868).

[842] ISA–DKJ, A.III.9. (Jerusalem, 13 October 1879). Regarding the "good memory" of Ibrahim Pasha in folk stories from Bir Zayt, ssee Schmidt and Kahle, pp. 16–23.

[843] See Finn, *Stirring Times*, I, p. 249 and II, pp. 179f.; Conder, *Tent Work I*, pp. 97f. and II, p. 332; Conder, "The Present Condition," p. 13; Conder, *Heth and Moab*, p. 374; Warren, *Underground Jerusalem*, p. 451; Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead*, p. 337; *Die Warte*, 23 October 1879.

[844] See Finn, *Stirring Times*, II, pp. 177f.; Finn, *Home in the Holy Land*, pp. 173–75; Lees, pp. 38f.; *SWP*, *Special Papers*, pp. 332f; Finn, *Palestine Peasantry*, pp. 11f. and p. 68.

[845] See AA–Egypt 3, appendix 8, vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 4 and 24 July 1882); vol. 2 (Jaffa, 14 August 1882, Jerusalem, 25 August and 6 September 1882); vol. 3 (Jerusalem, 19 September 1882); PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1412 (Jerusalem, 29 July and 23 September 1882); ISA–BCJ, J22/22 (Gaza, 24 September 1882); MAE–CPC Jér., vol. 15 (Jerusalem, 27 July, 30 July, 2 August, 23 August, 6 September, and 20 September 1882); HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 242 (Jerusalem, 23 July 1882); *Die Warte*, 20 July and 31 August 1882); *NNM*, 26 (1882) pp. 138f.

Not least because of the presence of refugees from Egypt in Gaza, Jaffa, and Lydda, there were minor incidents and verbal altercations with native Christians. But the Ottoman authorities strove as best they could to dampen the excitement and ensure that peace in the country was not disturbed. The governor of Jerusalem warned at the *Bayram* festival at the Dome of the Rock that the Europeans should be given no grounds for intervention, thereby referring to the events of 1860 in Syria.

The satisfaction of the British consul in Jerusalem corresponded to the dismay of the populace of Palestine over the defeat of 'Urabi on 13 September 1882 and the march of British troops into Cairo:

> It is evident that our rapid and brilliant successes have so impressed their minds that, short as has been the interval, their thoughts and feelings are fast subsiding into their old accustomed grooves. But one vivid impression has been produced which is likely to be as lasting as it is beneficial—an appreciation, namely, of the might and resources, material and scientific, of a great European Power, against which they now feel that it is not wise to contend, while there can be no doubt that our victorious campaign in its retributive aspect will be remembered as a powerful deterrent against those outbreaks of fanaticism which we have periodically to deplore, thereby rendering a service of inestimable value to the Christian populations of all Mussulman countries.[848]

The shortsighted interpretation of the battle as being against Muslim fanaticism and for the protection of Middle Eastern Christians had again repressed all deeper insights.

For the populace of Palestine, the battle of 'Urabi against the British represented only a brief episode of quickly disappointed expectations, which anyhow could not assume any specific form. They must most consciously have admired the attempt at self-assertion against expanding Europe that had been assailing the Ottoman Empire with increasing intensity since the mid-1870s. In retrospect, the British march into Cairo proved to be the start of a development that led in 1917 to the British march into Jerusalem. Between these developments lay the intensifying Jewish and/or Zionist colonization of Palestine, which became a more direct challenge to the Arabs of Palestine than the developments outside the borders of the country.

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[846] PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1412 (Jerusalem, 23 September 1882).

[847] HHSTA–PA XXXVIII, box 241 (Safad, 14 August 1882); regarding the mood in Nazareth, see Mansur, pp. 100f.

[848] PRO–F.O. 195, vol. 1412 (Jerusalem, 10 October 1882).

Even the first beginnings of Jewish settlement bore the seeds of later conflict. In 1870, Charles Netter from the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* founded the Mikveh Israel agricultural school southeast of Jaffa.[849] Through a *firman* of the sultan, he received land for the school which until then had been worked by the *fellahin* of the village of Yazur. "Though the land belongs to the Government, the Fellahin, from long usage, have got to look upon it as virtually their own, and resent its occupation by any other person." The peasants therefore became bitter enemies of the school farm.[850] In the late summer of 1870 the governor of Damascus visited Jaffa. Accompanied by Netter and the Templars Hoffmann and Ernst Hardegg, he also passed the village of Yazur:

> While riding between Natter's property and the city, the Wali was beset by Arab women and men who begged him, holding onto the reins of his mule, and onto his trousers, to help them regain their rights, the Jews were taking away their land; here they pointed at Natter, who rode next to the Wali, screaming "the Jews, the Jews." The Pasha, riding on the other side, asked Ernst for his riding crop and chased them away himself. The Wali accepted a petition handed him by a *shaykh*, incidently.[851]

Not until much later, however, would it become clear that in 1882 the stage had been set in two respects for the further development of Palestine, through the British occupation of Egypt and the start of the first Jewish *'aliya* from Eastern Europe.

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[849] See in this regard Chouraqui, pp. 357–63, 451–56, and 494f.

[850] *SWP*, *Samaria*, pp. 256f.

[851] *Die Warte*, 29 September 1870.

Conclusion

Paul Gauguin entitled his artistic testament, a monumental frieze completed in the year 1897 in Tahiti, *"D'où venons nous, que sommes nous, où allons nous?"* ["From where do we come, what are we, where are we going?"] The painter's questions can also be viewed as guidelines for historiographic reflection. First they may be referred to one's own society. But in analogous form, they can also express our interest in societies outside of Europe, provided such interest is not based merely on antiquarian or exotic appeal.

Our interest in Palestine in the nineteenth century is not only general in nature, however. It is directly linked to the historical and actual experience of the now more than 100-year-old Palestine conflict (since 1882). What characteristics did the Arab-Palestinian society exhibit before the immigration of European Jews? In what developmental process did it exist at that time? Can one discern burdensome or integrating elements of the historical heritage in the present? Despite all the catastrophes that have befallen Palestinian society in the twentieth century, can one discern lines of continuity, or at least islands of socio-cultural authenticity? Or were the breaks so basic that history can no longer offer an identity to today's Palestinians? The studies in this volume represent the raw material, as it were, which, together with many other studies of a similar nature, can facilitate reflection on the questions raised.

Against this general background, a particular interest determined the nature of the available studies on Palestine: the question of the specific impact of the European penetration and Ottoman centralization and reform policy during a limited phase of historical development in the Middle East. Here the accessible source material determined which individual aspects could be studied. Historians who pose other questions and utilize other sources (those who have access to the Turkish archives closed to me, for example) will expand and correct these studies.

Is there one striking main result of the work? In the introduction, milestones in the history of Palestine were placed within the framework of the overall development of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. I would like to retain their ordering and organizing function, hence also the dates 1856 and 1882. Naturally these dates do not mean abrupt breaks of course; indeed there were no revolutionary events. But during the phase thus delimited a decisive transformation did occur. If we visualize the history of Palestine from the start of the nineteenth century to the British occupation in 1917, the 1860s constitute a pivotal point in the economic and socio-political development of the country, dividing the final century of Ottoman rule into halves. Compared to the transformation period examined in this work, the ten-year Egyptian rule of 1831–40, the groping Ottoman reform attempts during the first *tanzimat* period, and the pre-Zionist and Zionist settlement undertakings since 1882, all brought about less incisive transformations. The decisive factors affecting the administrative-political reorganization and the socio-economic structural change in Palestine during the 1860s and 1870s were the breakthrough of the Ottoman reform and centralization policy on the one hand, and the European penetration, with the concomitant increased integration into the world economy, on the other.

Let us recapitulate the demographic, economic, and socio-political findings: In 1850 Palestine had about 350,000 inhabitants. Roughly two-thirds of the populace lived in 657 villages, about one-third in 13 cities or small towns. About 85 percent of the populace was Muslim. The Christians made up 11 percent; they were concentrated in the cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla, Haifa, Acre, and Nazareth as well as in the villages of the highlands around Jerusalem and in Lower and Upper Galilee. Less than 4 percent of the inhabitants of the land were Jews, who lived almost exclusively in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safad, and Tiberias. Until the middle of the 1860s the total population remained largely constant. There was a limited internal migration, of course, whereby the hinterland of Gaza and the highlands around Hebron experienced losses to emigration, while the hinterlands of Jaffa, the highlands around Jerusalem, and certain cities experienced gains. These demographic facts reflect the general situation of the country. The 1850s and early 1860s saw the last convulsions of the system of local rule, which was supplanted by the forced new *tanzimat* administrative structures. Those years were marked by internal struggles and military confrontations of local lords with the Ottoman authorities, by the influx of Bedouin even into the highlands, and by the impoverishment of the peasants through constant demands for contributions by their *shaykh*s. At the end of this phase, in the years 1865-66, Palestine also experienced significant population losses due to a cholera epidemic.

After that, however, rapid population growth set in, particularly in the

1870s. In one-and-a-half decades, until the start of the 1880s, the Palestinian population grew by one-third, to about 470,000 souls, and indeed, rather uniformly both in the cities and in the country. The growth appears to have been the most rapid in northern Palestine. The Jewish residents now made up 5 percent of the total population. This increase in population should be seen in the context of the overall development of the country. Individual factors were the assurance of greater security for a peasant existence, the general economic boom, the immigration induced by the economic development, and the improvement in hygiene and medical conditions. Since the mid-1860s there had been a mood of awakening in the country. A feeling of security was spreading along with a consciousness of living in a time of construction and "progress." This development was interrupted at the end of the 1870s for a short time only, by the general calamity of crop failures and by the wars of 1876–78 in the Balkans, during which a *levée en masse* was imposed in Palestine, which cost thousands of inhabitants their lives.

The essential characteristic of the economic development of Palestine in the period examined here was the increasing world market integration since the start of the Crimean War, and in this connection the growth and export orientation of agrarian production. The products of Palestine were sold in the region itself (Egypt, Lebanon, central Syria, Asia Minor) and increasingly in Europe. The main export products were wheat, barley, *dura*, sesame, oranges, olive oil, and soap, and for some time also cotton, namely during the cotton boom resulting from the American Civil War. Coinciding with the population growth, the development of agrarian production accelerated in the second half of the 1860s and in the 1870s, mainly due to expansion of arable agricultural land. Thus in this time extensive new olive tree plantations were created. The garden area of Jaffa (orange plantations and vegetable gardens) was quadrupled between 1850 and 1880, and the wheat cultivation area of southern Palestine, particularly in the districts of Gaza and Jaffa, increased in the 1870s by 150,000 to 200,000 acres. In the north of the country a similar major expansion occurred in the Marj ibn 'Amir and in the Ghawr.

The production and export figures climbed accordingly. In Jaffa, for example, the annual yield of the orange harvest was cited as 20 million in 1856 and 36 million in 1880. The exports through the port of Jaffa in the years from 1873 to 1882, in comparison with 1857 to 1963, showed the following growth rates: for wheat, fivefold; sesame and olive oil, one-and-a-half times; soap doubled; and oranges increased by a factor of three and a half. A doubling of the soap factories at Nablus from 15 in 1860 to 30 in 1882 corresponded to the expansion of olive cultivation and the doubling of soap export via Jaffa. The value of overall exports of Jaffa doubled in the period 1873–82 in comparison with the period 1857–63.

Handicrafts and businesses experienced a similar upward development only in certain areas. The traditional pattern of commercial specialization changed hardly at all. Here one should mention the weaving, pottery making, and soapmaking businesses of Gaza; the production of glassware and water bags as well as grape processing at Hebron; the production of devotional items and the construction trades at Bethlehem; the soap production and the cotton processing at Nablus; and the construction trades and the production of agricultural tools at Nazareth. The construction trade experienced considerable growth (especially on the basis of the construction boom in the cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jaffa, and Haifa) as did soap production, the manufacture of devotional items (for the pilgrims and for export), and the production of agricultural tools (based on the expansion of agrarian production).

This development during the 1860s and 1870s—the growth in agricultural production, commerce, and, in certain areas, manufacturing—was of course not due to a purposeful Ottoman economic policy. Still, the Ottoman administration did set the framework conditions in the context of the *tanzimat* policy, that is, it ended the local feuds and battles in the highlands, it kept the Bedouin away from the plains, and it created new legal and administrative foundations. The two other relevant factors were the increased demand for Palestinian products in outside markets and the activities of the Europeans in the country, which for example affected the increase in construction and an elevated demand for imports. How quickly and flexibly Palestine responded to market conditions, that is, external demand, was evident with the grain boom during the Crimean War and the cotton boom during the American Civil War. With its agricultural surpluses, Palestine contributed to the supply of neighboring lands, its export surpluses in trade with Europe equalizing the overall Syrian balance of trade.

The profitability of the agricultural exports and the possibility of increasing arable agricultural land resulted in a reassessment of individual land ownership both by the Ottoman central government and the local upper class. New legal conditions gradually guaranteed private, individual economic discretionary power over soil and land. There arose a class of large landholders consisting on the one hand of members of *shaykh* families of the highlands and urban *effendi*s, and on the other hand members of the growing stratum of merchants and financiers (especially in the coastal cities, including Beirut). This stratum consisted in particular of members of local non-Muslim communities and Europeans or European protégés. Thus they profited doubly and triply from the economic boom of the country through trade in agrarian products, through the financing of the trade, and through other credit businesses as well as capital investments in land ownership and in agricultural production.

The demographic development thus reflected the transformation in the economic development of Palestine in the 1860s and 1870s. Again, this occurred in the context of changed political-administrative conditions. In the second half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, there were three administrative-political "landscapes" in Palestine. The first was the north of the country, Lower and Upper Galilee, which was under the relatively effective control of the governors of Sidon and Acre. The second consisted of the coastal cities of Gaza and Jaffa, which were important for trade and transportation, and Jerusalem, where the Ottoman government affirmed its administrative presence. The third was the central Palestinian highlands, where the local *shaykh*s and the families of local lords dominated. After the interlude of Egyptian rule, in northern Palestine there remained a certain vacuum which the newly established Ottoman administration was able to fill only incompletely, while in the central highlands the system of local rule was fully reconstituted after the withdrawal of the Egyptians. Basically, it was only in the institutions of the large cities of Syria that the Ottoman reform policy of the first *tanzimat* period brought changes.

Until the end of the 1850s, therefore, the following socio-political structure, and the political and administrative pattern, were retained in the Palestinian highlands: the local lords, the chiefs of the dominant families, controlled their districts from their *kursi*s, their ancestral seats. They collected the customary payments from the peasants, irregular contributions and official taxes, which at least in part they paid to the responsible Ottoman governors during tax expeditions. They frequently feuded with one another over the human and material resources of the districts, that is, for payments in kind and in cash from the peasants on the one hand, and for the allegiance of individual *hamula*s, villages, and districts on the other. These tributary and allegiance ties between the peasants and local lords were still influential in the 1850s.

During the Crimean War, as a result of the withdrawal of almost all Ottoman troops from Palestine, the local lords asserted themselves for the last time before being finally brought to their knees in a series of subjugation expeditions at the end of the 1850s and beginning of the 1860s by the Ottoman governors in Jerusalem, Beirut, and Damascus. One of the most important goals of Ottoman policy in all of Syria after the Crimean War, and especially as of 1860, was to break the power of the local lords in order to be able to implement the centrally conceived and directed reform program of the second *tanzimat* period. Administrative centralization appeared as a prerequisite for this. This policy was naturally not pursued for its own sake; rather it had to do with the fiscal and military reforms of the Syrian provinces, that is, to render effective the tax collection and recruitment campaigns, a goal which in the face of the growing financial and military threats to the existence of the empire in the 1870s became ever more urgent.

There were four variant structures of local rule in Palestine. In Lower Galilee from 1847 to 1864 a Bedouin leader, 'Aqil Agha, was the most significant power factor. His official function was that of a *bashibozuq* commander. Starting in 1852 the Ottoman authorities sought his disempowerment but did not definitively succeed until 1864. In Jabal Nablus from 1853 to 1859 a real local war was waged between two large factions, the 'Abd al-Hadi and the Tuqan. This was both for control of individual districts and for dominance in the entire *jabal*, especially for the post of district governor of Nablus. The rule of the *shaykh*s came to end here with the storming of the ancestral seat of the 'Abd al-Hadi, 'Arraba, by Ottoman troops in April 1859. In the Jabal al-Quds the structure differed only in that the feuds of the local lords, headed by Abu Ghawsh and Lahham, were solely for control of the villages of the highlands. Jerusalem itself had its own power structure with the old established urban notables and the Ottoman officials. The Jerusalem *effendi*s held patronage relationships with the villages of the *jabal* or with the rural local lords, however. The situation in Jabal al-Khalil was again different. Here the rivalries between two factions of the 'Amr clan with their followers formed the nucleus of the altercations, while the city of Hebron played only a subordinate role; with respect to power politics it was more an appendage of its rural environs. As in Jabal Nablus, the military-administrative takeover by the Ottoman administration also ensued in the highlands around Jerusalem and Hebron during 1859. An outward sign was the Ottoman garrisons in the cities, and the quartering of soldiers in the individual villages. With this, the era of local rule came to a definite end.

However, most of the families of the local lords were soon able to build new political and administrative positions for themselves and carry over their power and influence to the new times. But to do this they had to shift the focus of their activities entirely to the cities and gain a foothold in the new administrative bodies established there: the administrative councils, the city councils, and the various courts. Socio-political power in the Palestinian highlands therefore shifted very quickly from the *kursi*s of the local lords to the city *majalis*. Above all, Jerusalem and Nablus became primary administrative centers. The urban orientation also became necessary because the allocation of tax farm, was put in the hands of the administrative councils. The rural *shaykh*s had to compete for these sinecures with the city notables. The reorientation was thus based not only on an administrative-political logic, but on an economic one as well. The local battles for influence, power, and economic resources in the *jabal*s had become obsolete in the 1860s and 1870s. The centers of agricultural production had shifted to the plains, and the best economic opportunities were opening up in the urban centers. The change therefore also had geographic dimensions to some extent.

Nothing more clearly illustrated the transformation occurring in Palestine than the fact that the successor of the Bedouin leader 'Aqil Agha as the "local lord" of Lower Galilee since 1869 was the Beirut banker and entrepreneur Niqula Sursuq. Similarly, in the Jerusalem highlands Mustafa Abu Ghawsh, the dominant local lord of the 1840s and 1850s, became a legendary historical figure and his *kursi* a tourist attraction, while the new prominent political head since the 1860s was Yusuf al-Khalidi, the municipal president of Jerusalem and the delegate of the district in the Ottoman Parliament of 1877-78. He came from one of the two dominant *effendi* families of the city and was a scholar and administrator loyal to the *tanzimat* policy. By contrasting the roles of 'Aqil Agha and Niqula Sursuq, Mustafa Abu Ghawsh and Yusuf al-Khalidi, the whole scope of the socio-economic and political-administrative transformation of Palestine in the 1860s and 1870s can be grasped quite graphically.

Another result of the Ottoman centralization policy and the European penetration was that Palestine gradually took shape as a political-administrative entity in the minds of contemporaries. To this extent the establishment of the borders of Mandate Palestine after World War I was no arbitrary act. The Europeans contributed to this formation by treating the "Holy Land" in their politics and activities as an historical-geographic unity. Of course the repeated attempts by the Ottomans to combine the three Palestinian districts into one province (1830, 1840, 1872), as well as the creation of the district of Jerusalem directly under the empire (1847), were of greater importance. Thus already in the nineteenth century, Palestine had become visible as an administrative entity.

As for relations between the religious communities, and the possible changes in these relations within the framework of the general transformation process, in Palestine this was perhaps a less significant aspect of the upheaval than it was in Lebanon and Syria. Generally, with respect to the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, it has been aptly stated that the internal balance of the relations between the ethnic and religious communities, or between the Arab Sunni majority and the various minorities, had been disturbed, mainly since the 1830s, by two factors. First was the Egyptian policy of treating the members of the various religious communities equally so as to make a politically calculated point, the effects of which were perceived by the Muslim majority as giving privileges to the Christians. Second was the European policy of the so-called "protection" of Christian and Jews, which made members of religious minorities appear as allies of the Europeans, as "bridgeheads" of European penetration.

The most significant consequences of these two factors could be felt in Lebanon and Damascus. In Palestine, the consequences were relatively limited, although it was precisely here that the European religious-cultural penetration was especially massive and the competition for minorities to protect especially intense. But because these religious-cultural interests already had a long tradition in Palestine, and because the populace was quite aware that their country now attracted the special attention of members of three world religions, the European assault since the end of the 1830s initially did not have very serious consequences on the relations of the religious communities with one another.

In their unceasing effort to discover minorities "in need of protection" or (as in the case of the Protestants) to create them through missionary work, the Europeans were disappointed again and again when they did not find the religiously caused polarization, the "Muslim fanaticism" that they assumed. They would then blame the "syncretism" or the "practical paganism" of the populace, and (like the German consul) they derided the liberalism and religious tolerance of the Jerusalem mayor and the parliament delegate Yusuf al-Khalidi. Even in the feuds and battles in the highlands around Jerusalem, with its mixed Muslim-Christian populace, the Christian and Muslim *hamula*s or villages never confronted one another as such. Rather, the archaic Qaysi-Yamani dualism, which transcended religious lines, was utilized more for the formation of factions. It was perhaps this that the French consul looked on with disapproval, when he noted reproachfully concerning the Catholics of Bayt Jala that party affiliation meant more to them than religious affiliation. In Lower Galilee, against the background of the ineffectiveness of the Ottoman administration, the Europeans courted the Bedouin leader 'Aqil Agha as the "protector" of Christians and Jews. 'Aqil Agha went along with this out of political calculation, even though there were no indications that the minorities in northern Palestine required his protection, not even during the crisis of 1860.

The events of 1860 in Mount Lebanon and in Damascus affected the Europeans in the "Holy Land," who henceforth wore invisible spectacles through which they viewed, in grotesque exaggeration, the brawl in Haifa in the year 1880 as the preliminary to a potential Christian massacre, and therefore called for the dispatch of European warships. But despite the sad events in the north, and despite the confessional line-drawing in Palestine by the Europeans in the country, relations between religious communities in Palestine were not disturbed in lasting fashion. The Muslim-Christian unions, formed after World War I, as Palestinian political representative organs, were also an expression of this fact. On the other hand, the old Yishuv was to a certain extent already locked out by then, that is, it was the victim of the confrontation with the Zionist movement and the political claims of the European Jewish immigrants.

To be sure, in the period studied here Palestine did not experience stormy development like that of neighboring Egypt under the Khedive Isma'il (1863–79), but nor did it remain the backyard of the Ottoman Empire, as is so often suggested to us. Rather, the 1860s were a pivotal point in the development of the country in the nineteenth century, a phase of far-reaching administrative-political and socio-economic transformations. It was external factors that induced this development: Ottoman politics and European penetration. But despite this forced penetration, despite multifaceted European interests and activities, Palestine did not become a quasi-colony; it was not yet "peripheralized" with respect to socio-economic structures. Of decisive importance for this was the fact that the political rivalry of the European powers was indeed great, but the economic attractiveness of the country was slight. The social change in Palestine implied a certain measure of Europeanization within the framework of the Ottoman reform policy, but insofar as this had any impact at all, it was in a slight economic destructuralization. Nonetheless, in the 1860s, a new stage began for the development of Palestinian society.

What do we mean by the word "development"? Today it is no longer necessary to stress that it does not mean "modernizing" following European models, even if that is how the native reformers of the nineteenth century are supposed to have understood the word "progress." Moreover, the idea that development means a constant expansion of production is now seen as flawed. Rather, we strive to obtain a closer view of the needs of people in their natural environment and in their social and cultural context. Were the needs of the members of Palestinian society more satisfied as a consequence of the transformation? Did their "quality of life" improve? Our examinations, which had more to do with statistically measurable demographic and economic developments, with institutionalized political-administrative changes, give little information about that. However, in individual examples, one can show that economic and socio-political development meant change, but not necessarily basic improvement. Thus, by the end of the period under study, the local feuds and battles had become a thing of the past and life had become more secure throughout the country. But at the same time, the "ordered" military service, above all the mass recruitment for the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, brought more misery to the populace of Palestine than the local war of the 1850s in Jabal Nablus. The surplus product raised by the peasants was no longer extorted from them, more or less arbitrarily, by their local lords. On the other hand, did the thirsty exchequer, the urban tax farmers, and the large landholders leave them relatively more to live on? The new educational opportunities in the European and Ottoman schools and the new representative institutions brought with them greater cultural and political developmental opportunities; initially, however, they remained restricted to small groups, and individual developmental attempts often ended all too abruptly. Thus, when one speaks of the 1860s and the 1870s as decades of upheaval, one should do so neither with the forlorn incantation of the "good old days" nor with the eager enthusiasm for colonization and progress found among the *"lords of human kind"* of the nineteenth century.

In the neighboring land of Egypt the euphoria concerning the "progress" of the 1860s and 1870s was swiftly ended by financial ruin and British occupation. However, since Palestinian society had not undergone the rapid and massive transformation process that the Egyptian society had, it also did not have to experience such abrupt disillusionment. But certainly, for Palestine, the later confrontation with Europe in the twentieth century grew into an incomparably greater catastrophe.

The period of the transformation in Palestine must be explained by the factors which induced the change. The increased activities of the Europeans in the "Holy Land" since the 1850s corresponded to the pace of the European penetration in the Near East overall. Constantinople as an "external factor" was itself in transformation. In the 1840s and 1850s the reforms and the administrative reorganization of the empire were also carried out only hesitantly, because the Ottoman ministers and governors themselves were passing through a process of rethinking and reorientation. It was only at a later stage of the *tanzimat* that the Ottomans attempted to render the fiscal and military reforms more effective, including in Palestine. The pulse of Palestine's economic life could then be felt above all in the plains and coastal cities, that of its political life in the most important urban administrative centers. The highlands, previously the theater of events that the chroniclers held worthy of transmission, took a back seat, as it were.

When we travel through the country today looking for traces of the time before the 1860s, we find little that leaps to the eye. The historical quarters in the towns, the palaces of the urban notables, the *kursi*s of the local lords, are in a sorry state of disrepair. Moreover, most of the former Arab localities in Israel within the 1949 borders have entirely disappeared, and with them the forts and ancestral seats that we have mentioned in our work (among them Ijzim, Majdal Yaba, Bayt 'Itab, Bayt Nattif, Bayt Jibrin).[852] When the visible traces of a society's past are destroyed, or when a society can no longer see to the conservation of these monuments, this is an index of the catastrophes which must have befallen it. The fact that today on the West Bank, and also in Israel, there is again an increased interest among Palestinians in their own history, and that diverse initiatives are being undertaken to preserve their historical and cultural heritage, is a sign of an unbroken will to self-assertion. Such activities can make an important contribution to self-orientation, and to preservation of their own identity.

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[852] See Abdulfattah, pp. 109–16.

Maps

Maps 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were drawn by Claus Leineweber, Essen.

Map 1: The districts of the Central Palestine Mountains during the third quarter of the 19th century (after C.W.M. van de Velde, *Map of the Holy Land* [1:315,000], Gotha: 1858; and C.R. Conder and H.H. Kitchener, *Map of Western Palestine* [1:168,960], London: 1881).

Map 2: The province of Syria during the year 1880 (after the *Salname-i Vilayet-i Suriya* for A.H. 1298 [A.D. 1880–81]).

Map 3: The administrative districts of Syria and Palestine at the eve of World War I (taken from *Bericht über Palästina, erstattet durch die britische Königliche Palästina-Kommission unter dem Vorsitz von Earl Peel*, Berlin: 1937).

Map 4: The natural regions of Galilee (taken from *ZDPV*, XXVII, 1904).

Map 5: Map of the sea and land communication lines in Syria (after Julius Zwiedinek von Südenhorst, *Syrien und seine Bedeutung für den Welthandel*, Vienna: 1873).

Map 6: The Mediterranean and Black Sea routes of the Austrian Lloyd (after *Information for Passengers by the Austro-Hungarian Lloyd's Steam Navigation Company Trieste*, 1874).

Map 7: The Mediterranean and Black Sea routes of Messageries Maritimes (after *Paquebots-Poste Français, Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes: Livret d'Itinéaires et Tarifs des Lignes de la Méditerranée et de la Mer Noire*, 1874).

Map 8: Telegraph map of Syria (after Julius Zwiedinek von Südenhorst, *Syrien und seine Bedeutung für den Welthandel*, Vienna: 1873).

Map 1: The districts of the central Palestinian mountains during the third quarter of the 19th century.


Jabal Safad
SAFAD
ACRE
HAIFA
TIBERIAS
NAZARETH
al-Haritha al-Shimaliyya
JININ
al-Sha'rawiyya al-Gharbiyya
al-Sha'rawiyya al-Sharqiyya
al-Haritha al-Qibliyya
Wadi al-Sha'ir
Bani Sa'b
NABLUS
Jurat 'Amra
Masharıq al-Baytawi
Masharıq Nablus
Bilad al-Jamma'in
JAFFA
SALT
Bani Zayd
Bani Murra
Bani Himar
LYDDA
AL-RAMLA
Bani Harith al-Shimaliyya
Bani Harith al-Qibliyya
Bani Salim
RAMALLAH
Bani Malik
Jabal al-Quds
JERUSALEM
Bani Hasan
al-Wadiyya
al-'Arqub
BETHLEHEM
AL-MAJDAL
BAYT JIBRIN
HEBRON
GAZA
KHAN YUNIS
Umud Rafah ('border')

ap 2: The province of Syria during the year 1880.


LATAKIA
Sanjaq Latakia
HAMA
Sanjaq Hama
TRIPOLI
Sanjaq Tripoli
BEIRUT
Jabal Lebanon
Sanjaq Damascus
SIDON
DAMASCUS
Sanjaq Beirut
Ra's al-Naqura
SAFAD
ACRE
TIBERIAS
HAIFA
NAZARETH
Sanjaq Hauran
Sanjaq Acre
JININ
Sanjaq Balqa
NABLUS
JAFFA
SALT
JERUSALEM
GAZA
HEBRON
Sanjaq Jerusalem
'Umud Rafah
KARAK
Borders of the provinces
Borders of the sanjaqs
The Jabal Lebanon and the sanjak of Jerusalem each have a special status.

Map 3: The administrative districts of Syria and Palestine at the eve of World War I.


34°
36
38°
Alexandretta
VILAYET OF ALEPPO
ALEPPO
SANJAQ OF ALEPPO
CYPRUS
Sanjaq of Latakia
Latakia
BEIRUT
SANJAQ OF HAMA
Hama
Homs
Sanjaq of Tripoli
Tripoli
VILAYET OF SYRIA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Nebk
BEIRUT
PROVINCE OF LEBANON
SANJAQ OF DAMASCUS
DAMASCUS
Sidon
Sanjaq of Beirut
Es Sur
VILAYET OF
Acre
Sanjaq of Acre
Haifa
L of Tiberias
Jabal Druz
SANJAQ OF HAURAN
Sanjaq of Balqa' (Nablus)
River Jordan
Jaffa
JERUSALEM
Independent Sanjaq of Jerusalem
Gaza
Dead Sea
al-'Arish
EGYPT
VILAYET
SANJAQ OF MAAN
Wadi Araba
Gulf of 'Aqaba
'Aqaba
HEJAZ
36°
34°
32°
30°
33°
Scale
Miles 50 40 30 20 10 5 0 50 100 Miles
1 mile = 1609 meters

p 4: The natural regions of Galilee.



1:500.000

Compare tables III and IV. The Arabic numbers without parentheses refer to population density in the regions according to memoirs (in the 1870s). The numbers in parentheses are taken from Schumacher (in the 1880s).*

Population Density
☐ uninhabited
▨ around 6
▨ around 12
▨ around 18
▨ around 25
▨ around 32
▨ around 42
▨ around 56
es-sūr
'akkā
haifā
safed
tabarije
en-nāsira
saffurije
lūbije
schefā 'amr
et-schūha
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX
XX
XXI
XXII
XXIII
XXIV

*Tables 11 and 14 above.

Map 5: Map of the sea and land communication lines in Syria.


75 M.
Urdeh
Hama
18 St
Restan
9 St
Homs
63 M.
Kalaat el Husn
9 St
Tripoli
7 St
Palmyra
Kara
4 St.
48 M.
Batrun
115 M.
Nicosia
Larnaca
to Rhodes
Beirut
9 St
13 St
Damascus
3 St
9 St
Saida
9 St
9 St.
Safed
Acre
4 St.
Tiberia
Haifa
7 St
5 St
Nazareth
Tantura
Dschenin
5 St
5 St
Remte
10 St.
Metran
12 St
Zerka
16 St
Belka
14 St
120 M.
Nablus
Jaffa
Ludd
Ramle
Jerusalem
Hebron
Gazza
132 miles
to Port Said
el Arisch
Syrian pilgrim route to Mecca
Ahsa
Aneseh
10 St
Ma an
18 St.
Akabat
18 St.
Medowara
8 St
Suez
Kalaat en Nachl
Egyptian pilgrim route to Mecca
Akabah


7St
Tus Hurmat
10St
Kefri
7St.
Kara Tepe
10St
Del. Abbas
11St
Howesch
8St.
Bagdad
sert route to Baghdad
Russian steamships
French steamships
Austrian steamships
Tartary mail (Turkish)
Mail carrier service (Turkish)
Main road from
Beirut to Damascus
Mail stations


Odessa
OFEN
PEST
Gratz
Lubiana
TRIESTE
Fiume
VENEZIA
Pola
Larssino
Ravenna
Zara
Sebenico
Spalato
Livorno
Ancona
MARE ADRIATICO
Ragusa
Cattaro
Antivari
Roma
Durazzo
Napoli
Brindisi
Valona
Corfu
Prevesa
S. Maura
Argostoli
Zante
Patrasso
ATENE
Sira
Messina
Palermo
Cergio
Canea
Retimo
Candia
Cardia
Malta
La Valetta
MARE MEDITERRANEO
Tripoli
Galatz
Ibraila
Tulcia
Sulina
Kustendje
Basziasch
Rustzuk
MAR NERO
Varna
Burgas
Sinope
Ineboli
Samsun
Kerasonda
Trebisonda
Batum
COSTANTINOPOLI
Amastra
Lagos
Cavalla
Gallipoli
Salonicco
Dardanelli
Tenedo
Volo
Metelino
Smirne
Chio
Rodi
Alessandretta
Latachia
Gerusalemme
Porto Said
ALESSANDRIA
CAIRO
Suez
P. Bombay


LONDRES
Havre
Seine Fl.
PARIS
Lille
Nantes
Bordeaux
FRANCE
Marseille
Cette
Barcelone
Santander
La Corogne
MADRID
ESPAGNE
Valence
Alicante
Carthagène
Malaga
Cadix
Gibraltar
Tanger
LISBONNE
PORTUGAL
Majorque
Minorque
Ibice
Alger
Dellys
Gigelly
Bone
Tenes
Oran
TUNIS
Tripoli
Golfe de la Syrte
MALTE
La Vallette
SICILE
Palerme
SARDAIGNE
Cagliari
CORSE
Ajaccio
TURIN
ITALIE
Mer Adriatique
Trieste
VIENNE
AUTRICHE
Ibraila
Danube
Kustendje
Sulina
Odessa
RUSSIE
Dnieper
Eupatoria
Sébastopol
Taganrog
Burgas
Port Lagos
Salonique
TURQUIE
CONSTANTINOPLE
Ineboli
Samsoun
Ordou
Trebizonde
Dardanelles
Smyrne
Rhodes
GRECE
ATHENES
Corfou
Candie
CHYPRE
Tarsous
Mersina
Alexandrette
Alep
Lattaquie
Tripoli
SYRIE
Beyrouth
Jaffa
Damas
JERUSALEM
Port Said
Suez
EGYPTE
Alexandrie
CAIRE
45
40
35
30
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40

Map 8: Telegraph map of Syria.


BAGHDAD
Baghdad
Bille
Mossul
Mardin
Diarbekir
18St
Suwerk
18St
Urfa
18St
Biredschik
ALEPPO
Aleppo
Aintab
18St
12St
Marasch
Kilis
12St
18St
Alexandrette
Antiochien
12St
Idlib
Beilan
9St
12St
Dschisr esch Schogr
18St
Maara
15St
Hama
12St
Homs
16St
Kara
Damascus
28St
Mesarib
SYRIA
Ladakia
15St
Tartus
15St
Tripoli
6St
9St
Batrun
Balbek
Zahle
Schtora
Baklin
Dschunie
Bekfaja
Beirut
Dair Kamr
Saida
9St
Sur
9St
Acre
20St
Nablus
12St
Jerusalem
Jaffa
11St
15St
Gaza
el Arisch
EGYPT
CYPRUS
Nicosia
ADANA
Adana
Tarsus
24St
Koniah
■ Main telegraph stations
○ Stations
● International stations

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Archives du Ministère des Affaires Ètrangères, Paris [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Paris]
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CCC Jaffa = Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale: Jaffa (an unnumbered volume) (1877–1897).
CCC Jer. = Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale: Jerusalem, vols. 2–4 (1842–1885).
MD = Mémoires et Documents, Turquie (to be made accessible with B.G. Spiridonakis, *Empire Ottoman. Inventaire des Mémoires et Documents aux Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France*, Thessaloniki 1973).

Chambre de Commerce, Marseilles [Chamber of Commerce, Marseilles] Dossier Jaffa, An XII–1880.

Haus-, Hof-, and Staatsarchiv, Vienna [Austrian State Archives, Vienna] HHSTA

PA XII = Political Archives, XII, Turkey (Constantinople), boxes 56–141 (reports 1856–1882); in part to be made accessible by the index of the Political Archives for the corresponding years.

PA XXXVIII = Political Archives, XXXVIII (Consulates), (Beirut and Jerusalem, 1856–1883).

Archive Jaffa = Archives of the Imperial and Royal Austro–Hungarian Consular Office in Jaffa, fascicle 1–7 (1853–1883). Fascicles 1–4 are documents from the Sardinian or Italian consulate, fascicles 5 and 6 contain documents from Jaffa *and* Jerusalem.

Archive Jer., n. = Consular Archives, Jerusalem, n. 16–18, current files and later files, 1850–1894.

Archive Jer., file = Consular Archives, Jerusalem, Political and Administrative Files, fascicles 38–62: correspondences 1856–1882; fascicle 127: economic files.

Archive Konst., Consular Reports = Inter-nunciature Archives, Constantinople, third consular reports and instructions, older series 1861–1880, recent series, Beirut, 1880–1894, and Jerusalem 1881–1896.

AR = Administrative Registry of the Foreign Office.

Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn [Archives of the German Foreign Office, Bonn]

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I.A.B.q. (Turkey) 126 = Protection of Christians in Palestine (1877–78).

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